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This  thesis  claims  that  by  constituting  a  certain  range  of  possible  identities  for 
countries,  the  nuclear  nonproliferation  regime  facilitated  India’s  forging  of  non-
weaponized nuclear deterrence and its decision to go ‘formally nuclear’ in 1998. The 
regime’s definition of the nuclear problem and its categorization of states into Nuclear 
Weapon States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) structured the threat 
environment facing India. India responded with a deterrence posture that both violated 
and employed the regime’s norms. Its 1974 ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’ for instance, 
played on the regime’s identification of a nuclear test with the possession of weapons, 
while challenging its attempt to restrict nuclear knowledge. The regime also served as 
a resource for actors within India who were advocates for the nuclear program. In 
1974,  domestic  and  international  audiences  were  reminded  of  the  developmental 
promise of nuclear power. By the end of the century, the strategic space that India had 
occupied  between  the  categories  of  NWS  and  NNWS  was  rapidly  shrinking. 
Perceiving a window of opportunity, India resorted once again to nuclear testing in 
May 1998 in order to move closer to NWS status. 
 
This work investigates the ways in which the nonproliferation regime impacted on 
India’s nuclear policy, with France and South Africa as secondary cases. It situates 
itself  at  the  intersection  of  the  domestic  and  the  international  spheres,  while  
challenging the separation between the two. It focuses on the processes through which 
international norms constitute national identity, thereby defining national interest and 
molding national policies. While the project stems from dissatisfaction with theories 
of nuclear proliferation, the argument should extend to several issue-areas. By the end 
of the twentieth century, terrorism had emerged as a threat to rival nuclear peril. The 
evolution of an international counter-terrorism regime was accelerated. This work tries 
to draw out lessons from the career of the nonproliferation regime for the counter-
terrorism regime.  
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The  devastating  display  in  1945,  of  the  destructive  power  of  the  atom,  convinced 
many that ‘world government’ was imminent and inevitable. Only such an authority 
could avert the annihilation of humanity and harness atomic power. Albert Einstein 
was  prompted  to  write:  “A  world  government  with  powers  adequate  to  guarantee 
security is not a remote ideal for the distant future. It is an urgent necessity if our 
civilization is to survive” (Einstein and Calaprice 1996, 125). Six decades later the 
international  system  remains  anarchic—it  lacks  a  central  authority—but  nuclear 
weapons are not as widely diffused as was once feared. Cooperation among states to 
create the nuclear nonproliferation regime seems to have been valuable. 
 
Both  regime  theory  and  studies  of  nuclear  proliferation  have  flourished  in  the 
discipline of International Relations. However, in scholarly treatments of the effect of 
the nonproliferation regime on state policies, the regime is seen solely as a (more or 
less  compelling)  constraint.  India’s  1998  nuclear  test  series,  followed  by  its 
declaration of Nuclear Weapon State status, thus becomes a symbol of the regime’s 
failure.  
 
This  thesis  claims  that  by  constituting  a  certain  range  of  possible  identities  for 
countries,  the  nuclear  nonproliferation  regime  facilitated  India’s  forging  of  non-
weaponized nuclear deterrence and its decision to go ‘formally nuclear’ in 1998. The 
regime’s definition of the nuclear problem and its categorization of states into Nuclear 
Weapon States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) structured the threat 
environment facing India. India responded with a deterrence posture that both violated      
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and employed the regime’s norms. Its 1974 ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’ for instance, 
played on the regime’s identification of a nuclear test with the possession of weapons, 
while challenging its attempt to restrict nuclear knowledge. The regime also served as 
a resource for actors within India who were advocates for the nuclear program. In 
1974,  domestic  and  international  audiences  were  reminded  of  the  developmental 
promise of nuclear power. By the end of the century, the strategic space that India had 
occupied  between  the  categories  of  NWS  and  NNWS  was  rapidly  shrinking. 
Perceiving a window of opportunity, India resorted once again to nuclear testing in 
May 1998 in order to move closer to NWS status. 
 
This work investigates the ways in which the nonproliferation regime impacted on 
India’s nuclear policy, with France and South Africa as secondary cases. It situates 
itself  at  the  intersection  of  the  domestic  and  the  international  spheres,  while 
challenging the separation between the two. It focuses on the processes through which 
international norms constitute national identity, thereby defining national interest and 
molding national policies. While the project stems from a dissatisfaction with theories 
of nuclear proliferation, the argument should extend to several issue-areas. By the end 
of the twentieth century, terrorism had emerged as a threat to rival nuclear peril. The 
evolution of an international counter-terrorism regime was accelerated. The career of 
the nonproliferation regime holds out lessons for the counter-terrorism regime. These 
will be taken up in the last chapter. 
 
In this chapter’s first section, I present the theoretical argument. Section Two defines 
the major terms that I employ. The next section introduces alternative explanations of 
India’s interactions with the nonproliferation regime that illustrate the limitations of 
the current treatment of norms and of the theoretical separation of the domestic and      
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international  spheres.  Section  Four  deals  specifically  with  the  strengths  and 
weaknesses of one major theoretical perspective—Constructivism. In Section Five, I 
set out my rationales for case selection. In the two concluding sections I take up issues 
of methodology and explain the specific methods that I use in the dissertation.  
 
 
Section One: Regimes at Work 
 
As  I  show  below  in  my  discussion  of  alternative  explanations  in the  International 
Relations  (IR)  literature,  India’s  nuclear  behavior  is  puzzling.  The  security  model 
finds it difficult to explain restraint (for instance, why India did not undertake a full-
fledged  nuclear  program  in  the  late  1960s).  The  domestic  politics  model  cannot 
account for the power that nuclear advocates command (for example, how a small 
group of scientists and technocrats persuaded politicians of different stripes to test). 
The norms model cannot explain shifts in the precedence given to certain norms (why 
India  promoted  disarmament  in  the  1950s  and  nonproliferation  in  the  1990s, 
describing both stances as proof of its independence in external affairs). In the above 
explanations, the international regime is viewed as a constraint on India’s actions. 
This conception underestimates the influence of the regime as it precludes a grasp of 
its  generative  or  enabling  power.  My  contribution,  which  studies  the  constitutive 
aspects of the international regime, enables us to explain policy outcomes as well as 
resolve the puzzles that are laid out above. 
 
I  argue  that  the  regime  was  not  merely  a  limitation  that  Indian  decision-makers 
strained against, nor solely an aggregation of states’ incentives. The nonproliferation 
regime  ‘made  possible’  (rather  than  directly  caused)  key  decisions  in  the  nuclear 
program  in  India.  My  focus  will  be  on  this  function  of  the  regime—creating  the      
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conditions of possibility of nuclear decisions. I argue against the rigid separation of 
the three models (security, domestic politics and norms) and for the detailed study of 
their interconnections. For instance, instead of counterposing security and norms, we 
can study how a commitment to independence and non-alignment ruled out options 
other than an indigenous nuclear response to the Chinese bomb.  
 
The  stakes  are  not  merely  theoretical.  India  is  a  huge  and  growing  power  and  its 
nuclear decisions are worthy of study in their own right. Further, countries that are 
tempted  by  the  nuclear  option  are  also  taking  heed  of  the  manner  in  which  the 
international community reacts to India. This case study of a regime and its effects on 
one country should offer us insights into the functioning of other regimes and the 
policies of other countries.  
 
The constitutive power of regimes 
How do regimes actually work? That is, in what ways do they affect states’ policies? 
Haas suggests that we focus on notions of process in answering this question (Haas 
1983, 29). I propose that regimes affect state behavior through four basic processes: 
definition,  categorization,  institutionalization,  and  enforcement.  The  first  two 
processes are constitutive, and the last two regulative. Regulation directly affects the 
interest calculations of a country’s decision-makers, while constitution has an indirect 
effect through its effects on the construction of national identity. While in practice 
constitution  and  regulation  are  not  easily  separated,  I  distinguish  them  here  for 
analytical purposes.  
 
In its constitutive avatar, the regime names the issue that it sets out to tackle. For 
instance, the international human rights regime aims to secure certain basic rights for      
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individuals in all countries, and the regime on climate change defines global warming 
as  the  problem.  Regimes  also  divide  international  actors  into  different  categories, 
assigning them identities.  
 
These processes put into place certain material and non-material costs and benefits. 
For instance, a country that is termed a violator of human rights may face concrete 
sanctions  and/or  international  ostracism.  Defining  ‘human  rights’  in  terms  of 
individual rights empowers some actors and marginalizes others. Decision-makers in 
states  are  aware  of  the  cost-benefit  calculus  institutionalized  by  the  regime.  They 
attempt to influence regime definitions when they perceive the opportunity to change 
them to their benefit. States modify their behavior in order to establish and maintain 
their preferred identities, that is to be placed in the right category. Thus, regimes affect 
identity  construction.  As  Tannenwald  puts  it:  “Compliance  with  the  appropriate 
nuclear norms reinforces the identity of states and their status as legitimate members 
of the international community and/or as a certain kind of state (responsible/civilized) 
etc.” (Tannenwald 1996, 142). 
 
In this process of identity construction states draw on internal and external normative 
resources.  As  they  try  to  construct  a  particular  identity  they  may  incur  short-term 
costs. They may be obliged to change domestic aspects of national identity. Even the 
states that initiated regimes, or those that rejected them, may come to be bound by 
regime  norms.  Definition  and  categorization  shape  state  behavior  by  setting  up 
standards  for  appropriate,  responsible  and  just  behavior.  They  also  shape  the 
regulative  processes  of  institutionalization  and  enforcement.  In  the  next  chapter  I 
describe in more detail the four processes by which the nonproliferation regime affects 
state behavior.       
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Section Two: Key definitions 
 
In  this  section  I  discuss  the  main  terms  that  I  will  be  using.  While  accepting  the 
definition of regime proposed by Stephen Krasner, I elaborate it in the context of the 
nonproliferation regime. In the next section I propose a description of the ‘regime at 
work,’  a  dynamic  conception.  In  recent  years,  the  International  Relations  (IR) 
literature  has  come  to  an  appreciation  of  the  importance  of  norms  in  explaining 
outcomes. At the same time the term has been employed in a variety of contradictory 
ways. In what sense do I use the term and how does it relate to my conception of 
regime? I begin with a definition and three characteristics central to my conception of 
norms. I then explain the relationship between norms and regimes.  
 
Nonproliferation regime 
According  to  Krasner’s  canonical  definition  from  his  1983  volume,  International 
Regimes,  a  regime  is:  “principles,  norms,  rules  and  decision-making  procedures 
around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (Krasner 1983, 1). 
Harald Müller has described the nonproliferation regime in terms of this definition. He 
identifies  its  four  foundational  principles:  one,  that  the  proliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons leads to a higher chance of nuclear war; two, that the civilian use of atomic 
energy  can  coexist  with  nonproliferation;  three,  that  horizontal  and  vertical 
proliferation are linked; four, that verification is essential. Müller lists nine norms that 
guide state behavior, such as the obligation of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to 
refrain from producing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons, and the obligation of 
the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to pursue disarmament. Rules follow from these 
norms—though these vary in specificity and strength. Finally, there are procedures 
such as those for NPT review (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997, 9-10).      
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In my analysis I take the “nonproliferation regime” to mean the complex of formal and 
informal agreements among states to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to new 
actors.  The  regime  includes  both  formal  treaties  and  the  prevalent  shared 
understandings in the international system about nuclear technology and the roles and 
responsibilities of member-states. Some members have a special role. In Finnemore 
and Sikkink’s terminology the US has the identity of ‘norm leader’ (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998, 895).  
 
The nonproliferation regime has both formal (treaties and international institutions) 
and informal components (intergovernmental cooperation and norm leader initiatives). 
The 1968 NPT is the most important of the treaties. Other multilateral treaties include 
the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) which prohibits nuclear testing in the atmosphere 
and  the  Threshold  Test  Ban  Treaty  (1974)  which  limits  the  yield  of  underground 
nuclear tests. Bilateral treaties are also part of the regime, for instance the Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty between the US and Russia (1991). International institutions 
include the UN which serves as the main venue for negotiations, mostly undertaken at 
the  Conference  on  Disarmament  in  Geneva.  Another  important  international 
organization under the UN is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) set up 
in 1957. 
 
Arrangements  for  intergovernmental  cooperation  without  formal  treaties  have 
increasingly become significant in the regime. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 
was set up in response to the Indian nuclear explosion of 1974. The NSG aims to 
tighten export controls on nuclear and dual-use technologies in order to prevent non-
nuclear weapon states from acquiring military nuclear capabilities. Its guidelines are      
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implemented  by  participating  governments  in  accordance  with  national  laws  and 
practices. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was started by the US in 2003 to 
coordinate the efforts of governments to interdict transfers of nuclear and delivery 
system parts and technology.
1 
 
Some norm leader initiatives, although unilateral, are included in the regime since they 
affect all countries. The American Atoms for Peace program opened up a new world 
of  nuclear  collaboration  in  the  1950s.  The  December  1993  Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative was the first formal policy change in US strategy after 
the  end  of  the  Cold  War.  The  most  recent  and  controversial  US  initiative  on 
nonproliferation  was  the  2002  National  Strategy  to  Combat  Weapons  of  Mass 
Destruction.  Norm  leader  initiatives  can  also  lead  to  formal  institutions.  In  March 
1963, President Kennedy expressed American fears about proliferation: “[P]ersonally 
I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be 10 
nuclear powers instead of four, and by 1975, 15 or 20.” This momentum against the 
spread of nuclear weapons culminated in the NPT.  
 
Table 1.1: Components of the nonproliferation regime 
 
Formal components  Multilateral treaties  NPT 
  International organizations  IAEA 
Informal components  Multilateral coordination  NSG 
  Norm leader initiatives  PSI 
 
                                                 
1 The PSI has two complementary components—the Container Security Initiative and the Marine 
Security Initiative but all three are usually referred to as PSI.      
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International norms 
In this work, I use the term ‘norm’ to refer to both beliefs and standards. By ‘norm’ I 
mean “the dominant accepted standard of behavior in a particular issue-area.” A more 
precise definition of norm specifies that it sets up “collective expectations about the 
proper behavior for a given identity” (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 54). 
That is, norms are closely linked to identities. What is appropriate for a certain type of 
state  is  inappropriate  for  another.  However,  since  there  are  certain  norms  that  are 
applicable to all countries, I use ‘norm’ more loosely.  
 
Many  norms  claim  to  be  grounded  in,  and  to  derive  their  power  from,  ethical 
imperatives.  Especially  in  the  international  arena,  such  claims  are  contested.  The 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,  for  example, claims that the  US is using 
nonproliferation to destroy the North Korean civilian nuclear industry and the socialist 
project.  By  demonstrating  contestation  I  try  to  denaturalize  norms.  Their  ethical 
content  will  be  seen  purely  as  a  resource  that  is  deployed  strategically.  To  put  it 
differently,  the  substantive  content  of  the  norm  which  may  be  ‘good,’  either  in 
deontological or consequentialist terms, is outside the scope of my study.  
 
The  IR  literature  has  tended  to  treat  realpolitik  behavior  as  the  null  hypothesis. 
Consequently, all behavior that does not contradict the predictions of Realist theories 
is treated as confirming such theories—although they may stem from other sources 
(Johnston 1996, 228). If norms are understood to be primarily regulative, then their net 
effect can be gauged only in opposition to other factors influencing decision-makers. 
Norms would be seen as competing with power and interest. I argue that since norms 
inform and ground the choices of national elites, this approach underestimates the 
value of norms. In the nuclear debate, notions of national destiny and uniqueness are      
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not  easily  separable  from  ‘pure’  security  arguments.  Discerning  the  former  in  the 
French  debate,  Sagan  classifies  the  French  nuclear  program  as  ‘norm-driven.’  Yet 
Camille Grand claims that destiny and uniqueness are perfectly compatible with the 
security model (Grand 1998b, 5).  
 
Accounts of national identity tend to view it as produced by domestic social, economic 
and  political  forces.  National  identity  is  formed  in  a  social  setting;  just  as  an 
individual’s  behavior  cannot  be  fully  understood  outside  her  social  context. 
International norms give meaning to the actions of states. A state’s relation to the 
international  is  essential  to  its  identity.  National  identity  is  neither  ‘given’  nor 
‘essential’ nor solely derived from domestic politics. States construct their identities 
through  practice—the  policies  they  adopt.  Therefore,  their  aspirations  towards 
particular  identities  in  the  international  sphere  delineate  the  boundaries  of  policy 
choices. Though national identity is not monolithic there has to be some coherence 
across various aspects of a country’s behavior.  
 
While international norms do alter the costs and benefits of alternative policies, they 
primarily shape national decision-making by constructing social categories (such as 
‘strong,’ ‘modern,’ ‘civilized,’ ‘rogue’ or ‘Great Power’). States internalize, resist and 
revise norms that constitute them in these positions. That is, a state can conduct itself 
so as to maintain its identity, contest the prevailing categorization, or seek to change 
prevailing norms. For example, China decided to join the nonproliferation regime in 
the 1990s to obtain status benefits. However, the sensitivity to image and status itself 
comes  from  an  “emerging  identity”  in  which  international  institutions  are  valued 
(Johnston 2003, 183-85). 
      




Figure 1:   Effects of international regimes on policies 
The constitutive role of norms in regimes 
In Krasner’s conception, norms follow upon the principles of a regime. He defines 
principles as “beliefs about fact, causation and rectitude” and norms as “standards of 
behavior defined in terms of rights and duties.” In current IR terminology, however,      
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‘principles’ are subsumed by norms. Krasner gives the first two components of his 
regime--norms and principles--more fundamental functions than rules and decision-
making procedures. In Krasner’s conception, when norms and principles change, it 
amounts to a change of regime. Change in rules and decision-making procedures is 
change  in  regime  (Krasner  1983,  2-3).  Clearly,  though  Krasner  does  not  use  that 
language, norms and principles for him are constitutive of rules and procedures.  
 
Most studies of regimes have focused on their regulative effects, i.e., they examine 
cases  where  they  have  encouraged  states  to  choose  or  reject  a  certain  policy. 
Constructivists  take  into  account  both  regulative  and  constitutive  effects.  By 
constitutive effects we mean the creation or definition of forms of behavior, roles and 
identities  (Tannenwald  1999,  437).  Regulation  directly  affects  interest  calculations 
while constitutive norms have an indirect effect through their construction of identity. 
In my analysis ‘identity’ means the dominant conception(s) among elites as to the 
present  and  the  desired  characteristics  of  their  country,  as  well  as  its  role  in  the 
international  system.  I  treat  national  identity  as  an  intermediate  variable,  which  is 
constituted by international norms.  
 
Since  constitutive  norms  make  possible  and  also  render  natural,  they  are  very 
powerful. Mutimer explains: “Once we have subjects and objects, it takes very little to 
produce interests—they are embedded within the representations that produce objects 
and identities” (Mutimer 2000b, 157). Constitutive norms are hard to study because 
their effects on policy are indirect. They are slower to change and are not explicitly 
documented. Moreover, the constitutive aspects of norms are not easily captured by 
the methods used to study causal questions (Wendt 1999, 86). However, constitutive 
theories do involve “inferences from observable events to broader patterns.” They do      
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have to stand the test of evidence, as their implications are compared to those of other 
theories (Wendt 1999, 87-88).  
 
 
Section Three: Alternative explanations--Three Models in Search of A Bomb 
 
It  has  become  standard  for  IR  scholars  to  follow  the  tripartite  categorization  of 
theories established by Martin Wight (Wight 1991). The first focuses on power, the 
second  on  interests  and  the  third  on  norms.  These  correspond  to  the  three  major 
schools  of  thought  in  IR  today:  Realism,  Liberalism  and  Constructivism.  Thus 
Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger classify approaches to international regimes into 
power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based; Scott Sagan classifies explanations 
of nuclear proliferation—that is, non-compliance with the international regime—into 
three models: security, domestic politics and norms.  
 
The three-part classification works well with answers to the question: why did states 
build bombs? The question, “How were they affected by the international regime?”, 
though of course closely related, refers to a five-decade-long process of interaction 
between states and international institutions. A full account of this interaction would 
have to consider both levels—state and systemic. By studying the constitution of a 
state by the regime—that is, the process by which it is assigned an identity, which it 
then contests or accepts—we can give both the domestic and international levels their 
due.  The  conventional  security  and  domestic  politics  models,  however,  end  up 
privileging  one  of  the  two  levels  of  analysis,  depending  on  their  underlying 
assumptions.  ‘The  domestic’  and  ‘the  international’  in  these  explanations  are 
envisioned as separate impenetrable spheres that bounce off each other. This division      
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has impeded a full account of the processes through which regimes impact on states. 
The  ‘level  of  analysis  problem’  infringes  on  a  full  understanding  of  regime 
functioning  in  all  paradigms/perspectives.  Since  my  approach  is  closest  to 
Constructivism, I devote the next section entirely to the Constructivist approach to 
regimes and the norms model, and deal with the security and domestic politics models 
in the section on alternative explanations in the Conclusion. By showing that even 
Constructivism, which emphasizes the study of processes of identity formation, has to 
overcome the ‘level of analysis’ problem, I establish the contribution of my study of 
the process of constitution.  
 
Here I wish to flag two implications of the security model which has been the common 
sense  view  of  nuclear  policy.  One,  Realism  was  to  some  extent  a  self-fulfilling 
prophecy:  American  leaders  believed  that  India  would  inevitably  acquire  nuclear 
weapons and that they could do little about it (Perkovich 1999, 194). As a result, the 
US did not intervene forcefully to stop India’s nuclear progress. Two, a critique of the 
security  model  and  a  focus  on  domestic  factors  has  political  and  normative 
implications.  Indian  decision-makers  insist  that  their  programs  were  impelled  by 
security threats; they see no reason why deterrence should not work in South Asia as 
elsewhere.
2  In  a  self-help  system,  where  security  rationales  have  some  degree  of 
legitimacy, they endeavor to refute theories emphasizing ‘bureaucratic’ or ‘symbolic’ 
motivations.  Scholars  have  pointed  out  that  the  presumed  contrast  between 
democratic,  responsible  Western  states  that  require  nuclear  arsenals  for  security 
reasons and their ‘others’—fanatical, irrational Third World leaders, is based on an 
Orientalist binary (Gusterson 1999). Haider Nizamani claims that Western analyses 
                                                 
2 Jasjit Singh writes: “…logically, the reasons for possessing nuclear arsenals by one state” cannot be 
different from those of others (Singh 1998a, 5). Also see the arguments of B. R. Nayar (Nayar 2001, 14-
16).      
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tend to explain national security decisions in countries like India with reference to 
political and parochial variables. He calls this ‘security orientalism’—the non-Western 
‘other’ is seen to have a different, inferior, rationality (Nizamani 2000, 10). 
 
 
Section Four: Norms in Constructivism 
 
While Realist/security models are associated with power, and Liberal theories focus 
on the determination of interest, the issue of norms is seen as the natural province of 
Constructivism.  In  this  section  I  discuss  the  basic  principles  of  Constructivism, 
showing how they can be modified to assess the full impact of regimes. I take up the 
‘norms  model’  from  Sagan’s  tripartite  classification,  critiquing  the  existing 
explanations within that model and tracing their inadequacies to the ‘level of analysis’ 
problem. 
 
Constructivism: key principles 
While we note fierce debates around the definition of Constructivism (Hopf 1998), we 
can identify key Constructivist principles:  
•  intersubjectivity (shared contextual beliefs drive human action) 
•  co-constitution (agents and structures are mutually determined) 
•  the importance of identity (which is determined by, and determines, the field of 
political action) 
Constructivists claim that their work breaks down the artificial divisions between the 
international and the domestic, straddling the boundaries of Comparative Politics and 
International Relations. However, Constructivism runs into problems when it theorizes 
the systemic-national link. In this section I will discuss some of these problems and 
show that the solution lies in including national identity in the analysis.      
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Constructivism prides itself on being a dynamic theory. Sans a non-systemic source of 
state identity, it cannot account for change (Price and Reus-Smit 1998, 268; Ringmar 
1997, 276). The domestic space acts as a circuit breaker preventing dominant norms 
from reproducing themselves. Further, one of the core claims of constructivism is that 
it treats identity as an empirical question to be theorized within a historical context, 
that is, as a dependent variable rather than a given. Therefore Constructivists study 
domestic processes closely. As an analytical perspective, Constructivism differs from 
Domestic Politics in that it attributes power to intersubjective beliefs—shared by all in 
a particular context—rather than the subjective perceptions of individuals or small 
groups (which in turn derive from relative economic positions or psychological traits).  
 
Constructivists  believe  that  agents  (states  or  other  actors)  and  structures  (the 
international system) are mutually determined or co-constituted. As discussed above, 
however, due to the centrality of identity in their explanations, Constructivist scholars 
tend to be situated firmly at the domestic level. Moreover, although Constructivism 
holds co-constitution to be fundamental, this process is difficult to make visible. In 
practice,  empirical Constructivist work takes social structure  and agents in turn as 
‘temporarily given’ to show the effects of the other (Wendt 1987, 365) and tends to 
privilege the domestic.  
 
Wendt is the only Constructivist who attempts a systemic theory; however, he claims 
that he avoids the pitfalls of the systemic approach by treating the international system 
as both a dependent and independent variable—i.e. he is interested both in how the 
current structure evolved from the interactions of its units, as well as in the causal 
powers of this structure (Wendt 1999, 11). Wendt makes a useful distinction between      
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the social identity of the state (the state in relation to other units in the international 
system) and its corporate identity (the glue that holds it together). Actors will resist 
social identities that militate against their “ontologically prior” identities exogenous to 
the international system. Thus, corporate identity acts as a “material constraint” on 
social identity (Wendt 1999, 328). In a parallel movement, the international system 
selects for system-sustaining changes among unit-level changes (Wendt 1999, 319). In 
this manner, change in domestic identity produces structural change at the macro-level 
(Wendt 1999, 339).  
 
This is an unsatisfactory conception of the relationship between identity at the national 
and international levels (Pasic 1996; Zehfuss 2001). No human action takes place in a 
pre-social  space  (Wind  1997,  250).  The  international  arena  is  not  asocial.  Since 
nations  are  imagined  communities,  domestic  elites  construct  identities  that  reflect 
actual and potential national positions in the international system. A country that aims 
to secure NATO membership, for instance, may foster democratic national institutions 
for reasons that cannot remain instrumental. Even studies of national identity have 
increasingly emphasized the role of the external. India’s nationalist movement, for 
instance, cannot be understood outside of the social and ideological framework of 
colonial capitalist modernity that sustained it, and which it modified and challenged 
(Chatterjee 1993). 
 
Table 1.2:  Identity and Level of Analysis Problem 
 
  Focus  National identity 
Systemic  International society   Given  
Domestic  Internal forces  Dependent variable      
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We cannot fully explain domestic change if we leave out the international dimension 
(Risse-Kappen  and  Ropp  1999,  273).  In  the  particular  field  I  analyze,  the 
characteristics of the technology also necessitate an extra-domestic perspective. We 
find certain common features among states dealing with nuclear technology, which 
derive  from  the  imperatives  of  technology  and  the  constraints  it  imposes  on  the 
agencies  (Hilgartner,  Bell,  and  O'Connor  1982;  Sagan  1993;  Weart  1988).  One 
prominent  feature  is  relative  isolation  from  the  national  political  and  economic 
mainstream.  Conclusions  from  policy  analysis  in  other  issue-areas  are  rarely 
applicable. For instance, the issue of cost, salient in other policy decisions in India, 
seems  less  important  on  the  nuclear  issue.  Further,  the  nuclear  field  boasts  an 
exceptional  degree  of  technological  sophistication  and  international  orientation. 
Enclave  development  fosters  similar  trajectories  among  states  with  very  different 
political  systems.  The  nuclear  taboo  and  international  controls  on  technology 
contribute to this. 
 
The characteristics of developing and post-colonial states also preclude a focus on the 
domestic.  We  cannot  separate  the  mission  of  gaining  internal  legitimacy  from  the 
security  imperative  (Ayoob  1995).  This  has  two  implications.  We  need  to  study 
domestic politics to understand decisions in the security sphere, and the contribution 
of  security  decisions  to  domestic  legitimacy  as  part  of  the  nation-building  project 
(Khattak 1996). Studying the relation of the nuclear project to identity can help us 
explain why domestic actors were able to use the nuclear policy to advance their own 
interests. Finally, explanations focusing solely on the domestic can lead to cultural 
reductionism: explaining state decisions without paying attention to systemic factors 
leads to a conception of the domestic political situation as deterministic. In terms of      
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normative evaluation, this could either rationalize and justify state policies or exempt 
international forces from blame (Mamdani 2000).  
 
Hopf criticizes Constructivist theories for paying insufficient attention to the domestic; 
and for buying into consequentialist logic, disregarding “the logics of thinkability and 
imaginability.”  Indebted  to  the  ‘systemic’  idea  that  interaction  at  the  international 
level shapes state identities, they tend to take up a particular norm and then investigate 
how  it  came  to  be  adopted  or  rejected.  He  calls  for  normative  work  to  provide  a 
“picture of the discursive terrain of a society” to show why it adopts certain norms and 
not others (Hopf 2002, 278, 81).  
 
Regimes in the norms model 
In the mainstream literature the term ‘norm’ sometimes refers to domestic politics, 
national culture and identity. At other times, it refers to the complex of international 
norms  governing  state  identities.  For  instance,  in  his  seminal  article,  when  Sagan 
refers to norms in his France case-study he cites domestic politics aimed at obtaining 
international respect and maintaining internal cohesion. In discussing the Ukraine case 
where  domestic  opinion  is  less  important,  he  uses  the  term  to  stand  for  the 
nonproliferation regime’s prohibition of new nuclear powers (Sagan 1996/97, 79-82).  
 
The domestic strand of the norms model focuses on the beliefs of powerful individuals 
and groups because nuclear policy decisions are made by a small number of people. 
Jacques Hymans’ recent innovative work studies Indian leaders’ identity “as Indians” 
and argues that the dominant variant of Indian identity which was “oppositional” and 
“nationalist” predisposed leaders to acquire weapons (Hymans 2001). Bajpai claims 
that  in  the  post-Cold  War  world  neoliberals  are  on  the  ascendant  in  determining      
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foreign and security policy in India (Bajpai 2002a, 245, 90). This strand of analysis 
does not go far enough in tracing the sources of ideas.  
 
Vanaik believes that “elite self-perceptions have been a much more likely determinant 
[than  external  security  factors]  of  possible  change  in  India’s  nuclear  posture  from 
1974 to 1998…and precisely because such self-perceptions are more easily subject to 
change from purely internal development…”  (Vanaik 2002b, 324). However,  even 
“purely  internal”  causes  of  changed  self-perceptions  may  derive  from  an  external 
source. Vanaik himself argues elsewhere that Indian strategic elites have bought into 
the Western doctrine of deterrence. They have (almost) always been Realists (Vanaik 
1995, 2) and with the end of the Cold War challenges to Realism became weaker 
(Bidwai and Vanaik 2001, 197, n.1).  
 
Other  scholars  agree  that  in  the  1990s  the  content  of  Indian  national  identity 
underwent dramatic changes. Disillusionment with the Nehruvian development model 
was  coupled  with  resentment  of  the  allegedly  special  treatment  of  minorities  in 
Nehruvian secularism. The BJP’s dramatic rise to power was both a symptom and a 
cause  of  hyper-nationalism.  Vanaik  traces  the  rise  of  a  more  aggressive  and  self-
centred elite nationalism to neoliberalism and Hindutva (Vanaik 2004). Such accounts 
cannot satisfactorily explain change, since middle class politics in India has exhibited 
these traits for some time. In fact, it is claimed that the middle class has always been 
pro-bomb (Smith 1994, 185). Vanaik’s explanation also draws an unexplained causal 
linkage between growing embourgeoisement and a particular conception of national 
interest.  
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Norms  model  explanations  at  the  domestic  level  are  often  presented  within  the 
‘strategic  culture’  rubric.  For  instance,  Ziemke  constructs  the  concept  of  “national 
myth” to explain Iran’s nuclear decisions. “National myth presents an “exaggerated 
view of the strengths, virtues, triumphs, and traumas that make up a state's collective 
self-image  and  provides  the  blueprint  for  its  strategic  personality:  how  it  sees  its 
relationship to the outside world, assesses its options and national interests, and makes 
decisions….” Her study finds the forces behind Iranian security policy in its history 
(including the ancient Persian empire), its civic philosophy and culture (Ziemke 2000, 
89).  Similarly,  Andrew  Latham  finds  the  determinants  of  India’s  stance  at  CTBT 
negotiations  in  the  country’s  history  and  culture.  He  identifies  as  influential  the 
Kautilyan  paradigm--which  paints  the  external  domain  as  an  inherently  conflictual 
site, a sense of vulnerability stemming from repeated foreign invasions, and a reaction 
to the 1962 defeat at the hands of China (Latham 1998).  
 
‘Strategic culture’ is not well-adapted to theorizing change in policy, since its roots are 
in  unvarying  history.  Further,  these  explanations  founder  in  the  face  of  similar 
decisions on nuclear weapons by countries that are considerably culturally distant—
such  as  India  and  Iran.  At  their  worst,  they  can  be  blatantly  reductionist.  Samuel 
Huntington saw the May 1998 tests by India and Pakistan as confirming his thesis that 
the  clash  between  civilizations  –  in  this  case  Islam  and  Hinduism  –  has  replaced 
ideological  confrontation  as  the  main  source  of  conflict  (Gardels  and  Huntington 
1998,  8).
3  Darren  Zook  sees  the  1998  test  series  as  a  manifestation  of  Hindu 
nationalist chauvinism (Zook 2000). 
 
                                                 
3 For a more ‘popular’ version of the argument, see the chapter on India and Pakistan, “Our God Can 
Lick Your God”, in William Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for 
Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).      
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Works by Itty Abraham, Steven Flank and David Mutimer can be classified under the 
systemic norms model.  Abraham makes a  real  effort to situate his analysis of the 
Indian nuclear program in “a field of action that is larger than the national” (Abraham 
1998, 70). Since development was always to be measured in relation to other nations, 
it  became  assimilated  into  the  concept  of  national  security—a  combination  that 
sustained  the  nuclear  program  (Abraham  1998,  9-12).  By  pointing  to  the 
institutionalization  of  this  duality  which  is  inherent  to  modernity  in  the  Indian 
program, Abraham is able to explain the conflicted character of the program. This 
duality cannot be explained by, say, Bidwai and Vanaik who in the same paragraph 
claim that India’s program was “conceived originally as a purely civilian effort”, and 
that it had a  “built-in dual character”  (Bidwai  and Vanaik 2001, 212). Abraham’s 
argument makes the conjunction of developmentalism and post-coloniality the crucial 
foundation for India’s attraction for nuclear power. However, there are scores of post-
colonial countries in Asia and Africa, who did not choose the nuclear option. We also 
have the example of ex-colony France, where, as I show in Chapter 5, modernity and 
independence  were  crucial  determinants  of  nuclear  policy.  Clearly,  nuclear 
weapons/capability  can  be  presented  as  optimal  solutions  only  when  a  security 
problem—which Abraham leaves unanalyzed—can be shown to exist. 
 
Steven Flank sees the international regime as providing resources to Indian actors who 
were advocating the nuclear program. He writes: “When Indian scientists argue that 
electrical utilities should use nuclear power stations, that Indian universities should 
have departments of nuclear engineering and physics or that nuclear weapons will 
deter Pakistani and Chinese attacks, they use the global nuclear network as the anchor 
for  their  still  unstable  systems”  (Flank  1993,  279).  Flank  correctly  identifies  the      
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resource-providing role of the international regime. However, he does not take into 
account change in international norms.  
 
David Mutimer sees the regime as an unfair bargain shaped by the concerns of the 
powerful. For instance, India rejected the CTBT because it was no longer the same 
treaty that it had called for: India was aiming for an instrument of disarmament but 
this  1996  treaty  was  a  tool  of  nonproliferation  (Mutimer  2000b,  124).  Mutimer  is 
sensitive to the shifts in international norms. However, he takes Indian declarations at 
face value, writing that for over twenty years India refrained from declaring itself a 
NWS, because it was committed to ending the arms race (Mutimer 2000a, 13). 
 
Does the transmission of ideas from the regime to different countries have to involve  
change in national identity? Adler describes convergence on arms control to manage 
deterrence in the Cold War, and claims that it took place sans change in domestic 
culture  in  the  USSR  (Adler  1992,  102).  Yet  even  if  identity  in  its  entirety  is  not 
affected, national elites do have to reconceptualize the roles of their weapons—in the 
Soviet case, from tools to overthrow the capitalist order to instruments of survival. 
This requires a rethinking of state purpose, thus affecting identity. Jabko and Weber, 
discussing the case of France’s embrace of the nonproliferation regime refute the idea 
that this was ‘convergence’ resulting from regime-building or adoption of the best 
‘ideas’. France’s identity itself had changed (Jabko and Weber 1998). 
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Figure 2: Determinants of national identity      
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Norms model explanations need to pay attention to the intersection of the domestic 
and the international. That is, they should treat national identity as an intermediate 
variable  between  international  norms  and  national/security  interest  formulation. 
Constructivist explanations are best suited to do this as they take norms seriously; 
however, they too need to overcome the level of analysis problem. 
 
 
Section Five: Case selection 
 
In political science we are used to treating events as the unit of analysis and countries 
as actors. For instance, the question can be asked—why did India test nuclear weapons 
in 1998? However, such questions privilege proximate, tangible causes over deeper, 
ideational processes. Wesley Salmon has argued that we should view processes rather 
than events as basic causal entities (Bennett 1999). Parsimonious accounts may be 
able to answer ‘why’ questions, not ‘how’ questions. Process is important in studying 
the effects of a regime. This project seeks to answer the question about the1998 tests 
by situating it within the symbolic field of evolving international norms. As a case 
study, it is better suited for assessing whether and how a variable mattered to the 
outcome than how much it mattered (George and Bennett 2005, 25).  
 
India’s  1998  tests  represent  a  puzzle  both  for  theories  of  proliferation  and  regime 
effectiveness.  While  defying  international  norms  by  openly  going  nuclear,  India 
consistently adhered to certain principles of the nonproliferation regime such as the 
non-dissemination  of  sensitive  technologies.  Its  advocacy  of  nuclear  disarmament 
continued.  One  cannot  view  the  regime  merely  as  a  constraint  around  the  Indian 
program, which the country strains against with varying degrees of force. Theorists of 
proliferation  have  classified  India  under  each  of  the  three  main  explanations  for      
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proliferation—Realist  (security  threat),  Pluralist-Institutionalist  (domestic  interests 
and/or  ineffective  regime)  and  Constructivist  (identity  and  norms).  This  contested 
status  makes  it  theoretically  interesting.  The  contest  also  has  obvious  policy 
implications. India, the second-most populous country in the world, is involved in a 
violent  enduring  rivalry  with  Pakistan—the  two  are  the  only  nuclear-endowed 
countries to have engaged in war. India is a rising power that is an opinion leader in 
world politics. Thus, investigating how the regime dealt with India and what responses 
it elicited, would help frame better policy especially in the US. 
 
My knowledge of the Indian case and my access to sources there make this the best 
case  to  develop  my  theory.  For  purposes  of  a  “parallel  demonstration  of  theory” 
(Skocpol and Somers 1980) I turn to two countries where we saw strikingly different 
outcomes in the post-Cold War world—France and South Africa. At some level, India 
and France are ‘most different’ cases where we observe similar outcomes in that both 
decided  that  nuclear  weapons  were  essential  to  their  security  but  moved  towards 
accommodation with the nonproliferation regime. India and South Africa are rising 
middle powers (possibly ‘most similar’ cases with differing outcomes) but while India 
formally adopted nuclear weapons for defense in the 1990s, South Africa renounced 
its capability.  
 
However, the great number of differences in domestic politics and international status 
mean that neither of these cases is amenable to controlled comparison with India using 
the Millian logic of elimination. These two cases have been included for purposes of 
theory-testing  and  extension  (to  observe  the  effect  of  the  independent  variable—
systemic norms—on other cases). The objective is to find the conditions under which      
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different  patterns  occur—conditional  generalizations  rather  than  frequency 
distributions (Bennett and George 1997).  
 
In France, the disappearance of its target—the USSR—led to a subdued debate about 
the value of the nuclear arsenal. As is well known, the government decided to retain 
the arsenal although it made substantial cuts in force structure. However, France also 
decided to join the NPT—which it had criticized for three decades, and became an 
advocate of the CTBT (although it did conduct controversial tests in 1995). Why did 
France make this public affirmation of its nuclear status? France is usually seen as 
defying international norms, but I will show that this is only half the story. 
 
The South African program was developed enough to produce actual weapons; in the 
1990s, the government destroyed its assets and submitted to international and regional 
safeguards. South Africa is a ‘hard case’ for an approach emphasizing the importance 
of international norms since, like Brazil and Argentina, it is usually depicted as giving 
up nuclear weapons under the influence of democratization. My hypothesis is that 
denuclearization was prompted not by some logic inherent to democratization, but by 
elite  decisions—shaped  by  decades  of  marginalization  and  conflict  with  the 
international community—to opt for alternative national identities. 
 
While I do not aim to formulate a comprehensive theory of regimes, I am interested in 
the extent to which processes are generalizable. There are few comparisons of regimes 
in different issue-areas in the literature. Among the exceptions are a comparison of the 
human rights and nonproliferation regimes, and ‘war on drugs’ to the ‘war on terror’ 
(Caulkins,  Kleiman,  and  Reuter  2003;  Wrage  and  Quester  1993).  In  the  last  two 
decades, the international community has been trying to institutionalize cooperation      
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among states against terrorism. Are findings from the nuclear nonproliferation regime 
transferable to this evolving counter-terrorism regime? Do we observe similarities in 
their formative periods in spite of differences in power distribution and norms? What 
can we predict about the unexpected and undesirable effects of the current efforts to 
fashion an international regime against terrorism?  
 
 
Section Six: Regimes, their normative effects, and language  
 
Ernst Haas’ contribution to the Krasner volume on regimes claimed: ‘words can hurt 
you’ (Haas 1983). In this section I explain my choice of discourse analysis to reveal 
regimes ‘at work.’ 
  
Discourse: visible field or actor in its own right? 
Security  studies  scholars  have  not  paid  much  attention  to  the  use  of  language  by 
actors, although studies of nuclear weapons strategy take statements seriously because 
they  recognize  that  rhetoric  is  of  utmost  significance  when  physical  jousting  is 
rendered impossible. However, while analysts may not consider language important, 
political actors do. Politicians and diplomats spend a lot of time on preparing and 
interpreting statements. This is because they recognize that each “speech-act”—which 
Austin defines as doing things with words—creates some associations and weakens 
others. Talk is not cheap, each iteration carries an opportunity cost in that it makes 
some future course(s) of action less likely. Even if a particular norm is adopted for 
instrumental reasons, it leads to change in identity. This is documented in the literature 
on  human  rights  issues  (Risse-Kappen,  Ropp,  and  Sikkink  1999).  Contemporary      
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discourse makes some policy options ‘unthinkable’ and facilitates others. Does this 
mean discourse has autonomous power? 
 
Post-structuralism attributes independent power to discourse.
4 Gunther Kress describes 
discourse as organizing and structuring the manner in which a particular object or 
process  is  to  be  discussed,  by  providing  rules,  descriptions,  permissions  and 
prohibitions  of  individual  and  social  action  (Fowler  1991,  68).  Language  is  not  a 
neutral  medium  of  communication;  objective  truth  or  knowledge  is  therefore 
impossible (Edkins 1999, 15). But positing discourse in itself as a causal factor may 
obscure the role of strategic action by elites in choosing among scripts for national 
identity construction (Fearon and Laitin 2000, 865). In postmodern analyses discourse 
“submerges”  agency  (Checkel  1998).  This  may  lead  to  a  disempowering  view  of 
politics (Krishna 1993). 
 
Most  Constructivists,  while  recognizing  the  constraints  of  language,  hold  that 
objective reality exists outside of our attempts to know it, that is, outside language. 
They work on the sociolinguistic construction of subjects and objects in world politics 
(Price  and  Reus-Smit  1998,  268).  My  methodology  will  follow  Kratochwil  and 
Ruggie’s  “third  path”—infusing  positivist  epistemology  with  interpretive  strains 
(Kratochwil  and  Ruggie  1986,  766).  In  terms  of  the  Hasenclever,  Mayer  and 
Rittberger classification, this work falls into the category of “strong cognitivism” since 
it  holds  that  knowledge  is  manufactured  in  an  international  society,  and  not  only 
                                                 
4 Though post-structuralists point out that “The fact that every object is constituted as an object of 
discourse  has  nothing  to  do  with  whether  there  is  a  world  external  to  thought,  or  with  the 
realism/idealism opposition…What is denied is not that [such] objects exist externally to thought, but 
the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive 
condition of emergence” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 108).      
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informs state preferences but also constitutes state identity (Hasenclever, Mayer and 
Rittberger 138).  
 
I see discourse as an arena where the complex relationships among material factors, 
institutions and ideas is played out. Policy makers, though bound by discourse, retain 
agency. They can use discourse in instrumental ways, and when these attempts are 
iterated over time, discourse changes. Discourse is a dynamic concept. Recognizing its 
power,  policy-makers  draw  on  resources  in  the  discourse  to  justify  their  choices. 
Taking  discourse  seriously  does  not  mean  taking  actors’  statements  at  face  value. 
Discourse is often employed strategically. Governments that violate human rights in 
the Third World are seen to engage in anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and nationalist 
discourse  (Risse-Kappen  and  Ropp  1999,  251).  In  the  Indian  nuclear  program, 
allegations of unsafe practices were dismissed by the establishment and attributed to 
vested interests.   
 
Studying discourse does not imply assuming the irrelevance of material factors. We 
cannot  speak  of  ideational  versus  structurally-derived  models  of  strategic  choice, 
Johnston points out, as there are no interests at the state level that are not ideationally 
based (Johnston 1995, 62). Power may be the ability to afford not to learn (Wendt 
1999, 331). Not all actors are equally susceptible to intersubjective understandings. 
Discursive  power  is  “almost  always”  undergirded  by  material  power  (Hopf  1998, 
179). 
 
We  must  also  consider  the  role  of  relative  power  in  discourse.  Not  all  actors  are 
equally able to ‘speak’ and not all are authorized to draw upon the same resources. 
Some countries are ‘reality-makers’, others are ‘reality-takers’ (Jervis 1985, 3) We      
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need not assume the clean space of argumentative rationality (Risse 2000). Tracing the 
development of concepts over time helps us identify the workings of power and reveal 
the  contending  forces  behind  definitions.  David  Mutimer’s  genealogy  of 
‘proliferation’ shows the debates over its interpretation, but also that the terms used in 
those debates shaped actual policies. For instance, the association of proliferation with 
instability/imbalance meant that it was situated firmly within the dyadic, statist arms 
control agenda, to be countered through technology denial (Mutimer 2000b).  
 
Identifying norms 
Scientific realism believes that we have access to reality, though we may need to posit 
certain  ‘unobservables’  to  explain  it  (Kosso  1992).  Norms  are  a  good  example  of 
powerful  unobservables.  Even  violations  of  norms,  if  justified  as  divergent  but 
authentic  interpretations  rather  than  frontal  challenges,  or  if  triggering  severe 
punishment, testify to the continued operation of the norm (Ruggie 1988, 97).  
 
My dependent or outcome variable is a specific understanding of foreign policy, one 
might say, a subset of it. I want to explain that part of Indian foreign policy which is 
known to its practitioners as ‘disarmament diplomacy.’ That is, the position that India 
adopts towards the various components of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Unlike 
most  studies  of  foreign  policy  which  focus  on  concrete  or  ‘real’  steps  such  as  a 
decision to move troops, to establish diplomatic relations, my outcomes are mainly 
rhetorical.  I  cannot  measure  behavioral  change  by  concrete  but  hidden  actions  in 
laboratories and secret strategy documents. Similarly, my independent variables refer 
to dominant international norms, not quantifiable variables such as relative military 
capabilities or GDP. With regard to nuclear weapons, it encompasses the dominant      
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understandings  about  the  possession  and  use  of  nuclear  weapons  among  the  main 
players in world politics. This raises certain issues for my analysis.  
 
First, norms have to be identified in the numerous rhetorical productions by states and 
international  organizations—that  is,  in  the  discourse.  Second,  many  scholars  have 
warned against the tautology involved in ‘proving’ that a norm exists by pointing to a 
certain policy, and then claiming that the norm causes the policy. It is important to 
operationalize the norm in a way that is distinct from the behavior it is designed to 
explain  (Finnemore  and  Sikkink  1998,  892).  However,  the  outcomes  that  I  am 
explaining  are  choices  among  norms  themselves.  Third,  I  will  have  to  distinguish 
between  identity  and  strategy.  Since  I  argue  that  identities  are  not  given,  but  are 
chosen  by  elites  (from  a  limited  menu),  there  is  a  strategic  element  to  identity. 
However, earlier choices about which norms to support constrain later choices about 
which identity to assume; similarly if a country has adopted an identity as a result of a 
particular understanding of international forces, it is constrained in the types of norms 
it can espouse. 
 
Analyzing changes in norms—a discourse approach 
By  discourse  I  mean  the  documented  expression  of  ideas  and  opinions.  This  is  a 
neutral definition, agnostic about whether ideas or material forces are the ultimate, 
“uncaused cause” behind the discourse. However, it does attribute what Albert Yee 
calls “quasi-causal” power to the ideas expressed in the discourse. Drawing on Yee’s 
theory,  I  argue  that  ideas  are  ontologically  prior  to,  and  account  for,  statistical 
regularities. Discourses “authorize or restrict, as well as prioritize and distribute, the 
ideas  and  beliefs  that  policymakers  can  think  and  in  so  doing  partly  delimit  the 
policies they can pursue” (Yee 1996, 95).       
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What sort of evidence can be presented to prove that constitution is occurring? Since 
the  process  is  ongoing  and  fundamental,  this  is  a  difficult  task.  In  the  preceding 
section  I  argued  that  the  study  of  national  discourse  can  be  useful  to  this  end.  I 
approach the study of discourse in three steps. First, I gather data from quantitative 
content analysis, parliamentary debates and interviews. Second, I note the changes in 
the salience and associations of various key terms in the data and draw conclusions as 
to the boundaries of the discourse—that is, what is permitted and what is not. Third, I 
take a fresh look at the major decisions in nuclear policy in light of these conclusions 
and show how these decisions become ‘natural’ or ‘inevitable’ in the context of these 
discursive boundaries. 
 
Since documentation of important security policy decisions is often unavailable or 
non-existent, scholars have always worked with public statements as source material. 
So  there  is  nothing  new  in  using  discourse  except  that  I  attempt  to  study  it 
systematically and verifiably. In the next section I discuss more fully the methodology 
of  quantitative  content  analysis.  Please  see  Appendix  One  for  a  discussion  of  the 
precise procedures adopted.  
 
My choice of methods responds to the usual objections to the study of language: how 
do we know that this evidence is authentic, representative and valid? How do we know 
it is not taken out of context and edited, or that the conclusions it draws are flatly 
contradicted by dozens of other statements? Instead of using the archive of texts as a 
resource for selective citations in support of the theory, I will have a greater role for 
the  elements  in  the  discourse  in  the  formulation  of  the  theory  itself.  Focusing  on 
discourse to ‘excavate’ norms will avoid the circularity problem which occurs when      
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they are inferred from behavior. Also, reading texts allows me to note changes in the 
salience of various norms (non-events). Moreover, discourse grounds all three models 
(security,  interest  and  normative)  and  studying  it  allows  for  tests  of  their  relative 
significance. Using public documents allows others to trace my arguments; moreover, 
Foucault  claims  that  the  genealogist  will  find  the  meanings  of  things,  not  in  the 
mysterious depths but in surface practices (Ryan 1989, 80).  
 
 
Section Seven: Methodology—the systematic analysis of language 
 
Language is extremely important in the study of International Relations. Authors in 
the  Realist,  Neoliberal  and  Constructivist  traditions  all  use  texts  as  sources  for 
decision-makers’  descriptions  and  justifications.  Those  more  sensitive  to  the 
importance of language might also examine a large corpus of texts to retrieve the 
meanings of specific terms—actors’ or analysts’ categories. Fearon, for example, calls 
for analysis of ordinary language to discover exactly what identity means (Fearon 
1999,  41).  More  recently,  game  theorists  have  incorporated  a  notion  of  linguistic 
competence to deal with indeterminacy (Johnson 1993). However, a systematic focus 
on texts is most characteristic of Constructivists, who take language seriously and do 
not dismiss statements as mere rhetoric, as ‘cheap’ (costless) talk. Constructivists note 
that elements of discourse function as resources for actors who want to frame and 
justify policies. Once institutionalized, they also constrain policy. 
 
Quantitative content analysis 
Lack of access to the archives, time and cost factors and unfamiliarity with techniques 
have ensured that textual analysis is not a widely used method in political science.      
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Political science is among the few social disciplines in which discourse analysis has 
remained virtually unknown (van Dijk 2001, 360). However, analysis of discourse is 
ideal for locating intersubjective understandings. As opposed to the study of individual 
utterances (say, speeches) which are the product of personal and subjective factors, 
discourse analysis is based on the idea that sense-making processes are carried out by 
the whole community.  
 
Various approaches often termed as content analysis (Holsti 1969), dialogical analysis 
(Duffy 1998), or narrative analysis (Mattern 1998) essentially involve close reading 
and  linking  themes  across  texts.  Quantitative  operations  make  this  a  considerably 
more rigorous process  as it forces the author to be specific about the sample, the 
statistical  results  and  their  generalizability.  Quantitative  content  analysis  is  the 
systematic and replicable examination of symbols of communication, which have been 
assigned numeric values according to valid measurement rules, and the analysis of 
relationships involving those values using statistical methods, in order to describe the 
communication, draw inferences about its meaning, or infer from the communication 
to its context, both of production and consumption (Riffe, Lacy, and Fico 1998, 20). 
Quantification makes it possible to reduce large sets of data to manageable form, and 
to characterize the variation in the data with summary statistics (Riffe, Lacy, and Fico 
1998, 26). 
 
While the usual critiques of quantitative methods in the social science can be leveled 
against this type of content analysis, they are even more valid because these analyses 
claim to represent content or meaning. If one adopts an individualist ontology, taking a 
political text as the “expression of the mind of a political actor” would mean removing 
it both from the context of its interaction with an audience, and from the community of      
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meaning in which it is produced (Chilton 1996, 28) (though this criticism does not 
apply only to quantitative methods). Moreover, quantitative methods cannot get at 
latent meaning (given by the reader). Quantitative analysis cannot take into account 
figures of speech, polysemie and ambiguity, and cross-referentiality with other texts. 
This loss of nuance within texts is also true of the sample—quantitative analysis is 
unable to identify crucial texts. 
 
In general, we can say that the quantitative-qualitative choice is a trade-off between 
reliability  and validity.  Reliability requires that  different coders  applying the same 
classification rules to the same content will assign the same numbers. Validity requires 
that the assignment of numbers is reliable and that it accurately represents the abstract 
concept being studied (Riffe, Lacy, and Fico 1998, 54). Quantitative methods are less 
valid than qualitative ones. For instance, a human coder would know that the term 
‘White House’ or a reference to ‘Uncle Sam’ is used to represent the US, however, the 
quantitative program can be made to account for this only with some work. However, 
they are more reliable. After reading several texts using certain similarities among 




Quantitative content analysis can be carried out using human coders; however, the 
time  and  expense  involved  in  such  an  endeavor  severely  restricts  the  size  of  the 
sample. Since this project deals with a long time period and seeks to capture a broad 
public conception of identity and interest, I decided to use a computer program and a 
large-N. The sample could include transcripts of audio-visual media, articles in the 
print media, public statements by ruling party and major opposition politicians, and 
                                                 
5 I am grateful to Dietram Scheufele for this point.      
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official government statements. In my sample construction I have used only public 
documents. Since I use a simple random sample, I need to define a population that is 
representative of informed public discourse, appears at regular intervals and can be 
easily accessed. Newspapers are ideal for this analysis. I chose to sample from one 
major national newspaper in English--The Hindu. The sample was assembled through 
‘reconstructing’ a sample week. The texts thus retrieved were then analyzed using the 
software CATPAC (Woelfel nd). 
 
In this study, I will perform two types of quantitative operations. First, the salience of 
various themes in the texts will be noted on the basis of word counts and placement 
within texts (thematic analysis). Which themes occur in a set of texts, and how often? 
Second, semantic analysis focusing on the sentence or sense group, encodes relations 
among concepts (Popping 2000, 26-29). I also carry out qualitative discourse analysis 
on texts selected on a subjective basis for their importance, reading them in relation to 
broader ideational themes.  
 
Parliamentary debates 
Although parliamentary debates can be a rich source of elite views on nuclear issues, 
they have not been systematically studied. As in any parliamentary system, India’s 
Houses of Parliament function as forums for the intense exchange of views on the 
burning issues of the day. There are two houses of Parliament—the Lok Sabha (House 
of the People) and the Rajya Sabha (House of States), somewhat analogous to the 
House of Representatives and the Senate in the American system. The Lok Sabha has 
over  500  representatives  from  different  political  parties  and  convenes  for 
approximately 75 days in three sessions over the year (budget, monsoon and winter).      
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During my field research in India from September 2002 to August 2003, I interviewed 
over thirty decision-makers and astute observers of the political scene. I am aware that 
my interviewees are constrained by rules of secrecy. Moreover, their views on policy 
are often remarkably congruent with the official narrative (Abraham 1998, 4). My 
questions  did  not  aim  at  eliciting  secret  information,  but  treated  the  responses  as 
elements of discourse. The elites that I interviewed fall into four groups: politicians, 
government  officials,  strategic  analysts  and  journalists.  Interviews  will  be  used 
primarily to help with process-tracing, and tend to focus more on recent developments 
in nuclear policy.  
 
Illustration 
To illustrate the discourse approach, I examine two key speeches that were made by 
Prime Ministers in 1974 and 1998 on the occasion of the two tests that neatly divide 
up India’s nuclear history. Both speeches were delivered to the Lok Sabha, the lower 
house of the Indian Parliament, roughly a month after the tests (Parliament is not in 
session in May). The first was made by Indira Gandhi of the Congress (I) and the 
second by Atal Behari Vajpayee of the Bharatiya Janata Party. 
 
                                                 
6 All data here has been obtained by looking through the indices of the Lok Sabha Debates. From 1991 
onwards some debates are available online and this is a work in progress. Hindi and English are the two 
languages used in the debates. All translations from Hindi are mine. I have used only the date to refer to 
the debates obtained online, all others are identified by the date and/or volume and column number. 
Since Parliamentary debates are episodic and have not been indexed systematically they were not 
subject to quantitative analysis.       
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The 1974 text is titled Statement re. Underground Nuclear Explosion Experiment.
7 
The  Prime  Minister  informed  the  House  that  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  had 
carried out this explosion, as part of the research and development the Commission 
had been “carrying on in pursuance of our national objective of harnessing atomic 
energy for peaceful purposes.” Thus the explosion at Pokhran formed part of a natural 
progression of a technological quest, a quest undertaken in the name of the people 
towards a national goal. The paragraphs that followed also situated the explosion in 
the  realm  of  scientific  experimentation,  as  the  PM  reminded  members  of  her  past 
declarations regarding the utilization of nuclear energy. She gave details of the nature 
and scientific study of the consequences of the test, and referred extensively to the 
global  enthusiasm  for  applying  nuclear  technology  in  the  solution  of  the  energy 
problem.  India  declared  its  willingness  to  share  the  fruits  of  research  in  nuclear 
technology with other countries.  
 
The Prime Minister went on to affirm that all the material, equipment and personnel in 
the project were “totally  Indian”. Discussing the reactions from different countries 
took up considerable time, with special emphasis on the reactions from Islamabad and 
Ottawa. The general conclusion was that countries that have criticised the test were 
misinformed as to the intentions of the Indian government. These intentions were laid 
                                                 
7 Lok Sabha Debates, 22 July 1974, cols. 264-9. The other document worth examining is the text of 
Indira Gandhi’s letter to her Pakistani counterpart Z. A. Bhutto (Kaul 1974, 24). Like the statement 
above, the letter was a part of the effort to shift the discourse from the terrain of security and 
confrontation to that of development and collaboration. The development of “indigenous resources” 
was held to be the right of every country. Especially at a time of world crisis in energy resources, it was 
important to exploit atomic energy, described as a “ray of hope for mankind.” Thus, atomic energy is 
represented as another valuable natural resource. The PM mentions that India is collaborating with other 
developing countries in this field. The letter goes on to acknowledge that in the general imagination, 
conditioned as it is by the misuse of atomic energy, a nuclear explosion evokes violence. This nuclear 
test is different, Mrs. Gandhi seems to imply: “There are no political or foreign policy implications of 
this test”. She expresses surprise that in spite of categorical declarations by India, Pakistan perceives a 
security threat. She writes that there was no reason to give up bilateral co-operation set in motion by the 
Shimla Agreement, “merely because we have conducted a test.”      
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out in the section dealing with the Canadian reaction: “I have repeatedly reaffirmed 
our policy of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and have specifically stated 
that we have no intention of developing nuclear weapons.” It is important to note two 
things:  first,  the  statement  is  presented  as  a  continuation  of  policy  of  eschewing 
military use. Secondly, the declaration does not promise that nuclear capability would 
not be used for enhancing security or defence preparedness, specifically that nuclear 
weapons would not be developed. The reaction of Pakistan to the blast was discussed 
next.  The  government  clarified  that  it  is  willing  to  share  nuclear  technology  with 
Pakistan, and assured that country of its peaceful intentions. 
 
The concluding part of the statement was: “No technology is evil in itself; it is the use 
that nations make of technology that determines its character. India does not accept the 
principle  of  apartheid  in  any  matter  and  technology  is  no  exception”.  Here  India 
simultaneously criticizes the double standards of the nations which have ‘misused’ 
nuclear  technology  and  affirms  that  its  own  ‘use’  is  of  a  different  order.  India’s 
technological efforts were an integral part of its challenge to the unequal international 
system.  
 
The first full-length official statement after the 1998 tests was titled The Evolution of 
India’s  Nuclear  Policy  (Anon  1998d).    It  began  by  declaring  that  “India  had 
successfully  carried  out”  three  tests.  While  the  1974  statement  named  the  Atomic 
Energy Commission as the actor carrying out the tests, here tests are presented as 
undertakings of the government, even the nation, not simply ‘scientific research’ by a 
specific  agency.  After  furnishing  some  technical  details  about  the  tests,  the  paper 
begins by situating  Indian nuclear policy in  a  global  context. When  India became 
independent, it says, “the nuclear age had already dawned. Our leaders then took the      
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crucial  decision  to  opt  for  self-reliance,  and  freedom  of  thought  and  action.”  The 
central place of independence as a characteristic of foreign policy is highlighted and 
explicitly linked to the idea of self-reliance in technology. Specifically, non-alignment 
“required” building up national strength, for which the development of science and of 
the “scientific spirit” was crucial, the statement says. 
 
The importance of disarmament is then reaffirmed. One rationale for India’s advocacy 
of disarmament is  ethical: it is the natural course for a  country that had achieved 
independence through non-violent struggle. Another is furnished in the paragraph that 
follows: a nuclear weapon free world would enhance the security of all nations. Here 
India’s  participation  in  disarmament  diplomacy  is  explicitly  linked  to  its  security 
needs. The sort of disarmament that was aimed for was, specifically, “universal and 
non-discriminatory”. The same paragraph extols the significance of sovereignty, and 
the right it grants to each nation to take decisions on the basis of its supreme national 
interests. It also offers an insight into why nuclear technology was so privileged in 
India. This technology, it states, offers developing countries the means to “leap across 
the  technological  gaps  created  by  long  years  of  colonial  exploitation”.  Next,  a 
substantial  portion  of  the  paper  is  devoted  to  listing  the  initiatives  that  India  put 
forward in the field of nuclear disarmament. 
 
By this point in the paper, two main strands have been  established  as part of the 
nuclear security discourse: deterioration in the strategic environment and commitment 
to disarmament. Keeping the option open was a policy that reconciled the imperatives 
of both security and disarmament. The document states that successive governments 
have been “safeguarding the option”. This statement also serves to reinforce the idea 
of continuity in the nuclear policy and the irrelevance of ‘political’ considerations.      
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Referring  to  the  1974  test,  the  paper  says  that  India  “demonstrated”  its  nuclear 
capability. The concept of demonstrating capability to establish and sustain deterrence 
is  implicitly  invoked.  Yet  in  the  sentences  that  follow,  further  references  to  the 
enhancement of this capability are conspicuously absent, reflecting the lack of open 
development.  India’s  refusal  to  sign  the  CTBT  is  also  explained  in  terms  of  both 
security and disarmament. On the one hand, it would limit India’s “potential” at an 
unacceptably  low  level;  “also”,  it  did  not  carry  forward  the  nuclear  disarmament 
process.   
 
The regional security environment is mentioned at this point. The abruptness of the 
reference to this variable in a discourse that has centred around abstract values until 
this point does not pass unnoticed in the paper. “Meanwhile”, it says, the last two 
decades  have  witnessed  increasing  insecurity  in  the  neighborhood.  Without 
mentioning  names,  the  document  summarizes  India’s  security  threats:  nuclear  and 
missile  proliferation,  partly  through  clandestine  procedures,  and  the  support  of 
terrorism (“clandestine war”) by neighboring states. The next paragraph asserts that 
the  end  of  the  Cold  War  did  not  assuage  the  country’s  anxieties.  Instead,  the 
compulsions  of  the  post-Cold  War  international  system  that  “left  India  with  little 
choice” but to go nuclear are listed—the lack of progress towards disarmament, and 
the legitimization of destructive technology in NWS arsenals. 
 
India had to ensure that its nuclear option did not “erode by a voluntary self-imposed 
restraint”. The paper does not explain why the option which had been safeguarded for 
so long would have eroded at this juncture; or in its own language, why at this point, “ 
the chosen path had reached a fork and the decision had to be made”. The rationale for 
the tests is coded in terms of the imperatives of technological development. In order to      
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ensure that “skills remain contemporary” and that “scientists and engineers are able to 
build on the work done by their predecessors”, data had to be obtained. The test was 
motivated by the need to reassure the Indian people about their security and to convey 
the government’s determination to “safeguard national security interests”.  
 
The remainder of the paper deals with the future of Indian nuclear policy. Whereas 
capability has been enhanced, intentions remain unchanged: “our policies towards our 
neighbours and other countries too have not changed.” India’s policy is described as 
“issue-based  bilateral  negotiation”  and  “promotion  of  peace  with  stability.”  By 
implication, enhanced capability is meant to deter external intervention in bilateral 
disputes and challenges to India’s regional predominance. 
 
“India is a Nuclear Weapons State”, the paper proclaims. This status is “India’s due”, 
“the right of one-sixth of humanity”, and “not a conferment that others are to grant.” 
Thus NWS status is privileged, and the possession of nuclear weapons seen as an 
attribute of a Great Power. Nuclear weapons are for self-defence, to ensure that “India 
is not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion”. Clearly, the deterrent role extends to 
nuclear  blackmail  and  not  just  direct  attack.  The  uniqueness  of  India’s  doctrine, 
marked by both “restraint and striving for [disarmament]”, is highlighted by vows not 
to follow the destructive nuclear doctrines of the NWS. India “shall not subscribe [to] 
or reinvent Cold War doctrines” and will avoid an arms race.  
 
Worries  about  costs  and  instability  are  refuted  in  two  ways.  First,  a  list  of  recent 
Indian  arms  control  proposals  is  put  forward.  The  traditional  commitment  to 
international institutions is reiterated. India’s closer links with the world economy as a 
result of liberalization are mentioned as further bases of interdependence. These serve      
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as reminders that India is not a ‘rogue state’. Next, the theme of  “the tradition of 
restraint” is taken up. For 24 years, India did not test. But restraint “has to arise from 
strength.  It  cannot  be  based  on  indecision  or  doubt”.  The  necessity  for  the 
demonstration  of  capability  in  maintaining  deterrence  by  convincing  a  potential 
adversary about the nature and scope of response is implicit here. India’s willingness 
to  negotiate  various  arms  control  measures  is  presented  as  proof  of  restraint.  The 
admission that comprehensive disarmament has been and is likely to remain a utopian 
ideal,  opens  up  the  possibility  that  India  would  be  amenable  to  settling  for 
modifications in the regime. 
 
The claim that there is absolute consensus on the policy: the people have, “with one 
voice,  spoken  in  favour  of  the  Government’s  action…”,  contributes  to  the 
marginalization of dissent. The paper ends with a quote from the Gita (one of the 
Hindu scriptures) exalting restraint. It says that while action undertaken to attain the 
goal of stability and peace may be seen as disruptive, this particular objective will be 
attained only through controlled and goal-oriented action. Indian tradition is invoked 
to substantiate the dictum that preparations for war are essential for peace. 
 
The  two  speeches  were  converted  into  machine-readable  form  and  analyzed  with 
CATPAC. The 1974 speech was 1291 words long (out of which CATPAC found 200 
words after elimination of the terms entered in the exclude file). Similarly in 1998, the 
PM’s speech was 3319 words and CATPAC analyzed 376 words.  
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Table 1.3: CATPAC Analysis of 1974 speech 
 
TOTAL WORDS: 200 
TOTAL UNIQUE WORDS: 25 (Only 14 reported here) 
TOTAL EPISODES: 194 
TOTAL LINES: 95 
 
 
WORD  FREQ  PCNT  FREQ*  PCNT* 
INDIA  18  9.0  102  52.6 
NUCLEAR  18  9.0  103  53.1 
ENERGY  14  7.0  80  41.2 
EXPERIMENT  14  7.0  71  36.6 
GOVERNMENT  14  7.0  67  34.5 
ATOMIC  13  6.5  72  37.1 
PEACEFUL  13  6.5  82  42.3 
COMMISSION  9  4.5  53  27.3 
TECHNOLOGY  8  4.0  36  18.6 
EXPLOSION  7  3.5  47  24.2 
CARRIED  6  3.0  40  20.6 
COUNTRIES  6  3.0  42  21.6 
EXPLOSIONS  6  3.0  26  13.4 
PAKISTAN  6  3.0  34  17.5 
 
 
CATPAC works by passing a window of a predetermined size through blocks of text. 
In this analysis the default size of 7 was used. Changing the size of the window did nto 
significantly alter the results. As it passes through the text, ‘neurons’ are activated 
either by being in a window or by being connected to another activated neuron. Finally 
the neurons are summed and if they exceed a threshold, they are reported. Each update 
is called a cycle. The default threshold is zero. By lowering the threshold, we make it 
more likely that neurons will be activated.  
 
While FREQ and PCNT refer to the number and percentage of times a word was used 
in the text, FREQ* and PCNT* indicate the total number of windows in which a word 
was used, and the percentage of windows that contain a particular word. Unique words      
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refer to the words that were analyzed (not excluded), and the number of episodes is the 
number of windows used in the text.  
 
In terms of salience, we see that in 1974 the most salient terms are India, nuclear, 
energy,  experiment,  government.  In  1998  the  top  five  terms  were:  nuclear,  India, 
weapons, security, tests. The shift of emphasis is encapsulated in the substitution of 
weapons and security for energy and experiment. In fact in the 1974 speech the word 
energy appears only twice, once in a reference to an Act passed in the 1950s and the 
other  time  in  a  quote  by  Nehru,  also  from  that  era.  Clearly  security  has  replaced 
energy as the most important word. It is also notable that the event is being named as 
tests rather than experiment, since the former is more associated with weapon systems 
and the latter with scientific research. 
 
Moving on to the clusters, we find that the clusters in 1974 were (not listed in any 
particular order):  
 
A.  radioactive, explosions, radioactivity, oil 
B.  Canada, Pakistan, technology, will, countries 
C.  government, India 
D.  purposes, international, stated, regard, research 





      





Figure 3: Plot of 1998 PM speech
8 
 
In 1998 the clusters were: 
A.  international, negotiations, Indian 
B.  restraint, action, decision 
C.  countries, disarmament, weapons, weapon 
D.  security, tests, government, nuclear, India  
E.  capability, years 
 
What do the clusters tell us about the discourse in 1974? In cluster E we see that the 
AEC carried out an underground nuclear explosion in 1974. In cluster B, Canada  and 
                                                 
8 Log transformed to make clusters more visible      
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Pakistan are named as the countries that are connected to technology—in the former 
case as a supplier and in the latter as a potential sharer of nuclear technology. As we 
would expect, oil appears in the ‘scientific’ cluster A along with ‘radioactivity’ and 
‘radioactive’,  since  the  explosion  was  ostensibly  carried  out  to  find  new  energy 
sources.  The  clusters  in  1998,  on  the  other  hand,  do  not  have  any  references  to 
technology. This means that in 1998 although science, technology and research were 
mentioned a few times in the speech, they were not well connected to the rest of the 
discourse. Security is closely associated with tests, a nuclear capability and the Indian 
government.  
 
Although  the  two  speeches  together  are  almost  5000  words  long  the  quantitative 
analysis was performed in a matter of seconds. The qualitative analysis took much 
longer and is almost 1700 words by itself. Since these are key speeches, however, they 
benefited  from  careful  analysis  of  transitions,  word  choice  and  allusions.  My 
qualitative  analysis  also  embeds  the  two  speeches  in  the  larger  context  of  nuclear 
policy. Thus a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is ideal for content 
analysis.  
      
  49 
Conclusion 
 
In  the  literature,  divergent  accounts  of  nuclear  policy-making  emphasize  national 
security, organizational interest or normative considerations. This work assumes that 
Indian policy makers are interested in maximizing the country’s security and global 
status, as well as personal and organizational interests. However, their conceptions of 
what these goals mean in concrete terms are constituted by changing global norms. In 
the chapters that follow, I discuss the making of Indian policy over five decades to 
illustrate this process of constitution.  
 
In Chapter 2 I provide brief histories of the nonproliferation regime as well as Indian 
security and nuclear policy. I discuss the four fundamental processes by which the 
former  influenced  the  latter.  In  Chapters  3  and  4  I  attempt  to  reconstruct  India’s 
policies as responses to changes in the nonproliferation regime. Chapter 3 shows how 
the  nonproliferation  regime,  by  attempting  to  constitute  India  as  a  Non-Nuclear 
Weapon State, also constituted distinct security problems for the country. This chapter 
describes India’s security problematique, stressing that threats were always perceived 
within  the  rubric  of  international  norms  concerning  the  possession  of  nuclear 
capability. Chapter 4 deals with domestic politics and demonstrates the processes by 
which the international regime empowered some actors within India with rhetorical 
resources.  The  chapter  also  describes  the  direct  effect  of  international  norms  on 
national identity. That is, it asks both, “who gets to decide what security is?” and the 
more fundamental question: “whose security are we talking about?” 
 
The next two chapters attempt to introduce some comparative examples. In Chapter 5 
I focus on the nuclear programs of France and South Africa and in Chapter 6, I study      
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the evolution of the counter-terrorism regime. In both chapters I explain the limitations 
of the comparison and draw out explicit parallels and discordances. The Conclusion, 
Chapter 7, draws out implications for International Relations theory from the case of 
Indian (and  French and South African) nuclear policy, and the mini-case study of 
counter-terrorism. It also hazards some predictions about the behavior of leaders in 
other  countries  of  proliferation  concern  such  as  North  Korea  and  Iran,  and  offers 
suggestions  to  policy-makers  responsible  for  strengthening  the  nuclear 
nonproliferation regime and dealing with these countries. The chapter concludes with 
a discussion of prospects for future research on these issues of global importance.           




INDIA AND THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 
 
 
In this chapter in the first two sections I first describe the four processes by which the 
nonproliferation regime affects state behavior and summarize the developments in the 
regime  over  the  last  fifty  years.  In  Section  Three  I  discuss  the  importance  of 
deterrence  in  the  nonproliferation  regime.  Next,  I  briefly  discuss  India’s  security 
problematic and the history of its nuclear program in Sections Four and Five.  
 
Section One: Regimes at work 
 
Here I describe the four processes by which regimes affect national decisions. The 
first two, definition and categorization, are constitutive processes while the last two, 
institutionalization and enforcement, are regulative. 
 
Definition 
In international politics, half the battle is won when one’s definition of a term becomes 
hegemonic. Recognizing this, states strive to influence the formulation of the problem 
that the regime is designed to confront. Hegemons not only solve problems but create 
them—that is, they frame something as a problem. Contrary to functionalist logic, 
there are no ‘objective problems’ (Goertz 2003, 173). 
 
Proliferation  today  has  an  accepted  meaning:  we  think  of  it  as  the  acquisition  of 
nuclear weapons, or the ability to produce them at short notice. Tracing the battles 
over the definition of proliferation reminds us of its constitutive power. The now-     
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hegemonic definition of proliferation encountered several challenges in the 1950s and 
1960s. First, there was the question of nuclear weapons that were manufactured by one 
country and housed or controlled by others. The Eisenhower administration planned to 
give nuclear technology to certain allies (Trachtenberg 1999, 146-7, 58). This was 
termed ‘nuclear sharing’ (Wohlstetter 1961, 356). The term ‘proliferation’, in contrast, 
had negative connotations because of its resonances with disease (Mandelbaum 1981, 
162). Further, there was the issue of nuclear arms owned by the US but stationed on 
the territory of NATO allies. Theoretically, Americans were supposed to be in control 
of  these  weapons,  but  recent  research  has  shown  that  the  policy  was  for  them  to 
relinquish control for some period (Trachtenberg 1999, 194). These arrangements with 
allies were not included within the ambit of ‘proliferation’, in spite of efforts by the 
Soviet Union and non-aligned countries such as India. In 1966, at a Congressional 
Hearing, Secretary of State Rusk claimed that NATO arrangements had “nothing to do 
with proliferation,” dismissing the Soviet objection as simply irrelevant (Anon 1966a). 
Another unsuccessful attempt to broaden the definition of proliferation originated in 
what  was  then  called  the  Third  World.  These  countries  wanted  ‘vertical’ 
proliferation—quantitative and qualitative increases in existing nuclear arsenals—to 
be included in the definition of proliferation along with ‘horizontal’ proliferation—the 
acquisition of capability by new countries. The NPT’s Article VI, which obliges the 
NWS to pursue disarmament in good faith, is intended to address this concern. The 
lack of progress in fulfilling this obligation is a source of leverage for the NPT parties 
not  possessing  nuclear  weapons  (albeit  one  that  has  become  moot  with  the  1995 
indefinite  and  unconditional  extension  of  the  treaty).
1  The  accepted  definition  of 
proliferation today is that of an increase in the geographical dispersion of weapons 
                                                 
1 The goal of “general and complete disarmament” referred to in Article VI, which would include also 
conventional disarmament, has faded without trace from the discourse.       
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(outside NWS control), rather than an increase in the number of weapons that NWS 
possess. In fact, some scholars claim, the present arrangement is better described as a 
‘nondissemination’ rather than a nonproliferation regime (Keeley 1990, 104).  
 
While the NPT narrowed the definition of proliferation in some ways, it broadened it 
in others. The treaty’s Articles I and II set up curbs on all nuclear explosive devices 
whether they were intended for use in peaceful civilian applications or not. NNWS 
were not allowed to carry out nuclear explosions, since the data could also be used for 
military  purposes.  Instead,  the  NWS  pledged  to  share  with  them,  for  peaceful 
purposes, the know-how obtainable from such experiments.  
 
Countries like India and Brazil, interested in the civilian uses of nuclear explosives, 
and/or in keeping the weapons option open, protested this definition, arguing that all 
nations should be free to take advantage of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs). They 
claimed that PNEs were so vital for development that no country could afford to rely 
on international aid for this technology. (India was willing to accept nondiscriminatory 
and universal safeguards to ensure that PNEs were not misused (Epstein 1976, 74). 
However, as we will see, the distinction between a PNE and a weapons test is not 
technical but political.)
2 India was not alone in wanting to restrict the definition of 
nuclear  weapons.  Within  the  US  government,  while  the  Arms  Control  and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) lobbied to expand the definition of nuclear weapon to 
include all nuclear explosions, the Atomic Energy Commission protested. The former 
carried the day. As Schelling wrote, “The decisive argument against PNEs was that 
                                                 
2 Speaking at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission (ENDC) on 12 March 1964, the Indian 
representative  said  that  safeguards  should  be  imposed  on  the  extraction  of  enriched  uranium  and 
plutonium and not on uranium mining, fuel fabrication, power plants, or “equipment and devices which 
in themselves serve no military purpose” (emphasis mine).      
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they  would  accustom the world to nuclear explosions, undermining the belief that 
nuclear  explosions  were  inherently  evil  and  reducing  inhibitions  on  using  nuclear 
weapons” (Tannenwald 2005, 30). 
 
In the 1990s we note another significant redefinition of the problem. Revelations about 
Iraq’s  nuclear  program  crystallized  a  growing  conviction  that  the  nuclear  danger 
stemmed not only from actual weapons but also the capability to manufacture them. 
The inclusion of all countries with nuclear reactors in the list of obligatory signatories 
for the CTBT symbolizes this broadening of the definition of the problem.  
 
Categorization 
Regimes define the problem to be confronted,  and also define  categories of states 
(usually but not always their members) with corresponding rights and responsibilities. 
Mandelbaum describes this as a primary function of the NPT: “The treaty clarifies and 
publicizes which states have the bomb and which do not” (Mandelbaum 1995, 162). 
As  per  article  IX  of  the  NPT,  countries  that  exploded  a  nuclear  device  before  1 
January 1967 are NWS and all other states are NNWS. Thus, a nuclear explosion is 
chosen to be the symbol through which a NWS is identified. Though the treaty does 
not explicitly state this, this categorization had the effect of legitimizing the possession 
of nuclear weapons by the five NWS—the US, the USSR, the UK, France and China.  
 
The NPT thus codified the convention that only a country that had tested a nuclear 
device could even put forward its claim to be a NWS. Does this imply that any country 
that had tested nuclear devices should be treated as a NWS? This question became 
important in 1974 when India, a non-NPT party, tested a device in what it described as 
a PNE. India did not claim NWS status at this time and insisted that the test had no      
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military  implications.  However,  as  we  will  see,  the  link  that  had  been  established 
between  testing  and  the  possession  of  weapons  helped  India  to  maintain  opaque 
deterrence over the next quarter-century.  
 
Is nuclear testing today necessary or sufficient for NWS status? North Korea declared 
(privately in 2003 and publicly in 2005) that it had nuclear weapons and withdrew 
from the NPT (Kerr 2003). Although it is assumed that North Korea has not tested, the 
country is treated as possessing nuclear weapons, yet it does not have NWS status and 
is unlikely to obtain it. The same is the case for Israel. Even India and Pakistan are 
resigned to not being formally acknowledged as NWS. We can conclude that testing is 
insufficient but necessary for acquiring NWS status. However, 1998 shows us that 
testing may be necessary—if not for formal NWS status, at least for regularization of 
nuclear possession.    
 
Categorization by the nonproliferation regime assigns each state an identity. Why do 
states  care  about  categorization?  While  national  identity  is  not  determined  by 
categorization  by  one  international  regime,  the  more  legitimate  or  hegemonic  the 
regime becomes, the more likely it is that its categorization of a country will become 
the dominant constitution. That is, it will make the country what it ‘is’ to the other 
members  of  the  international  community.  The  very  survival  of  the  state  will  then 
depend  on  how  it  is  categorized.  Here  security  derives  from  the  identity  the  state 
bears. While the term ‘identity’ is usually used to refer to the sense of nationhood, 
derived from domestic sources, that a state projects, I use it here to mean that which 
distinguishes the state among other states. 
      
  56 
The most vivid and recent example of the importance of identity is that of Iraq. In 
1991,  the  UN  passed  Resolution  687  depriving  it  of  all  WMD  and  facilities  to 
manufacture and deliver them. Over the next twelve years, various measures to ensure 
the  enforcement  of  this  resolution  led  to  increasingly  stringent  sanctions  on  Iraq. 
These resolutions named Iraq’s non-compliance a threat to international peace and 
security. They reminded the world that nuclear weapons could be owned only by the 
five countries identified in the NPT. Admittedly, Iraq had been acquiring weapons 
capabilities before its invasion of Kuwait (while the world turned a blind eye); other 
states like Iran and North Korea were also engaged in this quest and did not face 
similar punishment. Yet it was Iraq’s naming as a threat to international peace, as a 
NNWS that was acquiring nuclear weapons, that made international action against it—
however contested—possible.  
 
The German case is a less dramatic example of the effects of identity. The Paris Treaty 
of  1954  restored  full  sovereignty  to  the  FRG  and  lifted  restrictions  on  its  civilian 
nuclear program on condition that the country would never manufacture WMD. This 
was not enough to reassure Germany’s traditional rivals. Britain and France were keen 
to curb the FRG’s nuclear development. One way was to include the country in the 
NPT  as  a  NNWS.  The  permanent  renunciation  of  nuclear  weapons  codified  in  an 
international treaty reminded many in the FRG of postwar humiliations (Schrafstetter 
and Twigge 2004, 10, 194). They perceived an attempt to cut Germany down to size 
by keeping it out of the NWS category forever. A major concern was that as a NNWS 
its civilian program would be hobbled (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 183). This 
would turn it into a “toothless agrarian country” (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 188). 
The German association of NWS status with military and economic might was not 
mistaken. Western diplomats of the time fretted at the possibility that if even India      
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acquired nuclear weapons they would fail to convince an industrialized country like 
the FRG to refrain from following suit (Schrafstetter 2002, 88).  
 
At the same time, the identity effects of NNWS status were also appreciated by some 
in Germany. German scientists supported NPT accession in their quest to overcome 
the stigma of their association with Hitler’s projects (Kotter and Muller 1990, 18). 
Germany insisted on a public confirmation of the US security guarantee in return for 
signing the NPT (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 184). Realizing that they were not in 
a position to influence the treaty, Germany’s leaders feared that they would be blamed 
for  blocking  progress  if  they  insisted  on  linking  the  treaty  to  disarmament 
(Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 95, 189). They also felt unable to counter the hostility 
from the USSR that would follow on a German rejection of the treaty. Thus Germany 
signed the NPT in 1969. Similarly, Yugoslavia signed the NPT as a NNWS because it 
was worried about possible Soviet aggression (Jha 1983, 303). Here the NPT is being 
used  as  a  signaling  device  by  countries  trying  to  mitigate  their  security  dilemmas 
(Sasikumar and Way 2005). 
 
Institutionalization and enforcement 
International  institutions  represent  a  concentration  of  technical  and  organizational 
resources  devoted  to  an  issue-area.  Their  services  include  standardization,  dispute 
settlement,  and  facilitation  of  discussion.  Enforcement  includes  both  positive 
incentives (inducements) and negative incentives (sanctions). On the one hand, states’ 
interests are determined by their identity choices, and the processes of definition and 
categorization have already established the range of possible identities. On the other 
hand, institutionalization and enforcement do reinforce definition and categorization, 
and they form the most visible parts of the regime.      
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The  Conference  on  Disarmament  and  the  IAEA  are  among  the  institutions  of  the 
nonproliferation  regime.  While  the  term  institution  has  sometimes  been  used  as  a 
description of patterns of behavior or a synonym for norm, I employ it to refer to 
formal  or  informal  international  organizations.  Institutions  are  the  locus  of  the 
concrete  activity  of  a  regime.  Consequently,  they  are  often  the  focus  of  scholars 
studying  ‘what  the  regime  does.’  A  focus  on  formal  and  concrete  organizations 
obscures some of the power of the regime. Since my goal is to illuminate constitutive 
processes, I often treat institutions in a simplistic fashion, taking them as ‘given’ and 
‘monolithic.’ While I accept the inevitable limitations, this was necessary to avoid an 
unwieldy project.  
 
Enforcement in the nonproliferation regime is controversial. Non-compliance, though 
rare, is not easy to deal with. Violators of the NPT can be referred to the U.N. Security 
Council.  During  the  Cold  War  this  provision  was  never  invoked  although  several 
countries such as India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa were known to be working 
on  nuclear  programs.  In  these  cases,  geopolitical  considerations  prevailed  over 
concerns about proliferation, while commercial interests seemed to trump them in the 
cases of Brazil and Argentina.  
 
After the Cold War the Security Council became more effective as vetoes were used 
less  frequently  and  other  UN  bodies  received  mandates  supporting  enforcement. 
Inspections after the First Gulf War revealed that Iraq had been conducting programs 
to develop its own uranium enrichment programs, make atomic and hydrogen bombs, 
and  develop  delivery  systems.  The  international  community  imposed  sanctions  to 
prevent the resumption of the program. Yet even in 2003, American doubts as to the      
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effectiveness of multilateral inspections and the complete elimination of Iraqi WMD 
capabilities were invoked as justification for another war. Recently when North Korea 
announced its withdrawal from the NPT the international community was paralyzed.
3 
Since enforcement is a complicated issue I will deal with it in the following chapters 
only as far as it affected India’s policy.  
 
 
Section Two: Changing international norms on nonproliferation 
 
The nonproliferation regime developed concurrently with the post-World War Two 
order. It bears the marks of the political climates it passed through. There are several 
excellent studies of the politics of the regime (Chafetz 1995; Epstein 1976; Mutimer 
2000b; Ungerer and Hanson 2001). As I clarified in Chapter 1, while I recognize that 
international norms are produced by highly political maneuvers, I bracket this process 
for the most part. Here I summarize the shifts in international norms without delving 
into their causes.  
 
1950s 
The early years were marked by intense optimism about the power of the atom, yet the 
notion  of  having  created  a  Frankenstein-ian  power  remained  strong  (Ungar  1992, 
60,65). The US emerged as the most advanced state in the military and civilian uses of 
nuclear power, and not coincidentally, as the norm leader in arms control. In the 1950s 
the newly-established UN manifested a genuine tide of world opinion against nuclear 
weapons.  The very  first UNGA called for proposals for the  elimination of  atomic 
                                                 
3 Under Article X a party has the “right” to withdraw from the treaty, but this right is not unconditional. 
In addition to providing three months’ notice of its intention to withdraw, the state must also provide 
the Security Council with a statement of the “extraordinary events” that would make continuation in the 
treaty injurious to its “supreme interests.”      
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weapons and all other major weapons “adaptable to mass destruction” (Tannenwald 
2004, 3). The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission (ENDC) became, in 1961, 
the main negotiating body. In the war-weary climate of the age, the superpowers felt 
obliged  to  participate  in  disarmament  negotiations,  unwillingly  furthering  the  anti-
nuclear  weapon  discourse  (Tannenwald  2005,  19).  The  idea  that  sovereign  state 
privilege would have to compete with the imperatives of international peace when it 
came to nuclear weapons gained ground.  
 
The  IAEA  was  set  up  with  the  dual  tasks  of  promoting  nuclear  technology  in 
development and restricting its military uses. Conflicting mandates may be responsible 
for the organization’s failure to predict and contain proliferation, but they reflect the 
linked beliefs of its founders—that nuclear power was vital and transformative, and 
that  its  destructive  uses  would  be  controlled.  In  1953  Eisenhower  gave  a  famous 
speech to the UN proferring the ‘commercial option.’ He admitted: “If at one time the 
US  possessed  what  might  have  been  called  a  monopoly  of  atomic  power,  that 
monopoly ceased to exist several years ago…the knowledge now possessed by several 
nations will eventually  be shared by  others, possibly all others” (Schrafstetter  and 
Twigge 2004, 49). The Atoms for Peace program was an attempt by the norm leader to 
attract other states to a framework to channel nuclear knowledge into peaceful uses 
(Nye 1981, 17).  
 
In  1957  the  US  Atomic  Energy  Commission  started  Project  Plowshare  to  study 
nuclear explosions in mining and other civilian uses (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 
173).  American  firms  had  cornered  the  market  and  commercial  interests  were 
reinforced by scientific laboratories who had an interest in keeping all options for 
testing open. 200,000 copies of Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace speech were sent out by      
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US  firms  in  their  foreign  mail.  The  US  Information  Agency  also  propagated  the 
message  (Titus  1986,  77).  Other  Western  countries  also  were  interested  in  the 
opportunities for profit. As a result, there was competition among nuclear suppliers for 
markets. This implied that any supply-side regime faced a collective-action problem: 
while it was in the larger interest of all to prevent the diffusion of weapon technology, 




The decade of the 1960s was marked by nuclear testing—by France in 1960 and China 
in 1964. The Chinese program greatly worried the US as well as the USSR, which had 
initially aided China. The perceived need to seal the door to the nuclear club hastened 
the negotiation of the  NPT. This decade also  saw the establishment of a strategic 
stalemate between the US and the USSR, as the latter developed missiles capable of 
targeting the US. The idea of deterrence became the common sense of the age.  
 
We note the gradual erosion of the belief that nuclear weapons could be completely 
eliminated  (Poulose  1996,  69;  Schrafstetter  and  Twigge  2004,  5).  Tests  by  five 
countries  had  shown  that  know-how  was  too  diffused  for  the  nuclear  genie  to  be 
returned to the bottle. The enmity between the superpowers rendered impossible the 
task of creating trust between the parties to eventual disarmament. While international 
forums saw frequent calls for disarmament, these were often issued by the nonaligned 
and  developing  nations,  identifying  disarmament  as  a  demand  of  the  weak.
4  As 
disarmament became increasingly implausible, arms control became more acceptable, 
                                                 
4 Thomas Schelling contrasted the “serious and businesslike prospects for realistic negotiations in 1969” 
with  the  “fantasy  and  pretense  about  general  and  comprehensive  disarmament”  a  decade  earlier 
(Mutimer 2000b, 34).      
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especially after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The very first treaty negotiated under 
UN auspices was the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) prohibiting nuclear testing in the 
atmosphere,  under  water,  and  in  outer  space.  Originally  devised  as  part  of  a 
comprehensive  disarmament  plan,  the  link  between  disarmament  and  testing  was 
dropped in 1959, turning the PTBT into an arms control measure (Schrafstetter and 
Twigge 2004, 121).  
 
The  NPT,  which  opened  for  signatures  in  1968,  became  the  cornerstone  of  the 
nonproliferation regime. The NPT was the product of an unprecedented agreement 
between the superpowers. The Johnson administration (in contrast to the Kennedy and 
Nixon  administrations)  put  its  weight  behind  nonproliferation.  The  two  primary 
targets—the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan—were persuaded by this support 
on the part of norm leader, to accede to the NPT and thereby acquire the status of 
“virtuous” countries (Gavin 2004/5, 135). The Italian foreign ministry once described 
the  NPT  as  the  first  unequal  treaty  of  the  20th  century.  Over  time,  though,  most 
countries came to accept this infringement of sovereignty and the double standard of 
the  treaty  in  the  belief  that  it  was  the  most  reasonable  way  to  avoid  a  nuclear 
conflagration (Quester 1979, 546).  
 
1970s 
The 1970s saw a thaw in the Cold War symbolized by the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks that produced a successful treaty in 1972. In that year the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty also came into effect. By limiting their ability to defend important territories, 
the  latter  institutionalized  the  mutual  vulnerability  of  the  two  superpowers,  thus 
strengthening deterrence. Détente, brought about by several structural and domestic 
factors,  represented  the  acceptance  of  the  international  order  by  the  powers  that      
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mattered. The NPT was gradually growing in strength as a treaty. In the first three 
years, over 40% of eligible states acceded to it (and expanded in a linear fashion after 
that) (Sasikumar and Way 2005, 13). 
 
The 1974 PNE by India was the first event that destabilized the regime, providing a 
vivid  demonstration  of  the  need  to  ensure  that  nuclear  exports  were  safeguarded. 
Although the explosion fitted the definition of proliferation in the NPT, India was not 
a party to the NPT and had not broken any formal international commitments. While 
the  Zangger  Committee  had  already  been  formed  in  1971  in  recognition  of  the 
inadequacies of the NPT, the  Indian test triggered the creation of the  NSG which 
mandated safeguards on all nuclear facilities and later, on dual-use technologies also. 
The NSG  allowed for the inclusion of France—a nuclear exporter, yet not an NPT 
member—in export control. India did face sanctions after 1974, although these were 
never  as  severe  as  nonproliferation  advocates  wished.  One  observer  commented: 
“…India has succeeded in becoming a nuclear power with astonishingly little adverse 
comment. India seems to have ‘pulled it off’ at very little, if any, cost in terms of 
world opinion” (Epstein 1976, 229). 
 
Nuclear  technology  came  under  greater  scrutiny.  The  Symington  and  Glenn 
Amendments to the US Foreign Assistance Act implied an expanded definition of 
proliferation, covering not only the detonation of a device but also the acquisition of 
the capability of producing fissile material (Scheinman 1987, 184). Writing in 1977, 
Fred  Iklé  of  ACDA  named  Atoms  for  Peace  as  the  main  culprit  for  proliferation 
(Poulose  1996,  109).  In  July  1974,  the  US  announced  suspension  of  long-term 
uranium enrichment contracts (Brenner 1981, 14). Washington ended funding for its 
own PNE program in 1970 (Reiss 1995, 230). After the 1979 accident at the Three      
  64 
Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania, no new nuclear reactors were built in the US. The 
USSR continued to conduct PNEs till 1988.  
 
President Carter adopted a ‘countervailing’ strategy for national defense, that some 
claimed, made nuclear use more probable by making it more thinkable. At the same 
time, his administration adopted the most activist position of any US administration to 
that point on proliferation—exemplified by the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act 
which put stringent and retroactive conditions on nuclear fuel supplied by the US. 
However, other suppliers like France and Germany were engaging in unsafeguarded 
nuclear  commerce.  The  most  flagrant  example  was  the  1975  Germany-Brazil 
agreement on the supply of eight nuclear power reactors.   
 
1980s 
The nonproliferation regime entered the 1980s battered but not broken. By the early 
1980s,  97%  of  all  nuclear  plants  in  the  NNWS  were  under  IAEA  safeguards. 
Inspections were also on the rise: from 180 inspections in 1970, to 1100 by 1980, and 
1820 by 1984 (Scheinman 1987, 150). Anti-nuclear movements demanded that the 
superpowers do more to curb the nuclear danger. The ‘freeze’ movement—calling for 
a bilateral moratorium on testing and production—was a response to the US failure to 
ratify the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II agreement. The re-freezing of the Cold 
War, as symbolized by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, stymied any possibility of 
arms control. Ronald Reagan came to power promising to end the impotence that was 
a result of nuclear deterrence. His administration saw the discussion of warfighting 
doctrines at the highest levels. On proliferation, it declared itself more sympathetic to 
countries’ security and economic imperatives, reversing many Carter decisions (Tate 
1990, 401).       
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This decade saw increasing concern about the possibility that terrorists would acquire 
nuclear materials, and the Vienna convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Materials was enacted. Nuclear programs in Israel, India and Pakistan were tacitly 
acknowledged but in the absence of an overt crossing of the nuclear threshold, they 
did not face penalties. Joseph Nye advocated that once a country is capable of building 
nuclear weapons, all others could do was to persuade it not to produce or deploy them 
(Nye 1989-90, 60). By the late 1980s, other military technologies such as missiles had 
also begun to be ‘imagined’ in terms of proliferation (Mutimer 2000b, 66).  
 
Radical change was possible only with the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev on the world 
scene. The deceleration of the nuclear arms race proceeded apace with Gorbachev-
initiated internal change in the Soviet Union. These shifts were to lead to the peaceful 
end of the four-decades-long Cold War in the eventful years 1989-1991. During the 
Cold War strategic compulsions had frequently prevailed over nonproliferation (Smith 
and Cobban 1989). At a lecture on 6 May 2005 at Stanford, Hans Blix, former head of 
the IAEA, characterized the start of the 1990s as “euphoric.” Supporters of the UN 
believed that the Security Council could now effectively ensure collective security in 
the absence of obstructive vetoes, and that there would be dramatic cuts in the arsenals 
of  the  NWS,  as  well  as  an  extension  of  the  nonproliferation  regime  to  the  few 
holdouts, of which India was one.   
 
1990s 
The US did trim its arsenal in response to the fading of the Soviet threat. In September 
1991 President Bush issued a directive that halved the number of warheads. Russia 
also decided to eliminate the bulk of the nuclear weapons it had inherited. Belarus,      
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Kazakhstan  and  Ukraine  chose  to  give  up  their  nuclear  arms  under  international 
pressure  and  acceded  to  the  NPT.  In  Latin  America,  traditional  rivals  Brazil  and 
Argentina engaged in a peace process and gave up their arsenals. They even dropped 
their common antagonism to the NPT and signed it in 1997 and 1995 respectively. In 
1991 the USSR announced a test moratorium, and this was followed  by a  French 
moratorium in 1992 (France resumed testing for a few months in 1995) and a US 
moratorium in 1993. In December 1996 dozens of retired military officers from across 
the world joined to call for the abolition of nuclear weapons. 
 
Yet,  nuclear  weapons  continue  to  structure  the  global  order.  Russia  still  has  8200 
nuclear warheads, most targeted at the US. The Americans maintain 7000 offensive 
strategic warheads. Each of these has roughly 20 times the destructive power of the 
bomb dropped on Hiroshima (McNamara and Caldicott 2004). The People’s Republic 
of China maintained its arsenal and improved delivery systems. The UK and France 
also  chose  to  retain  their  arsenals,  although  they  made  cuts.  The  1991  Gulf  War 
allowed  the  US  to  conflate  WMD  and  ‘rogue  states’  in  order  to  justify  the 
modernization of nuclear arsenals and doctrines of nuclear deterrence (Alley 2001, 
57). The end of the bipolar competition only reinforced the perception of NWS as 
mature and advanced states responsible for international stability through their deft 
wielding of the instruments of deterrence.  
 
The IAEA, originally a forum for technical discussion, began to host discussions with 
overt political hues. Delegations to the IAEA began to comprise more diplomats than 
scientists (Ramanna 1991, 85). The post-Gulf War revelations about Iraqi preparations 
to  build  weapons  damaged  the  institution’s  credibility.  US  and  British  leaders 
routinely denigrated its capabilities for inspection and export control (Spector 1998,      
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65).  They  increasingly  preferred  informal  multilateral  agreements  such  as  the 
International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC) and the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), to multilateral treaties under UN auspices. 
 
In this climate, the NPT Review Conference (NPTREC) was held in 1995. As per the 
treaty’s provisions, the conference would decide whether to extend its life. The US 
Ambassador to the NPTREC called it the “most important multilateral arms control 
conference  in  history”  (Williams  2005).  NNWS,  intent  on  extracting  concessions, 
pointed to the glaring failure of the NWS to attempt in good faith to eliminate nuclear 
weapons as required by Article VI. They threatened to grant only a limited extension 
conditional on progress towards disarmament. The NWS exerted intense pressure for 
an indefinite and unconditional extension. Finally, the NPTREC approved “Principles 
and  Objectives  for  Nuclear  Nonproliferation  and  Disarmament”  a  document 
recommitting nations to the goal of nuclear disarmament, as part of the bargain that 
NNWS extracted in return for indefinite extension.  
 
By the late 1950s the cessation of tests had emerged as an integral and often the most 
salient component of the UN's disarmament agenda (Reisman 1999b, 477). The early 
conclusion of a CTBT was another promise that the NWS made at the NPTREC. Yet 
the CTBT was not a disarmament measure. The NWS had conducted thousands of 
nuclear tests and had the ability to use the data thus obtained for simulations. The 
Clinton  administration,  in  attempting  to  convince  the  Senate  to  ratify  the  CTBT, 
assured  Americans  that  the  treaty  would  “lock  in  a  technological  status  quo  that 
protects us without threatening others” (Leaver 2001, 125). Similar statements are to 
be found in the discourse in the UK (Calvert and Gourlay 1995). Countries like India, 
low on the nuclear learning curve, saw themselves as the treaty’s targets.      
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Tannenwald  writes  that  with  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  the  major  debates  in  arms 
control  were  no  longer  on  the  East-West  axis  but  on  the  North-South  axis 
(Tannenwald 2004, 3). However, the 1995 Review Conference highlighted the fissures 
among the Third World and the non-aligned. After the Cold War, the regime began to 
shed its ‘Western’ and ‘neo-imperialist’ connotations and could more easily be seen as 
providing a common good. If Atoms for Peace had helped unleash the atomic genie, 
the US is now trying to put it back in the bottle. President G. W. Bush currently argues 
for  disallowing  the  universal  right  to  acquire  enrichment  technology.  Countries 
already enriching uranium would be exempt from the ban, and would supply nuclear 
fuel for power reactors to others. In March 2005 he reiterated that this was the only 
way to close the loopholes in the regime (Sanger 2005). The Bush administration is 
thus  pushing  for  a  tighter  definition  of  proliferation  under  which  all  uranium 
enrichment would be controlled.  
 
Section Three: Deterrence—identity and performance 
 
The previous section highlighted the shifts in priority given to nuclear norms over 
time.  Constructivists  would  recognize  deterrence  as  another  international  norm 
(Farrell and Lambert 2001, 310). While the practice has no basis in international law, 
it has been so fundamental since 1945 that it was recognized by the  International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) as an exception or possible justification for states’ retaining 
nuclear weapons.  
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The concept of deterrence 
 Deterrence is a military strategy where the threat of reprisal is used to forestall an 
attack by the adversary. The concept of credibility allows this mainly psychological 
concept  to  be  treated  within  a  rational  utilitarian  calculus.  However,  credibility 
simultaneously allows for a great deal of latitude in the estimation of the requirements 
of deterrence (Falk 1989, 64). Since deterrence is based on rationality it is universally 
applicable. It is said that ‘nuclear weapons concentrate the mind wonderfully.’ That is, 
since the cost of aggression is so stark, differences in individual psychology, culture or 
national values are evened-out and irrelevant to actors’ cost-benefit calculations. In 
effect, deterrence is culture-proof.  
 
The  literature  contains  many  attacks  on  this  conception  of  deterrence—from 
psychology (Green 1966; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1989), ethics (Shue 1989b), and 
organizational theory (Sagan 1993). Others have shown that the non-use of nuclear 
weapons  after 1945 cannot be explained without reference to  a nuclear taboo—an 
unreasoning  avoidance  of  nuclear  use.  Yet  while  the  taboo  and  deterrence  are 
competing  explanations  for  nuclear  nonuse,  the  taboo  has  also  strengthened  and 
legitimized nuclear deterrence by making nuclear use less likely (Tannenwald 2005, 
41).  Nuclear  warfighting  doctrines  were  disparaged  as  making  nuclear  use  more 
probable by making it more thinkable; we can say that by making nuclear use more 
unthinkable, deterrence made nuclear arsenals more acceptable.  
 
In  the  security  model,  deterrence  is  portrayed  as  a  matter  of  acquiring  a  certain 
capability against given threats. Yet identity is vital for threat assessment. Nuclear 
weapons take on different meanings depending on whether they are held by friend or 
foe.  As  Constructivists  are  fond  of  pointing  out,  nuclear-tipped  missiles  are  not      
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figments  of  the  imagination,  but  their  targeting  is  a  function  of  what  a  country 
imagines the possessors of other missiles might do (Lipschutz 1995, 10). Deterrence 
games,  interestingly,  recognize  the  importance  of  identity.  One  must  know  at  the 
decision node what type of opponent (Wimp or Tough Guy) one faces, since that 
determines one’s payoffs. 
 
Deterrence turns on establishing in the adversary’s mind a certain perception of one’s 
capability  and  intentions—fundamentally  an  intersubjective  understanding.  Success 
depends  on  the  communication  of  credible  messages  about  capability  and  the 
willingness to use it, rather than on actual possession. McCanles describes this as the 
“circular validation of text by force and force by text” (McCanles 1984, 12). This 
process has to be constantly reinforced, lest it lead to the “progressive entropy of the 
threat”—the threatening text may be read as a “mere threat” (McCanles 1984, 15). 
Thus, there is a constant need for louder threats and more visible capabilities.  
 
Stability depends on ensuring the right balance between capabilities and intention. A 
country makes itself vulnerable to attack if the adversary perceives that its capabilities 
are inadequate; if those capabilities are seen as exceeding the limit of sufficiency, the 
adversary  will  pre-empt  on  the  assumption  that  they  are  intended  for  offensive 
purposes.  While  the  manifest  function  of  nuclear  weapons  is  to  make  massive 
explosions, their  latent function  is  to  circulate  “as  complex  signs  of  national  will, 
capability and determination… communicat[ing] the direction of particular national 
policies and goals” (Luke 1989, 219). Recognizing that deterrence is not a ‘fact’ but a 
process needing constant reinforcement, implies also recognizing that the discourse of 
policy-makers is part of the package of deterrence.  
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Deterrence theory recognizes that the process of communicating credible messages is 
perilous.  Thomas  Schelling  writes:  “Communication  is  often  neither  entirely 
impossible nor entirely reliable; while certain evidence of one's commitment can be 
communicated directly,  other evidence must travel by newspaper or hearsay or be 
demonstrated by actions” (Schelling 1960, 39). Methods of communication include 
statements  by  leaders,  acquisition  of  equipment,  and  demonstrations  of  resolve  in 
other conflicts. For instance, the Nuclear Posture Review (2002) expresses concern 
about rogue states, and reveals that the US is considering using nuclear-tipped tactical 
missiles and resuming nuclear testing (Gordon 2002).
5  
 
By  presenting  nuclear  policy  as  determined  by  technical-strategic  considerations, 
deterrence strengthens the state-centric view of the world, and the idea that states are 
rational actors (Falk 1989, 66). In France, it reinforced de Gaulle’s statism (Gordon 
1999, 226). Deterrence allows the government to reconcile pacifist traditions or war-
weariness  with a buildup of atomic arms.  It  creates a  radical divorce  between the 
value-in-use of nuclear weapons and their value-in-exchange in deterrence (der Derian 
1998, 119). The end of bipolar rivalry led to an even greater appreciation of nuclear 
deterrence for its ‘freezing effect’ on the Cold War (Gaddis 1986, 127). The ICJ in 
July 1996 reaffirmed its legitimacy: “… the Court is led to observe that it cannot reach 
a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by 
a state in an extreme circumstance of self-defense in which its very survival would be 
at stake” (Reisman 1999b, 485).  In 1998, Shimon Peres described  Israel’s nuclear 
option as the basis for peace in the region: “We have built a nuclear option, not in 
order to have a Hiroshima, but to have an Oslo” (Anon 1998m).  
                                                 
5 The award of the Hero of the Soviet Union medals to submarine personnel was interpreted by Western 
analysts as a sign that Russia had developed Polaris-type missiles that could be launched by submarines 
(Anon 1962).      
  72 
 
Deterrence in the nonproliferation regime 
Few  scholars  have  pointed  out  the  centrality  of  deterrence  in  the  nonproliferation 
regime’s normative core. This is because of two reasons: first, the regime is usually 
viewed as resting on an economic tradeoff: facilitation of civilian uses in return for 
renunciation  of  military  uses  (Smith  1990,  258).  Second,  deterrence,  defense,  and 
disarmament are seen as three discrete ways in which states protect themselves against 
the diffusion of nuclear weapons. The nonproliferation regime is, in fact, an amalgam 
of all three strategies, not an instantiation of disarmament. India and other nonaligned 
countries  had  called  for  “an  acceptable  balance  of  mutual  responsibilities  and 
obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear powers” in UNGA Resolution 2028 (1965). 
The 1968 draft of the NPT did not embody this balance. 
 
At first glance, deterrence and the nonproliferation regime are at cross-purposes; the 
former depends on the brandishing of nuclear threats while the latter aims to reduce 
the threat from nuclear weapons. Yet, at the core of nonproliferation is the idea, shared 
with deterrence, that nuclear weapons are essential to world peace, provided they are 
handled exclusively and responsibly by the NWS. The spread of nuclear weapons, 
however, would raise the possibility of nuclear use simply by increasing the number of 
weapons and drawing Great Powers into conflicts. Moreover, deterrence is predicted 
to be too unstable among new nuclear powers; it is unlikely to work in emotionally 
charged mass polities in which rage  and religious hatred drive decisions (Bracken 
1999, 113). Instability could also derive from the small size of new nuclear forces, 
encouraging pre-emption. The association of proliferation with instability/imbalance 
meant that it was situated firmly within the dyadic, statist arms control agenda, and 
countered through technology denial (Mutimer 2000b). This is the basis for the claim      
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that  the  underlying  logic  of  the  regime  would  be  weakened  if  the  big  powers 
renounced or cut their arsenals dramatically (Scoblic 2001, 77; Smith 1990, 258). 
 
Deterrence grounds the nonproliferation regime in three ways: first, NWS deter each 
other,  thus  preserving  the  balance  of  power  among  the  big  powers.  The  regime 
institutionalizes one solution to their security problems. After the end of the Cold War 
the  deterrence  of  ‘rogues’  has  also  been  accepted  as  the  legitimate  basis  for  the 
continuation  of  nonproliferation.  Second,  by  prohibiting  proliferation,  the  regime 
reinforces  the  hierarchical  relationship  between  NWS  and  other  states.
6  In  this 
function,  deterrence  shades  into  coercion.  The  Indian  analyst  Jasjit  Singh  lists  47 
incidents  of  nuclear  coercion  between  1946  and  1996  (Singh  1998c,  12-13).  The 
regime does not offer formal protection to states against the NWS. NNWS attempted 
to gain some measure of security by demanding negative security guarantees (where 
NWS promise not to use nuclear weapons against them). Instead, Resolution 255 of 
the UN Security Council (1968) was only able to offer a positive security guarantee: a 
NNWS that faced a nuclear threat would receive Council assistance. Since the NWS 
had  veto  powers  in  the  Council  this  guarantee  did  not  mean  much.  Although  just 
before the NPT Extension Conference, NWS declared through Resolution 984 that 
they would not use nuclear weapons against NNWS that were members of the NPT, 
this declaration fell short of a legally-binding assurance. 
 
Third, the nonproliferation regime facilitates the strategy of hedging. Ariel Levite has 
shown  that  several  countries  that  have  ostensibly  given  up  nuclear  weapons,  are 
actually engaged in a strategy of nuclear hedging. He defines this as a “strategy of 
                                                 
6 One could of course argue that this is a reasonable price to pay for a world with fewer nuclear powers, 
and that seems to be the calculation made by most states.       
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maintaining, or…appearing to, a viable option for the relatively rapid acquisition of 
nuclear weapons, based on an indigenous technical capability to produce them within 
a relatively short time-frame” (Levite 2002/03, 69-70). This is facilitated by the NPT’s 
Article IV which allows members to develop nuclear programs as long as they adhere 
to  international  safeguards.
7  During  NPT  negotiations,  NNWS  (in  particular, 
Germany) prevented the inclusion of safeguards with the potential to curb economic 
activity  or  sovereignty—such  as  the  ability  to  search  at  any  time  and  place  for 
undeclared weapons (Fischer 2000, 13). The right to develop nuclear energy coupled 
with  such  non-intrusive  safeguards  ensures  that  NPT  parties  can  make  use  of 
ambiguity.  Japan,  for  instance,  currently  possesses  approximately  five  tons  of 
plutonium,  sufficient  to  manufacture  hundreds  of  nuclear  weapons  (Campbell  and 
Sunohara 2004, 243). Occasional statements by Japanese leaders reinforce the policy 
of hedging (Levite 2002/03, 71).
8  
 
Section Five: India’s security problematic 
 
This section provides a brief discussion of the four phases in the history of India’s 
security and foreign policy. 
 
The First Phase: 1947-1964  
India attained independence from the British on 15 August 1947 and Jawaharlal Nehru 
became the first Prime Minister (PM). Nehruvian security strategy was based on a 
holistic  idea  of  security,  informed  by  the  needs  of  development,  disarmament  and 
                                                 
7 Article IV: “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the 
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.” 
8 For instance, two days after the North Korean missile test in 1998, Japan’s largest newspaper wrote: 
“It must be remembered that preparedness can serve as a major deterrent” (Khergamvala 1998).      
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defense.  In  all  three  spheres,  gains  for  India  were  not  seen  as  incompatible  with 
greater security for the rest of the world. Though this strategy was discredited by the 
unexpected conflict with China in 1962, the core elements of it remained influential 
for decades.  
 
In his first decade at the helm of affairs, Nehru made a concerted effort to reach out to 
China. He supported Chinese admission into the UN and tried to foster Asian unity 
between the two countries. This phase of foreign policy was known as ‘Hindi-Chini 
bhai bhai’ (Indians and Chinese  are brothers).  The  India-Pakistan  enduring rivalry 
began ‘at birth’ in 1948 when the two countries went to war over the disputed territory 
of Kashmir. The war ended in a ceasefire, which left Pakistan occupying almost two-
thirds of this territory. The roots of the enduring rivalry are deep. While India saw 
itself as a secular nation bound by freely-given allegiance, Pakistan saw itself as the 
homeland of Muslims in the region.  
 
There was no clear strategic impetus for developing a nuclear capability in this phase. 
India appeared to have cordial relations with China and the superpowers and the threat 
from Pakistan was not seen as meriting a nuclear response. The Ministry of Defence in 
fact,  holding  that  the  Chinese  and  Pakistani  threats  were  based  on  conventional 
weapons, opposed the diversion of resources to a nuclear force (Moshaver 1991, 36). 
Consequently,  India  refrained  from  constructing  a  visible  military  nuclear 
infrastructure.  Ending  the  development  and  production  of  nuclear  weapons  was 
repeatedly stated to be one of the major aims of Indian foreign policy.  
 
At the same time, by establishing a technological base that could be used for a military 
program, the option of nuclear weaponization was kept open. As Homi Bhabha, the      
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first  put it in 1948, “India will have an atomic research centre comparable with those 
in the most advanced countries” (Moshaver 1991, 31). No expense was spared--the 
foremost scientists and engineers of Indian origin were offered incentives to join the 
AEC, and foreign scientists and agencies were approached for collaboration (Sharma 
1983,  82).  The  Department  of  Atomic  Energy  received  exceptional  support  and 
autonomy from the Central government (Sharma 1983, 119). No other field of science 
in India has received such consistent attention (Chopra 1974, 38).  
 
Yet  even  the  atomic  energy  establishment  did  not  openly  advocate  a  weapons 
program. Homi Bhabha, the first Chairman of the AEC, strove to ‘keep the option 
open,’ and, given the personal relationship he enjoyed with the Prime Minister, this 
was a significant influence on the direction of Indian nuclear policy. On hearing about 
the  reported  Chinese  attempt  to  build  a  bomb,  Bhabha  announced  at  a  press 
conference that Indian technology had advanced to a point where it could produce a 
bomb  within  18  months.  This  statement,  whether  by  design  or  default,  put  great 
pressure on the government to change its no-weapons policy (Moshaver 1991, 37). By 
1960, when the 40 MW CIRUS reactor went into operation, Nehru was able to tell the 
National Development Council, “We are now approaching a stage when it is possible 
for us…to make atomic weapons” (Chellaney 1993a, 33). 
 
The Second Phase: 1964-1974 
Coming as it did after the war with China in 1962, the 1964 Lop Nor test by China 
seriously jeopardized the Nehruvian security strategy. India noted that even the Afro-
Asian countries could not be persuaded to condemn the Chinese test (Moshaver 1991, 
40).  The lack of international support during the war with China was also cause for 
worry. In 1965, Pakistan was defeated by India after a short war in the Rann of Kutch.      
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At the global level, the negotiations towards the NPT made plain the impossibility of 
attaining India’s self-declared goal of general and comprehensive disarmament. The 
political  elite  suffered  a  loss  of  faith  in  the  UN  over  the  Kashmir  issue.  A  1965 
symposium in the influential journal Seminar came to the conclusion that the existing 
approach to nuclear policy was unable to meet India’s security needs, and that foreign 
nuclear  guarantees  would  not  suffice.  In  1966,  a  survey  on  nuclear  policy  was 
conducted. 70% of those surveyed held that atomic weapons were needed for defense 
against China and Pakistan, to withstand blackmail and to enhance national prestige 
(Kapur 1976b, 179). When a survey was carried out in 1968, on whether or not to 
develop nuclear weapons, a sizeable majority was shown to favour the development of 
an independent nuclear capability (Bhatia 1979, 117). The results of a 1970 survey 
showed that two-thirds of the sample wanted India to have an independent nuclear 
deterrent, while a quarter favored a nuclear umbrella (Moshaver 1991, 52). The first 
collective demand for the bomb in fact came from the ruling party, at the All India 
Congress Committee session of November 1964, though this position did not prevail 
in the final resolution (Moshaver 1991, 38).  
 
As Soviet-US détente deepened in the 1970s, it was feared that Indian interests were in 
danger of being sidelined (Kapur 1976b, 205). The separation of East Pakistan, now 
Bangladesh, was midwived by India in 1971, the occasion for a third war. The sending 
of the nuclear-armed warship the USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal during this 
conflict, appeared  as the most visible symbol  of superpower intervention in South 
Asia.  
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In  May  1974,  India  surprised  the  world  by  conducting  a  nuclear  explosion  in  the 
Pokhran  desert  in  Rajasthan.  Since  it  was  not  an  NPT  signatory,  this  test  did  not 
violate any formal legal commitments. Still, the Indian government insisted on naming 
the test a PNE and disavowed any military implications. However, India began to be 
considered  as  having  some  claim  to  possessing  a  military  nuclear  capability  after 
1974. The test can be taken to mark the beginning of a new phase in security policy. 
 
The Third Phase: 1975-1990 
The euphoria that the first Pokhran test generated proved ephemeral. A year after the 
PNE, the unpopularity of the Indira Gandhi regime necessitated the imposition of an 
Emergency.    In  1977,  the  first  non-Congress  government  came  to  power  in  New 
Delhi. Although the new leaders had criticized the tilt of India’s nonalignment policy 
towards the Soviet Union, they did not do much to reverse this tendency in their short 
tenure in office. The 1980s saw the return of the Congress party to power. Successive 
Prime Ministers Indira and Rajiv Gandhi were noted to be pursuing more confident—
or aggressive—foreign policies, especially in the South Asian region. India became 
embroiled in the civil conflict in Sri Lanka, making a major military commitment in 
the form of an ill-fated peacekeeping force. Military expenditure rose to cross 4% of 
GDP for the first time (Gupta 1995, 5).  
 
Though India’s program was initially responding to China’s nuclear progress, by the 
mid-1970s  Pakistan  was  making  strides  on  the  nuclear  path.  Pakistani  PM  Bhutto 
initiated  work  on  the  bomb  in  1972  (Chakma  2002,  887).  Pakistan  first  becomes 
salient in the analysis in 1975 and remains salient at a 4% level through most of the 
years until 1984. A small-scale Indian military operation (Brasstacks) in 1986-87, and 
the reported Pakistani nuclear response to it, made Indian leaders realize that Pakistan      
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was  destabilizingly  close  to  having  a  nuclear  capability  (Anon  1987).  By  the  late 
1980s,  India’s  threat  perception  was  focused  on  Pakistan  although  Sino-Pakistani 
collaboration was noted (Giles and Doyle 1996, 137; Goldblat and Lomas 1989, 19). 
 
The  analysis  of  Lok  Sabha  Debates  shows  that  in  the  1960s,  the  Chinese  bomb 
dominated the discussion, with 24 references to it in that decade (a potential Pakistani 
bomb is mentioned only twice). By contrast, all through the 1980s, there are many 
questions as to how far Pakistan has progressed in its quest for the bomb and what the 
government is doing in response (the reply is always that the government is concerned 
and that the nuclear policy is under constant review). There are a few questions about 
China-Pakistan nuclear collaboration, but none about China as a threat itself.  India 
was also put on guard by the US President’s refusal, starting in 1991, to certify that 
Pakistan did not have a nuclear bomb (Anon 1998b).
9 Indian diplomats continued to 
demand,  in  international  forums,  various  disarmament  measures  that  were  politely 
ignored by the rest of the world.  
 
The Fourth Phase: 1991-2000 
The end of the Cold War forced India to re-evalute its foreign policy as well as its 
economic  strategy.  The  Soviet  Union  disappeared,  and  it  was  unclear  that  its 
successor,  Russia,  was  willing  and  able  to  provide  military  collaboration  and 
diplomatic support. A Congress government was forced by a foreign exchange crisis 
in  1991  to  initiate  wide-ranging  liberalizing  policies.  The  new  economic  strategy 
contributed to a gradual but steady rise in growth rates. 
                                                 
9 In 1985, the US Congress adopted the Pressler Amendment, specifying that the President had to 
certify annually that Pakistan was not making a bomb. For the first five years, the President did issue 
this certification but with the end of the Cold War and increased sensitivity to proliferation, this was 
discontinued.       
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India’s performance still lagged behind that of China which had begun to open up its 
economy almost a decade earlier. China’s growing economic and political clout was 
noted  with  concern  in  India.  On  the  other  hand,  Pakistan  was  a  source  of  worry 
because of its support of militancy in India, particularly in Kashmir. After a lull in 
separatist activity in Kashmir in the 1970s, Pakistan started fomenting trouble again in 
the late 1980s. Taking advantage of the disillusionment among Kashmiris after the 
rigging of the state elections in 1987, Pakistan started what Zia called the ‘war of the 
thousand cuts’ where India would be bled to death slowly.
10  
 
It was the nuclear issue that dominated the security debate in the 1990s. The indefinite 
extension of the NPT in 1995 over India’s protests highlighted the weakness of Third 
World solidarity and the resolve of the sole superpower to push its nonproliferation 
agenda through. During the Cold War, the US had turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s 
nuclear activities in return for the latter’s support in the containment of the Soviet 
Union (Singh 1998c, 24). As we shall see, the US did not pressure India to give up its 
emerging military capability either. With the end of the Cold War, the US “suddenly 
changed gear” and tried to disarm both India and Pakistan (Nayar 2001, 37). At the 
same time, some Indian leaders detected a new US strategy of befriending Pakistan to 
get access to Central Asian resources (Jha 1998). They also feared that the US was 
deterred by Chinese nuclear capability and economic power from intervening in Asia. 
 
The series of five nuclear tests in May 1998 marked the end of this phase of Indian 
security policy. India declared itself a NWS and firmly resisted international appeals 
to sign away its nuclear capability. Within weeks, Pakistan also conducted a series of 
                                                 
10 Author’s interview, E. Rammohan, 23 April 2003, Delhi.      
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nuclear tests. Indian officials and analysts insisted that the new nuclear situation in the 
subcontinent would make for more stability. Yet the two countries were at war again 
in 1999 in the Kargil sector of the Himalayas—the first full-fledged war between two 
nuclear-armed states.  
 
Section Six: India’s nuclear program: a brief history 
 
The foundations of the India nuclear program were laid even before India became 
independent. The Tata Institute of Fundamental Research was set up in 1944. On the 
first anniversary of India’s independence, a three-person Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) was set up (Abraham 1998, 60). In 1948 Prime Minister Nehru wrote to his 
Defence Minister: “The future belongs to those who produce atomic energy. That is 
going to be the chief national power of the future. Of course, defence is intimately 
concerned  with  this.  Even  the  political  consequences  are  worthwhile”  (Chengappa 
2000, 71).  
 
In  January  1957,  Jawaharlal  Nehru  made  a  statement  amounting  to  the  public 
renunciation of the military use of nuclear technology: “On behalf of my government, 
and I think I can say with some assurance, on behalf of any future governments of 
India, that whatever might happen, whatever the circumstances, we shall never use this 
atomic  energy  for  evil  purposes.  There  is  no  condition  attached  to  this  assurance, 
because once a condition is attached, the value of such an assurance does not go very 
far” (Subrahmanyam 1990, 121).  
 
The literature sometimes refers to the ‘atomic energy complex’ or ‘nuclear estate.’ The 
Indian  state  firmly  controls  nuclear  activities  through  the  Department  of  Atomic      
  82 
Energy (DAE). Unlike other government departments, the DAE is located in Mumbai, 
not in the capital. It is not part of a ministry, but under the direct charge of the Prime 
Minister.
11 The DAE is guided by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).
12   
 
The  very  first  achievement  of  the  DAE  was  the  construction  of  the  first  research 
reactor in Asia,  APSARA.  In 1956 this 1 Megawatt (MW) ‘swimming pool type’ 
reactor  went  critical—a  self-sustaining  chain  reaction  was  initiated.  This  was 
followed,  four  years  later,  by  a  40  MW  reactor  called  CIRUS  (Canadian  Indian 
Reactor-US). The name of the reactor acknowledged that it was built with Candian 
assistance  while  the  heavy  water  came  from  the  US  (Chellaney  1993a,  5).  Since 
CIRUS produced plutonium as a by-product, it allowed India to acquire its first stocks 
of fissile material. Canada had pressed for formal safeguards over spent fuel rods. At 
this time the IAEA had not been set up, and there were no formal procedures for 
safeguards. The Indian government merely pledged that CIRUS by-products would be 
“employed for peaceful purposes only.” A similar pledge was given to the US Atomic 
Energy Commission in 1956 (Chellaney 1993a, 6).  
 
Plans for a reprocessing plant that was capable of extracting plutonium from fuel rods 
were  initiated  in  1958  and  Phoenix  was  formally  inaugurated  in  1965  in  Tarapur. 
CIRUS started producing plutonium in 1958 at the rate of 8 kgs per year. In 1964 a 
plutonium separation plant was completed. This was designed to process the spent fuel 
                                                 
11 The Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR), also in Mumbai, is the only laboratory engaged 
in fundamental research in atomic science. Though managed by a trust, the TIFR works closely with the 
DAE.  Several  research  centers—such  as  the  Indira  Gandhi  Center  for  Atomic  Research  and  the 
Variable Energy Cyclotron Center, and production units—such as the Heavy Water Board (HBW) and 
the  Uranium  Corporation  of  India  Limited  (UCIL),  work  under  the  DAE.  The  most  important 
constituents are the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) located in Trombay near Mumbai, and 
the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad, which produces fuel bundles for reactors.  
12 It has been a tradition for several years to have as members of the AEC, the Principal Secretary to the 
Prime  Minister,  the  Cabinet  Secretary,  the  Finance  Secretary,  the  Chairman  of  the  Nuclear  Power 
Corporation, and the Director, BARC.      
  83 
from  the  CIRUS  reactor  (Lefever  1979,  33).  In  1965,  with  the  approval  of  Prime 
Minister Shastri who succeeded Nehru in 1964, Bhabha initiated a project called the 
Study of Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (SNEPP). By 1967, both men were 
dead, and  Bhabha’s successor Vikram Sarabhai terminated the project  (Chengappa 
2000, 104). A known opponent of nuclear weapons, Sarabhai accelerated the Indian 
rocket and space programs. Sarabhai’s marginalization of nuclear research was not 
challenged by the higher authorities.  
 
The delicate balance of forces between the traditional, pro-disarmament school and 
those who advocated some kind of nuclear capability was tipped in favour of the latter 
in the summer of 1974.  At 8.05 a.m. on 18 May 1974, a nuclear explosion of a 
magnitude  between  10  and  15  kilotons  was  triggered  100  metres  beneath  the 
Rajasthan desert. India had conducted its first nuclear test, officially termed a PNE.  
 
The 1980s were dominated by disagreements with suppliers. As India was suspected 
of building up its nuclear capability, the international community started restricting its 
access  to  material.  The  1963  India-US  agreement  on  nuclear  cooperation  imposed 
safeguards  on  the  Tarapur  plant  and  was  accepted  by  India  with  great  reluctance. 
Apparently this was motivated by US domestic interests keen to exploit the Indian 
civilian nuclear power market (Chellaney 1993a, 22-4). Indian policy-makers believed 
that  US  rights  to  insist  on  safeguards  in  Tarapur  came  from  the  supply  of  fissile 
material and not from the imported reactors. Therefore, they claimed, once American 
fuel supplies had stopped, the US had no more rights over what happened in Tarapur. 
The US insisted that India’s obligations under the agreement were binding (Chellaney 
1993b, 28-29).  
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During the 1990s, as we noted above, India’s nuclear capability came under increasing 
scrutiny.  Denuclearization  in  South  Africa  and  Latin  America  encouraged  the 
international community to put pressure on India to roll back its nuclear ambitions. 
India’s refusal to sign the CTBT signaled its resolve not to oblige. The advent of the 
BJP to power at the head of a multi-party coalition revived fears that India would cross 
the line and conduct a nuclear test. These fears were not unfounded. In May 1998 at 
the Pokhran testing range, India carried out a series of five nuclear tests. 
 
The first three tests took place in the afternoon of 11 May 1998. Two days later two 
more tests were carried out. The first test was of  a thermonuclear boosted fission 
device (where the explosion of the fission bomb releases heat and energy leading to 
the fusion of hydrogen isotopes). The second explosion featured a lighter but more 
high-yielding version of the 1974 Pokhran device. The third, the low-yield bomb is 
meant for smaller explosions in the battlefield situations. The last two tests were sub-
critical: the nuclear device is tested without the explosive release, and therefore fall 
outside  the  purview  of  the  CTBT  (Chengappa  and  Joshi  1998a,  34).  The  official 
statement delivered by the Prime Minister’s Principal Secretary noted that these tests 
“have  established  that  India  has  a  proven  capability  for  a  weaponised  nuclear 
programme” (Joshi 1999a, 1469).      




THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
INDIAN NUCLEAR DETERRENT 
 
In this chapter I discuss the ways in which the nonproliferation regime constituted 
India’s security problematique, and the ways in which India used regime norms to 
construct a nuclear deterrent. Through its definition and categorization of India (and 
other  countries),  the  nonproliferation  regime  sustained  a  particular  power 
constellation. It also tried to fit India into the NNWS category through (inconsistent) 
application of its enforcement mechanisms. India, in its turn, was attempting to ensure 
national security through nuclear deterrence. The effective performance of deterrence 
requires a constant re-creation of identity, which means that we cannot easily separate 
security  imperatives  and  identity  construction  in  explaining  Indian  policy.  India 
adopted  five  strategies  to  construct  its  nuclear  identity—nuclear  development, 
statements by authorities, nuclear testing, selectively playing by the regime’s rules, 
and crisis behavior.  
 
In Section One I describe the operation of two mechanisms of the regime—definition 
and categorization—with respect to India. This section is a portrait of the regime at 
work. In the next section, Section Two, I describe various stages in India’s efforts to 
establish deterrence. Section Three considers the nature of India’s power as an agent, 
as it uses the regime to construct its deterrent identity. I devote Section Four to the 
1998  nuclear  tests,  which  symbolized  both  the  success  and  failure  of  the 
nonproliferation regime. In Section Five I present examples of the persistent influence      
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of  certain  ideational  associations,  showing  that  identity  is  more  than  a  strategic 
response to changing power relations. 
 
Section One: The regime at work-- defining and classifying India 
 
Indian  nuclear  development  has  been  constrained  by  certain  formal  and  informal 
mechanisms of the nonproliferation regime. The regime’s effect in the first instance, 
however, is through the constitutive processes of definition and categorization. Threats 
derived from the power constellation that the regime was shoring up, and from the 
regime’s efforts to make India assume a certain position. The nonproliferation regime 
constituted  a  particular  global  and  regional  hierarchy,  buttressed  with  nuclear 
weapons,  thus  delineating  the  adversaries  that  India  would  have  to  deal  with.  It 
attempted to incorporate India as a state without nuclear weapons, which would have 
rendered  deterrence  against  those  adversaries  almost  impossible.  Finally,  since 
deterrence  was  an  integral  principle  of  the  regime  itself,  stability  through  nuclear 
deterrence was established as a legitimate goal.  
 
Constituting world order and the universe of threats  
Chapter Two described the process through which a certain definition of proliferation 
as the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five NWS, became enshrined as a global 
norm.  India  was  acutely  aware  of  the  inequality  of  this  nuclear  order.  During  the 
negotiations on the draft of the NPT, Indian diplomats tried to broaden the definition 
of  proliferation  to  include  growth  in  NWS  arsenals  and  curb  the  manufacture, 
stockpiling and sophistication of weapons by the NWS (Husain 1968, 742). A world 
that was not structured by nuclear weapons would be safer for India as well as for 
other states.       
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Indians saw the NPT as ipso facto a victory for China, which thereby acquired NWS 
status. The Indian Express, extrapolating from Dean Rusk’s statement that the NPT 
precluded  any  US  security  guarantees,  claimed  that  India  now  had  no  protection 
against  nuclear  blackmail  by  China.  Similarly,  the  Times  of  India  saw  the  treaty 
removing potential nuclear challenges to the PRC (Williams 1969, 33-36). The threat 
from  China  was  intensified  by  its  recognition  as  a  NWS  by  the  nonproliferation 
regime. ‘China’ first appears as salient in 1956, but is most salient in 1967, when it 
became obvious that it would gain NWS status. In this year it attained a high of 9.2% 
of the sampled texts and it never returned to this height again. Even in 1998, the term 
was mentioned less than 2% of the time.  
 
At the same time, India wanted to restrict the definition of proliferation to exclude 
explosions of nuclear devices for civilian research. NNWS would become dependent 
on NWS if barred from conducting such “explosive experiments” which were vital to 
the full utilization of nuclear technology (Trivedi 1965, 595).
1 It is clear that India 
perceived the nonproliferation order as doubly threatening—both strategic freedom 
and development were at stake. Even in 1998, an  Indian official responded to the 
demand to sign the NPT with the statement: “Tell us what we are and we will tell you 
whether we can sign…Guarantee to us that technology controls, which you apply to us 
as though we were a non-nuclear weapon state, will be removed” (Ram 1998). 
 
The content analysis shows us that in the 1950s, the international realm was frequently 
mentioned  in  the  discourse.  In  the  period  1950-1962,  references  to  three  external 
                                                 
1 Consequently, India also objected to IAEA safeguards because these were not universally applied. 
Obviously, it was preparing the ground for a test at this point. Yet, that India could credibly make this 
argument is important.       
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actors—the US, USSR and the UN, add up to an average of 15% a year. From 1965 to 
1975, by contrast, this figure is less than 5%. In the decade leading up to 1998, we see 
a  somewhat  higher  awareness,  with  international  referents  (references  to  foreign 
countries or their leaders, except Pakistan and China) amounting to just over 6.5%. In 
1995 and 1996, two international treaties—the NPT and the CTBT—are among the 5 
most salient terms. We can conclude that the relative importance of the international 
referents  in  the  1950s  and  the  1990s  was  eclipsed  in  the  intervening  decades  by 
regional  referents—China  and  Pakistan.  This  is  congruent  with  my  argument  that 
India was most active in the early years in trying to influence the formation of the 
regime, and at the end of the century was trying to enter it.  
 
Casting India: a security threat 
Since India had not tested by 1967, the regime made available only one identity—that 
of  a  NNWS,  an  identity  it  could  not  accept  since  it  was  engaged  in  establishing 
deterrence with China and Pakistan. One of the indicators of a regime’s strength is the 
extension of its scope, including to those countries that resist its formal components. 
As the regime became hegemonic, Indian elites realized, the country be pressured to 
conform to the behavior expected of a NNWS. Thus, the growing power of the regime 
became a security issue for India. Through the 1970s and the 1980s, India tried to 
escape being categorized either as a NNWS (by testing a nuclear device) or as a NWS 
(by imputing peaceful purposes to the 1974 test).  
 
China took advantage of the regime’s categorization, refusing to enter into bilateral 
discussions with India on nuclear issues on the grounds that as a non-nuclear weapon 
state India should raise them only in multilateral disarmament fora (Singh 2003, 153). 
For instance, in 1988 Indian analysts asked Qian Qichen, the Chinese foreign minister,      
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about the possibility of a ‘No First Use’ agreement between the two countries. Qian 
quipped that since India claimed it had no nuclear weapons, such an agreement would 
be meaningless (Parthasarathy 2004). Worryingly, there were indications from China 
that its nuclear no first-use and non-use pledges would not be applicable to India as a 
non-party to the NPT (Parthasarathy 2001). India ‘learned’ from the Chinese attitude 
that it would be taken seriously only when its nuclear status was unambiguous. K. 
Subrahmanyam, the dean of Indian strategists, maintained that a nuclear bomb would 
enable India to talk to China as an equal (Thomas 1986, 47). Perkovich also reports a 
1995 conversation with a senior Indian official who claimed that India had to deploy 
ballistic missiles “with enough capability” not to guard against a Chinese threat, but to 
compel China to negotiate seriously (Anon 1995a, 127).  
 
India’s 1998 test series was followed by a declaration by the PM that India was a 
NWS: “This is a reality that cannot be denied. It is not a conferment that we seek; nor 
is it a status for others to grant…it is India's due, the right of one-sixth of human-kind” 
(Anon 1998d). Nationalist rhetoric notwithstanding, India cannot simply declare itself 
a NWS on fulfilling certain technical requirements. This status is intersubjective and is 
enforced  through  particular  procedures.  The  official  US  response  to  India’s  self-
declaration was: “We do not and will not concede even by implication that India and 
Pakistan  have  established  themselves  as  nuclear  weapon  states  under  the  NPT” 
(Talbott  1998).
2  ‘Self-declared’,  ‘statutory’,  and  ‘de  facto’  are  used  as  qualifiers 
before ‘NWS’ when referring to these countries. India has also been called a ‘nuclear 
state’ or a ‘possessor state.’ 
 
                                                 
2 This was reiterated by the Geneva meeting of the permanent members of the UNSC (P-5) on 4 June 
1998, and, shortly afterwards, the Group of 8 Foreign Ministers’ meeting and a Joint American-Chinese 
declaration.      
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In 2000, India’s Minister for External Affairs declared in Parliament:  
 
India is a nuclear weapon state. Though not a party to the NPT, India's 
policies have been consistent with the key provisions of NPT that apply to 
nuclear  weapon  states…Article  I  obliges  a  nuclear  weapon  state  not  to 
transfer nuclear weapons to any other country or assist any other country to 
acquire them and India’s record on non-proliferation has been impeccable. 
Article III requires a party to the treaty to provide nuclear materials and 
related  equipment  to  any  other  country  only  under  safeguards;  India’s 
exports of such materials have always been under safeguards. Article VI 
commits the parties to pursue negotiations to bring about eventual global 
nuclear disarmament… India today is the only nuclear weapon state that 
remains committed to commencing negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons 
Convention in order to bring about a nuclear-weapons-free world, the very 
objective envisaged in Article VI of the NPT (Ministry of External Affairs 
2000).  
 
Here the government again tries to show that it has satisfied all the conditions for 
accession to the NPT as a NWS. Clearly, India is not ready to abandon the search for 
more formal acknowledgement of its status and considers this an important security 
goal. While my interviewees conceded that is unlikely that the NPT will be amended 
to include India as a NWS, some were hopeful that ‘other means’ could be found to 
give India the status of a nuclear power. One way would be for India to sign a regional 
nuclear-weapon-free-zone pact as a nuclear power (Taksal 1999). 
 
 
Section Two: India’s performance of deterrence 
 
Deterrence  is  not  a  possession,  or  a  state  of  affairs.  It  is  an  intricate  social-
psychological drama in which each player has to perform various routines. In Chapter 
2 I discussed this aspect of deterrence, and its relationship with the nonproliferation 
regime. In this section I interpret several of India’s key nuclear decisions as part of the 
performance of deterrence. By situating them in a deterrence frame, some puzzling      
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decisions become comprehensible. I take up the quest for a security guarantee against 
the Chinese bomb, the presentation of the 1974 nuclear explosion as peaceful, the 
covert weaponization of the 1980s, and finally the 1998 nuclear test.   
Security guarantees 
India’s 1960s attempt to secure guarantees is often viewed as a missed opportunity for 
the international community: it is assumed that had India been assured of protection 
against the Chinese threat, it would have given up the effort to acquire an independent 
nuclear capability (Power 1979, 577). In fact, India’s strategic position at the time 
would  not  have  permitted  it  to  make  the  concessions  that  would  have  made  a 
guarantee credible. The norms of foreign policy would not allow India to give up its 
independence. We can understand the failure of the search for security guarantees and 
the  choice  of  non-weaponized  deterrence  (NWD)  only  in  terms  of  the  norms  that 
Indian  identity  was  based  on.  As  R.  K.  Nehru  put  it,  it  was  “natural”  for  the 
government to choose nuclear deterrence over giving up non-alignment and seeking 
Western  protection  (Nehru  1965,  5-6).  Moreover,  India  did  not  want  to  align  too 
closely with one superpower and incur the wrath of the other.  
 
India  originally  demanded  negative  security  guarantees  for  all  non-nuclear  states 
(Anon 1965c).
3 It preferred a guarantee under UN auspices to getting under a Western 
or Soviet nuclear umbrella (Anon 1965a). However, India was willing to settle for a 
joint  guarantee  by  all  NWS,  in  order  to  avoid  repercussions  on  its  nonaligned 
credentials (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 169). Indian officials must have known 
                                                 
3 Security guarantees may be positive or negative. The former consist of assurances that the parties 
would come to each other’s aid in the case of an attack. Negative security assurances indicate that one 
party will not attack the other, in this case, with nuclear weapons. In fact, in 1966 Soviet Premier 
Kosygin proposed to include in the NPT a ban on the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
parties that had no nuclear weapons on their territories. The West rejected this on the grounds that it 
would be impossible to verify and would disadvantage NATO members ‘hosting’ nuclear weapons 
(Epstein 1976).       
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that such a proposal would be a non-starter, yet they were intransigent on the issue of 
independence. Finally, Indian diplomats declared they were giving up the search for 
guarantees since ‘going it alone’ was more consistent with nonalignment (Bunn 1997, 
13, n.27). The Indian delegate’s speech to the ENDC in February 1966 indicates this: 
“It  is  not  the  armaments  of  other  nations,  in  any  case,  which  can  be  a  perpetual 
guarantor of a nation’s integrity and independence” (Trivedi 1966, 615). The PM also 
admitted that the effectiveness of a guarantee would “depend on the vital and national 
interests of the giver” (Williams 1969, 52). 
 
India recognized, as did France around the same time, that extended deterrence suffers 
from a credibility issue.
4 No guarantee can be automatic, and no government would 
embark on nuclear war with another’s hand on the trigger, wrote one commentator 
(Gopal 1968, 60).  The  US had specified that its response to an attack, even on  a 
European  country,  would  not  be  automatic  (Williams  1969,  17).  The  Johnson 
administration did not want to make an explicit commitment to India (Gavin 2004/5, 
118). Neither did Harold Wilson’s government in the UK (Schrafstetter and Twigge 
2004, 168). Chellaney correctly describes the idea of a guarantee as “romantic” and 
“idealistic” because India did not have the ties to either superpower that would make it 
credible.
5 Another clue that India was not completely serious comes from the fact that 
the government’s emissary, L. K.  Jha had no ideas about how the guarantee would 
work in practice (Noorani 1967, 500). Documents that have now become available 
show that Jha specifically rejected the notion of a formal alliance with the US, which 
he was told was a pre-requisite for a security guarantee (Anon 1966b). 
 
                                                 
4 In fact, PM Indira Gandhi in 1967 referred to France’s distrust of guarantees (Noorani 1967, 499). 
5 Author’s interview with Brahma Chellaney, 30 April 2003, New Delhi.      
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What then was the impetus behind India’s search for a guarantee? It seems that this 
diplomatic activity was intended to draw attention to India’s security predicament, and 
to signal the determination to combat it. India’s disarmament diplomacy at this time 
had a complementary goal. Homi Bhabha, head of the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC), in a 1964 radio broadcast issued a veiled challenge to the world to create a 
“climate favorable to countries which have the capability of making atomic weapons 
but  have  voluntarily  refrained  from  doing  so”  (Chengappa  2000,  94).  B.  N. 
Chakravarty told the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission (ENDC) on 4 May 
1965: “I must point out the danger that some countries may find it necessary…to 
acquire nuclear weapons if proliferation is allowed to go on” (Chopra 1984, 154).  
 
The lack of credibility also applies to the supposed Soviet nuclear umbrella that India 
‘lost’ in the 1990s. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was 
signed in August 1971. The Soviet motivation was to use  India to counter China, 
while India aimed to deter Chinese or US intervention in a seemingly inevitable war 
with Pakistan (Singh 1986, 88-89).
6 Article VIII of the treaty precluded either party 
from entering into military alliances directed against the other, and Article IX banned 
them from assisting a third party in armed conflict if the other was the target. It also 
said that the parties would enter mutual consultations to deal with such conflicts. Does 
this  treaty  amount  to  a  security  guarantee?
7  K.  Subrahmanyam  warned  against 
thinking of the USSR as a security guarantor (Subrahmanyam 1987, 5).
8 While India’s 
                                                 
6 The war officially began on 3 December 1971, and ended with Pakistan’s surrender on 16 December 
1971. 
7 The alliance coding from the Correlates of War dataset counts only defense pacts as providing 
guarantees.  
8 It is unclear that a Soviet umbrella would have been in India’s interest anyway. On 15 December 
1971, at the tail end of the Bangladesh war, a nuclear-armed warship, the USS Enterprise (part of the 
US Army’s Seventh Fleet), appeared in the Bay of Bengal. Henry Kissinger, then National Security 
Advisor to the President, admitted that this was an attempt at nuclear coercion. He had two goals: to 
prevent a victorious Indian army from taking over West Pakistan and to shield the PRC from being 
coerced by Soviet blackmail, into not aiding Pakistan (Kissinger 1979, 905). India is supposed to have      
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foreign policy did tilt towards the Soviet Union, it is hard to imagine that the latter 
extended a nuclear umbrella. 
 
A peaceful nuclear explosion 
On 18 May 1974 the AEC exploded a nuclear device at the Pokhran test site in the 
Rajasthan desert, describing it as a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE), “an experiment 
for purely scientific investigation.” The government declared that it did not intend to 
produce nuclear weapons and reaffirmed its opposition to any military use of nuclear 
explosions (Anon 1974e). The Defense Minister reiterated: “Our armed forces know 
that this is not for their use” (Anon 1974b). In a letter to her Pakistani counterpart, PM 
Indira Gandhi wrote: “There are no political or foreign policy implications of this test” 
(Kaul 1974). 
 
Why did India test? The PM’s response was simply: “We had to do it to demonstrate 
our independent capability” (Bidwai and Vanaik 2001, 219). Carrying out a test less 
than  five  years  after  the  NPT  had  come  into  force  demonstrated  capability  and 
signaled intention—that India reserved the right to develop weapons. The test was an 
indicator  of  achievement  and  resolve—and  not  just  in  nuclear  capability. 
Commentators  predicted  after  the  test  that  India  would  no  longer  be  seen  as  an 
insignificant jumble of feuding factions (MKD 1974). India would not allow itself to 
                                                                                                                                             
learned two lessons from 1971—that it would be abandoned in times of need, and that it could become 
a target for nuclear blackmail by the superpowers. In fact, the Soviet Union did come out in support of 
India, sending four of its ships into the area after the entry of the Enterprise (Singh 1986, 96). 
Moscow also exercised its veto in the Security Council three times in India’s favor 
during this crisis (Horn 1987, 213). In fact, it was the alliance with an NWS that 
exposed India to nuclear blackmail. It is somewhat implausible that India wanted to take over and 
colonize West Pakistan, therefore coercion really applied only to the US attempt to deter the USSR. We 
cannot argue that India’s acquiring a fledgling nuclear capacity would have helped it to deter the US in 
future conflicts of this  kind. Yet the Enterprise incident has taken on a  mythic significance in the 
nuclear debate, a shorthand reference to the perfidy of the NWS. Arundhati Ghose, in her interview 
referred to it as a formative influence. She was, as a young officer, assigned to track the ship.       
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be treated as a second-rate country (Dutt 1974). K. Subrahmanyam warned against any 
attempt  to  institutionalize  the  pledge  of  peaceful  use,  for  example,  through  a 
constitutional amendment, for fear it would imperil the country’s “new bargaining 
leverage” in international politics (Anon 1974k).  
 
An American author had suggested that India could maintain its prestige as a nation 
“capable of but not willing to go nuclear” (Williams 1969, 33). He pointed out that 
refraining from a test might encourage India’s adversaries to follow suit, and could 
bring it aid and arms exports (Williams 1969, 41). However, Indian security elites felt 
the need to validate the text of deterrence with a demonstration: “It is only when we 
are prepared to take determined steps in the protection of vital Indian interests that our 
diplomatic postures will be meaningful. In this game of blackmail nothing that is said 
must be taken at face value” (Kaul 1974, 153). 
 
Thus, while security is driving the decision to test, it is not security in the conventional 
sense  of  response  to  an  external  threat.  The  1971  war  conclusively  demonstrated 
India’s conventional superiority, therefore it is hard to believe that the 1974 test was 
needed to deter Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan only appears 5.1% of the time in the 1974 
oversample,  as  opposed  to  8.2%  in  1998.  As  for  China,  it  is  true  that  there  is  a 
breakpoint  in  the  content  analysis  in  1965  after  the  Chinese  test.  So  far  the  most 
salient terms have related to negotiations between the US, the Soviet Union and other 
major powers on arms control. In 1965 the term ‘India’ becomes salient for the first 
time. In the years that follow, the term ‘China’ remains among the top 5 most frequent 
terms until 1972. Clearly, the Chinese nuclear program is a big concern for India, yet 
instead of following the ‘logical’ path of seeking a guarantor or developing a weapon, 
India tries to strengthen deterrence.       
  96 
 
While deterrence considerations help us understand why India chose to test, they are 
not well-suited to explaining why the test was camoflaged as a PNE. We have to pay 
attention to the boundaries of the discourse at the time that the test was carried out. 
Vikram Sarabhai, AEC Chairman from 1966 to 1971, pointed out that undertaking a 
nuclear weapons project was a massive endeavor. The decision to do so was a political 
one and would have to take into account the sacrifices the country would have to 
make. He expressed himself against prototype bombs, calling them paper tigers (Anon 
1965b). Sarabhai’s viewpoint represented the mainstream opinion  among informed 
elites  at  the  time.  The  Nehruvian  consensus  that  the  top  priority  should  be  state-
directed economic development still held sway. Moreover, almost two decades after 
Gandhi’s death, Gandhian principles received ritual obeisance. Plunging the country 
into an overt nuclear program would have been divisive. On the international front, the 
superpowers seemed determined to stem overt proliferation. Even the hawkish Karnad 
admits that India would have suffered isolation had it followed the Chinese path of 
single-mindedly pursuing nuclear weapons (Karnad 2002b, 218).  
 
A rare bird: covert nuclear activity in the 1980s 
In 1974, Nihal Singh described India as a rare bird: neither a “nuclear Power” nor a 
“non-nuclear  Power”  (Singh  1974a).  India’s  post-1974  deterrent  has  been  termed 
opaque,  virtual,  ambiguous  or  existential.  I  prefer  the  term  ‘non-weaponized 
deterrence’ (NWD), a type of deterrence where the parties tacitly acknowledge, and 
are  deterred  by  each  others’  capability  to  manufacture  weapons,  rather  than  the 
weapons themselves.  
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India  performed  its  deterrent  identity  within  the  ‘breathing  space’  that  the  regime 
offered  it.  The  results  of  the  content  analysis  do  not  show  a  breakpoint  in  1974, 
although in Chapter 2 I indicated that year as the start of a new phase in policy. The 
most salient terms continue to come from the semantic field of civil uses of atomic 
power. For instance, in 1976 the most salient terms are ‘nuclear’, ‘power’, ‘plants’, 
‘scientists’ adding up to 36% of the yearly sample. In the four years that follow, the 
most salient terms relate to negotiations over nuclear fuel with the US. 
 
The  question  of  why  India  did  not  ‘nuclearize’  after  1974  raises  endless  debate. 
Whatever the reason, India chose the “prudent and less costly path” of keeping the 
nuclear weapons option open (Lefever 1979, 41). Some have claimed that India could 
not have weaponized because 1974 was a mere symbolic gesture and useless as the 
basis  for  an  arsenal.
9  However,  even  a  single  test  can  provide  some  data  for  the 
engineering effort to turn the device into a deliverable warhead.
10 Albright and Hibbs 
report that the 1974 explosion could have provided data sufficient for miniaturization 
(Gordon  1994,  670).  India  may  have  wanted  to  avoid  the  financial  costs  of 
manufacturing  warheads  and  delivery  systems  (Kaul  1998).  It  also  realized  that  a 
formal declaration would attract a level of hostility (for instance, being included in the 
targeting plans of the US and China) that it would be incapable of countering. Hagerty 
suggests that the avoidance of overt development was intended to send a message of 
nuclear equivalence to China while reassuring Pakistan, but this obviously did not 
work (Hagerty 1998, 45).
11  
 
                                                 
9 Peter Lavoy calls it a ‘physics experiment.’ Personal communication, 7 April 2005. 
10 Hisham Zerriffi, personal communication, 17 April 2005.  
11 In 1965, Pakistan’s PM Bhutto famously vowed that his countrymen would “eat grass” if needed in 
order to build nuclear weapons once India did.       
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Was it sanctions that stopped India after 1974? The US did not really pressure India on 
the nuclear issue during the Cold War (Rathjens 1998, 27). While the US government, 
as  mandated,  voted  against  aid  to  India  from  the  International  Development 
Association in 1974, the flow of aid did not stop (Balachandran 2002, 239-40). The 
Nixon administration held that its predecessor had sacrified US interests on the altar of 
nonproliferation (Nye 1988, 344). Kissinger privately sought and received assurances 
that  India  would  be  proliferation-conscious  in  exports  and  would  not  pursue  a 
weapons program (Singh 1986, 124).
12 One scholar described the post-1974 sanctions 
as a headache rather than an impediment (Foran 1999, 42).  
 
However,  sanctions  did  curtail  fuel  supply  for  the  Tarapur  and  Rajasthan  power 
stations. India also faced restrictions on dual-use items. For instance, in the 1980s the 
US  refused  to  allow  the  export  of  a  supercomputer  from  the  Cray  corporation 
(potentially used in warhead design) and in the early 1990s, opposed the transfer of 
cryogenic engine technology from Russia (potentially used in missiles). Although the 
IAEA had members who were not NPT signatories, India accused the institution of 
implementing NPT standards (Scheinman 1987, 242). For instance, the organization’s 
annual  funding  for  power  projects  was  partly  dependent  on  NPT  membership 
(Scheinman 1987, 253). 
 
Did  NWD  work?  There  are  indications  that  Pakistan  acknowledged  this  form  of 
deterrence. Cohen reports that Gen. Zia, the Pakistani leader in the 1980s, claimed that 
India  and  Pakistan  had  achieved  deterrence  stability  (Cohen  1992,  209).  The  two 
                                                 
12 One way to explain the tepid US reaction--"The US has always been against nuclear proliferation for 
the adverse impact it will have on world stability"—is as part of a strategy to downplay the event. 
Apparently Kissinger did not want to "endow" a "crude nuclear device" with great intrinsic value 
(Brenner 1981, 68-69).       
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countries adopted in 1988 an agreement prohibiting attacks on each other’s “nuclear 
facilities.”
13 A nuclear Confidence Building Measure (CBM) between two undeclared 
nuclear powers, it served to buttress the idea that deterrence was at work. This belief is 
essentially non-falsifiable. On the one hand, there were no full-scale wars between 
India  and Pakistan or China after 1971. Paul Kapur, on the other hand, finds that 
conventional conflict--as measured by militarized interstate disputes (MIDs)--between 
India and Pakistan was over five times as frequent from 1990 through 2002, at .82 
disputes per year, compared to the non-nuclear period from 1972 through 1989 (Kapur 
2006). Those who argue that deterrence was ‘keeping the peace’ are using a very 




By  not  demanding  NWS  status  after  the  1974  test,  India  was  also  attempting  to 
establish a deterrent relationship with the regime itself.
15 NWD was a tacit bargain that 
India would not test, disseminate, or deploy weapons as long as it was allowed to 
maintain its ostensibly civilian program. The policies of the US, as norm leader, were 
particularly  important.  Studies  published  by  the  Council  on  Foreign  Relations,  the 
Brookings  Institute,  the  Carnegie  Foundation  and  the  Asia  Society  in  the  1990s 
advised the government that proliferation should not be primus inter pares in dealing 
with India (Cohen 2000b, 15; Harrison and Kemp 1993). Mitchell Reiss suggested the 
creation of a full-scope safeguards regime in South Asia on the Latin American model 
                                                 
13 This agreement bound the two parties not to cause destruction or damage to each other’s nuclear 
installations or facilities, including nuclear power and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium 
enrichment and reprocessing facilities, as well as establishments storing significant quantities of 
radioactive materials. Each party had to declare the exact location of its installations and facilities.  
14 Almost all my interviewees agreed that deterrence was vital to prevent Pakistani aggression, they 
were divided on its effect on Chinese calculations.  
15 I am grateful to Gregory Dinsmore for suggesting this argument.       
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and  allowing  India  to  “preserve”  its  option  (Reiss  1993,  1113-15).
16  The  1990s 
American  policy  of  hiving  off  the  contentious  nonproliferation  issue  in  bilateral 
relations was read in India as “indirect acknowledgement of the correctness of India’s 
nuclear policy” (Kampani 2001a).  
 
1998: an explosion for peace 
If NWD was the optimum policy, why did it not serve as equilibrium? That is, why 
did  India  decide  to  test  again?  On  11  May  1998  the  AEC  set  off  three  nuclear 
explosions at the Pokhran test site and followed two days later with smaller tests. This 
series had two motivations: to shore up deterrence against adversaries and to clarify its 
position vis-à-vis the regime.  
 
Who  were  the  adversaries  that  India  was  trying  to  deter?  Operation  Brasstacks  in 
1986-87, and the reported Pakistani nuclear response to it, made Indian leaders realize 
that Pakistan was destabilizingly close to having a nuclear capability (Anon 1987). 
India was also put on guard by the US President’s refusal, starting in 1991, to certify 
that Pakistan did not have a nuclear bomb (Anon 1998b).
17 By the late 1980s, India’s 
threat perception was focused on Pakistan although Sino-Pakistani collaboration was 
noted, as we saw above (Giles and Doyle 1996, 137; Goldblat and Lomas 1989, 19).
18 
Pakistan becomes increasingly salient in the discourse, appearing among the top 5 
                                                 
16 Steve Fetter was an early critic of this approach (Fetter 1996). 
17 In 1985, the US Congress adopted the Pressler Amendment, specifying that the President had to 
certify annually that Pakistan was not making a bomb. For the first five years, the President did issue 
this certification but with the end of the Cold War and increased sensitivity to proliferation, this was 
discontinued.  
18 The analysis of Lok Sabha Debates shows that in the 1960s, the Chinese bomb dominated the 
discussion, with 24 references to it in that decade (a potential Pakistani bomb is mentioned only twice). 
By contrast, all through the 1980s, there are many questions as to how far Pakistan has progressed in its 
quest for the bomb and what the government is doing in response (the reply is always that the 
government is concerned and that the nuclear policy is under constant review). There are a few 
questions about China-Pakistan nuclear collaboration, but none about China as a threat itself.        
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terms in each year after 1993, and is associated with the terms ‘nuclear’, ‘military’, 
‘India’ and ‘weapons.’ The US, the superpower that was able to influence Pakistan, 
turned  a  blind  eye  to  its  nuclear  activities  in  return  for  the  latter’s  support  in  the 
containment of the Soviet Union (Singh 1998c, 24). With the end of the Cold War, the 
US “suddenly changed gear” and tried to disarm both India and Pakistan (Nayar 2001, 
37). On the other hand, some Indian leaders detected a new US strategy of befriending 
Pakistan to get access to Central Asian resources (Jha 1998).   
 
Shortly after the May 1998 tests, the Indian PM penned a missive to US President 
Clinton (soon ‘leaked’ to the New York Times). This letter created a storm because of 
its identification of China as the threat motivating India’s nuclear tests, as it stated:  
 
We  have  an  overt  nuclear  weapon  state  on  our  borders,  a  state  which 
committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations 
with  that  country  have  improved…an  atmosphere  of  distrust  persists 
mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust, that 
country has materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a covert 
nuclear weapons state (Anon 1998i).  
 
Combined with the statement a few weeks earlier by the Defense Minister to the effect 
that China was India’s ‘enemy number one’ this was taken as a huge policy shift 
(Chengappa and Joshi 1998b, 30). India was for the first time naming a particular 
country as the object of its program. 
 
The puzzle for security model explanations is: why was China named as a threat when 
relations were on the upswing? A look at the Militarized Interstate Rivalry data for 
India and China shows a dying rivalry. Before the 1970s, apart from the 1962 war, we 
note around 15 disputes involving force; Chinese involvement on the side of Pakistan      
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in the wars in 1965 and 1971; and three sharp incidents lasting one day each. The last 
standoff was on the border from 1985-87. The Reports of India’s Ministry of External 
Affairs for the years 1996 to 1998 state that while relations with China show steady 
improvement, Pakistan’s adversarial and confrontationist approach was impeding the 
normalization of relations (Ministry of External Affairs 1996, vii, viii; Ministry of 
External Affairs 1997, 2, 3). Sino-Indian talks were extremely successful in the 1990s. 
After the historic visit of PM Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 1988, India quietly put the 
border dispute on the back burner and was concentrating on strengthening bilateral 
economic relations. In fact, when France expressed its inability to supply enriched 
uranium to the Tarapur power plant after its accession to the NPT, China stepped in to 
supply the nuclear fuel. Observers also allege that India’s fears of Beijing's military 
capabilities are exaggerated (Karp 1998; Shirk 2004).  
 
We  cannot  understand  the  naming  of  China  as  a  threat  without  situating  it  in  the 
context of international norms. China, as a rising power, presents a worthy security 
justification for a nuclear program. It was more credible to evoke the Chinese threat to 
justify testing, since the Indian and Pakistani arsenals were already seen as balancing 
each other.
19 An interesting finding is that in 1998 although China was the ‘official’ 
justification  for  the  tests,  Pakistan  appeared  much  more  frequently  in  the  public 
discourse  as  noted  in  the  oversample  for  this  year  (2.9%  versus  8.2%).
20  In  the 
oversample for 1998, China is the 12
th most common term (Pakistan is the 3
rd most 
common, followed by the US). Moreover, China is not associated with any cluster in 
                                                 
19 The title of an article by prominent politician Krishan Kant, who ended his career as Vice-President 
of the country, says it all: “Should India Place Itself in the Position of Pakistan, Bangladesh and 
Indonesia and Determine its Role?” (Kant 1982). 
20 As explained in Appendix One, I oversampled from 1974 and 1998—14 days a month instead of 21 
days a year.      
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particular in this sample, which indicates at least that it was not consistently perceived 
as a threat.  
 
I argue that it is precisely because relations with China were improving, that India 
could risk this test and the naming of China. The 1998 test was not a revisionist attack 
on China, but a warning flag. Already in the summer of 1998, Indian diplomats were 
scrambling  to  undo  the  damage  to  Sino-Indian  relations.  Engagement  resumed  in 
December 1998 (Shirk 2004, 84). Deft diplomacy averted military escalation on the 
border where India remains vulnerable. After the nuclear assertion of independence, as 
the Chinese leadership was forced to take India seriously, it became easier for Indian 
politicians to extend the hand of friendship. The flurry of diplomatic activity in 1999 
would not have taken place without the 1998 tests (Frazier 2004, 297). In June 2003, 
PM Vajpayee made a historic visit to Beijing. He was able to sign a border agreement 
on Sikkim while avoiding accusations that he was caving in to the Chinese.
21 
 
Jaswant Singh, the main spokesman on nuclear issues in the ruling party at the time, 
clarified that demonstration was the real objective of the 1998 tests: “The tests of May 
11 and 13 were not directed against any country. They were intended to reassure the 
people  of  India  about  their  own  security”  (Singh  1999,  333).
22  If  deterrence  is 
inherently  difficult  to  maintain,  the  non-weaponized  version  is  even  trickier.  The 
‘need’  for  tests  can  be  assessed  only  in  terms  of  requirements  of  size  and 
sophistication which in turn depend on the deterrent’s targets. Some analysts wrote 
that testing was not needed for simple fission weapons, only for thermonuclear (Mark 
1988, 34). Some felt that the data from the 1974 test were adequate to maintain a 
                                                 
21 Author’s interview, Indian official at the Embassy of India in Beijing, July 2003. 
22 Senior BJP leader M. M. Joshi said that he does not blame adversaries for demanding that India 
demonstrate its “confidence”, and that Pokhran was a demonstration of confidence (Joshi 1999b).       
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deterrent against Pakistan but not against China (Chari 1995, 74). Others advocated 
testing  (Balachandran  1996;  Subrahmanyam  1996).  R.  Chidambaram,  head  of  the 
AEC  from  1993,  claimed  that  testing  was  needed  to  build  up  a  database  for 
simulations (Ramana 2003, 238). Walker points out that moving from latent to actual 
nuclear power need not involve testing (Walker 1996, 65).
23 France, already a NWS, 
accepted a US offer to share the results of simulations before it declared a moratorium 
on testing. The rules of the regime prevented the transfer of such data to a NNWS like 
India. There are rumors that India availed of American simulation data after its 1998 
tests (Mutimer 2000b, 153). 
 
Indian  policy-makers  in  1998  were  striving  to  reduce  ambiguity  about  capability 
(Paranjpe 2000, 53). They found it increasingly tricky to communicate capability and 
intention. The deterrent lacked credibility because there were no operational forces, 
and no signs that the  government was willing  to use them (Kampani  2001a). The 
armed forces in particular were not convinced that deterrence was operating (Giles and 
Doyle 1996, 138; Jha 1998; Menon 2000, 172; Roychowdhury 2002, 281). By the 
early 1990s, Gen. Sundarji was saying openly that ambiguity made mutual deterrence 
fragile (Giles and Doyle 1996, 140-43). In 1996 J. N. Dixit, just retired as Foreign 
Secretary,  wrote:  “We  must  provide  concrete  proof  that  our  potentialities  are… 
operational realities” (Dixit 1996, 374). A frank nuclear dialogue was not possible 
since the ambiguous deterrent posture depended on uncertainty. Further, talks would 
contradict  the  official  line  that  India  had  no  nuclear  weapons  (Chari  1996,  75). 
Secrecy “was written into the fabric of the atomic energy program” (Abraham 1998, 
                                                 
23 Weaponization requires data that can be acquired in three ways: by testing, obtaining a tested design 
from a NWS, or with computerized simulations based on test data.      
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163). However, the continual entropy of deterrence demands an inexorable pulling 
back of the veil.
24  
 
Testing is not sufficient to acquire NWS status, and has to be followed up with other 
measures. While the test in 1974 amounted to a crossing of the threshold, statements 
by Indian leaders since that date and the lack of further testing were considered to put 
India back into the class of NNWS (Goldblat and Lomas 1989, 17). Clearly, the test as 
a claim to NWS status was of temporary utility. Hence, predictions that India would 
be  tempted  to  test  and  join  the  NPT  as  a  NWS  before  categorization  was  further 
solidified by the 1995 NPTREC (Thomas 1993, 76). 
 
The decision to describe 1974 as a PNE reinforced the image of India as a “soft state” 
and denied it the privileges of a NWS (Singh 1998d, 4). According to Karnad, while 
nuclear weapons have political utility, a mere nuclear capability does not inspire the 
same respect (Karnad 2002b, 225). Bhabani Sen Gupta described the  1974 test as 
earning India “the status of a nuclear power without nuclear teeth” (Kapur 1993, 316). 
Doubts about India’s resolve were damaging to deterrence, plus, on a more rhetorical 
level, it was deprived of the intangible powerful benefits of declared NWS status.  
 
At the end of the Cold War nuclear deterrence was acknowledged as the basis of 
international stability, although the identity of the ‘deterree’ changed from the Soviet 
Empire  to  a  motley  collection  of  ‘rogue’  states.  Deterrence  was  reaffirmed  as  a 
performance for civilized and mature states. The Indian elite noted signs such as the 
justifications advanced in NWS depositions to the International Court of Justice in the 
                                                 
24 The termination of NWD in weaponization is not inevitable in all cases. I deal with these in the 
conclusion.       
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Nuclear Weapons case, the NPT extension and the pressure put on India to sign the 
CTBT (Anon 1999b).  
 
India used the annual ritual of the Pakistani resolution on the South Asia Nuclear 
Weapon Free Zone as an index of its support. In 1992 it was found that the abstentions 
had dwindled from 43 in 1976 (and a high of 46 in 1982), to 13. The votes in favor of 
the  Pakistani  resolution  went  up  from  91  in  1976,  to  144  in  1992.  The  US  also 
changed its vote from abstention to affirmation after 1977 (Murthy 1993, 122-23). In 
addition, India’s old patron, the USSR/Russia, began following the US lead, voting 
with the US on the Pakistan-sponsored NWFZ resolution in 1990-91 (Thornton 1992, 
1065). After its rapprochement with the nonproliferation regime in the 1990s, China 
had begun to use regime norms against India. China called on India to sign the NPT 
and insisted on India’s accession as a condition for the entry-in-force of the CTBT 
(Nayar 2001, 141).  
 
India increasingly found itself on the other side of the table from its comrades in the 
nonaligned and ‘developing country’ camps on arms control. The most dramatic proof 
of this came during the CTBT negotiations, as Indian positions became more and more 
distant  from  the  consensus  draft.  Indian  diplomats  had  almost  no  experience  with 
dealing with such isolation, as they were used to leading the principled opposition 
against the five NWS and their allies. The chief negotiator then asked the government, 
then headed by P.V. Narasimha Rao, what the delegation was ultimately striving for. 
The government was forced to engage in debate about the future of the deterrent.
25 
Instructions were issued to block the treaty. The final vote on the CTBT in the UN 
General Assembly was 158-3 in favor. India found itself isolated, with only Libya and 
                                                 
25 Author’s interview with Arundhati Ghose, New Delhi, 1 August 2003.        
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Bhutan (its client state) for company.
26 In the 1990s, the content analysis features a 
rise in the salience of arms control terms such as ‘treaty’ and ‘amendment’. In fact, 
after 1989, these terms never drop below the first ten most significant words. It is clear 
that  Indians  were  recognizing  that  their  options  were  being  delineated  by  these 
international efforts.    
 
Anti-CTBT rhetoric blended with injunctions to exercise the option before it was too 
late.  This  urgency  stemmed  from  Article  XIV  of  the  treaty,  which  provided  for 
measures  to  ensure  India’s  adherence  to  be  decided  at  a  review  conference  in 
September  1999.  It  was  also  an  acknowledgement  of  the  global  shift  towards 
nonproliferation. At the height of the CTBT debate, T. T. Poulose, a known opponent 
of nuclear weapons wrote: “It is no longer possible for India to avoid taking some hard 
decisions…India can also decide to come out openly and declare that she is a NWS 
and face the economic, political, and strategic consequences…Otherwise India can go 
on living with the nuclear option and face the fury of all those nations which are 
waiting  to  punish  India”  (Poulose  1996,  225).  India’s  middle  ground  provides  no 
security dividends, analysts pointed out (Thomas 1998, 292).  
 
The first-ever UN Security Council Summit had declared proliferation to be a threat to 
international  peace  and  security,  invoking  the  authority  of  the  Council  to  respond 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Rajamohan 2003a, 82). Post-war revelations 
about Iraqi capability impelled the regime’s institutions to closely monitor states with 
the technical capability to produce a nuclear weapon—whether they had actually done 
so or not. The problem was constituted as one of inevitable technological diffusion 
                                                 
26 India had refused to allow the draft to be adopted as a consensus document by the CD and instead it 
was sent to the General Assembly.       
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(Mutimer 1998, 115). India’s nuclear capability became a problematic asset in this 
context. As definitions were broadened, enforcement mechanisms were fortified with 
military options. There was a greater focus on the dangers of regional proliferation, 
which had been of interest during the Cold War only because of the potential for 
superpower involvement. In 1993 the US Central Intelligence Agency Director James 
Woolsey testified that the India-Pakistan arms race “poses perhaps the most probable 
prospect for future use of weapons of mass destruction” (Hagerty 1998, 5).   
 
The  strategic  space  that  India  had  occupied  between  the  categories  of  NWS  and 
NNWS  was  rapidly  shrinking.  There  was  a  rush  among  countries  to  clarify  their 
ambiguous relations with the regime, with Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, along with 
three  states  that  inherited  nuclear  weapons  (Belarus,  Kazakhstan  and  Ukraine), 
formally  giving  up  their  nuclear  capabilities.  France  and  China  reversed  their 
traditional  antipathy  to  the  regime  and  became  staunch  supporters.  India  was  a 
member of the regime with undefined status. Although its engagement with the US-led 
global community was qualitatively and quantitatively improving, there was a sense 
that this would only increase pressure on the nuclear program.
27 India perceived a 
small window of opportunity which it could use to move closer to NWS status, again 
resorting to nuclear testing. In the event, Realists were right in predicting that testing 
would actually reduce the pressures on India’s program (Kapur 2001, 6). 
 
 
Using the regime for deterrence 
 
In  this  section  I  will  discuss  how  India  used  understandings  introduced  by  the 
nonproliferation regime to enact its deterrent identity; and in the next section I will 
                                                 
27 Author’s interview with Arundhati Ghose, 1 August 2003, New Delhi.      
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take up the related idea that Indian decision-makers too were constrained by ideational 
forces that may initially have been deployed strategically.  
 
Deterrence through nuclear development 
We have seen that the nonproliferation regime facilitates the development of nuclear 
capabilities short of weaponization, that countries then employ in ‘hedging.’ In the 
1960s, the US tried to reduce the lure of the weapons option by affirming the power 
potential  of  civilian  programs.  A  State  Department  telegram  advises  American 
diplomats that the term “civil nuclear power” should be used to describe a state that 
has the potential to employ advanced nuclear technology for weapons but has decided 
against it (Department of State 1966). 
 
India’s deterrence strategy rested on conveying the idea that it was capable of ‘going 
nuclear’ by crossing acknowledged thresholds. It too plays on the inherent dual-use 
characteristics  of  nuclear  technology.  India  was  initially  able  to  garner  nuclear 
materials  and  technology  on  the  basis  of  its  developmental  plans.  The  Indian 
government had pledged that fissile materials produced in the process of the operation 
of CIRUS would be “employed for peaceful purposes only.” A similar pledge was 
given to the US Atomic Energy Commission in 1956 (Chellaney 1993b, 6). A senior 
policy-maker hinted that available fissile material was moved from civilian to military 
uses. He said that India had to choose between using its limited “precious” [fissile] 
material  for  civil  applications  or  for  weapons.
28  The  Indian  government  initiated 
dozens  of  programs  under  different  organizations  like  the  Indian  Space  Research 
Organization (ISRO), the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the Defence 
Research and Development Organization (DRDO), which, taken together resemble a 
                                                 
28 Author’s interview with K. Santhanam, 13 June 2003, New Delhi.      
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full-fledged deterrent program (Chellaney 1991, 63). Karnad claims that by the late 
1980s India had a “fairly sophisticated arsenal” (Karnad 2002b, 267). India also began 
a missile program in 1970 to build delivery vehicles for its nuclear warheads. Indira 
Gandhi was aware of the signaling function of the program, observing that there was 
no point in making threats unless one had something to back them (Chengappa 2000, 




India’s  deployment  of  capability  was  an  instrument  of  nuclear  strategy  just  like 
deterrence, threat, or use (Subrahmanyam 1974b). In 1974, the Statesman predicted 
that  other  countries  would  disregard  statements  about  peaceful  uses  and  focus  on 
capability: “Whatever the declared policy may be, the production of actual weapons is 
just another step forward should a political decision be taken to that effect” (Anon 
1974f). Subrahmanyam clarified: “The same range of tests needed to perfect the use of 
the bomb for peaceful purposes will be needed for making weapons” (Anon 1974d). 
India would be entitled to use her knowledge for peaceful purposes, “or otherwise as 
the situation might demand” (Dasgupta 1974). India’s ambassador to the Conference 
on Disarmament made sure to inform that body that “all countries developing uses of 
nuclear energy are nuclear powers, those which develop or possess nuclear weapons 
are nuclear weapon powers” (Anon 1974c, emphasis mine).  
 
Statements by authorities 
Politicians, military leaders, scientists and diplomats hinted at nuclear  progress.  In 
February 1961 Homi Bhabha, the head of the AEC, claimed publicly that a bomb 
                                                 
29 1998 did not obviate the need for development, and the testing of the Agni-II missile in April 1999 
for instance was described by the government as a demonstration that India would resist pressure on 
security issues (Anon 1999d).      
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could be ready in two years (Perkovich 1999, 38). In 1964, the Information Minister 
said  it  would  take  18  months  (Jain  1974,  vol.1,  80).  Replying  to  an  question  in 
Parliament about India’s knowledge of atomic bomb production, PM Shastri said: “the 
general principles are well-known but we have not acquired the detailed knowhow as 
we  have  not  worked  towards  this  end.  It  would  take  about  a  year  to  develop  the 
detailed knowhow if a decision to do so were taken.”
30 In 1967, Foreign Minister 
Chagla declared that India could explode a nuclear device within a year (Williams 
1969, 40).  
 
In June 1985, PM Rajiv Gandhi declared that if India decided to become a nuclear 
power it would take only a few weeks or months (Spector 1985, 83). In 1988, the 
Defense  Minister  announced  that  the  Indian  armed  forces  “would  not  be  at  a 
disadvantage”  in  the  face  of  a  nuclear  attack  by  Pakistan  (Smith  1994,  191). 
Statements  often  reiterated  the  commitment  to  peaceful  uses  but  stressed  policy 
mutability. Soon after the Chinese test, PM Shastri told Parliament that he could not 
say  that  the  policy  of  not  developing  nuclear  weapons  was  deep-rooted  (Sundarji 
1995, 139, emphases mine). Responding to calls for an arsenal in 1970, Mrs. Gandhi 
declared that although the policy was to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, 




Parliamentary  statements  were  often  used  in  enacting  deterrence.  In  1984,  the 
Pakistani nuclear program was brought up for discussion in Parliament. Narasimha 
Rao,  then  Foreign  Minister  (later  PM)  responded  that  the  government  was  “not 
                                                 
30 Lok Sabha Debates, 14 September 1964. 
31 Lok Sabha Debates, 5 March 1970.      
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unaware” of developments in the neighborhood: “Our scientists are continuing with 
their  research.  What  else  can  one  say?”  On  being  asked  specifically  whether  the 
nuclear option was open he read out a bland statement: “Indian scientists are keeping 
abreast of all aspects of research and development connected with modern relevant 
technologies.” When the questioner then demanded to know what this statement really 
meant,  Rao  retorted  that  any  intelligent  person  would  understand  its  meaning.
32 
Instead of nuclear testing, PM Gujral used missile testing, and even the awarding of 
India’s highest civilian honor (the Bharat Ratna) to Abdul Kalam (known as the father 
of India’s bomb, now President) to establish his and the country’s resolve (Chengappa 
2000, 406, 09).  
 
Testing  
The literature has focused on the timing of tests. Scholars search for security ‘triggers’ 
(in 1974, Nixon’s visit to China via Pakistan; in 1998, Pakistan’s testing of a missile 
in April). Finding these insufficient, scholars seek explanations in domestic politics (in 
1974 Mrs. Gandhi’s bid to win public support, in 1998 the BJP’s attempt to build 
consensus).  I  believe  that  the  question  of  timing  is  relatively  unimportant  and 
becoming less relevant: the program was advanced enough that it could produce an 
explosive device with some notice—approximately 18 months for the first test and a 
few weeks for the second.33 I focus on what the government was attempting to ‘do’ 
with the test. Why should an explosion make a country more secure? This can only be 
                                                 
32 Lok Sabha Debates, Matters under Rule 377, 30 March 1984. 
33 There are reports that a test was planned in 1982 (canceled for reasons unknown) (Chengappa 2000, 
260; Perkovich 1999, 242). Another test was attempted in late 1995/early 1996, but international 
pressure forced the government to draw back (Joeck 1997, 42). When the BJP was in power for 13 days 
in May 1996 it reportedly authorized a test. Unconfirmed reports suggest that PM Deve Gowda, who 
formed the government in 1996, planned to carry out a test in the summer of 1997 to shore up his 
political position (Chengappa 2000, 402).       
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understood in the context of the understanding that a nuclear explosion stands for the 
capability to make weapons. 
 
First,  nuclear  tests  are  vital  steps  in  establishing  deterrence,  creating  confidence 
within and outside the country. In the collective consciousness of weapons scientists 
the experimental demonstration of the reliability of nuclear weapons is associated with 
the reliability of nuclear deterrence itself (Gusterson 1996, 152). ‘Reliability’ has been 
shown to be a constructed concept (Montgomery 1999; Pinch 1993, 33). Yet it is not 
only  scientists  who  place  their  faith  in  tests.  The  US  had  conducted  around  1000 
nuclear tests by 1987 (Anon 2002d). Yet it initially rejected negotiations on a CTBT 




Second,  as  I  showed  in  my  discussion  of  categorization,  testing  is  necessary  to 
establish a state as a NWS. The international community is simply unable to recognize 
the development of arsenals if they are not tested (Chafetz 1995, 755). India used the 
link  that  had  been  established  between  testing  and  the  possession  of  weapons  to 
maintain opaque deterrence. Third, testing demonstrates a country’s commitment to 
developing its arsenal. The 1974 test put paid to the idea that the Soviet Union was 
able to restrain Indian nuclear ambitions (Anon 1974a). 
 
Fourth, testing by states that are not NWS represents a public blow to the regime. The 
international community strives to avert testing where it cannot stem proliferation, 
making significant concessions to this end. India’s interlocutors counseled restraint 
                                                 
34 Around eight years later, thanks to political concessions and technological advances the American 
government was able to convince laboratories to support the CTBT.       
  114 
and  presented  suggestions  for  stabilizing  deterrence  (Lavoy  1995).  The  goal  was 
apparently to prevent testing, which would symbolize an overt failure of the regime. 
This preoccupation with averting a test facilitated India’s adoption of a particular kind 
of deterrence.  
 
India’s  tests  exploited  the  link  established  in  the  regime  between  testing  and 
acquisition of nuclear weapons, inherent in the Article IX definition of a NWS. After 
1974  India  had  to  be  considered  as  sharing  some  of  the  qualities  of  a  NWS, 
challenging the binary NWS-NNWS distinction resting on the controlled explosion of 
a nuclear device. India was not eligible for NWS status, and claimed not to want it. 
Yet it wanted to reap the deterrence benefits of the intersubjective understanding that 
the  explosion  proved  India’s  capability  to  make  weapons.  It  is  unclear  that  India 
actually had this capability in 1974. 
 
Playing by the rules: disarmament, arms control and signaling 
India  maintained  its  deterrence  posture  by  picking  and  choosing  its  disarmament 
commitments.  As  we  have  seen  the  advocacy  of  general  and  comprehensive 
disarmament (GCD) was in fact an integral part of security strategy (Dubey 1998b, 
3).
35 The underlying assumption was that India, like other nations, would be most 
secure in a disarmed world. The idea that security would be best assured in a nuclear 
weapon-free  world  was  congruent  with  commitments  to  development  and 
nonalignment (Chopra 1984, 6-10). Realists, however, believe that  India promoted 
GCD because it was so manifestly unachievable that it would never constrain its own 
                                                 
35 GCD was rarely and divergently defined. In one of the more radical formulations: “So far as India 
was concerned, disarmament meant elimination of all national military forces, leaving each country 
with nothing more than the domestic police or militia…applied to conventional, nuclear and other 
weapons of warfare, it included all kinds of armed forces and all nations” (Chopra 1984, 15).      
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options  (Karnad  2002b,  218).  At  various  points  India  presented  the  world  with  a 
choice: either efforts towards disarmament were speeded up, or India would solve its 
security problems by acquiring weapons. Presenting his three-stage plan to the UN in 
1988, Rajiv Gandhi condemned the doctrine of deterrence, yet his speech contained a 
veiled threat: “Left to ourselves, we would not want to touch nuclear weapons. But 
when tactical considerations, in the passing play of great power rivalries, are allowed 
to take precedence over the imperatives of nuclear nonproliferation, with what leeway 
are we left?” (Gandhi 1988, 1152). 
 
India’s refusal to sign the NPT was the first clear signal of its intention to keep the 
option open, that it was “aiming at acquiring basic nuclear weapons capabilities” to be 
operationalized according to the security environment (Dixit 1998a, 421). However, 
because of the regime’s norms, it was able to modulate this signal. India could frame 
its  opposition  in  terms  of  an  anti-(neo)  colonial,  developmentalist,  and  principled 
stance. Apartheid and racial discrimination dominated the international discourse in 
the 1950s and the 1960s; India drew on them to critique the NPT (Biswas 2001). It 
could continue to advocate disarmament measures and harangue the nuclear powers. 
The benefits were not purely symbolic. India’s position as a leader of the Third World 
and the nonaligned movement was strengthened, insulating it somewhat from pressure 
from the superpowers. India had to be invited to UN bodies debating disarmament, 
although it had repudiated the most prominent treaty, and could continue to influence 
the formulation of the regime.  
 
The regime’s bargain exalts the importance of nuclear technology for developmental 
purposes.  States  are  persuaded  to  trade  off  potential  military  uses  for  technical 
assistance. India made use of this understanding—obviously one that weakened as the      
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initial  promise  of  nuclear  technology  faded  by  the  1980s—to  create  a  credible 
ideational base for its NWD. The claim that the data from the PNE would not be used 
for  military  purposes  was  meant  to  demonstrate  that  the  militarization  of  nuclear 
energy was a political choice, thus reversible.  
 
But disarmament was never followed blindly. Observers noted a change in India’s 
disarmament activism in the late 1960s as it began to worry about China. Its goal 
shifted from world peace through disarmament, to reciprocity—nuclear renunciation 
by some in return for disarmament by others (Chopra 1984, 154; Epstein 1976, 65). 
India’s rejection of regional arms control in the form of the proposed South Asian 
Nuclear  Weapon  Free  Zone  (SANWFZ)  is  an  example  of  its  careful  choices  in 
disarmament diplomacy.
36 The SANFWZ was introduced into the debate by Pakistan 
after the tests in 1974. The draft resolution slyly referred to India’s support for Nuclear 
Free  Zones  in  Latin  America  and  Africa  (Murthy  1993,  110).  For  eighteen  years 
(1974-92)  Pakistan  reintroduced  the  resolution  in  every  General  Assembly  session 
with the purpose of embarrassing India (Murthy 1993, 120). India often used support 
for general principles to evade regional measures. For instance, it rejected a Pakistani 
proposal for mutual inspection of nuclear facilities on the grounds that joint inspection 
would “detract from our principled stand that any safeguard on the use of nuclear 
energy should be non-discriminatory and have universal applicability”.
37   
 
India’s  refusal  to  enter  into  bilateral  disarmament  signaled  its  resistance  to  the 
definition of its security problem with respect to Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan becomes 
                                                 
36 Reflecting the more accommodationist mood, Amitabh Mattoo suggested after the 1998 tests that 
India should work toward a Nuclear Safety, Assistance and Collaboration Zone (NSACZ) rather than a 
NFZ (Mattoo 1998b, 25). 
37 Minister of External Affairs, Reply to Question, Lok Sabha Debates, 28 April 1983, col. 110.      
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salient in the content analysis only in 1976. Studying the terms that cluster with it in 
that year we find that they all relate to the proposed NWFZ (weapon, region, India, 
south, asia and free). The feeling was that American analysts, working within the 
“analytical straitjacket” of bipolar competition, did not give adequate importance to 
the China factor in Indian calculations. Their definition of South Asia excluded China 
(Chellaney 1991, 51). India insists that China is part of the region (Cohen 1992, 211). 
Since  China  as  a  NWS  could  not  be  asked  to  disarm,  India’s  need  for  a  nuclear 
deterrent was thrown into relief as a result of this tactic. India also pointed to the 
nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific.
38 It used this opportunity to 
reiterate  that  “due  to  its  global  implications  there  can  be  no  bilateral  or  regional 
solution  to…proliferation”.
39  This  was  a  direct  refutation  of  the  opinion  of  the 
nonproliferation  community,  as  expressed  by  Michael  Krepon:  "The  root  of  the 
problem in South Asia is in South Asia. It's not in Washington, it's not in Beijing" 
(Anon 1995b). 
 
The 1974 test could be framed as directed against the NPT (Kapur 1976b, 205). The 
test had made it impossible for the NPT’s sponsors to claim victory (Subrahmanyam 
1974b). Some claimed the treaty would be replaced with a fairer one (Sawhney 1974, 
9). The PNE label also allowed India to retain the benefits of its role as disarmament 
advocate fighting the unjust international system. By refusing to declare itself a NWS, 
India  could  portray  its  actions  as  promoting  disarmament,  rather  than  hurting  that 
cause. The test gave “special force, credence, and meaning” to India’s disarmament 
efforts,  according  to  V.P.Singh,  later  PM  (Singh  1974b).  Presenting  the  test  in  a 
                                                 
38 Minister of External Affairs, Reply to question, Lok Sabha Debates, 8 January 1976, cols. 76-77. 
39 Minister of External Affairs, Reply to question, Lok Sabha Debates, 20 July 1989, col.210.       
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manner  that  denuded  it  of  military  implications  let  India  elude  responsibility  for 
triggering further proliferation (Anon 1974i).
40 
 
India  skillfully  constructed  its  identity  to  distinguish  itself  from  other  nuclear 
aspirants,  with  selective  adherence  to  certain  norms.  One  method  by  which  India 
established its nuclear identity was adherence to norms of technology diffusion. It was 
remarkably  conscientious  in  controlling  the  exports  of  sensitive  materials  and 
technology. Apparently  in 1978  India rejected a  Libyan offer to pay off its entire 
foreign debt in return for the sale of nuclear weapons (Anon 2005e).
41 India’s nuclear 
deals in the 1970s also followed NSG guidelines (Power 1979, 578). Indian diplomats 
played up the fact that although it is not a member of supplier groups or the NPT, 




Like the other measures listed in this section, behavior during security crises is also 
designed to emphasize India’s restraint and responsible conduct in order to establish 
its legitimate claim to possess nuclear weapons. This demonstration of restraint was 
most recently seen during the Kargil war in 1999 and the 2001-02 border standoff. In 
both these cases, India issued nuclear threats against its nuclear-armed rival, Pakistan. 
Yet Indian diplomats were able to emphasize the restraint it imposed on itself, in order 
                                                 
40 During the discussion on the 1974 tests, V.P.Singh says that a country building nuclear weapons is 
following the example set in Hiroshima, not in Pokhran. Lok Sabha Debates, 8 August 1974, col. 210. 
The External Affairs Minister castigates Pakistan for postponing the Shimla negotiations using the PNE 
as a pretext, Lok Sabha Debates, 25 July 1974, col. 151-52. 
41 India also refused, partly due to US pressure, an offer from Iran to buy a research reactor in 1991 
(Montgomery 2005, 182). 
42 Every time India expresses concern about proliferation from Pakistan, it is reinforcing the idea that 
proliferation involves buying or stealing materials and technology as opposed to an indigenous bomb 
program.      
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to draw global condemnation on Pakistan. Since this strategy draws on the norms of 
the emerging counter-terrorism regime, it is dealt with in detail in Chapter 6. 
 
 
Pokhran-II: The 1998 tests and their aftermath  
 
According  to  Scheinman,  a  norm  precluding  PNEs  had  not  yet  emerged  in  1974 
(Scheinman 1987, 199, n.4). However, by 1999, a politically binding norm against 
testing  had  been  established  (Bunn  1999,  21).  It  seems  paradoxical  to  claim  that 
India’s violations of global norms by testing and declaring itself a NWS were aimed at 
insinuating  itself  into  the  regime.  Yet  May  1998  featured  both  violations  and, 
obscured  by  the  furore,  a  reversal  of  the  principles  of  five  decades  of  Indian 
disarmament  diplomacy.  India  laid  claim  to  several  of  the  resources  that  the 
nonproliferation regime itself used to assign positive identities to its members.  
 
Crashing the nonproliferation regime 
First, with all the fervor of the newly-converted, India pledged responsible deterrence. 
The Prime Minister declared: “Our intentions were, are, and always will be peaceful, 
but we do not want to cover our action with a veil of needless ambiguity” (Chawla 
1998, 39). The declaration that India would be content with a “minimum” nuclear 
deterrent was the cornerstone of India’s post-test identity construction.  
 
The Prime Minister must leave no room for any doubt that India is now a 
nuclear weapon state…must insist that there can be no negotiation about 
weaponisation or deployment of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously India 
must convey that it will strain every nerve to ensure that its nuclear force 
structure will be built on maximum possible restraint…must signal…that 
India  has  no  desire  to  engage  in  an  open-ended  nuclear  arms  race 
(Rajamohan 1998d).       
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The PM promised that India, unlike “other nuclear weapon powers,” did not intend to 
build a large arsenal or create an elaborate command and control system (Chengappa 
1998, 58). India would induct nuclear weapons into the armed forces only if necessary 
and there was no time frame in which this process would be completed (Anon 1998k). 
It is precisely with the help of nuclear deterrence, which does not depend on matching 
weapon to weapon, that India would avoid an arms race (Singh 1998b). 
 
Moving away from the traditional goal of general and comprehensive disarmament, 
India began advocating clearly incremental measures such as a draft resolution on 
reducing the risk of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons, and a global 
NFU pact (Anon 1998n). In 2002 India joined the Vienna Convention on the Physical 
Protection  of  Nuclear  Material.  Most  importantly,  the  government  proclaimed  its 
willingness to sign the CTBT and enter negotiations on a Fissile Materials Cutoff 
Treaty  (FMCT).  India  objected  to  the  NPT  because  it  did  not  touch  the  weapons 
already existing in NWS arsenals, but is now ready to sign an FMCT which only 
restricts further production of fissile material and does not operate with retroactive 
effect to reduce stockpiles of material owned by nuclear nations.  
 
The PM announced that India, “as a responsible state possessing nuclear weapons” 
was tightening export controls (Rajamohan 1998c). Another significant shift in policy 
appeared in India’s willingness to discuss nuclear issues with the US. Strobe Talbott 
and Jaswant Singh, special envoys of their countries, began a dialogue in 1998, one 
which Talbott admitted went in India’s favor (Haniffa 2004).
43 Even in the famous 
                                                 
43 "In eight rounds of talks with Strobe Talbott, Jaswant Singh has skilfully brought India back from the 
edge of being declared a rogue state to the verge of rejoining the global community as a recognised, de 
facto nuclear power" (Jha 1999).      
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post-test letter to President Clinton, India pledged to continue working with the US on 
arms control (Anon 1998i).
44 Bilateral arms control became the principal vehicle of 
reassurance  as  to  the  ability  of  South  Asians  to  pursue  responsible  policies 
(Rajamohan 1999a). Since the relationship between India and Pakistan was considered 
a  nuclear  flashpoint,  India  attempted  to  prove  its  non-aggressive  intentions  with  a 
package of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). A No First Use (NFU) guarantee 
to Pakistan was the most important of these. India also proposed the extension of the 
hotline between national leaders, advance notification of missile tests of over 200 km 
range, extension of the agreement on non-attack to population and economic centers, 
and measures to end hostile propaganda (Baruah 1998).  
 
Rajamohan emphasised that Asian states needed convincing that India is not North 
Korea  (Rajamohan  1999b).  India  was  not  Pyongyang  nor  Baghdad,  indulging  in 
nuclear blackmail (Anon 1998a; Anon 1998c). The signals from New Delhi needed to 
reflect the mind of a mature, self-assured nation, not those of a defensive, jingoistic 
establishment (Gupta 1998a). The strength of giants is to be used with care, and India 
should  present  itself  as  a  responsible  country  (George  1998c).  Aside  from  active 
participation in the global economy and international institutions, particularly those 
relating  to  arms  control,  India  also  strategically  deployed  its  democratic  form  of 
government (Bhagwati 1998, 32; Talbott 2004, 13, 121)—because it implies civilian 
control of nuclear weapons.
45 In his Parliament speech on the nuclear tests, the PM 
reiterated  India’s  commitment  to  international  institutions,  and  mentioned  growing 
links with the world economy consequent on economic liberalization.  
                                                 
44 India’s enthusiastic endorsement of the Bush administration’s missile defense project, and its 
participation in the Container/Proliferation Security Initiatives have signaled its acceptance of US 
leadership in arms control, anathema to Indian diplomats before the 1990s. 
45 The separation of regulatory authority for civilian and military plants was done following the US 
model (Gopalakrishnan 2000; Subramaniam 2000).      
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After  the  initial  hand-wringing,  the  dominant  powers  decided  that  India’s  newly-
acquired capability did not upset the balance of deterrence that was at the core of the 
regime. The ‘norm leader’ gave the cue (Arms Control Association 2001; Council on 
Foreign  Relations  2003).  In  July,  October  and  November  1998  the  impact  of 
American  sanctions  was  periodically  and  substantially  diluted.
46  The  US  lifted  all 
remaining sanctions against India in September 2001 acknowledging it as a valuable 
ally in the war on terrorism; other countries followed suit. The adverse repercussions 
of the 1998 tests, as Indian decision-makers had predicted, were not long-lasting. Now 
India’s nuclear status is routinely referred to among its qualifications to be a great 
power,  for  instance,  in  its  campaign  to  secure  a  permanent  seat  on  the  Security 
Council. Seven years of quiet diplomacy since then have consolidated India’s position. 
 
The fruit of nuclear diplomacy 
In July 2005 India and the US signed a historic agreement in Washington DC.  It 
declared that “as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should 
acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states” (Office of the Press 
Secretary 2005 emphasis mine). An American spokesman clarified: “By taking this 
decision, we are not recognizing India as a nuclear weapons state” (Burns 2005). Yet 
the logic of the US approach to India only holds if India is seen as a NWS.  How can 
one, for example, assert that India is a NNWS while recognizing that it has civilian 
and military nuclear fuel cycles? How can one make an exemption from the NSG 
Guidelines for a NNWS?  (Stansfield 2005). Several scholars of nonproliferation see 
this deal as indirectly conferring on India the status of a NWS by giving it many of the 
                                                 
46 In July 1998, the farm lobby pressured the government to exclude export credits for farm products. 
Three months later, Congress gave the President omnibus powers to waive sanctions against India and 
Pakistan for one year, except for sanctions on arms sales. On 7 November 1998 President Clinton 
removed all sanctions against two countries except for arms sales and certain technology transfers, 
which were then removed after the September 2001 attacks and the ‘war on terror.’        
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same rights and responsibilities. The Additional Protocol agreement that India would 
negotiate with the IAEA would resemble that body’s agreements with an NWS. India 
will voluntarily accept full-scope international safeguards to be administered on the 
civilian portion of its nuclear estate. Unlike the NPT parties who are NNWS, India 
thus has the right to choose which facilities it will designate as civilian. This would 
allow India to exclude military-related facilities and even portions of civilian facilities 
on ‘national security’ grounds (Kimball 2005).  
 
India promised to set in place a wall of separation between the military and civilian 
parts  of  its  nuclear  program.  The  country  also  voluntarily  accepted  full-scope 
safeguards  administered  by  the  IAEA  on  its  civilian  nuclear  reactors,  pledged  to 
incorporate  international  export  controls  into  domestic  legislation  to  prevent  the 
horizontal proliferation of nuclear technology out of India, and agreed to continue its 
voluntary moratorium on testing. The US in turn agreed to commence trade in fissile 
material and related technologies for civilian uses. On 26 September 2005, Canada 
and India also came to an agreement whereby trade in dual-use technology to India 
would be facilitated. 
 
The deal weakens the credibility of the nonproliferation regime since India will now 
be  able  to  avail  of  the  economic  advantages  of  NPT  membership  without  its 
constraints  (Einhorn  2005;  Krepon  2005;  Talbott  2005).  On  the  other  hand,  some 
Indian leaders were unhappy  with the manner in which  India had been identified. 
Former PM Vajpayee was quick to point out that the deal recognizes India merely “as 
a  responsible  state  with  advanced  nuclear  technology”,  not  as  a  “legitimate  and 
responsible nuclear weapons state" (Vajpayee 2005). The Communist Party of India 
(Marxist)  also  criticized  the  government  for  accepting  “junior  partnership  of  the      
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United States in return for a de facto recognition as a nuclear weapon state without 
acquiring a legitimate position in the nuclear club” (Anon 2005demphasis mine).  
 
A few months after the 1998 tests, we note already suggestions that India should be 
enticed  with  civilian  technology  to  adhere  to  nonproliferation  norms  (Christopher, 
Hamburg, and Perry 1999, 51; Rajamohan 1998a). Its membership in formal arms 
control mechanisms was a lower priority. Questioned about India’s accession to the 
CTBT in 2001, a State Department spokesman responded that the US was mainly 
concerned  with  preventing  further  testing  (Arms  Control  Association  2001).  US 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said that his country and “other interested countries” 
should encourage India and Pakistan to “learn that is it possible to live with nuclear 
weapons and not to use them.” He hoped that the India-Pakistan relationship could 
become as stable as the Cold War rivalry (Arms Control Association 2001).
47  
 
The seven rounds of talks between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott in 2001 and 2002 
can be viewed as a way to cautiously institutionalize India into the dominant order of 
global governance (Muppidi 2004, 289). In January 2003 the Chairman of the US 
Nuclear  Regulatory  Commission  met  with  the  AEC  Chairman  to  discuss  the 
possibility of bilateral cooperation (Harrison 2002). Elements of the July 2005 deal 
were foreshadowed in a Carnegie report released earlier that year, India as a New 
Global Power (Tellis 2005). A month earlier, India and the US had signed a ten-year 
defense agreement (“New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship”) paving 
the  way  for  joint  weapons  production  and  cooperation  on  missile  defense  (US 
Embassy 2005). 
                                                 
47 When asked if Rumsfeld’s remarks indicated a policy change on South Asia, the Pentagon refused to 
comment.      
  125 
 
The importance of discourse 
 
We have seen that the construction of a deterrent identity was the basis of India’s 
security  strategy.  I  also  attempted  to  demonstrate  that  the  principles  of  the 
nonproliferation  regime  can  be  exploited  in  ways  that  were  not  intended  by  their 
originators. Here I explain why it is important to pay attention to the constraining and 
enabling  power  of  elements  in  the  discourse.  First,  I  ask  how  deterrence  came  to 
function  as  a  ‘natural’  goal  of  strategy.  I  find  that  there  were  four  factors  that 
contributed  to  its  incorporation  into  the  discourse—its  association  with  peace,  a 
middle path in world affairs and a comprehensive conception of national security, and 
the influence of external actors. Second, I will present some evidence for the claim 
that discourse remains powerful even when structural conditions change.  
 
How deterrence prevailed 
Colin Gray once said that just as everyone supports peace, everybody is for deterrence 
(Williams 1992, 68). This does not hold true in India. India initially opposed the very 
concept  of  deterrence  because  it  relies  on  the  conditional  use  of  nuclear  weapons 
(Menon 1954). Subrahmanyam denounced the very idea of deterrence as immoral and 
unworkable  (Subrahmanyam  1981).  As  late  as  1995,  PM  Narasimha  Rao  told  the 
UNGA that deterrence was a ‘false belief’. Since the possession of nuclear weapons 
by some prompts other countries to acquire them, the idea of a permanent number of 
nuclear weapon states is unrealistic and self-defeating. This critique cuts at the core of 
the  nonproliferation  regime.  He  appealed  for  the  complete  elimination  of  nuclear 
weapons, possibly as per the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan (Rao 1995). No doubt the 
realization  that  it  could  not  afford  to  erect  a  credible  deterrent  strengthened  this      
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aversion.  How,  then,  did  deterrence  become  hegemonic  to  the  extent  that  Indian 
analysts branded as racist suggestions that it would not work in South Asia? (Giles and 
Doyle 1996, 143; Subrahmanyam 1986b, 286; Sundarji 1995, 159).  
 
It is important to note that deterrence gained ground slowly. Itty Abraham claims that 
the 1974 test moved India from a “mythic space of nonalignment and peaceful co-
existence  into  an  everyday  realm  of  naturalized  fear,  threat,  danger  and 
insecurity…Finally, in 1998, the state’s rhetoric caught up when India conducted a 
new round of tests and officially announced it was a NWS” (Abraham 1998, 165). 
Varadarajan correctly questions whether a single act could constitute a fall from grace 
in this way (Varadarajan 2004a, 334). In fact, there was no stark demarcation. The 
evolution of policy, taking India from being a staunch opponent of nuclear weapons to 
its current position as the newest entrant to the club, also took place at a tectonic pace.  
 
Arming for peace 
The  doctrine  owes  its  acceptability  in  great  part  to  the  ease  with  which  it  can  be 
presented as a path to peace. Adopting deterrence allows a country to think of itself as 
peaceful and concerned only with self-defense, yet powerful and capable of ensuring 
its own security—that is, deterrence allows the country to ‘have it both ways’ (Shue 
1989a). Deterrence allowed India to escape a debate about the country’s commitment 
to  peace,  its  Gandhian  ethos  and  military  expenditure,  while  making  a  nuclear 
capability possible. For instance, D. K. Palit responded to such objections by citing 
deterrence  theory  to  the  effect  that  nuclear  weapons  reduce  the  risk  and  scale  of 
violence (Palit 1971, 13). According to Jasjit Singh, if 1974 was a Peaceful Nuclear 
Explosion, the 1998 explosion was an “explosion for peace” (Sethi 1998, 84).  
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Peace has been the axis of India’s declarations on nuclear policy. The particular type 
of deterrence, i.e., NWD, was cited as an example of self-control and ethical norms 
(Rajan 1999, 8; Sethi 1998, 90). In 1974 ‘peaceful’ meant that nuclear power would be 
used for non-military purposes. Frequent references to nuclear capability and peaceful 
purposes  shaded  into  nuclear  weapons  and  peaceful  intentions.  The  inherent 
unreliability of NWD coupled with changing global norms, made it natural for security 
elites to demand a hardening of the option. It is no wonder that in 1998 advocates of 
‘ambiguity’  or  ‘keeping  the  option  open’  easily  switched  to  a  strident  defense  of 
enhancing  the  arsenal  (Vanaik  2004).  The  term  ‘peaceful  uses’  was  gradually 
broadened to include national defense, thus paving the way for deterrence without 
weapons in the 1980s,  and ‘keeping the option open’ in the 1990s.  It  was almost 
inevitable  that  existential,  non-weaponized  deterrence  hardened  into  ‘minimum 
deterrence’.  By  the  1990s  the  government  adopted  the  more  assertive  posture  of 
recessed deterrence, keeping the components of operational devices in readiness at 
separate locations (Banerjee 1998, 289; Muralidharan and Cherian 1998, 4).  
 
According  to  Tellis,  Indian  decision-makers  hold  the  mechanistic  conception  that 
deterrence,  like  the  invisible  hand  in  economics,  operates  thanks  to  the  essential 
characteristics  of  nuclear  weapons  themselves.  India's  traditional  antagonism  to 
deterrence made it imperative for analysts to strip the nuclear weapons of military 
implications and present them as purely 'political' instruments (Tellis 2001, 280-81). 
Rajesh Basrur’s interviews with members of the strategic elite in India showed him 
that  most  of  them  think  of  nuclear  weapons  as  sources  of  bargaining  power,  not 
necessarily  guarantors  of  a  net  positive  effect  on  security  (Basrur  2006,  68).  By 
delinking the deterrent from relative balance-of-power calculations India also escaped 
some of the costs of an arms race (Tellis 2001, 293).      
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Staying on the golden mean 
While the association of deterrence and peace can be observed in many countries, it 
was well-suited to the tendency of Indian government policies, from foreign affairs to 
economic restructuring, to stick to the ‘middle path’. Nehru once said about foreign 
policy formulation: “Any attempt on our part to go too far in one direction would 
create difficulties in our own country” (cited in Kapur 1976b, 14). Non-weaponization 
allowed successive Indian PMs to make the literally correct statement that India did 
not have nuclear weapons. It also allowed the construction of a rationale for seeming 
inaction (Menon 2000, 176, n.38). In this way, the hawks were also pacified. 69% of 
the respondents of a survey of academics specializing in IR claimed there was no 
conflict between the PNE and India’s peaceful intentions in world affairs (Misra and 
Gandhi 1975, 349). 
 
Another  route  through  which  the  terminology  of  deterrence  entered  India  was  the 
translation of India’s development-centered discourse to the dominant discourse. In a 
broader  sense,  self-reliance  translated  into  self-help.  The  Times  of  India  editorial 
claimed that the 1974 test showed that India takes its own decisions. Another claimed 
that the Enterprise incident had strengthened the case for self-reliance (Bhattacharya 
1974). Answering a question as to whether India had the capability to make a nuclear 
weapon, the Prime Minister said: “We have demonstrated, time and again, that we 
have always been extremely restrained…but for a country of India’s size, we simply 
cannot  be  technologically  dependent  on  other  countries”  (Anon  1974g,  7).  In  the 
1990s  the  focus  of  the  regime  expanded  to  include  restriction  of  technological 
capability,  and  ‘peaceful  uses’  became  suspect.  India’s  claims  about  the 
developmental uses of nuclear technology no longer passed muster and were given up.      
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In his first interview after the 1998 tests, PM Vajpayee stated: “You would have noted 
that  neither  my  own  statement  of  May  11  nor  the  longer  official  text…has 
characterized  the  nuclear  tests  as  ‘peaceful  nuclear  tests’…India  is  now  a  nuclear 
weapons state” (Chawla 1998). Here the authorities are anxious to denude the tests of 
all developmental significance and situate them firmly in the security discourse. Yet 
we can discern the operation of the economic progress-nuclear technology association, 
in the support for the tests in two economic constituencies.  
 
Some were concerned about the effects of nuclear and dual-use technology denial to 
an India unrecognized as a NWS. These actors still believed in the promise of nuclear 
technology,  particularly  the  ‘new-generation  reactors’.  Among  the  effects  of  non-
recognition as a NWS was the denial of nuclear technology and fissile materials via 
the rules of the NSG. The tightening of the regime, as manifested in the NSG’s 1992 
guidelines on dual-use technology made it impossible for India’s unsafeguarded plants 
to receive fissile material. Others—the globalizers—supported  economic openness 
and  calculated  that  a  NWS  India  would  perform  better  in  the  world  economy. 
Deterrence signals have always blended with economic ones, and this has eased their 
acceptability. Developmental aspirations, piggybacking on nuclear power, merged into 
security concerns.  
  
Lost in translation 
Because India was such a ‘rare bird,’ its stratagems fell on ears more accustomed to 
hearing the terminology of power and deterrence. Since the nonproliferation regime 
reinforced the idea that the possession of nuclear weapons solely for deterrence was 
legitimate  and  stabilizing,  Indian  elites  needed  deterrence  arguments  to  convince      
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international  and  domestic  audiences  that  they  were  entitled  to  nuclear  weapons 
because of ‘genuine’ security reasons. India’s arguments were gradually fitted into 
these  categories.  For  instance,  George  Quester  ‘translated’  India’s  insistence  on 
‘peaceful uses’ as equivalent to a No First Use (NFU) Declaration (Quester 1981, 
226).  In  1997,  K.  Subrahmanyam  made  a  similar  interpretation  (Joshi 1998a,  45). 
Since  the  Cold  War  represents  the  only  model  for  rivalry,  the  Indian  strategic 
community borrowed from it, while criticizing it at the same time.
48 
 
Indian  strategists,  even  those  who  were  not  trained  in  the  IR  discipline,  found 
inspiration  in  Western  texts  on  deterrence.  Many  of  my  interviewees  were  either 
trained in the US, or sought out American texts. K. Subrahmanyam cites his meetings 
with American strategists like Henry Kissinger, Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling and 
Bernard  Brodie  among  others,  as  very  influential  on  his  thinking.
49  The  soldier-
scholar,  D.  K.  Palit,  draws  “one  clear  lesson  from  twenty-five  years  of  nuclear 
confrontation”—that  the  chance  of  large-scale  violence  is  minimized  in  strategic 
nuclear  rivalry  (Palit  1974).  Ravi  Kaul  advocates  nuclear  deterrence  extrapolating 
from  the  views  of  André  Beaufre,  while  Sundarji  cites  Waltz  (Kaul  1974,  110; 
Sundarji 1994).  
 
Starting in the late 1980s, nonproliferation diplomacy by US-based thinktanks such as 
Carnegie and Rockefeller, encouraged a new generation of  Indian analysts to shift 
from disarmament to arms control thinking.
50 We know from the Soviet experience 
that centralized and hierarchical states are in fact more likely to effectively implement 
                                                 
48 Michael Krepon, personal communication, 17 November 2005. 
49 Author’s interview with K. Subrahmanyam, New Delhi. 
50 Author’s interviews with C.Rajamohan, 21 June 2003, New Delhi; Brahma Chellaney, 30 July 2003, 
New Delhi.      
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ideas  from  transnational  sources  (Evangelista  1999,  19).  In  the  realm  of  nuclear 
policy, India’s decisions are in fact made by a small and closed group of decision 
makers.  Western  scholars  argued  that,  with  NWD,  India  had  arrived  at  a  way  of 
performing  deterrence  that  was  less  dangerous  and  expensive  (Perkovich  1993; 
Quester 1992). (It must be noted that Realist scholars and practitioners dismiss the 
notion of transmission of ideas.
51) US government officials were also influential in this 
process. In 1995 Secretary of Defense William Perry became convinced after a visit to 
South Asia, that its leaders would never reverse their nuclear course. The official US 
policy at this time was to “cap, rollback and eliminate” the nuclear capability of non-
NPT  states  (US  Congress  Office  of  Technology  Assessment  1993,  103).  Perry 
advocated that the US give up on ‘rolling back’ and ‘eliminating’ nuclear arsenals in 
India and Pakistan and concentrate on ‘capping’. He also touted the virtues of CBMs 




Disarming logic: an obstacle to changing course 
Disarmament diplomacy started out as an integral part of security strategy (Dubey 
1998b, 3). Realists claim that policy-makers did not acquire nuclear weapons at the 
‘right time’ because disarmament had “calcified as dogma” (Karnad 2002b, 72).
53 In 
its semi-official national security doctrine and leaders’ pronouncements, India keeps 
reiterating its commitment to disarmament. The goal of a nuclear weapon free world is 
always present (Anon 1998e; Rajamohan 1999c; Singh 1998b). Even after 1998 we 
                                                 
51 Author’s interview with Ashley Tellis, August 2005, Washington DC. 
52 Author’s interview with William Perry, 23 March 2005, Palo Alto, CA. 
53 Jasjit Singh regrets that he did not write enough about the security benefits of disarmament—“many 
of us forgot the original motivation.” Author’s interview, 24 July 2003.      
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observed Raja Ramanna advocating that weaponization should not be the priority and 
that nuclear energy should be used for peaceful purposes (Ramanna 1998). 
 
After the 1998 tests the government announced that it was ready to sign the CTBT 
now that scientists had gained all the knowledge necessary for weaponization. Since 
the  CTBT  was  then  the  most  prominent  treaty  and  was  seen  as  targeting  Indian 
capabilities  in  particular,  this  concession  was  essential  to  establishing  India’s 
credentials  as  a  status  quoist  member  of  the  club.  The  political  elite  reacted  with 
skepticism, not least because doubts were raised about the AEC’s claims about yields 
recorded during the tests (Anon 2000a; Iyengar 2000; Sibal 1999). More importantly, 
it was accustomed to seeing the CTBT portrayed as discriminatory and harmful to 
disarmament. The government was severely criticized for even considering becoming 
party to the treaty and opposition leaders made it clear that they would be closely 
monitoring  any  movements  in  that  direction.
54  Arundhati  Ghose,  formerly  India’s 
representative to the Conference on Disarmament, claimed that endorsing the CTBT 
would  be  “tantamount  to  joining  the  inequitable  regime  we  have  fought  so  long 
against…to  joining  the  pyramidal  international  power  structure  with  the  US  at  its 
apex.”  She  argued  for  preserving  the  tradition  of  dissidence  pointing  out  that  its 
“contrariness” had permitted India to preserve its option (Ghose 1999). The longer 
India  went  without  signing  (whether  the  NPT  or  the  CTBT)  the  harder  it  was  to 
reverse that stand which was presented in the interim as independent and principled. A 
domestic campaign to “de-demonize the CTBT” is clearly a necessary first step for 
accession (Talbott 2004, 98).
55 
                                                 
54 Author’s interviews with Natwar Singh, 2 August 2003; and I.K. Gujral, 5 August 2003, New Delhi. 
55 By 2005, the CTBT had 176 signatories (out of 194 states) and 126 of them have ratified it (the US 
has not yet ratified). However, it cannot enter into force as long as India and Pakistan among others do 
not sign it.       
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Opposition  to  ‘hegemonic’  arms  control  which  had  been  a  staple  of  the  Indian 
discourse, uniting Left and Right, continues to inform the debate. In the parliamentary 
debate over the 1998 tests, Communist leader (and nuclear opponent) Indrajit Gupta 
questioned why the government had declared a unilateral moratorium on testing. He 
accused the government of bringing CTBT conditionalities in through the back door.
56 
The  new  breed  of  strategic  analyst  may  condemn  “nuclear  Talibanism,”  that  is, 
dogmatic adherence to an anti-systemic program (Rajamohan 1998b). He may preach 
that  the  goal  of  diplomacy  is  no  longer  “soaring  rhetoric  on  disarmament”  but 
“managing  the  nuclear  dynamic  in  a  responsible  fashion”  (Rajamohan  1998f). 
However,  the  associations  of  nonproliferation  with  discrimination,  hegemony,  and 
sanctions, prevent India from reversing course with ease.  
 
Although long-term strategic goals were posited as impelling the tests, the threat from 
Pakistan  was  inevitably  linked  with  terrorism.  The  temptation  to  use  the  newly 
declared capability to solve issues of internal stability, blurs the boundary between 
nuclear war-fighting and deterrence. In the same speech where he assured an audience 
that India would use nuclear weapons only for self-defence, Vajpayee announced his 
resolve to combat those meddling in India’s internal affairs (Anon 1998j). When, in 
the week after the 1998 tests, Home Minister Lal Krishan Advani warned Pakistan to 
expect a more proactive Indian policy on Kashmir (and another Minister challenged it 
to a fourth round of war), analysts claimed that these statements were designed merely 
to  taunt  Pakistan  into  testing.  However,  over  the  next  few  years,  the  concept  of 
                                                 
56 Lok Sabha Debates, 27 May 1998.      
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minimum deterrence was severely strained. Basrur claims that Kargil in fact saw the 
abandonment of minimum deterrence (Basrur 2003, 53).
57  
 
The ‘minimum’ can be quantified only with reference to the purpose of the deterrent. 
Is it intended to strengthen India’s position vis-à-vis the sole superpower and rectify 
“asymmetry”? If yes, a minimum cannot be much lower than the capabilities of the 
NWS (Singh 1998c, 13). Is nuclear capability to be used as insurance against any 
future threat to India’s vital interests from the region (Anon 1998o; Fernandes 1998, 
14)?  If  yes,  China’s  capability  and  intentions  provide  the  benchmark.  Keeping  all 
these factors in mind, Muchkund Dubey counsels that India should not accept any 
“strategic  restraints.”  The  nuclear  option  should  be  kept  open,  not  only  to  meet 







Through its definition of proliferation and categorization of member-states the regime 
determined the security needs of a country like India which was actively contesting 
that  hierarchy.  However,  a  focus  on  the  regime’s  power  obscures  an  interesting 
phenomenon—once the regime’s normative resources have been deployed they can be 
appropriated and ‘misused’ by states. India also used the nonproliferation regime in its 
                                                 
57 During the border standoff between India and Pakistan in early January 2000, the Chief of Army Staff 
declared that in a future confrontation India might have to cross the Line of Control with Pakistan 
(Ganguly 2002, 126). The Chief of Naval Staff proclaimed that India could survive a nuclear strike and 
continue fighting (Anon 1999c). Hindu nationalists called on the PM to carry out a nuclear strike on 
Pakistan. 
58 Some of those opposing the July 2005 deal are anxious about its implications for the deterrent’s size. 
The separation of civilian and military facilities would impact on the ability to make the stockpile as big 
as India needs for a minimum deterrent (Bhatt 2005; Vajpayee 2005).      
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quest for deterrence. At one level, May 1998 was the latest act in the performance of 
deterrence.  At  another  level,  the  manner  in  which  the  tests  were  carried  out  and 
presented to the international community, tells us that the performance was also aimed 
at the regime itself. India’s overt defiance was aimed at crashing the country into the 
regime, a goal that is slowly being achieved. By the 1990s, the security/deterrence 
motive and the need for recognition by the regime had become intertwined. Therefore, 
one cannot see 1998 as a victory for security/deterrence over the norms of the regime.      
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CHAPTER 4 
THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME AND INDIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS 
 
In  the  literature  on  the  Indian  nuclear  program,  domestic-level  explanations  rival 
Realist or security-based accounts in popularity. In the previous chapter I showed that 
the constitutive powers of the international regime delineated the boundaries of the 
field of action for national policy makers. In this chapter, I will attempt to reveal the 
constitutive role of international norms in the domestic sphere.  
 
The first five sections of the chapter deal with the main actors in nuclear policy and 
the  political  and  economic  context  they  come  from.  Scholars  often  comment  that 
security,  domestic  forces  and  norms  all  influenced  decisions  on  nuclear  policy 
(Ganguly 2002, 101). Yet the precise mechanisms of the interaction of these three 
remain  unstudied.  The  first  section  analyzes  the  characteristics  of  nuclear  policy-
making in India. While revealing the importance of the particular characteristics of the 
national policy-making process,  I rebut arguments that hold the ‘strategic enclave’ 
responsible for the nuclear program. Section Two takes up, in turn, the bureaucracy 
supporting nuclear development, the community of security analysts, and the military. 
Section Three deals with the imperatives driving political parties’ decisions on nuclear 
weapons. In Section Four I show how the nuclear program was supported at various 
stages of economic development in India’s history. Section Five uses the example of 
the  1974  ‘peaceful  nuclear  explosion’  to  show  how  these  divergent  forces  came 
together to generate the impetus for a nuclear test and to legitimize it both for internal 
and external audiences.  
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The second main part of the chapter studies international norms and their effect on 
national  identity  and  the  indirect  effect  on  security  and  nuclear  policies.  While 
national  security  is  partly  determined  by  domestic  forces  as  shown  in  the  earlier 
sections, its ultimate goal is preserving national identity. National identity in turn, can 
be understood simply as the product of those domestic social, political and economic 
forces. Yet this would be an incomplete understanding, since identity is always formed 
within  an  international  society  with  its  own  norms  about  statehood,  security  and 
nuclear power. Identity formation as a response to international norms is the focus in 
this part. While in the earlier half of the chapter I pose the question—who decides 
what security is?—here I ask a more complicated question—whose security are we 
talking about? In Section Six I show why it is important to consider questions of 
identity when discussing nuclear policy.  In the next section  I discuss international 
norms both as resources and as constraints on decision-makers. 
 
 
Domestic politics and nuclear security 
 
Who decides what security needs are? What are the characteristics of the decision-
making  process  on  nuclear  issues  in  India?  In  this  section  I  first  deal  with  the 
particular features of policy formulation on the nuclear issue. It is made by a small, 
secretive and personalized group of individuals, that presents policy to the public and 
generates opinion in favor of it. At the same time, public opinion is opposed to nuclear 
reversal. Decision-makers are thus predisposed towards at least maintaining the status 
quo—usually termed ‘retaining the nuclear option.’ The three other sub-sections deal 
with the three major groups of decision-makers on the nuclear issue: nuclear scientists 
and the military, politicians, and economic actors. 
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Nuclear policy-making in India  
The characteristics of policy-making on the nuclear issue are exaggerated reflections 
of the characteristics of foreign policy formulation in India. In his study of India’s 
evolving  stance  on  international  environmental  regimes  Rajan  finds  that  policy  is 
formulated by small groups of bureaucrats, ensuring continuity across administrations. 
These  groups  also  had  substantial  autonomy,  with  little  external  input  owing  to 
concerns  about  secrecy  (Rajan  1997,  242-52).  Decisions  on  the  nuclear  issue  are 
handled  by  a  small  number  of  officials,  scientists  and  politicians  who  enjoy 
unquestioned authority.  
 
It is important to remember that these characteristics of nuclear policy are not unique 
to India. Nuclear technology is fundamentally undemocratic both within and among 
countries (Chatterjee 1998, 1438). At the same time, India’s democracy enabled the 
state’s legitimization of the nuclear program. In my discussion of the 1974 test below, 
I show that the democratic credentials of the government forestalled criticism of the 
test; in 1998, the democratic history was invoked to establish the program’s legitimacy 
in the eyes of the world.  
 
It is worth pointing out here that in the content analysis the term government appeared 
as  the  10
th  most  significant  term  overall  in  the  entire  sample.  This  is  even  more 
impressive when we consider that it appears in sixth place if the terms nuclear and 
atomic are removed from the list. No non-government organization, whether economic 
association, political party or non-governmental organization (NGO) gained salience 
in any of the years examined. The Indian discourse is very much dominated by the 
state.  Since  nuclear  policy  is  associated  with  the  state  and  not  with  a  particular 
political faction it is considered to also be above public debate.       
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Often, it is impossible to find traces of  governmental deliberations on  the nuclear 
issue.  George  Perkovich,  finding  no  evidence  of  the  orderly  processes  of  security 
policy-making around major decisions, claims that this absence reveals that domestic 
imperatives (rather than security) were paramount (Perkovich 1999, 177, 412). In fact, 
India’s  oral  tradition  may  have  obliterated  the  paper  trail.  More  importantly, 
government  confabulation,  especially  on  nuclear  issues,  was  immensely  secretive. 
Finally, in the context of the commonly-held mechanistic conception of deterrence 
discussed in the previous chapter, the absence of discussion is less surprising. 
 
Prime Ministers, who have by convention held the Atomic Energy portfolio in the 
Cabinet, have exercised disproportionate influence on the subject. Nehru’s successor 
revealed that the nuclear question had never been discussed in the Cabinet (Brecher 
1968, 234). One specific instance where the absence of discussion is striking is the 
momentous  decision  to  stay  out  of  the  NPT.  A  note  on  the  legal  and  diplomatic 
repercussions  of  rejecting  the  treaty  was  sent  to  the  PM  with  comments  by  the 
Defence Ministry and the DAE. At the Cabinet meeting called to consider the issue, 
Mrs. Gandhi, “in the style of a headmistress” listened to the discussion and concluded 
it  abruptly  with  the  declaration,  “We  are  in  favor  of  disarmament  but  this  Treaty 
would permit the five states that have these weapons to make more and more of them. 




                                                 
1  Ashok  Kapur  indicates  there  was  a  debate  in  the  Cabinet  but  also  states  that  the  Cabinet  was 
unanimously against the treaty (Kapur 1976a, 196). In Chengappa’s version of the discussion, the PM 
remained silent till the end and ended by saying simply that while she admitted there were arguments 
against it, India should go ahead with the test (Chengappa 2000, 57).       
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In India, as in other modernizing societies, traditional and personal ties influence even 
‘high politics.’ The most important decision-makers on an issue are often not those 
formally  responsible.  Indira  Gandhi’s  ‘kitchen  cabinet’  in  her  first  stint  as  PM 
consisted of men who held no important official positions.
2 According to Karnad, in 
India where you stand is shaped not by where you sit, as Graham Allison would have 
it, but by who you know. Influential personalities like Raja Ramanna, K. Santhanam, 
and  K.  Subrahmanyam  were  convinced  of  the  importance  of  nuclear  weapons  not 




Public  opinion  can  be  expected  to  be  a  major  determinant  of  public  policy  in  a 
functioning democracy. Using an approach analyzing both institutional structure and 
coalition-building  processes,  Risse-Kappen  comes  up  with  four  types  of  domestic 
structures among democracies. India is closest to his description of France—with a 
centralized political system, weak and heterogenous organizations in society, and a 
state-dominated policy network. Under these conditions, we would not expect public 
opinion to exercise much influence over foreign policy (Risse-Kappen 1991).  
 
We  note  also  a  general  lack  of  knowledge  about  nuclear  weapons  and  the 
consequences of their use. The nuclear weapon is perceived as just another weapon. 
India’s policy is always presented in the discourse as peaceful, thanks to the doctrine 
of  deterrence.  Additionally,  the  issue  is  often  portrayed  as  one  where  India  is  in 
confrontation with the world. This presentation in terms of oppositional nationalism 
                                                 
2 In the kitchen cabinet were Ashok Mehta, Romesh Thapar, Dinesh Singh, Mohan Kumaramangalam 
and  
I. K. Gujral (later to be Prime Minister himself).   
3 Interview with Bharat Karnad, New Delhi, 18 July 2003.      
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makes people more likely to support the government’s stand. Content analysis shows 
that the word ‘two’ appears at times when oppositional nationalism is at its peak on 
the nuclear issue. This word becomes salient in 1972, 1974, 1998 and 1999.
4  
 
Interestingly, in India the nuclear issue becomes salient in public discourse only when 
the government considers a change in policy. This can be observed by looking at the 
average number of articles on the nuclear issue in the sample. In the 1960s, the Hindu 
featured an average of 15 articles per year on the issue (in the 1950s, the number of 
articles  was  much  higher—over  20,  but  this  was  because  the  paper  at  that  time 
subscribed to a style with very small articles, sometimes less than 250 words). In the 
1990s,  by  contrast,  as  the  government  came  under  international  pressure  to  sign 
international treaties, the coverage went up dramatically, with an average of 22 articles 
(this is only partly due to the larger size of the entire newspaper).   
 
Public  opinion  surveys  have  shown  that  although  citizens  give  nuclear  policy  low 
priority in their list of concerns, there is a fairly strong sentiment against giving up the 
capability. In one of the few systematic polls in 1994, only 6% of the respondents 
considered the nuclear issue to be the first or second most important national issue, yet 
only 8% of those surveyed would support nuclear renunciation (Mattoo and Cortright 
1996). The numbers in support of weaponization, however, have been on the rise—
from 53% in 1987 to 60% in 1992 and to 65% by 1995 (Mattoo 1998a, 11-12). Public 
opinion erects a barrier to any downward revision of nuclear ambitions and tends to 
accept ‘progress.’ In June 1978, PM Morarji Desai pledged at the UN that India would 
never make nuclear weapons, even if the rest of the world did so. His moral opposition 
to nuclear arms was well-known. A month later Desai was forced to declare, quite 
                                                 
4 Of course, two can be associated with bilateral cooperation as well—in this particular sample, it is not.       
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mystifyingly, that he was opposed to nuclear ‘explosions’ rather than ‘blasts’ (Singh 
1980, 118). He clarified that he was not advocating unilateral disarmament, merely 
reductions conditional on others reducing their arsenals (Chengappa 2000, 224). Even 
official  justifications  of  policy  shifts  paint  them  as  continuations  of  tradition  and 
enhancements  of  existing  capability.  After  the  1998  tests,  for  instance,  many 
advocates of the status quo position of ‘ambiguity’ or ‘keeping the option open’ began 
stridently defending testing and strengthening the arsenal (Vanaik 2004).  
 
Parliament  has  remained  relatively  silent  on  nuclear  policy,  as  with  foreign  and 
defense issues in general. Most studies describe Parliament as uninterested in these 
issues except during salient events such as the nuclear test. There are two reasons for 
this.  Structurally,  the  Indian  constitution  vests  enormous  power  in  the  executive 
branch  with  regard  to  foreign  policy;  conferring  on  it  the  right  to  conclude 
international treaties without the need for legislative ratification. The main form of 
control  that  Parliament  exercises  is  financial,  specifically,  the  power  to  reject  the 
budgetary  demands  of  the  Ministries  of  External  Affairs  or  Defense.  However, 
rejection  of  a  budget  demand  is  tantamount  to  a  vote  of  no-confidence  in  the 
government. The second reason for Parliament’s inability to control foreign policy is 
the technical nature of the subject and its low salience in public concerns. Since most 
political parties believe it is unpatriotic to suggest reductions in the demands of the 
Defense  Ministry,  the  discussion  on  grants  is  a  mere  formality  (Jain  1984,  130). 
Parliament  has  Consultative  Committees  on  Defense  and  on  External  Affairs, 
however, the executive uses them mainly to disseminate its point of view and receive 
feedback on prospective legislation (Jain 1984, 132).
5 
                                                 
5 Members of the two houses of Parliament are elected to these committees which are chaired by the 
Defense and Foreign Ministers. Ex-officio members are the Ministers of State in these ministries.       
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The term ‘strategic enclave’ was first used by Itty Abraham to denote the nuclear and 
missile programs, which he saw as a subset of the military-security complex (Abraham 
1992,  233).  The  ‘strategic  enclave’  has  been  accused  of  championing  the  nuclear 
program  for  its  parochial  ends.  I  define  the  strategic  enclave  as  ‘technocrats  and 
bureaucrats working for nuclear agencies in India.’ The existing literature does not 
answer two elementary questions about the strategic enclave: how did its members 
come to acquire a remarkable degree of power? How did these powerful actors come 
to define their interests? 
 
A  purely  materialist  interpretation  fails  to  answer  two  important  questions.  What 
motivated  the  actors  in  the  strategic  enclave,  and  how  were  they  in  turn  able  to 
influence  the  political  leadership?  The  statist  bureaucratic  atomic  complex  can  be 
reasonably expected to be interested in shielding its privileges and material rewards 
(salaries, security of tenure, and so on). Yet if scientists were putting in relentless 
efforts on behalf of the program, the rewards that materialized seem rather inadequate. 
For instance, Perkovich asserts that the 1998 tests served the exclusive interests of 
“the weaponeers”— and goes on to detail the awards received by prominent officials 
soon afterwards (Perkovich 1999, 439).
6 
 
The choices of members of the strategic enclave are not entirely explainable by the 
motives of personal and organizational advancement. The insistent statism of Indian 
defense,  particularly  in  the  atomic  sector,  prevented  the  formation  of  a  military-
                                                 
6 The scientific teams received awards of Rs. 10 lakh each (approximately $23,000) (Anon 1999a).      
  144 
industrial complex as we understand the term.
7 Since nuclear research, development 
and  production  have  been  entirely  concentrated  in  a  few  wholly  state-owned 
organizations, the profit motive was absent. As for the military, as shown below, it 
was kept away from nuclear policy. In the content analysis the armed forces do not 
attain salience in  any  year, not even in 1999  when the country  was  fighting on a 
nuclear  battlefield  with  Pakistan  in  the  Kargil  sector.  Interestingly,  the  atomic 
bureaucracy does not figure prominently in the discourse and does not attain salience 
in the content analysis. 
 
Scientists could have been trying to get more resources from the government for their 
own projects. It is unclear why they had to choose the military path to this end. If 
military uses had been eschewed, the lifting of restrictions on scientific exchange and 
technology  transfer  would  have  benefited  technocrats  more  than  any  other  elite 
group—as seen in Brazil and Argentina, where they supported nuclear reversal for this 
reason. Consequently, we cannot point to material incentives significant enough to 
account for the preferences of nuclear advocates and we must find the sources of their 
ideas  in  larger  social  forces.  The  scientific  community  has  shrunk  from  political 
engagement even on the nuclear issue where it has some authority because of material 
(the  governmental  monopoly  of  employment)  and  cultural  (hierarchical  nature  of 
academic institutions) reasons (Anon 1998q; Sharma 1998).  
 
Another resource that the enclave drew upon was the secrecy inherent in the strategy 
of nonweaponized deterrence. Abraham has argued that secrecy had the function of 
designating  that  which  was  ‘secret’  as  valuable  (Abraham  1998,  140).  In  a  more 
                                                 
7 Interestingly, now that it is a WTO member, India, taking advantage of the ‘security exemption’ for 
subsidies, is opening up the defense sector to private participation and creating a military-industrial 
complex (Koshy 2001).      
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practical way, secrecy was also important for deterrence. The lack of clarity about the 
size of the fissile material stockpile, the resources available to the AEC and the extent 
of cooperation with the military served to enhance the opacity of deterrence. Thus, 
while keeping the military out of the decision-making loop for the most part, domestic 
actors have used the military imperative towards secrecy to shield their projects from 
scrutiny.  For  instance,  questions  about  the  safety  record  of  reactors  and  uranium 




The nuclear issue has become more important over the years. However, it has never 
occupied center stage on the national agenda for long. India has not had a broad-based 
popular movement advocating a nuclear arsenal (Tellis 2001, 106). The discourse on 
the  nuclear  issue  in  India  is  controlled  almost  entirely  by  those  justifying  official 
policy (Mattoo 1996, 30; Poulose 1996, 230). The debate in the public realm is rather 
narrow,  and  is  almost  always  supportive  of  government  policy.  The  direction  of 
communication  is  top-down.  The  government  nurtures  certain  experts,  authorizing 
them to speak for the nation (Vanaik 2004). 
 
Members of the very small group of Indian security analysts have strong links across 
professional lines. They work in English, and  often trained in the West. They  are 
almost always based in New Delhi. They are located in the government, thinktanks 
(such as the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, the Centre for Policy Research 
and the Indian Council for World Affairs), universities (Jawaharlal Nehru University 
and Delhi University), and the national (mainly English) media. A substantial number 
                                                 
8 Jaduguda in Jharkhand (formerly Bihar) is the country’s biggest uranium mine. Recently another mine 
in Narwapahar, close to Jadguda, has begun operations.       
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are retired from the civil, foreign or military services. Many of these appear in my 
sample, which is only expected since the Hindu is a studiedly middle of the road 
newspaper. One factor which testifies to the increasing professionalization of security 
analysis (and journalism) in India is that while almost none of the articles before 1984 
have ‘bylines’, over 30% of all articles in the sample after that are written by easily 
identifiable ‘experts’—like K. Subrahmanyam, C. Rajamohan and so on. 
 
Kanti  Bajpai  provides  a  comprehensive  classification  of  India’s  ‘security 
intellectuals.’  He  divides  them  into  Nehruvians,  neoliberals  and  hyperrealists. 
Nehruvians, who believe that states can establish just and durable social rules among 
themselves if minimum defense is assured, dominated Indian policy-making for the 
first two decades. Neoliberals, currently on the ascendant, advocate accommodation 
with  the  international  order.  They  are  both  suspicious  of,  and  pragmatic  about, 
international  institutions.  Hyperrealists  are  those  who  wish  India  to  follow  the 
principles  of  realpolitik  closely  (Bajpai  2002a).  Based  on  their  preferred  nuclear 
policies,  elites  can  be  divided  into  rejectionists,  pragmatists  and  maximalists. 
Maximalists (hyperrealists or hypernationalists of the religious kind) demand more 
tests, a large arsenal, and a proactive employment policy. Rejectionists continue to 
believe that disarmament is feasible and desirable while the pragmatists, who tend to 
be neoliberals, feel that India’s security interests can be best taken care of within the 
current nuclear order. Though both categories are moderate on the nuclear issue, their 
motivations are different (Bajpai 2000b). Bharat Karnad and Brahma Chellaney could 
be classified as maximalists, C. Rajamohan, Sanjaya Baru and Amitabh Mattoo as 
pragmatists, and Arundhati Ghose and N. Ram as rejectionists.  
 
Civil-military relations      
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India’s civilian control of the nuclear program is in keeping with the general isolation 
of the military from defense policy. The military has historically lacked influence in 
policy formulation, ‘contained’ as it is by the bureaucrats at the Ministry of Defence 
(Cohen  1988,  116;  Roychowdhury  2002).  Politicians  were  averse  to  allowing  any 
military input in security strategy making (Dasgupta 2001, 93). Former Vice-Admiral 
K. K. Nayyar disclosed that when he had advised Indira Gandhi to exercise the nuclear 
option, he was told that the issue was none of his business (Khan 2002, 84). The 
armed  forces  themselves  have  a  strong  ‘professional’  identity,  which  involves  an 
acceptance of civilian control. This ethos has been credited with making the prospect 
of a military coup improbable in India (Kundu 1998).
9  
 
Aside from this general reluctance to interfere in the civilian realm, the armed forces 
were less than enthusiastic about nuclear weapons for fear that they would increase 
civilian interference, or reduce allocations for conventional weapons and salaries. A 
nuclear capability may not have been seen as effective against the concrete threats that 
the military cared about (Sahni 1996, 89). In the context of fierce inter-service rivalry, 
it also may have been a strategic decision to put the program on hold.  
 
However, there are important exceptions to this rule. General K. Sundarji, Chief of 
Army  Staff  wrote  and  spoke  extensively  on  nuclear  issues.  Sundarji  advocated  a 
minimum deterrent and delineated the doctrine behind it—his evocative phrase was 
“more is not better if less is enough” (Joshi 1998b, 22). In the 1990s he was among 
those  who  urged  the  world  to  accept  India’s  arsenal  and  strengthen  its  safety  and 
                                                 
9 Sumona Dasgupta points out that while the isolation of the military from strategic decision-making has 
prevented the politicization of the military, in the 1980s the military and paramilitary forces were frequently 
used in the service of political objectives—both to quell internal unrest and for operations in the region. 
She terms this the ‘militarization of politics’ (Dasgupta 1998).       
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security (Sundarji 1992, 53). Another former Chief of Army Staff writes that mid-
level army officers after 1974 were determined to maintain the impetus of the test and 
develop a credible nuclear deterrent as early as possible (Roychowdhury 2002, 281).  
 
During the period of non-weaponized deterrence, senior military leaders were pressed 
into service to issue vague threats from time to time, but their exclusion from any role 
in command, control, and doctrine obviously limited the potential military utility of 
India’s  nuclear  capability  (Perkovich  1999,  450-51;  Tellis  2001,  287).  This 
arrangement  made  sense  within  the  mechanistic  conception  of  deterrence  that  was 
prevalent  in  India.  However,  as  the  Indian  government  comes  under  pressure 
internally and externally to ‘declare’ its doctrine, the role of the military is enhanced. 
Since the doctrine specifies the conditions under which nuclear weapons will be used, 
the military must come up with credible plans for those contingencies to ensure that 
opponents will be deterred. Given the organizational preferences of militaries, this is 
likely to push towards deployment of nuclear arms.
10 
 
Politics, ideology and the bomb 
Scholars who highlight the role of political parties in nuclear policy rely—sometimes 
simultaneously—on two different logics (Bidwai and Vanaik 2001; Das 2003b; Jha 
1998; Ram 1999; Zook 2000). The ideological explanation focuses on Hindutva, the 
BJP’s  ideology,  as  a  cause  for  the  1998  tests.  In  the  instrumental  logic  the 
compulsions  of  electoral  politics  are  driving  policy.  I  argue  that  neither  a  purely 
electoral/instrumental approach nor an ideological one can explain the role of nuclear 
policy  in  domestic  politics.  This  issue  is  sporadically  salient  among  a  small  but 
influential elite; however, it makes strong appeals to consensus in the name of national 
                                                 
10 Author’s interview with M.V. Ramana, Vancouver, 23 November 2005.      
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security and nationalism. Politicians who wish to reap the benefits of nuclear decisions 
must kowtow to a pre-existing consensus and share the credit. Often, the remaining 
electoral benefit is easily wiped out by other factors.  
 
The ideological approach holds Hindutva responsible for the subversion of a peaceful 
and independent nuclear program. Hindutva is an ersatz term that literally means no 
more than ‘Hinduness.’ In contemporary Indian politics it stands for a brand of politics 
espoused  by  the  ‘Sangh  Parivar’  (organizational  family)  of  which  the  BJP  is  the 
political  wing.
11  In  the  ideological  approach  the  BJP  is  viewed  not  simply  as  an 
interest-maximizing  political  party,  but  also  as  a  vehicle  for  the  aspirations  of  a 
powerful and rising class: the prosperous, educated middle class that is impatient with 
the image of India as a peace-loving, idealistic nation. While the ideological analysis 
is  powerful,  it  needs  elaboration  and  refinement.  Hindutva  is  both  broader  than 
support  for  nuclear  challenge  (it  is  a  complete  social,  economic  and  political 
philosophy) and narrower (since not all nuclear supporters are adherents of Hindutva). 
The  ideological  affinity  between  Hindutva  and  the  acquisition  of  nuclear  weapons 
comes  from  its  militaristic,  hyper-masculinist  and  Manichean  worldview.  The 
international roots of the diffused social anxiety that supports Hindutva are dealt with 
in the next section. 
 
The ideological argument is plausible in the first place because the BJP has been a 
consistently  pro-bomb  party.  A  study  of  BJP  election  manifestos  shows  an 
increasingly overt trajectory on nuclear issues: they promise to give nuclear teeth to 
defenses  (1991),  to  re-evaluate  nuclear  policy  and  induct  nuclear  weapons  and 
                                                 
11 The Sangh Parivar itself is the subject of countless academic works but I shall examine its ideology 
only with respect to the implications for nuclear policy.      
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missiles  (1996),  to  review  the  nuclear  policy  and  exercise  the  option  and  develop 
ballistic missiles (1998). The Jan Sangh, the previous avatar of the BJP, first called for 
a bomb in the 1960s.  
 
However, on other controversial issues the BJP has never been so ideologically driven 
as to be impervious to electoral considerations (Hansen and Jaffrelot 1998).
12 Situating 
the nuclear issue within the party’s strategy will help us understand the conditions that 
make  the  decision  possible.  In  1998,  the  BJP  was  trying  to  broaden  its  “moral 
hegemony”,  acquiring  legitimacy  among  the  widest  possible  swathe  of  citizens 
(Bhargava  2002,  84;  Hewitt  2000).  This  was  the  strategy  that  had  allowed  it  to 
increase its tally in Parliament from 2 seats in 1984 to 174 in 1998. Traditionally, the 
BJP’s  support  base  consisted  of  rich  peasants,  small  urban  traders  and  was 
concentrated in North India. The new BJP voter, however, was on average upwardly 
mobile and well educated (Yadav 2003).  
 
The BJP used toughness on defense to bridge its twin avatars as social movement and 
centrist  political  party  (Basu  2000,  176),  to  reconcile  its  sectarian  and  nationalist 
aspects  (Katzenstein,  Kothari,  and  Mehta  2001,  244).  Three  nationwide  surveys 
conducted on the same sample for the three Lok Sabha elections in 1996, 1998 and 
1999 show that the BJP, versus the Congress, enjoyed more support from men, urban 
areas,  younger  people,  more  educated  voters  and  those  with  'higher  occupational 
status' (Singh 2004, 312-21). The BJP was seen by urban, middle class India as a well-
organized political force that promised order and efficiency and projected a coherent 
worldview in the fast-changing post-Cold War world (Bajpai 2006). Once in power, 
                                                 
12 Controversial issues include building a temple at a disputed site in Ayodhya, imposition of a uniform 
civil code on all Indians, and revocation of the special status of Kashmir.      
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the party  replaced the  ‘threat to  Hinduism’ with national security,  an issue whose 
appeal is “equally emotional but more diffused” (Kantha 1999, 353). Presenting the 
tests as a symbol of defiance to the domestic audience, the BJP also laid claim to the 
high ground of anti-imperialism and the mantle of Indian nationalism (Ahmed 1998). 
Contrary to popular wisdom, the BJP’s test was not intended to demonstrate its radical 
credentials,  but  rather  to  move  squarely  into  the  mainstream  and  lay  claim  to  the 
identity of the ‘party of national security.’  
 
However, by 1998 all major political parties were in favor of at least maintaining 
India’s nuclear capability (Thakur 1998). We now know that opposition parties had 
also seriously contemplated undertaking tests. The fact that nuclear policy was the 
only item on the BJP’s agenda that also made it on to the 1998 National Agenda for 
Governance binding on its coalition partners, tells us about the centrality of the issue 
in politics. It is precisely this grounding in widely-accepted notions of the national 
interest that induced the BJP to play the nuclear card.  
 
The BJP manifesto for the February 1998 general election promised that the party 
would “re-evaluate the country’s nuclear policy” and “exercise the option to induct 
nuclear weapons”, and this was repeated by party members (Guruswamy 1998). By 
this  time,  ambiguity  and  nuance  in  nuclear  diplomacy  were  so  pervasive  that  this 
statement  did  not  serve  as  warning  that  India  would  test  once  the  BJP  came  to 
power.
13 It was also reassuring that at an early press conference, the new PM Vajpayee 
said that no timeframe had been set for inducting nuclear weapons. Observers both in 
                                                 
13 Senator Patrick Moynihan made the famous and unfair comment that since the BJP had announced its 
intentions to test, the events of May 1998 could have been predicted if US analysts had learned to read 
(Moynihan 1998).       
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India and the US had understood the manifesto to be a piece of campaign rhetoric, 
quite in keeping with the tradition of ‘keeping the option open’ (Burns 1998).  
 
The BJP-led government claimed in 1998 that the decision to test arose from a pre-
existing, apolitical, national consensus (Chawla 1998). What Aijaz Ahmed calls the 
“indecent haste” of the opposition, especially the Congress, to share credit for the tests 
reinforced this impression (Ahmed 1998). While this strategy helped paint critics of 
the test with an anti-national brush, it also decreased the political mileage that the BJP 
could derive from the tests.  
 
This brings us to the instrumental explanation linking domestic politics to nuclear 
weapons:  decisions  to  ramp  up  the  nuclear  program  were  taken  in  expectation  of 
popular  support,  translating  into  votes.  While  most  accounts  deal  with  the  BJP  in 
1998,  this  argument  also  extends  to  other  parties  including  the  Congress  in  1974 
(Ganguly 2002, 104; Kux 1993, 315; Sidhu 1997, 29). There are three main problems 
with the ‘instrumental’ argument. First, it is unclear whether in fact nuclear policy 
contributes to success at the polls. There has been no systematic study of the link 
between elections and nuclear policy in India, but larger surveys cast doubt on the 
relevance of ‘diversionary’ foreign policy in developing societies. Historically, foreign 
policy and defense issues have not been significant election issues (Mattoo 1998b; 
Yadav, Heath, and Saha 1999). The 1974 test generated some ephemeral support but 
barely  a  year  later,  Indira  Gandhi’s  regime  became  so  unpopular  that  she  was 
compelled to impose an Emergency.  
 
The nuclear afterglow seems not to have lasted in 1998 either. A poll conducted less 
than 24 hours after the first tests on 12 May 1998 in 6 metros found that 91% of the      
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respondents  approved  of  the  tests  and  only  7%  disapproved.  82%  advocated  that 
nuclear weapons should be built, and 78% felt more secure after the tests (Mattoo 
1998a,  11).  However,  six  months  later  another  survey  reported  that  47%  of  the 
repondents had not heard of the tests, although a majority of those who were aware of 
the tests approved of them (Bidwai and Vanaik 2001, 273). More mundane concerns 
were important to the Indian voter. There was an upsurge in food prices from May to 
November 1998 (a 20% rise in the Consumer Price Index) (Acharya 2001). This is 
widely  held  to  have  ensured  the  BJP’s  defeat  in  crucial  state  elections  in  Delhi, 
Rajasthan  and  Madhya  Pradesh  in  December  1998.
14  In  early  1999  the  central 
government was forced to resign after losing the support of certain regional parties in 
Parliament.  
 
Second, if ‘bomb votes’ were available to governments who took the final step of 
testing, why did only two leaders take that step? Here we cannot ignore the importance 
of personality and party politics. Third, we still have the task of accounting for pro-
bomb  votes,  or  at  least  the  perception  by  political  parties  that  they  will  be 
forthcoming. This expectation presupposes that a consensus exists on the need for 
nuclear weapons and spurs us to study the sources of that consensus.  
 
What can we conclude about the role that nuclear policy plays in domestic politics? It 
acts as a cement between actors on different ends of the political spectrum, allowing a 
rare occasion for unity and for displaying a party’s nationalist colors. No political 
parties are salient in the content analysis. Even in the oversampling for 1998, the term 
BJP did not attain salience (that is, it was mentioned less than 1.9% of the time in 43, 
759 lines of text). The Left parties opposed arms control treaties on the grounds that 
                                                 
14 The BJP also lost in the small northeastern state of Mizoram.      
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they  symbolised  superpower  hegemony,  while  the  Right  saw  them  as  assaulting 
sovereignty.  This  pre-existing  consensus  allows  bolder  parties  and  individuals  to 
attempt to capture the mantle of national security by testing, but does not guarantee 
that their attempts will translate into votes. One can hypothesize that toughness on the 
nuclear issue contributes indirectly to electoral success, but in the absence of more 
systematic polling data this cannot be proven. There is some indication that the BJP 
benefited marginally in the 1999 elections from India’s victory over Pakistan in the 
Kargil conflict that summer, and the general reputation for toughness from Pokhran 
could have contributed to its reputation as the party of national security (Dasgupta 
1999; Yadav, Heath, and Saha 1999). 
 
Governments  who  did  not  test,  however,  also  supported  the  program  and  had  to 
preserve the image of safeguarding the progress already made. As Perkovich points 
out, domestic pressure has rarely compelled politicians to advance nuclear capabilities 
since  it  was  never  that  salient  an  issue  for  the  general  population.  Leaders  were 
worried  about  the  impact  that  accepting  controls  on  the  further  development  of 
capabilities would have on popularity. Thus, political pressure served to maintain the 
option (Perkovich 1999, 438). We saw that by the end of the 1970s Morarji Desai, 
despite  his  distaste  for  nuclear  weapons,  could  not  reverse  the  direction  of  the 
program. While the instrumental and ideological explanations are both  focused on 
testing, we must also appreciate the strength of the domestic political imperative to 
maintain nuclear assets.  
 
Economics and the bomb 
The level of economic development is usually viewed as a constraint on states’ nuclear 
ambitions.  Yet  constraints  have  not  always  been  decisive.  China’s  bomb  was      
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developed during the dislocation and famine of the Great Leap Forward in the late 
1950s. Nuclear programs took resources away from the cash-strapped post-World War 
II economies of France and Britain. An analysis of the relationship between economics 
and  the  nuclear  project  in  India  leads  to  two  surprising  conclusions:  economic 
weakness  initially  buttressed  the  dual-use  nuclear  program;  but  economic 




How could economic backwardness have encouraged India on the nuclear path? The 
perceived causes of backwardness and the policies adopted to overcome it rest on 
certain arguments which made a nuclear program more plausible. There are three ways 
in which this happened: first, as we saw in the previous chapter, it was feared that 
India’s  progress  would  be  retarded  if  the  country  was  facing  coercion  from  other 
(possibly nuclear-armed) states. Nuclear weapons were in this understanding, essential 
in securing an environment for development. Second, once the fixed costs of setting up 
a relatively indigenous nuclear infrastructure had been incurred, taking  the step of 
weapons acquisition became more reasonable (Cohen 2001, 177). The electricity and 
space programs subsidized the cost of the nuclear program (Reddy 1998a).
15 It should 
be  noted  that  there  are  no  accurate  estimates  of  the  financial  costs  of  the  nuclear 
program.
16 This is true of both the civilian and the weapons components.
17 
                                                 
15 Dismissing the economic argument in the Lok Sabha after the 1974 test, Congress MP V. P. Singh 
(later Prime Minister) said that including the sunk costs of the program in the costs of the test would be 
like computing the expenses of a daughter’s marriage to include the costs of her education and 
upbringing. Lok Sabha Debates, 8 August 1974, col. 211.  
16  Explanations  of  the  problems  of  cost  estimation,  and  descriptions  of  various  attempts  at  it  are 
available (Reddy 1998a; Reddy 1998b; Tellis 2001, 107-11). 
17 Most of India’s nuclear power plants have been running at levels much lower than their capacity, 
making it difficult to evaluate their cost-effectiveness. Since after five decades of investment, they 
contribute  around  3%  to  national  electricity  generation,  they  cannot  be  described  as  commercial 
successes.       
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Most  importantly,  development  was  not  seen  as  distinct  from,  or  competing  with 
defense, especially with reference to the dual-use nuclear program. Thus, perceived 
opportunity costs were also lower. In 1974, K. Subrahmanyam answered critics who 
pointed to India’s poverty by claiming that the test did not divert resources away from 
development “but was itself a splice-off from a steady development programme over 
25 years” (Subrahmanyam 1974a, 5). The 1974 test was also a significant step towards 
self-reliance. The Director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre declared that India 
would no longer have to rely on  foreign-trained personnel in the nuclear program 
(Anon 1974j).  
 
Economic reforms were initiated in India in the late 1980s after decades of semi-
autarkic  and  slow  growth.  A  Balance  of  Payments  crisis  in  1991  triggered 
comprehensive liberalization: privatization of state-owned enterprises, reversal of the 
reservation  of  certain  sectors  for  small-scale  industries,  lifting  of  restrictions  on 
ownership  and  production,  and  deregulation  to  promote  entrepreneurship.  Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) was eagerly solicited, even in sectors that had been reserved 
for  Indian  business.  Export  promotion  became  an  important  goal,  India  joined  the 
World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)  and  rewrote  national  legislation  to  adhere  to 
international  standards  on  free  trade  and  property  rights.
18
 
The  reforms  had  a 
significant  effect  on  the  economy.  Between  1992-93  and  1997-98,  average  annual 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate (constant prices) rose to 6.9% (compared 
to 5.5% for the previous decade) (Anon 2003f).
 
Indian exports were rising at a faster 
rate than the global average, and contributing a steadily increasing share of GDP.   
                                                 
18 While the mechanism enforcing nuclear restraint is economic integration or globalization rather than 
liberalization in general, the two are not divorced in practice as countries almost never implement one 
without the other.      
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Table 4.1: Export growth rates
19 
 
Year   Export growth rate (world)  Export growth rate (India) 
1995  19.67  22.41 
1996  5.28  8.1 
1997  3.55  5.75 
1998  (-)1.63  (-)4.48 
1999  3.95  8.61 
2000  12.4  16.46 
 
Table 4.2: India’s exports as percentage of GDP (market prices)
20 
 
Year  Imports/GDP (%)  Exports/GDP (%) 
1985-86  8.1  4.4 
1990-91  8.8  5.8 
1992-93  10.2  7.8 
1993-94  10.3  8.8 
1995-96  12.3  9.1 
1996-97  12.7  8.9 
1997-98  12.5  8.7 
1998-99  11.5  8.3 
1999-2000  12.4  8.4 
 
                                                 
19 Medium-Term Export Strategy 2002-07 Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.  
20 Economic Survey, Government of India, 2002-03, Table 6.3.      
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A straightforward Realist expectation would be that increasing prosperity fuels nuclear 
ambitions. One study finds that upto a certain threshold of growth (roughly $7700 in 
1996 USD) countries are more likely to develop a military nuclear capability with 
increases in GDP (Singh and Way 2004, 876-77). There are in fact indications that 
this process was playing out in 1990s India. Opponents of the nuclear program had put 
forward  economic  arguments  (Jain  1974,  143;  Perkovich  1999,  157-58).  The  new 
perception of prosperity now made it possible to argue that India could afford the 
direct  and  opportunity  costs  of  weapons  (Kapur  2002,  243).
21  ‘More  bang  for  the 
buck’ arguments presented nuclear weapons as ideal for upwardly mobile states trying 
to keep up with the Revolution in Military Affairs (Karnad 1998; Rajamohan 1998e). 
However, increased prosperity has not inevitably led to nuclear acquisition in every 
country. Increasing growth could have made a ‘trading state’ strategy more attractive. 
Giving  up  the  nuclear  option  could  have  provided  India  access  to  cheap  energy, 
critical technologies, and diplomatic rewards—possibly even the much-coveted seat 
on the Security Council.
22  
 
As  countries  get  more  integrated  into  the  global  economy,  we  would  expect  that 
decision-makers become more sensitive to the international regime’s response to their 
nuclear decisions. Thus, economic integration should lead to nuclear restraint rather 
than  a  more  aggressive  policy  as  Realists  would  predict.  Etel  Solingen’s  pluralist 
account  invokes  the  policy  preferences  of  powerful  economic  actors.  Her  core 
assumption is that their conceptions of national interest are derived at least partly from 
                                                 
21 Tellingly, Jasjit Singh commences his discussion of the 1998 tests celebrating the end of the ‘ship-to-
mouth’ existence of the 1950s (Singh 1998c, 10).  
22 Frank Wisner, the US Ambassador to India from 1994-97 is supposed to have offered a deal to New 
Delhi known as the ‘three Nos’: no pressure on India to sign the CTBT, no blocking of the treaty by 
India, and no testing. In return India would receive American support for its bid to have a permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council. Interview with Uday Bhaskar, 21 July 2003, New Delhi.      
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their economic interests (Solingen 1994, 136). The initial economic strategy of import 
substitution fostered ideological opposition to the nonproliferation regime and created 
a  “technical  and  entrepreneurial  military-industrial  complex.”  A  brief  period  of 
liberalization and nuclear rollback in the early 1990s under a Congress government 
was torpedoed by the advent of the “radical-confessional Hindu BJP” representing 
import-competing economic actors, and consequently hostile to “Western” regimes 
(Solingen 1994, 145-48). In the previous section I have shown that the BJP was not 
dominated by anti-Western religious fundamentalists when it was in power in 1998 
and was in fact trying to cultivate its new educated urban middle class constituency 
that backed economic reforms. 
 
In the 1990s, the international community began to expect that stronger economic 
relationships would inhibit India’s nuclear ambitions (Council on Foreign Relations 
1997; Hagerty 1998, 188). If the nuclear program were accelerated, the country would 
be  ostracized  internationally,  harming  the  interests  of  the  growing  middle  class, 
especially the urban groups in the BJP's core constituency (Feaver, Sagan, and Karl 
1996/97, 206, n.12). Yet, in this period there were numerous attempts to test. In 1995 
premature  discovery  and  subsequent  pressure  allegedly  from  the  US  and  the  pro-
liberalization faction headed by the Finance Minister, persuaded PM Narasimha Rao 
to halt test preparations (Nayar 1998).
23 Whether this was true or not, the test was 
merely postponed. In 1997 a short-lived BJP government tried to test before it lost the 
confidence  of  Parliament.  Again,  in  May  1998,  the  greatest  support  for  the  overt 
nuclear declaration came from the educated middle classes, who had the most to lose 
under economic integration logic. How can we explain this? Latha Varadarajan points 
out the need for an account of identity that is sensitive to the history of the nation’s 
                                                 
23 Apparently similar pressure was applied on PM Deve Gowda in 1996 (Chengappa 2000, 398).      
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relationship with the global economy.
 
However, analyses that view India’s 1998 tests 
as an attempt to regain the self-esteem that was wounded by liberalization tell only 
one side of the story (Khare 1998; Varadarajan 2004a). India’s new economic policy 
actually facilitated the turn in nuclear policy. 
 
The costs of overtly going nuclear were reduced by three factors. First, globalization 
meant that constituencies in sanctioning countries had a stake in mitigating the effects 
of sanctions since they were aware of the competition for the Indian market. Although 
actual trade value in 1998 was low, its reputation as a Big Emerging Market made 
potential partners wary of alienating India. Moreover, although India was not a major 
trading  partner  in  quantitative  terms,  it  was  vital  to  certain  politically  important 
constituencies  in  the  US.  It  was  due  to  pressure  from  farmers  that  the  American 
government exempted export credits for farm products from sanctions for one year in 
July 1998. In October and November 1998 the impact of American sanctions was 
further diluted.
24 The US being the norm leader in the regime, other countries also 
lifted their sanctions soon after. Membership in international economic institutions 
also  insulated  India  from  ‘revenge’  sanctions.  Restrictions  on  imports for  political 
reasons were deterred because they  could have been  challenged under WTO rules 
(Kapur 2002, 241).  
 
Second,  in  the  context  of  the  close  associations  between  security,  technology  and 
development, the requirements of the nonproliferation regime were viewed as attacks 
on sovereignty. Influential sections of the nuclear elite—scientists and bureaucrats—
                                                 
24 In October 1998 the US Congress gave President Clinton omnibus powers to waive sanctions against 
India and Pakistan for one year, except for sanctions on arms sales. On 7 November 1998 he removed 
all sanctions except those on arms sales and certain technology transfers. All sanctions were lifted in 
September 2001.       
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were  particularly  alienated  (Kapur  2002,  247-48).  Since  the  rules  of  the 
nonproliferation  regime  were  already  causing  delays  and  difficulties  in  technology 
transfer negotiations, in a framework where technology denial was seen as a national 
security threat, the costs of going nuclear were perceived as lower. The third factor 
reducing costs was the estimate that the regime was not serious about sanctioning 
countries that did not seriously challenge it. Sanctions are salient in only one year in 
the  analysis—in  1998.  They  are  discussed  2.6%  of  the  time  in  that  year.  In 
comparison, weapons are discussed 3% of the time in that year.  
 
Further,  testing  promised  economic  benefits.  Liberalizers  hoped  for  a  positive 
economic fallout from testing. First, they claimed that as a nuclear power and open 
economy India could deal with the world “on an equal footing” (Baru 1999, 49). A 
soft state that compromises on security issues cannot project the image of a strong 
negotiator on trade and commerce issues (Chellaney 1997; Jetley 1998). The ‘Made in 
India’ label would acquire brand equity when the country openly joined the major 
powers as a strategic player (Nalapat 1999). An Indian representative at the UN or the 
WTO would be heard with respect (Gurumurthy 1998). India’s “wavering” had cost it 
patent rights as well as the benefits of being a nuclear power (Joshi 1998c). Second, 
testing would attest to technological prowess and stimulate exports (George 1998b). 
Third, the inevitable sanctions would stimulate self-sufficiency and nationalism (Jetley 
1998;  Mahajan  1998;  Pillai  1998;  Sehgal  1998).  Finally,  liberalizers  called  on  the 
government to use the euphoria generated by the tests to push unpopular, cost-cutting 
reforms (Bhagwati 1998, 52; Lal 1998a; Nair 1998).  
 
Aside  from  costs  and  benefits,  the  shift  in  discourse  with  economic  liberalization 
facilitated the test. As the state withdrew from its developmental role its regulatory      
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role  became  more  prominent.  There  was  a  dramatic  reversal  in  official  state 
discourse.
25 India was seen as having finally become a ‘normal state’: simultaneously 
participating in the global market and putting national security first. Just as the Rao 
government  had  “put  the  clock  back  on  Nehruvian  economics”,  Vajpayee  had 
consigned Nehruvian strategy to the archives, wrote one editor (Gupta 1998a). This 
aspiration towards ‘normalcy’ led decision-makers to be more supportive of the global 
status  quo  on  nuclear  weapons,  just  as  they  were  disrupting  it.  The  language  of 
liberalization shattered residual populism (Sarkar 1998, 1729).  
 
The country’s shift towards ‘normalcy’ helped reassure the world about the behavior 
of a nuclear India. In his important statement on the evolution of nuclear policy in 
Parliament  in  May  1998  PM  Vajpayee  cited  globalization  to  bolster  the  case  for 
treating India not as a rogue state, but as a responsible member of the international 
community: “The policies of economic liberalisation introduced in recent years have 
increased  our  regional  and  global  linkages  and  the  Government  shall  deepen  and 
strengthen these ties” (Anon 1998d). While liberalizers celebrated the fact that the test 
helped globalize India by making it imperative for the government to attract foreign 
investment  (Aiyar  1998),  others  lamented  that  the  BJP  was  forced  to  make 
concessions to foreign interests in order to keep its new dangerous toy (Sarkar 1998, 
1725). 
 
On the flip side, responsible nuclear behavior served to reassure investors and lenders 
that India’s economy was stable. J. N. Dixit wrote that sanctions would be mitigated 
after a year if India’s behavior was seen to be rational and responsible (Dixit 1998b). 
                                                 
25 Manmohan Singh, currently PM and the chief architect of the 1991 liberalization had been the 
Chairman of the South Commission. Gyanendra Pandey points out that in a significant but unremarked 
break with tradition the Union Budget of 1992 did not even mention ‘poverty’ (Pandey 1993, 7).        
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Liberalizers encouraged the government to pursue policies of accommodation with the 
nonproliferation regime and abandon the traditional disarmament rhetoric in favor of 
arms control. It is no coincidence that the advocates of a pragmatic stance on arms 
control  tend  to  be  liberalizers  (Bajpai  2002a,  233).  While  they  are  ideologically 
committed to free markets, it is true that they recognize that economic strength can be 
used to project national power. Thus they are suspicious of international institutions—
which means that there is a disjuncture between liberalism and institutionalism in the 
Indian  discourse.  However,  the  economistic  logic  of  their  view  of  world  politics 
ultimately leads them to support order-building (Bajpai 2000a, 254-57). 
 
Table 4.3: Comparing economic openness and nuclear policy 
 
  Economic 
openness 
Nuclear status  Stance  on  nuclear 
order 
1950s-1970s  Low  Ambiguous  Oppositional  
1980s-1990s  Growing  Open  Moderate 
 
Indian decision-makers were keenly observing the operation of the regime, and they 
estimated that the costs of sanctions would not damage the economy. First, sanctions 
in the nonproliferation regime are rare. Sanctions had been imposed only 24 times and 
of these only 7 led to negotiations between the sending and targeted country (Speier, 
Chow, and Starr 2001, 11).
26
  
Liberalizers judged that India could win concessions on 
security regime issues by proffering economic gains—popularly known as “doing a 
China”  (Bajpai  2002a,  269).  Second,  sanctioning  countries  did  not  appear  to  be 
uniformly  committed  to  nonproliferation.  Advocates  of  ‘crossing  the  nuclear 
                                                 
26A different coding of sanctions lists nine major cases of economic sanctions for infringement of the 
nonproliferation regime, with three coded as successes (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990).        
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threshold’ predicted that India would be able to pry apart the coalition of sanctioning 
countries  before  sanctions  began  to  hurt  (Balachandran  1996;  Balachandran  1999; 
Mattoo 1994).
 
France and Russia opposed the imposition of sanctions, with the latter 
signing an agreement to build nuclear reactors days after the tests (Nayar 2001, 81).
 
On economic sanctions, Germany officially followed the G-8 line, but in practice its 
stand was softer and occasionally it remained neutral in the voting on aid proposals 
(Nayar  2001,  98).
 
Within  the  US  too  there  was  opposition  to  an  emphasis  on 
nonproliferation  at  the  expense  of  other  economic  and  strategic  objectives 




Third, sanctions are intended to signal sending countries’ commitment to enforcing a 
certain normative order; in order to maintain the strength of the signal, the impact of 
sanctions may need to be diluted. The yearly cost of sanctions to the Indian economy 
was equivalent to 0.2% of GDP, while it amounted to 1% of Pakistan’s GDP.
 
The 
presence  of  nuclear  weapons  obviously  raised  the  stakes  in  ensuring  stability.
 
To 
prevent Pakistan’s economic collapse, the US decided not to veto its loan from the 
International  Monetary  Fund.
 
Since  removing  sanctions  on  Pakistan  alone  would 
invite  charges  that  sanctions  were  motivated  by  strategic  (as  opposed  to 
nonproliferation  concerns),  India  rightly  predicted  that  sanctions  on  both  countries 
were unsustainable.  
 
 
                                                 
27 Madeleine Albright also criticized the sanctions, mandated by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, as 
being too inflexible: “all sticks and no carrot” (Rydell 1999, 10).       
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Alliances and the production of legitimacy 
 
I  argued  in  the  previous  chapter  that  testing  should  be  read  as  a  device  in  the 
performance of nuclear deterrence. A test is also evidence of a successful alliance 
among various pro-nuclear constituencies. In this sub-section I use the 1974 test to 
demonstrate the convergence of various forces (for reasons of space I do not show this 
for 1998). These multiple sources of support enabled the Indian state to present the 
nuclear program as legitimate to both internal and external audiences.  
 
Pressure for nuclear testing from the scientists has been somewhat of a constant in 
Indian policy circles. In India scientists demanded tests through the 1970s and the 
1980s. According to former PM Gujral, the file calling for a nuclear test was on the 
table of every single Prime Minister.
28 We know from the US experience with the 
CTBT that weapons laboratories protested the replacement of testing by simulations 
(Goldblat and Cox 1988, 8). 
 
How did scientists garner the support needed for a testing program? Unlike in other 
countries, in India the military was not the partner of choice. Had the nuclear program 
been explicitly conceived with military applications, scientists would have come under 
more pressure to produce results (Perkovich 1999, 448). It was only when technocrats 
found  themselves  unable  to  establish  stable  alliances  with  foreign  scientists  or 
domestic industry that they turned to the military (Flank 1993, 272). Former Army 
Chief Shankar Roychowdhury reports that he started persuaded the Defense Ministry 
to test after senior scientists informed him in 1994 that the country had a “working 
prototype” of a bomb which required further testing (Roychowdhury 2002, 278). The 
                                                 
28 Author’s interview with Inder Kumar Gujral, 5 August 2003, New Delhi.      
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military may also have pushed for testing in this period owing to its predisposition to 
distrust  civilian  claims about  weapons  system  performance.  However,  a  test  could 
occur only with the consent of the political elite, which in turn was concerned about 
repercussions on popularity. 
 
PM  Lal  Bahadur  Shastri  faced  a  difficult  situation  after  the  Chinese  test  in  1964. 
India’s  top  nuclear  scientist  Homi  Bhabha  had  publicly  declared  that  India  could 
afford the bomb and should acquire it as a deterrent.
29 The right-wing Jan Sangh and 
members  of  his  own  Congress  party  were  pressuring  him  to  authorize  weapons 
development. In September 1965, 86 MPs across party lines signed a resolution to that 
effect (Chopra 1984, 73). Shastri’s personal faith in non-violence and his misgivings 
about costs biased him against this option. Shastri stated that despite the continued 
threat from China, India would follow the path of peace by renouncing its right to 
manufacture  nuclear  weapons.  He  also  reiterated  India’s  resolve  to  work  for  the 
elimination of nuclear weapons (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1966, 109). 
As a compromise, he promised to consider carrying out a PNE. He declared that the 
AEC would “progress and improve upon” nuclear devices for peaceful purposes.
30 In 
May  1965,  Shastri  approved  a  research  project  “Study  of  Nuclear  Explosions  for 
Peaceful Purposes” which laid the groundwork for a PNE. Indira Gandhi inherited this 
program when she became PM. 
 
Soon after her triumph in Bangladesh in 1971, Mrs. Gandhi was besieged by political 
opposition  from  several  quarters.  A  student  agitation  against  corruption  and 
                                                 
29 In this famous radio speech on 24 October 1964 (on the occasion of UN Day), Bhabha claimed that 
atomic explosives were 20 times cheaper and thermonuclear ones 500 times cheaper than conventional 
explosives. He also warned that India would have to reckon with a number of nuclear nations within the 
next 5-10 years. Nuclear disarmament, he declared, should be conditional on general disarmament. 
30 Lok Sabha Debates, 27 November 1964, col. 2291.      
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unemployment, economic crisis triggered by runaway inflation and industrial action 
(including  a  massive  railway  strike  in  1974)  culminated  in  the  ‘Total  Revolution’ 
movement. India was listed by the US among the 28 economies that had been worst 
hit by food and fuel price rises as a result of the 1973 oil crisis.
31 The politician’s 
insecurity  coincided  with  the  scientists’  desire  to  strengthen  their  position  with  a 
demonstration  of  technology.  Abraham  claims  that  1974  was  a  fetishized 
demonstration  to  divert  attention  from  the  AEC’s  failure  to  achieve  its  targets 
(Abraham 1998, 164).  
 
The  test  was  seen  as  legitimate  and  necessary  because  of  two  factors.  First,  the 
decision to test was taken by a democratically elected government—Indira Gandhi’s 
Congress-R had won 44% of the vote in 1971 in parliamentary elections. The program 
had been sustained by similarly democratic governments to that point. Thus it was not 
tainted with associations with military juntas or dictators. Second, the nuclear program 
was able to unify opinions on the Left and the Right. The former saw the NPT and 
other arms control measures as instruments of neo-imperial hegemony, while the latter 
believed in a strong national defense. Similarly, traditional Gandhian types rejected 
nuclear weapons but shared skepticism about international  arms control, while the 
young  socialists  in  Indira  Gandhi’s  camp  were  enthusiastic  about  the  benefits  of 
nuclear power. In 1974 sociologist Ashis Nandy conducted a survey of 80 elites on 
nuclear issues. Given that a majority of the respondents in his survey opposed both the 
NPT and nuclear weapons, he concluded that consensus could only be created by 
flouting the NPT with a PNE, all the while paying homage to a pacific tradition by 
stressing peaceful uses and pledging not to produce nuclear armaments (Nandy 1974, 
931). Indeed, the test laid the foundation of the policy of ambiguity.  
                                                 
31 Hindustan Times, 4 August 1974.      
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Domestic politics, national and international norms 
 
In the sections above I have demonstrated the influence of organizational, political and 
economic forces within the country on the determination of India’s national security 
interests. An independent nuclear policy became a locus for the convergence of these 
forces and nuclear tests, in particular, served to cement alliances. In the discussion, I 
emphasized the importance of dominant ideas in the national discourse. The ability of 
the nuclear enclave to attract resources, the expectation of political reward by certain 
parties, and the welcoming of a declaration of NWS status by economic liberalizers—
all these stem from certain unquestioned understandings about the nuclear program. In 
the  next  sections,  I  show  how  international  norms  shaped  national  identity,  which 
indirectly shaped nuclear policy.  
 
National identity: who or what is to be secured?  
In the first half of this chapter I posed the question—who decides what security is? 
Here I ask a more complicated question—whose security are we talking about? So far 
I  have viewed domestic politics as the matrix of various dynamic forces of class, 
technology  and  religion.  Here  I  adopt  a  more  holistic  approach  as  I  describe  the 
characteristics of ‘that which is to be defended’ with nuclear weapons. 
 
In India, as in other fledgling nation-states, claims to national security draw on the 
rhetorical resources invested in the concept of nation as well as state (Khattak 1996, 
341). To the extent that the force of nationalism is invested in a national security 
enterprise such as the making of a bomb, it becomes more difficult to challenge or      
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change.  Even  within  the  security  model,  as  we  saw,  national  will  is  a  crucial 
component in making nuclear deterrence work. Thus, a discussion of Indian nuclear 
policy would remain incomplete without a study of nation-building.  
 
State-building and nation-building are parallel and simultaneous processes within a 
developing  economy.  These  immense  pressures  lead  to  what  Ayoob  called  the 
‘security  predicament’  of  the  Third  World  state  (Ayoob  1995).  For  such  a  state, 
security could not be limited to order, it had to include welfare and freedom (Khilnani 
1998, 33). To put it differently, the state’s duties included protecting citizens from 
invasion or annihilation (security), making them independent of the external world for 
sustenance  (self-reliance)  and  in  foreign  policy  (nonalignment).  K.  Subrahmanyam 
writes: “National security does not merely mean safeguarding territorial integrity. It 
means  also  ensuring  that  the  country  is  industrialized  rapidly  and  has  a  cohesive 
egalitarian  and  technological  society.  Anything  that  comes  in  the  way  of  this 
development internally or externally is a threat to [India’s] security” (Subrahmanyam 
1972,  vii).  Such  a  comprehensive  conception  of  security  does  not  necessarily 
contribute to a more peaceful world. It is precisely because all aspects of national 
security  are  viewed  as  inter-related,  that  the  nuclear  program  is  able  to  overcome 
objections on the basis of cost or morality.  
 
 
Identity: persistent effects on nuclear policy 
Why  should  analyses  of  nuclear  policy  take  national  identity  into  account?  By 
reinforcing certain linkages, national identity molds the paths of future policies, and 
therefore it is important to study it. The importance of consensus in Indian politics 
makes this particularly important.       
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The ‘middle path’ has long characterized the Indian state. Secularism is interpreted as 
equal respect for all religions, nonalignment as equidistance from contending blocs, 
and  the  mixed  economy  is  a  compromise  between  socialism  and  the  free  market. 
Nehru once said; “any attempt on our part to go too far in one direction [in foreign 
policy]  would  create  difficulties  in  our  own  country”  (Kapur  1976b,  14).  Political 
parties have learned to moderate their rhetoric and bureaucrats have avoided radical 
shifts. The BJP, for all its radicalism, has reinterpreted founding principles, referring 
to its opponents as ‘pseudo-secular’. During the 1970s when it briefly had control of 
the Foreign Ministry, the party’s motto was ‘genuine’ nonalignment (countering the 
tilt towards the Soviet Union). The BJP even managed to sell the idea that ‘swadeshi’ 
(indigeneity,  an  ideal  of  national  self-reliance)  should  be  reinterpreted  as  national 
competitiveness (Lakha 2002, 88). Here I present two examples of continuity in the 
nuclear program. 
 
The  1990s  saw  a  conscious  redefinition  of  identity,  security  needs,  and  strategic 
worldview  in  India.  Centralized  planning,  self-reliance  and  autarkic  development, 
shaped by the environment of the post-World War II world, were no longer considered 
appropriate  (Subrahmanyam  1992,  375).  Yet,  the  concept  of  the  security-integrity-
prosperity triad had become institutionalized. Liberalizers drew on themes which had 
a deep resonance with established principles of grand strategy. In the words of Sanjaya 
Baru, then head of the Economic Security Group of the National Security Advisory 
Board: “In the past self-reliance was defined as liberation from external dependence; 
henceforth it will have to be viewed in terms of ensuring interdependence through 
economic engagement” (Baru 1999, 14). If there had been a sharp break away from 
self-reliance and the role of the state in infrastructure-building, the nuclear program      
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may have been perceived as a white elephant. However, an understanding of the links 
between  economic  and  military  security  prevented  elites  from  calling  for  a  re-
assessment of the nuclear complex. Instead, economic integration was framed as a 
“necessary element of India’s pursuit of a larger global role for itself, including a 
declared nuclear power status and a larger voice in global economic and political 
forums, like the UN” (Baru 1999, 16, n.7, emphasis mine).  
 
As we have seen in the rejection of security guarantees, independence was another 
important  trope  in  nuclear  policy.  India  originally  declared  its  independence  by 
refusing to shelter under a nuclear umbrella. The 1974 test was a symbol of India’s 
independent stance. India’s decision not to use the data obtained from the explosion 
for military purposes, would demonstrate that the militarisation of nuclear energy was 
a  political  choice  and  thus  reversible.  India’s  restraint  would  symbolise  the 
constructive use of a technology misused by the NWS. After 1974, keeping the option 
open began to symbolise independence in the face of a discriminatory nonproliferation 
agenda. Is this manifested in the content analysis? Unfortunately we run up against the 
problem  that  quantitative  methods  do  not  map  latent  meaning.  On  including 
independent, independence, autonomous and sovereign in CATPAC’s “include file”, I 
noted that these words together made up less than 0.5% of the entire sample. 
 
 “We have to maintain our independence”, said future PM Vajpayee in the discussion 
of the PNE in Parliament.
32 India has been consistently pointing out that the NPT 
confers a special status on the five Nuclear Weapons States, entitling them to retain 
and modernize their arsenals indefinitely. On grounds of discrimination, the country 
also  opposed  other  multilateral  arms  control  measures,  most  recently  the  CTBT. 
                                                 
32 Lok Sabha Debates, vol.42, no.14, August 8, 1974, col.232.      
  172 
Refusing to sign the treaty, PM Gujral declared that the alternative to defiance was for 
India to bend and crawl. India must be willing to face isolation which was the price for 
asserting itself (Mansingh 1998, 37-38).  
 
Whereas  India’s  defiance  of  global  norms  at  first  was  expressed  by  a  refusal  to 
manufacture nuclear weapons, it was restated in 1998. India’s decision to weaponize 
its capability was now a mark of its independence. The invocation of the unfettered 
sovereign right of a country to take decisions in its national interest was repeated in 
the discussion of the tests in 1974 and 1998. Although the purpose of this rhetoric was 
quite different, its emotive power in pitching a principled and solitary India against the 
rest  of  the  world  was  still  in  evidence.  Since  in  the  current  dataset  words 
characterizing independence occur so rarely, it is not easy to find clusters.  
 
International norms constitute national identity 
 
So far we have discussed how national identity constitutes a certain conception of 
security and how that molds interest and therefore policy. A view of national identity 
as a purely domestic product is rather a narrow one. For purposes of clarity I have 
been  employing  an  artificial  distinction  to  isolate  the  internal  sources  of  national 
identity.  In  this  section,  however,  I  discuss  how  international  norms,  specifically 
nuclear  norms,  molded  national  identity.  Regulations  imposed  by  international 
regimes obviously bound the activities of domestic actors. But it is also possible to see 
how their interests are defined by international norms. In other words, do international 
norms create and sustain certain ‘nuclear actors’ in India? Acknowledging this does 
not  mean  that  we  dismiss  the  role  of  domestic  actors,  merely  asking  where  they 
‘learned’ what their interests were and how they managed to achieve them.      
  173 
 
Shaping national purpose: international norms and the character of nationalism 
Compared  to  civilizations  in  Europe  and  Asia,  India  was  depicted  in  colonial 
scholarship as singularly lacking in political unity, and consequently history and even 
rationality (Inden 1990, 8, 17). One response to colonialism was to embrace a kind of 
hyper-masculinity, which would enable Indians to be construed as a people just as 
“manly”  as  the  British  (Lal  1998b).  Feminist  analyses  have  discerned  in  nuclear 
rhetoric the need to prove masculinity (Das 2003a; Kishwar 1998; Patwardhan 2002). 
Another response to colonialism was an investment in a particular kind of ‘catching 
up’ development. Since development was always to be measured in relation to other 
nations, it was assimilated into the concept of national security (Abraham 1998, 9-12). 
The  quest  to  catch  up  engenders  both  insecurity  and  imitation  in  post-colonial 
nationalism. Nuclear technology and nuclear weapons are symbols of modernity that 
do not threaten the internal power structure.  
 
The dual attraction of nuclear power was immediately obvious to Indians, as it was 
over the world. The coincidence of Indian independence with the discovery of the 
atom’s  power  made  nuclear  technology  even  more  appealing  (Abraham  1998,  7). 
Abraham  emphasizes  that  because  of  the  split  character  of  science,  the  Indian 
program’s  military  aspect  was  not  a  diversion  or  mutation  of  an  original  civilian 
intent; both potentialities were inherent in it. He points to Nehru’s revealing admission 
during the Constituent Assembly debates, when asked why both civilian and defense 
uses  of  nuclear  energy  had  to  be  controlled:  “I  do  not  know  how  to  distinguish 
between the two.” When Bhabha quipped, "There is no power as expensive as no 
power" his listeners concluded he meant both military and industrial power (Anderson 
1983, 42).       
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A third strand in modern nationalism attempts to redress the perceived lack of strategic 
culture. In this view, the insular mindset of Indians both prevented them from seeking 
power  outside  the  region,  and  obliged  a  fatalistic  acceptance  of  extra-regional 
invasions  (Karnad  1999,  3-4;  Subrahmanyam  1999).  Jaswant  Singh  blames 
“excessive, and at times ersatz pacifism” for crippling the state itself (Singh 1999, 13). 
These  beliefs  about  a  cultural  inadequacy  on  security  are  shared  by  Hindutva 
supporters and liberal secular Indians (Cohen 2001, 168). Witness the wave of concern 
triggered by the assertion in a RAND study by George Tanham that India lacked a 
tradition of strategic thinking (Bajpai and Mattoo 1996).
33  
 
Nandy describes the ‘modern Indian’ as a gatekeeper between India and the outside 
world, scanning, assessing and adapting to the latter’s demands. The self-perception is 
that he or she stands between the wolves in the global nation-state system and the 
vulnerable sheep in the form of the irrational, uninformed majority of ordinary Indians 
who cannot fathom the dirty, hard-eyed, masculine game of realpolitik (Nandy 2003). 
There  is  a  sociological  root  to  this  mindset.  Most  security  elites  are  extremely 
outward-oriented—concerned with India’s position in the world. Since most do not 
have parochial constituencies, they are intellectually and emotionally committed to the 
Indian nation-state (Cohen 2001).  
 
The  nuclear  program  functions  as  a  way  of  overcoming  this  societal  inferiority 
complex in response to international norms. Fears that India is perceived as a ‘soft 
                                                 
33 The Hindu concept of time and destiny, the agricultural nature of the economy, the hierarchical 
character of society and bureaucratic traditions made for what Tanham called “passivity in military 
affairs” (Tanham 1992).      
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state’  compound  worries  that  India’s  deterrence  message  is  not  credible  enough.
34 
Thus, calls for national unity on nuclear and security issues abound. On the other 
hand,  traditions  of  non-aggression  are  also  cited  in  claims  for  Indian  nuclear 
exceptionalism--that India would use nuclear weapons only for peaceful and defensive 
purposes (Chengappa 2000, 8, 416). The Chief of Army Staff said that India’s defence 
policy is “defensive in nature.” He claimed that since  India has never crossed the 
boundaries  of  her  territory  to  invade  other  countries,  nuclear  policy  too  would  be 
defensive in nature (Kumar 1999).  
 
The  BJP’s  foreign  policy  orientation  has  always  been  more  aggressive  than  its 
competitors’.  This  is  primarily  because  of  its  ideological  roots.  The  most  famous 
Hindutva ideologue Veer Savarkar exhorted his followers to ‘Hinduize the nation and 
militarize Hinduism.’ However, Hindutva is also a response to international norms 
privileging nation-states that are internally unchallenged and externally independent. It 
is an extreme extension of the post-colonial attempt to overcome the paralysis of a 
‘soft  state’  that  is  unconcerned  with  material  power.  Nuclear  weapons  are  for 
Hindutva followers the ultimate symbol of the centralized power of the strong state 
(Nandy 1995, 62).  
   
International norms as resources 
State  institutions  charged  with  foreign  policy  construct  representations  of  self  and 
other. This process is called articulation (building meaning out of cultural resources) 
(Weldes 1996, 281-87). Among the resources that powerful actors and institutions use 
to  construct  Indian  identity  (and  interest)  are  international  norms.  Indian  nuclear 
                                                 
34 A phrase used originally by Gunnar Myrdal to denote the inability of the state to establish itself as the 
primary value, it is now used to denote all manner of failings by the state machinery. The term appeared 
frequently in the context of the post-1998 test debate.      
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advocates were consumers of international norms valorizing the double-edged power 
of the atom and also users of these norms, deploying them in the domestic arena to 
counter those who opposed nuclear power on ethical, economic or strategic grounds.  
 
First, international norms valorizing nuclear technology were deployed in domestic 
debates by scientists, technocrats and their allies. Second, Indian actors, in demanding 
resources  from  the  global  community,  invoked  the  international  norm  that  this 
monumental technology had to be shared for peaceful purposes. Indian politicians, 
diplomats, and other public figures used the norms of sovereignty and free peaceful 
use  to  defend  the  existence  of  an  Indian  nuclear  program  both  internally  and 
externally.  Third,  as  the  international  community  came  to  accept  India’s  nuclear 
capabilities, dialogues between (mainly American) strategic thinkers and their Indian 
counterparts  allowed  the  latter  to  rebut  arguments  by  traditional  disarmament 
supporters. Finally, certain norms of responsible nuclear conduct were used by India 
to construct its preferred nuclear identity and indirectly to clip Pakistan’s wings.  
 
How  did  pro-nuclear  actors  in  India  draw  on  international  norms  to  bolster  their 
arguments? Nehruvians held India’s technological backwardness responsible for its 
subjugation (Bajpai 1998b, 160). But India’s choice of technological autonomy and 
self-sufficiency in economic strategy stems not only from its history, but also from the 
ideology  of  ‘developmentalism’  prevalent  in  Asian,  African  and  Latin  American 
countries  in  the  1950s  and  1960s  (Adler  1987).  Developmentalism  provided 
“captivating social metaphors” (Sikkink 1991). It encouraged leaders to establish a 
centralized state committed to import-substituting industrialization (ISI) with the goal 
of self-reliance.  
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There are several reasons why such a state would be attracted to nuclear power. Faith 
in the leapfrogging potential of nuclear power meant that disproportionate resources 
were  devoted  to  it.  Interestingly  the  AEC  itself  remained  a  meritocratic  enclave 
unhindered  by  bureaucratic  obstacles.  Nuclear  technology  required  a  high  initial 
investment that could be made only by the state, but that was common in all types of 
infrastructure-building.  Moreover,  self-sufficiency  was  the  watchword.  If  nuclear 
technology  was  so  crucial,  other  nations  would  be  reluctant  to  part  with  it.  Thus 
Bhabha argued in the press for indigenous nuclear research on the grounds that “in the 
present international situation [India] was unlikely to obtain the information from the 
countries which are the most advanced in the field” (Abraham 1998, 77). For post-
colonial  and  developing  economies,  this  fitted  in  with  a  generally  confrontational 
attitude towards developed countries.  
 
In addition, creating a nuclear capability benefited the very sectors of the economy 
that  ISI  treasured—high-technology  research  and  development,  engineering  and 
electrical power. The nuclear program clearly was a good fit with the ideology of 
developmentalism. The first industrial revolution passed India by, Parliament was told 
after the PNE, but “we have no intention of letting the same thing happen in the 
technological  revolution  in  this  century.”
35  The  content  analysis  of  the  1950s  is 
instructive here. India is not mentioned until 1965 in connection with nuclear issues. 
Yet there is an average of 15 articles dealing with atomic power and with disarmament 
measures among the Big Two—the USA, USSR and to some extent, Britain, Canada 
and European countries also feature.  
 
                                                 
35 Lok Sabha Debates 8 August 1974, emphasis mine.       
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Since nuclear power was such a crucial, prestigious and risky undertaking, it had to be 
guided by scientific elites free from public interference.  India’s nuclear activities had 
to be kept secret and monopolized by the state. In 1958, the government issued a new 
constitution for the AEC giving it unprecedented powers. The official resolution said 
that these changes were driven by “the newness of the field, the strategic nature of its 
activities, and its international and political significance” (Abraham 1998, 97). 
 
How did Indian elites use norms as resources in the international sphere? I present two 
examples, one political and the other economic. India’s democratic status, we have 
seen, gave its nuclear policy an amount of legitimacy domestically. It also served to 
strengthen its international legitimacy. During the Cold War, for instance, the US felt 
constrained from intervening forcefully against the largest democracy in the world. 
After  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  as  democracy  became  even  more  important  in 
assessing state identities, India worked hard to play this to its advantage. In 2006 a US 
State  Department  spokesman  said:  “We  treat  India,  a  democratic,  peaceful  friend, 
differently  than  we  treat  Iran  and  North  Korea  and  we’re  very  happy  to  say 
that…India is playing by the rules. Iran is not. If that’s a system of double standards, 
we’re very proud to establish that double standard on behalf of a democratic friend” 
(Ruppe 2006).  
 
Indian elites used the global euphoria over the potential of atomic energy to bolster 
claims that their program was aimed at developmental uses. The Indian delegate’s 
speech at the 18
th IAEA session cited that organization’s declarations acknowledging 
the benefits of PNEs.
36 It did not escape India’s notice that US scientists too were 
contemplating PNEs, and that 6.3% of the energy supply in that country came from 
                                                 
36 Hindu, 21 September 1974.      
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nuclear power.
37 Until the US conducted nuclear blasts under its Plowshare program in 
1957 PNEs had not entered the global discourse on nuclear power (Epstein 1976, 172). 
In the years immediately preceding India’s test the IAEA sponsored three technical 
conferences on PNEs. By May 1974, the US had detonated 41 PNEs and the USSR 31 
(Reiss 1995, 230). The NPT itself affirms the importance of nuclear explosions for 
peaceful  purposes.  The  American  Atoms  for  Peace  program  unleashed  a  flood  of 
propaganda promoting nuclear technology in the mid-1950s (Weart 1988, 155-65). 
Policymakers  were  inspired  by  US  efforts  promoting  commercial  nuclear  projects 
(Barletta 2001). The Soviet Union had its own version of Atoms for Peace.
38  
 
The Indian elite even claimed the role of spokesperson for developing nations eager to 
utilize  it.  Homi  Bhabha  was  elected  the  President  of  the  first  UN  Conference  on 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva in 1955. After the 1974 test, one article 
said: “For years, we have been sitting at the feet of the superpowers, being shown their 
films and their achievements in the harnessing of nuclear power…for development, 
India needs that sort of capability” (Anon 1974h). Scholars have also traced the initial 
enthusiasm for nuclear energy in Pakistan to Atoms for Peace (Chakma 2002, 874).  
 
The sharing of nuclear technology became a sign of good faith. Canada’s provision of 
the  natural  uranium-fueled  Canada  Deuterium  Uranium  (CANDU)  reactor  was 
effected  under  the  Colombo  Plan  for  development  in  South  and  Southeast  Asia 
(Chellaney 1993b, 6). Thousands of Indian scientists received training at the Argonne 
National  Laboratories  in  the  US  (Weiss  2003).  Later,  Indians  bought  enrichment 
equipment  from  foreign  suppliers,  sent  scientists  abroad  to  be  trained  to  handle 
                                                 
37 Hindustan Times, 20 June 1974. 
38 Author’s interview with David Holloway, Stanford, CA, January 2005.       
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uranium  and  plutonium,  and  based  their  missile  designs  on  American  and  Soviet 
designs  (although  the  incorporation  of  indigenous  components  made  the  missiles 
heavier and not as accurate).
39 The Apsara research reactor that went critical in 1956 
had design components from the UK (Mian and Ramana 2005). However, the atomic 
energy  establishment  laid  great  stress  on  its  technological  achievements  and 
indigeneity. Apsara was proudly presented as the first reactor in Asia. 
 
How were international norms transmitted? Interactions with security analysts played 
a major role. K. Subrahmanyam points out that even movements like Pugwash were 
not pacifist and their members believed in deterrence.
40 In the early 1990s, the arms 
control community (concentrated in the US) gradually came to the realization that 
India was not likely to renounce the nuclear capability it had already acquired (Chari 
2003a, 38; Tellis 2002b, 30). Members of this community, such as Thomas Graham, 
Selig Harrison, George Perkovich, William Perry, George Quester, Scott Sagan and 
Ashley Tellis urged the government to move away from the tired and futile insistence 
on nuclear reversal.
41 Concerned about the vulnerability of arsenals in South Asia, 
they suggested that dialogue should focus on ensuring nuclear restraint, preventing 
destabilizing horizontal and vertical proliferation and assuring the physical safety of 
weapons.  This  more  pragmatic  approach  strengthened  Indian  planners’  faith  in 
deterrence  and  signaled  an  acceptance  of  India’s  existing  capability  by  the  norm 
leader.  
 
                                                 
39 Alisa Carrigan, personal communication, 8 November 2005. 
40 Author’s interview with K. Subrahmanyam, New Delhi, 20 July 2003. 
41 Most of these analysts were aware that the Indians could be learning the ‘wrong’ lesson from their 
dialogues, however, they felt that it was counterproductive to press for accession to the NPT, and that 
the US had a responsibility to provide resources that could lower the likelihood of nuclear war in South 
Asia.       
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In terms of domestic politics, this development was important because it strengthened 
certain factions among  Indian decision-makers. For the first time  arguments about 
deterrence fell on receptive ears in India (Krepon 2003, 9). The end of the Cold War, 
the fall of Communist regimes and ideology, economic liberalization in India and a 
rapid change of governments in India rendered Indian elites anxious and eager to learn 
from  the  US.  American  strategic  discourse,  no  doubt  molded  by  the  Cold  War 
experience, emphasized the importance of second-strike capability to make the arsenal 
survivable and ensure deterrence stability.
42  
 
In  India,  the  proponents  of  ambiguity  and  opaqueness  in  deterrence  were  led  to 
reassess their stances in light of these concepts. Consequently, calls for testing and 
against accession to the CTBT increased. On the specific issue of testing, members of 
the strategic enclave drew upon the international experience to put pressure on the 
government  to  authorize  tests.  Perkovich  draws  our  attention  to  an  important  but 
ignored  interview  by  R.  Chidambaram  (then  AEC  Chairman)  in  March  1998.  On 
being asked whether tests were essential for the program, he responded simply that 
some countries had undertaken over 2000 explosions, demonstrating that computer 
simulations were useful only when a large database from actual testing had been built 
up  (Perkovich  1999,  407).  These  transnational  contacts  encouraged  the  strategic 
community  to  see  arms  control  as  part  of  security  policy,  not  a  constraint  on  it 
(Rajamohan 2003a, 19). According to Rajamohan, the mental shift from disarmament 
to arms control occurred almost a decade before 1998, and was mainly the result of 
interaction with American scholars.
43 After 1998 Indian strategists were suddenly in 
demand for discussions on nuclear issues and this process was further intensified.
44 
                                                 
42 Interview with Scott Sagan, Stanford, CA, 4 May 2005. 
43 Interview with C.Rajamohan, New Delhi, 21 June 2003. 
44 Interview with Bharat Karnad, New Delhi, 18 July 2003      
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International norms as constraints 
International norms can go beyond influencing policy to creating the conditions under 
which national identity is formed. Shampa Biswas points out that the Indian elites use 
‘nuclear apartheid’ arguments to gain advantages in international negotiations. Such 
arguments  make  it  possible  for  Indians  to  imagine  themselves  as  a  community  of 
resistance, and simultaneously bring into being an India which excludes enemies of 
the state (in the BJP’s version, ‘anti-national Muslims’) (Biswas 2001, 508). Certain 
domestic political institutions such as civilian control of the military, democracy and 
secularism are vital for India’s membership in the right category in the regime. India 
wins the right to be categorized as a responsible nuclear state because its domestic 
politics conform to global norms of civilized and proper states.  
 
Domestically,  this  changes  the  power  balance  among  the  factions  attempting  to 
construct  national  identity.  As  we  saw  after  the  1998  tests,  the  more  radical  and 
overtly  religious  factions  of  the  Sangh  Parivar  were  tightly  leashed.  The  Prime 
Minister  vetoed  all  celebrations  by  his  party  to  celebrate  the  event,  and  refused 
permission  for  the  construction  of  a  temple  at  the  Pokhran  range,  and  for  the 
ceremonial distribution of radioactive dust from the site. The Government was advised 
not to let the tests get hijacked by the “lunatic fringe” (George 1998d; Misra 1998; 
Singh 1998e). It is true that pro-bomb religious nationalists incorporate references to 
Hindu mythology in their rhetoric (Ramana 2000a). They do not, however, represent 
the mainstream although they are more visible and dramatic in the international media 
and public opinion. 
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Democracy  is  also  an  important  resource  that  allows  India  to  be  categorized  as  a 
responsible  nuclear  state.  The  Nuclear  Command  Authority  (NCA)  created  by  the 
Indian government in January 2003 vests control of the nuclear arsenal in the Political 
Council headed by the PM. (However, the announcement of the NCA also includes a 
reference  to  “alternate  chains  of  command  for  retaliatory  nuclear  strikes  in  all 
eventualities” (Rajamohan 2003c). The published doctrine does not specify at what 
point  authority  over  nuclear  weapons  is  delegated  to  the  armed  forces  in  these 
alternate chains). After  1998 the military’s role has been expanding. Although the 
armed forces are not involved in the design or certification of nuclear weapons they 
are increasingly being brought in as ‘operators’. The world is reassured that weapons 




There  is  an  imperative  to  maintain  coherence  between  various  aspects  of  national 
identity.  Thus  international  alliances  also  constitute  national  identity.  As  we  have 
seen, if India had accepted a nuclear umbrella as a solution to the Chinese threat in the 
1960s, it could no longer have maintained either a nonaligned stance in foreign policy 
or a middle-path in domestic economic and social policy. Aware of this effect, Indian 
leaders  chose  not  to  make  these  substantial  adjustments.  The  acquisition  of  an 
indigenous  nuclear  capability  became  the  logical  choice.  During  the  Cold  War, 
countries  in  NAM  pressed  for  disarmament  at  various  international  forums.  This 
advocacy bolstered India’s stance but greatly increased the costs of breaking out and 
talking about security interests.
46 It is only in 1997 that the term security enters the top 
8 list of salience (even taking into account its synonyms such as defense used earlier).  
                                                 
45 Interview with Ashley Tellis, Washington DC, 25 August 2005. 
46 Interview with Jasjit Singh, New Delhi, 24 July 2003.      
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International norms can directly affect policies by creating the imperative to maintain 
coherence between domestic and external rhetoric. Even when state leaders declare 
their  support  for  international  norms  for  purely  strategic  purposes  to  external 
audiences,  their  utterances  can  be  used  by  others  to  push  certain  policies.  Social 
movement  theorists  have  been  sensitive  to  the  power  of  international  norms  on 
national  policies,  and  have  shown  how  American  declarations  of  commitment  to 
norms of equality and freedom in foreign policy helped bring about domestic social 
reform (Dudziak 2000; Klinkner and Smith 1999). Even on high security issues like 
nuclear weapons, rhetoric can be used in this way. During the Cold War, transnational 
activists were able to point to the frequent reiterations of the purely defensive role of 
nuclear weapons by the USSR to push for reductions in the Soviet arsenal (Evangelista 
1999, 384). 
 
In  the  Indian  context,  however,  we  do  not  see  this  process.  Indian  disarmament 
activists  were  unable  to  wield  the  rhetoric  of  peace  to  restrain  government  policy 
because the arsenal was unacknowledged. In fact several arguments made by the peace 
movement in other countries were coopted by the state into the language of official 
diplomacy.
47  Until  the  1990s,  the  state’s  nuclear  scientists  effectively  defanged  a 
potential  indigenous  peace/nuclear  disarmament  movement  by  profferring  their 
‘scientific’  credentials  as  proof  of  their  peaceful  intentions.  Disarmament  rhetoric, 
radical elsewhere, was part of the official discourse in India and was “almost dull” 
(Sarkar 1998, 1727).  In the 1990s a slick and  sophisticated nuclear discourse was 
imported  from  the  West  (Ray  1998,  1637).  Ironically,  at  roughly  the  same  time, 
                                                 
47 Indian diplomats were calling for a nuclear freeze, castigating the NWS for not complying with the 
obligation to consider disarming, pointing out the financial and environmental costs of nuclear 
weapons—just as anti-nuclear activists did in the West.      
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arguments presented by India (in particular those of Nehru) on disarmament inspired 






The Indian case does not fit within a pluralist understanding of politics where power is 
dispersed  among  competing  groups  with  prior  interests  and  identities.  We  would 
benefit  from  sociological  studies  of  the  bureaucratic  corps  and  strategic  analysts, 
especially  as  India  opens  up  to  inputs  from  nongovernment  sources.  Pro-nuclear 
elements  in  these  groups  advanced  their  policies  because  they  operated  within  a 
framework where the nuclear program is central to security, development and national 
identity. Nuclear testing was part of strategy to build truly national support for both 
Indira  Gandhi  and  the  BJP.  The  nuclear  issue  was  chosen  by  these  very  different 
governments because it could unify several important constituencies. While ideology 
played a role in the BJP’s 1998 decision to call for nuclear tests—but it was not a 
radical Hindu nationalist ideology, rather a more unifying consensus that motivated it. 
A  comprehensive  conception  of  security  facilitated  the  advance  of  the  nuclear 
program,  endowing  it  with  developmental  implications  that  strengthened  domestic 
support, and furnished a critique of the discriminatory nuclear order. Unlike Realist 
accounts  which  pit  economic  factors  against  security  imperatives,  my  account 
demonstrates the ways in which they can reinforce each other.  
 
While national identity is the source of national interest and therefore policy, foreign 
policy (including nuclear policy) also helps create national identity. Especially in a 
‘new’ nation-state the project of nation-building cannot be divorced from the country’s 
self-presentation to the world. In fact it is the very proof of its existence, as shown in      
  186 
Nehru’s  1949  statement:  “What  does  independence  consist  of?  It  consists 
fundamentally and basically of foreign relations. That is the test of independence. All 
else is local autonomy.” A certain degree of coherence between domestic and foreign 
policy  is  essential.  The  first  three  decades  of  Indian  policy  saw  the  mutual 
reinforcement  of  mixed  economy  and  self-reliance  in  economic  strategy, 
nonalignment in foreign policy, and multinationalism on the question of representation 
and internal order.  
      




FRANCE AND SOUTH AFRICA: FACING THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 
 
In the preceding chapters, I have analyzed India’s nuclear policy in the context of the 
international nonproliferation regime. In this chapter I present analyses of French and 
South African policies towards the regime, demonstrating the varying impacts of the 
international regime on different polities. I find that while variance is clearly due in 
some measure to differences in domestic structure, the international regime lays down 
the conditions of possibility within which choices are made.  
 
What do we gain from a comparison of India with France and South Africa? India and 
France are ‘most different’ cases where we observe similar outcomes, in that both 
decided that nuclear weapons were essential to their security while moving towards 
accommodation with the nonproliferation regime. On the other hand, India and South 
Africa are both rising middle powers, yet in the 1990s, India formally adopted nuclear 
weapons for defense while South Africa renounced its capability. These are possibly 
‘most similar’ cases with differing outcomes.  
 
This chapter deals with France and South Africa in two different sections. In each 
section, I begin with a brief history of the nuclear program, with special emphasis on 
the changes in the first decade after the end of the Cold War. In the second sub-
section,  I  present  explanations  for  these  changes  from  the  security,  norms  and 
domestic politics models. My focus in the third sub-section is on the actual operation 
of  deterrence.  How  were  nuclear  weapons  or  nuclear  capability  pressed  into  the      
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security project? How did the characteristics of deterrence as a practice shape policy in 
the 1990s?  
 
I find that both France’s ‘limited deterrence’ without a fixed target, and South Africa’s 
‘catalytic’  and  ‘ambiguous’  deterrence  were  based  on  modest  capabilities. 
Consequently,  the  affirmation  and  reaffirmation  of  intentions  were  even  more 
important for the institution of deterrence in these two countries than in other nuclear 
states. France’s apparent defiance of the nonproliferation order was meant to reinforce 
its intentions and its independence.  
 
South Africa’s strategy, on the other hand, aimed at maintaining an identity of interest 
with the West. So the country had to convey its capability  and intentions without 
crossing  the  nuclear  Rubicon  with  a  test.  At  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  France’s 
deterrent was repositioned, South Africa’s given up. The characteristics of deterrence 
in  the  two  countries  shaped  these  divergent  outcomes.  The  French  ‘tous  azimuts’ 
deterrent could accommodate a larger  range of  targets. The South African nuclear 
arsenal had the sole aim of keeping the West involved in its security. Further, it was 
tainted by the association with apartheid—it had never been a national project as in 
France.  
 
The final sub-sections investigate the constitutive role of international norms in France 
and in South Africa. How did the processes of definition and categorization shape 
nuclear  choices  in  the  1990s?  Deterrence  practices  were  premised  on  certain 
international norms during the Cold War in both France and South Africa. In the new 
world order, the nuclear capabilities of states unrecognized as NWS became suspect. 
France therefore reaffirmed its position as a legitimate possessor of nuclear weapons, a      
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NWS, and South Africa gave up its capability, declaring itself a NNWS. New regional 
alliances in Europe and Africa fostered changes in the role of nuclear weapons. France 
and South Africa also found it desirable to assume the identity of  ‘champions of 
disarmament.’ I conclude with a comparison of the trajectories of France, India and 
South Africa. 
 
I find in all three countries, careful attention to international nonproliferation norms on 
the part of a small nuclear elite. These norms are of course refracted through different 
lenses in each country. As an influence on nuclear policy, domestic political change is 
most important in South Africa and least important in France. Security threats are 
most  salient  in  India  and  least  in  South  Africa.  However,  for  each  country,  the 
pressure to define itself in terms of the nuclear regime became intense in the 1990s. 
While I do not deny the importance of defense and domestic political imperatives, the 
effects of international norms should also be taken into account.  
 
France  is  a  puzzle  for  theories  of  nuclear  policy.  The  ability  of  the  small  French 
deterrent to counter the USSR was always in doubt. In addition, French disarmament 
diplomacy was disconcertingly similar to that of a NNWS, in that it often brought up 
themes  of  fairness  and  non-discrimination.  However,  France  moved  closer  to  the 
mainstream NWS position over time, and in the 1990s made important changes that 
placed it firmly in that mainstream. Here, I first briefly describe the program and its 
re-evaluation  in  the  1990s.  Then,  I  discuss  the  operation  of  deterrence  in  French 
strategy and show its relation to the recasting of the deterrent in a post-Cold War era. 
In the next section I link the constitutive power of international norms to France’s 
changing position.  
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History 
The 1960 nuclear test, in Reggane in colonial Algeria, marked the beginning of a 
modest  French  nuclear  force,  one  that  has  been  staunchly  defended  by  successive 
governments. The function of the French arsenal in the Cold War was, in Charles de 
Gaulle’s words “ to exert at least some influence upon the intentions of a potential 
aggressor” (Gordon 1993, 59). According to the 1994 White Paper, the Livre Blanc, 
which  was  the  last  formal  presentation  of  French  doctrine,  the  deterrent  serves  to 
protect the country and its allies from a major threat to Western Europe and to support 
French intervention in regional conflicts. This latter, it admits, is the likelier scenario 
(1994).
1  
1954 is often cited as the beginning of the French nuclear program. In this year, the 
Mendes-France  government  initiated  a  secret  study  to  examine  the  military 
applications of nuclear energy, although the decision to develop a weapon was taken 
in the spring of 1957 (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 209). Charles de Gaulle, who 
took charge of the Fourth Republic in 1958, is most closely identified with the French 
bomb. In the first year of his Presidency he ordered preparations for a nuclear test 
(Duval  and  Mongin  1993,  42).  His  legacy  has  been  described  as  “lasting,  clearly 
definable  and  highly  consequential”  (Gordon  1993,  6).  French  government 
publications assert blandly that nuclear policy rests on Gaullist principles. Such textual 
salutes appeared even during the d’Estaing administration, when doctrinal concepts 
were redefined and practices were changing—for instance, France joined suppliers’ 
groups (Heuser 1998, 80).  
                                                 
1 All translations from French in this chapter are mine unless otherwise indicated.      
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De Gaulle’s insistence on an indigenous nuclear capability and his refusal to share 
control of it led to France’s withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) joint defense planning mechanisms in 1966.
2 Obviously, this was a great 
strain  on  inter-alliance  and  Franco-American  relations.  In  practice,  the  French 
deterrent  was  perforce  a  complement  to  NATO  nuclear  forces.  French  strategists 
claimed  their  country’s  deterrent  would  “complicate  the  calculations”  of  NATO’s 
adversaries (Gregory 2000, 142).  
 
Change and continuity in the 1990s 
There were several reasons to expect radical change, even renunciation of the nuclear 
arsenal in the 1990s. First, the threat from the Soviet Union had dissolved into thin air. 
France  would  have  benefited  immensely  from  closer  cooperation  with  the  sole 
hegemon, the US. Second, nuclear weapons lost some of their value as international 
currency with the collapse of the nuclear-armed USSR. Economic issues came to the 
fore in France as in other countries, and the nuclear program was one of the most 
expensive components of the defense budget. Third, this period also saw European 
integration picking up speed. France intended to be a leader in that process, in which 
its distinct nuclear identity could only be an irritant. Fourth, the  credibility of the 
deterrent was being reduced by the apparent public distate for nuclear weapons. In a 
1980 opinion poll, 57% of the respondents declared that the government should not 
use nuclear weapons even if France was being invaded; in 1991 this figure went up to 
72% (Heuser 1998, 89). In February 1991 President Mitterrand made a significant 
declaration eschewing any use of French nuclear weapons in the ongoing Gulf War 
(Yost 1995, 67). 
                                                 
2 The development of indigenous bombers by this time made it possible for France to withdraw from 
the integrated NATO structure (Heuser 1998, 143).      
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The French government did initiate some paring down of nuclear forces, moves which 
were primarily seen as responding to financial constraints. Currently France’s arsenal 
adds up to less than 5% of American and Russian forces (Grand 1998a, 49). In July 
1991 Mitterand canceled the S-45 missile program, and in June 1992 announced that 
the peacetime nuclear alert level and the number of SSBNs at sea would be scaled 
down (Yost 1995, 21). France’s arsenal was originally deployed on a triad mirroring 
force structures in Russia and the United States.
3 In February 1996, President Chirac 
announced his intention to eliminate land-based missiles. France would concentrate on 
the modernization of its sea-based deterrent.  
 
Yet, the question of whether France should have nuclear weapons in the first place 
was not debated. The nuclear doctrine was “only slightly adapted” to the new security 
environment (Grand 1998c, 530). Dramatic changes did occur—not in the arsenal, but 
in France’s relation to the nonproliferation regime. In the last fifteen years France has 
reinvented itself as a ‘champion of disarmament’—a phrase that Chirac employed in 
February 1996 (Grand 1998a, 49). In 1991 France announced it would sign the NPT, 
and in the same year began applying full-scope safeguards to its exports (which were 
in practice more consequential than NPT adherence).
4  In 1992 France declared its 
support for an unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT (Yost 1995, 35). 
France is now a prominent advocate of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
and the Fissile Materials Control Treaty (FMCT). However, this acceptance of arms 
control is contingent on the retention of its arsenal.
5 Discussing the CTBT in 1994, 
                                                 
3 The Mirage 2000N is France’s nuclear-armable bomber. Its combat range is around 1450 kms. In 
2005, the French Navy and Air Force introduced the nuclear-capable Rafales. There are currently five 
French SSBNs— Le Vigilant was the last to be commissioned, in 2004. 
4 The accession to the NPT was ratified by the French Parliament in August 1992.  
5 France also became a member of two Nuclear Weapon Free Zones—the African NWFZ and the South 
Pacific NWFZ in 1996 and has expressed its readiness to sign the South East Asian NWFZ. It had 
already ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a NWFZ in Latin America.      
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Prime  Minister  Balladur  said  that  the  treaty  “must  not  in  any  way  envisage  the 
elimination of nuclear weapons or seek to undermine the status of the nuclear powers” 
(Jabko and Weber 1998, 145).  
 
Explanations for the French bomb (and its persistence) 
 
Here I briefly present the three major explanations for why France decided to acquire 
nuclear weapons. Although the question of its revised policy towards the regime has 
not figured prominently in the literature, I extrapolate from the logics of the three 
models to construct explanations of policy reversal. 
 
The security model attributes the French nuclear program to the failure of extended 
deterrence. After the launch of Sputnik in 1957 it became clear that the USSR could 
threaten  the  US  mainland  with  intercontinental  missiles,  and  that  France  could  no 
longer count on an American shield against Soviet threats. It has also been suggested 
that the American refusal to issue nuclear threats in support of French forces at Dien 
Bien Phu in 1954 contributed to the French government’s desire to acquire its own 
nuclear  capability  (Schrafstetter  and  Twigge  2004,  90).  The  joint  Anglo-American 
tests in 1962 contributed to a loss of faith in the US nuclear umbrella (Schrafstetter 
and Twigge 2004, 112). France required its own arsenal for security reasons. In this 
model, France’s 1990s embrace of nonproliferation stems from its recognition of new 
security threats, such as revelations of Iraq’s nuclear development and ‘loose nukes’ 
from the ex-USSR (Duval and Mongin 1993, 105).   
 
The domestic politics and norms models are in fact more conventional than security 
explanations in the literature on the French bomb (as for the British). It does seem      
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incredible that the USSR (assuming it had an interest in attacking France) could be 
deterred by the small French capability. According to the domestic politics model, 
France’s  powerful  atomic  enclave  pushed  for  the  acquisition  and  retention  of  the 
deterrent. French nuclear policy has indeed been made by a handful of political leaders 
and officials (Tertrais 1999, 4). Most major decisions are taken in the Defense Council 
chaired by the President, where the military has a very small role (Tertrais 1999, 5). 
The nodal agency is the Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA), the first of its 
kind in the world when it was set up in 1945. The CEA’s military branch is influential 
in policy-making (Muller 1990, 3).  
 
One should also note that the civil nuclear industry has considerable political clout in 
France. There is a high degree of circulation of elites between the CEA and private 
nuclear industry (Muller 1990, 8). Roughly 76% of France’s electricity is generated in 
58 nuclear plants (Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique 2002). France is also a major 
nuclear  exporter.  Since  1975,  45%  of  world  reactor  orders  have  gone  to  France 
(Muller 1990, 3). This puts France in a very different category from the other nuclear 
weapon  powers.  Any  international  constraints  would  have  commercial  as  well  as 
security ramifications. France’s determination to keep away from multilateral arms 
control  could  be  related  to  its  fear  of  compromising  its  commercial  interests.  The 
nuclear  industry  would  have  worried  about  the  effects  of  safeguards  on  nuclear 
exports,  as  well  as  the  potential  for  international  inspections  to  open  the  door  to 
industrial espionage.  
 
While I have not come across ‘domestic politics model’ accounts of change in French 
policy, one could reconstruct such an account, wherein payoffs such as promises of 
continued funding for domestic actors were offered to the nuclear estate in return for      
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their acceptance of certain international restrictions. One can also surmise that to the 
political leadership, the advantages of signing the NPT had begun to outweigh the 
domestic political costs of such restrictions.  
 
The supporters of the norms model point out that the nuclear program helped France 
to regain Great Power status externally and provided a national symbol to unite a 
broad spectrum of political ideologies internally (Heuser 2000; Kolodziej 1994, 168; 
Perkovich 1998, 16; Sagan 1996/97). One scholar writes:  
 
France found a formula to reconcile the country’s need for security, its 
demoted  position  internationally,  and  its  need  to  rehabilitate  a  self-
image of grandeur. Nuclear weapons were simultaneously a means to 
ensure that France could never again be occupied, and an expression of 
being  a  nation  of  the  first  rank...  The  national  declaration  of 
independence helped the country to overcome its debilitating internal 
divisions and undertake the modernization that de Gaulle also saw as 
the prerequisite to the nation’s future grandeur (Flynn 1995, 9).  
 
As per this model, France’s acceptance of the nonproliferation regime in the 1990s 
could be attributed to its changing national identity influenced by international norms.   
 
In response, supporters of the French arsenal insist that threat perceptions motivated 
the program. To better understand this seemingly unresolvable dispute, I examine the 
actual  role  that  nuclear  weapons  played  in  France’s  security  strategy.  In  the  next 
section I take up the following questions: how was the relatively small nuclear arsenal 
positioned so that France could reap the maximum benefits in security and prestige? 
How did these positions shape the French response to the post-Cold War world?  
 
‘La dissuasion’ and its elements 
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In  this  section  I  discuss  the  role  of  deterrence  in  the  French  security  discourse. 
Formulations of deterrence in the Cold War period, I show, facilitated the retention of 
the arsenal and the adoption of new roles. I end with an analysis of the 1994 White 
Paper that illustrates these themes.  
 
At the height of the Euromissile controversy, as European allies of the US debated 
whether to allow the deployment of intermediate-range missiles on their territories, in 
a speech to the German Bundestag, President Mitterand laid out a succint and forceful 
analysis of the centrality of nuclear deterrence to French (and European) security. He 
declared that the nuclear weapon—whether one applauds or deplores it—remains the 
sole guarantee of peace and of a balance of power. Peaceful co-existence, as evidenced 
in détente, the Helsinki accords and Ostpolitik, rested on this nuclear basis (Mitterand 
1989, 257).  
 
In deterrence we trust 
There  were  two  main  reasons  for  France’s  consistent  public  declarations  of  its 
commitment  to  deterrence.  Its  arsenal  was  relatively  tiny,  and  its  deterrent  effect 
depended entirely on the enemy’s perception that it would be, inevitably and solely, 
used to defend France. France in the 1960s had no invulnerable nuclear submarines 
and did not widely disperse its missiles. Neither did it have tactical nuclear weapons. 
Therefore  the  nuclear  arsenal’s  function  was  to  deter  a  first  strike  from  a  much 
stronger  opponent—deterrence  of  the  strong  by  the  weak  (dissuasion  du  faible  au 
fort). The accompanying deterrence rhetoric (declaration of intention) had to persuade 
a potential attacker that any weapons surviving a first strike would be turned on it with 
a vengeance. Expressions of fidelity to the arsenal were important also to ward off 
pressure  from  Atlantic  allies  bent  on  compromising  the  independence  of  French      
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forces. Therefore, French declarations of intention were essential complements to its 
limited capability.  
 
Deterrence  also  had  domestic  political  uses.  A  broad  pro-nuclear  consensus  was 
established in France in the late 1970s, replacing the substantial initial opposition to 
nuclear weapons. What did this consensus rest upon? “…[p]art of the answer is the 
success of consecutive French governments in describing their nuclear arsenal as a 
deterrent which will definitely work (i.e. deter aggression) and will therefore never be 
used” (Heuser 1998, 92). David Yost writes that France had the strongest consensus in 
favor of deterrence among NWS, and this was in great measure thanks to the absence 
of public discussion of actual use contingencies (Yost 1990, 493).
6 Thus by the 1970s, 
the Parti Socialiste which had been the political voice of the anti-nuclearists was no 
longer demanding disarmament, merely reductions in the arsenal (Heuser 1998, 95).  
 
New threats and new cuts 
At the end of the Cold War, French security intellectuals realized that the program 
would have to justify itself anew to the world and to the French people. The existence 
of the arsenal had to be justified in terms of new threats, although cuts in the size of 
the force were anticipated. Pascal Boniface wrote in 1999:  
 
Possession of a nuclear arsenal can no longer be justifiable, in the eyes 
of  others,  by  appeals  to  the  ‘grandeur’  of  France  or  the  need  to 
safeguard  the  country's  rank  in  the  international  hierarchy.  Such 
appeals are guaranteed to generate scorn and rejection. Only the appeal 
to security can have any meaning, provided it is complemented by an 
attitude of co-operation  and embedded in the discourse of a  general 
interest (Boniface).  
 
                                                 
6 This consensus is unusual in Europe (Delpech 2004, 132).      
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The 1992 draft military program law discussed the expanded range of threats (Yost 
1995, 30). The ‘loose nukes’ problem apparent at the collapse of the Soviet Union was 
cited as a cause for concern (Delpech 1998, 209). Other threats mentioned include the 
growing  capabilities  of  Algeria,  Libya,  Iran,  and  at  one  time,  Iraq.  The  need  to 
maintain a position of strength vis-à-vis the countries of the ‘South’ is frequently cited 
as a reason to keep the arsenal (Yost 1995, 69). Here ‘dissuasion du faible au fort’ has 
been neatly reversed—now it is the uncertainty stemming from the weak ‘South’ that 
strong French deterrence aims to counter. In recent years various French leaders have 
even gestured towards contributing to a European nuclear deterrent (Koster 2000). 
How was it possible for French deterrence to expand its scope so seamlessly? 
 
French  doctrine  has  always  held  that  it  is  uncertainty  that  underlies  successful 
deterrence (Beaufre 1985/1965, 73). The size of the French arsenal relative to other 
nuclear powers is less important. This is the theory of ‘proportional deterrence’ that 
Pierre Gallois disseminated in his famous work Balance of Terror (which Raymond 
Aron described as “the fragment of truth that Gallois stretches to absurdity” (Aron 
1965, 141)). General Ailleret’s tous azimuts doctrine, announced in 1967, posited that 




The concept of uncertainty reconciled the arsenal’s small size with its warning to all 
countries and made possible the deterrence of the strong by the weak. Consequently, 
in the 1990s, expanding the role of the deterrent while implementing budget cuts did 
                                                 
7 "Our independent force, intrinsically as powerful as possible, should also--since we cannot anticipate 
from which part of the world the threat to future generations will come--not be oriented only in one 
direction, that of the a priori enemy, but be capable of intervening everywhere, or as we say in our 
military jargon, at every point of the compass" (Ailleret 1967, 42).      
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not appear illogical. However, although the doctrine disregards size as a factor, most 
French experts today believe that the nuclear force has been cut down to the lowest 
possible level, that is, to a point below which reductions would render it non-viable 
(Delpech 2004, 141). 
 
In addition, the original broad definition of enemy in the tous azimuts formula, and the 
general refusal to name the USSR as the ‘deterree’ in the early years, facilitated the 
shift to other enemies in the discursive terrain of nuclear policy. Although the stated 
rationale  for  the  French  nuclear  arsenal  was  countering  the  USSR,  another  core 
function of the force de frappe was to challenge US predominance (Schrafstetter and 
Twigge 2004, 166).
8 “The deterrent force is not only made to deter an aggressor. It is 
also made to deter an abusive protector. That is the reason it has to be an all-azimuts 
one,” proclaimed de Gaulle somewhat elliptically (Tertrais 1998, 10, n.9). In a sense, 
the  French  deterrent  was  aimed  both  at  the  USSR  and  indirectly,  at  superpower 
hegemony.  Since  its  primary  function  was  to  protect  national  independence,  the 
disappearance of the Soviet threat did not render it irrelevant. Thus, in response to 
President  Yeltsin’s  announcement  that  Russian  missiles  would  no  longer  target 
France,  Mitterand  declared  that  the  French  deterrent  was  intended  to  safeguard 
France’s independence and was not directed against a particular country (Yost 1995, 
24).  Indeed,  Pierre  Joxe,  Defense  Minister  from  1991  to  1993,  suggested  that  the 
concept of tous azimuts was most meaningful in the post-Soviet era (Yost 1995, 25).
9 
 
Re-reading the White Paper 
                                                 
8 Khrushchev told the French that he believed that their atomic force was created to annoy the 
Americans (Heuser 1998, 120). 
9 The tous azimuts doctrine is essentially the same as current NWS doctrine—no specific targets, but 
aimed against all threats (Delpech 2004, 132).      
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The White Paper was commissioned by the Balladur government. It performed the 
functions of the Bottom-Up Review, the Roles and Missions Commission, and the 
Nuclear Posture Review in the U.S. (Tertrais 1999, 2).
10 This text refers to France as a 
country  with  global responsibilities (“un pays  à responsabilités mondiales”)  (Anon 
1994, 254).
11 Here it must be noted that in a 1991 poll by L’Express 72% of the 
respondents stated that France was a great power and just as many claimed that the 
nuclear arsenal facilitated this status (Gordon 1993, 185). The White Paper also warns 
that hasty disarmament would create new disequilibria (80), and that while the Cold 
War had ended, the nuclear age continues (96). It describes the Cold War period as 
one  of  ‘rationality’  (21)  whereas  the  post-Cold  War  era  is  one  of  uncertainty  and 
instability (13).  
 
The White Paper begins with the acknowledgement that for the first time in history 
France  faces  no  territorial  military  threat  (21).  This  is  a  time  where  France  could 
conceivably adopt a “fallback position”; but such a defense strategy resting on the 
“sanctuarisation”  of  the  national  territory  would  imply  a  renunciation  of  France’s 
“mission and role”. At the same time, if French defense were to be oriented only 
towards  global  peace-keeping,  it  would  become  dependent  on  NATO  guarantees, 
contrary to the principle of strategic autonomy (91).  
 
In this paragraph the foundation is laid for the military nuclear option as a reasonable 
middle path that will protect France’s global role as well as national independence. 
“The possession of an independent nuclear arsenal…will remain an essential means 
                                                 
10 In February 1996, based on the Livre Blanc recommendations, President Chirac put forward a major 
military reform which would be completed only in 2015. The main features were a reduction of civilian 
defense service, restructuring of the nuclear deterrent, development of military projection capabilities, 
and a focus on internal security (Mathieu 1996, 56). 
11 Further references to this text will have the page numbers in brackets.      
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for the strategic space for maneuver that France needs to defend its interests (93).”
12 
While  the  text  defines  ‘vital  interest’  in  terms  of  survival,  it  quickly  denies  the 
possibility of distinguishing between vital and strategic interests. In order for the state 
to retain liberty of action this boundary cannot be specified, it states frankly (49). We 
note  that  this  refusal  to  draw  boundaries  enables  the  slippage  of  the  arsenal’s 
meaning—from  guarantor  of  national  independence  to  a  capacity  that  allows  the 
country to assist allies and join a European defense entity (6). As Balladur reaffirms in 
his introduction to the White Paper, a nuclear deterrentthat is credible and constantly 
adapting to evolving threats, is a requirement for a defensive yet independent strategy.  
 
International nuclear norms and the French deterrent 
In earlier chapters, we have seen how Indian policy-makers employed the norms of the 
world nuclear order to maintain deterrence, even while openly defying them. Did the 
limited French deterrent also rest on similar practices? In this sub-section I analyze 
two  policies  that  apparently  illustrate  French  disregard  for  international  norms: 
France’s  refusal  to  sign  the  Partial  Test  Ban  Treaty  (PTBT)  and  the  Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and its deeply unpopular 1995-96 tests after it had 
moved into the nuclear mainstream. In both cases, I argue, although French actions did 
push against international norms, they also acknowledged the power of these norms. 
They were both intended to maintain the credibility of deterrence among the NWS, the 
cornerstone of the regime. Additionally, both policies were justified as upholding the 
spirit of the regime. 
 
                                                 
12 “La detention d’un armément nucleaire indépendent…demeurera un moyen essentiel pour la France 
de disposer de la marge de liberté dont elle a besoin pour défendre ses intérêts.”      
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France’s position on the PTBT is mirrored in India’s evaluation of the CTBT three 
decades later. De Gaulle made his refusal to sign the PTBT a symbol of France’s 
determination  to  stay  on  the  nuclear  path,  thereby  reinforcing  the  country’s 
commitment to deterrence. As he put it, it was easy for countries that could not make 
the bomb to accede to the treaty, just as it was easy for people to declare they had no 
intention of going to the moon. France, however, would be hindered in its program by 
signing. Since the treaty favored countries that had already acquired sufficient data 
from testing, it did not contribute to disarmament, he claimed (Yost 1995, 33).  
 
On the other hand, why did France refuse to sign the NPT a few years later? The 
NPT’s  definition  of  proliferation  did  not  disadvantage  France,  nor  was  its 
categorization of states into NWS and NNWS. Here the influence of an individual’s 
personality cannot be disregarded. De Gaulle had his reasons for refusing to sign, and 
these may have included a wish to mark out a distinctive national position and a desire 
to weaken the treaty. However, no political party dared take the risk of questioning 
Gaullist  dogma  for  two  decades  afterwards.  By  signing  the  NPT,  the  government 
would have greatly reduced the value of the deterrent to the nation as a symbol of 
independence,  thereby  focusing  attention  on  its  dubious  security  benefits.  Thus, 
revisiting the NPT decision would not only have been politically difficult for political 
parties, it would have weakened the ‘deterrent’ by bringing into the open a discussion 
of its true role and abilities.   
 
France’s nuclear tests have always been carried out in a defiant atmosphere. Its very 
first test in 1960 was condemned by  a UN General Assembly  (UNGA) resolution 
(with a two-thirds majority). The first four tests were conducted at a time of rising 
international concern about testing in the atmosphere (Yost 1995, 73). As these tests      
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were  conducted  in  Africa,  PTBT  negotiations  took  on  a  distinct  anticolonial  tinge 
(Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 122). France, for reasons discussed above, refused to 
sign the PTBT which banned above-ground nuclear testing. However, in 1966 tests 
were shifted to the Pacific (Thakur 1996, 467). Between 1966 and 1996 France carried 
out 192 underground tests in the region(Anon 2002d; Johnston 2005). 
 
France’s  final test series came at a time when the CTBT was being  negotiated in 
Geneva. Six tests were conducted between September 1995 and January 1996. The 
1990s  tests  again  angered  ex-colonies  in  the  South  Pacific  and  strengthened  the 
worldwide  view  that  they  were  anachronistic.  French  decision-makers  were  taken 
aback at the intensity of opposition to the test series.
13 Although the tests did not 
violate any international treaty they were seen as contrary to the spirit of the CTBT. 
The Chinese and French tests reinforced each other (Thakur 1996, 475). Many Asian 
governments were upset that the French tests had taken the pressure off China, and 
encouraged India and Pakistan to harden their stances on the CTBT (Thakur 1996, 
485).  
 
President Chirac claimed that this last test series was motivated solely by technical 
compulsions (Tertrais 1998, 31). However, by this point France had already carried 
out 204 tests. It had also entered into a deal with the US government to receive data 
from  computer  simulations  of  weapons  tests  carried  out  in  American  nuclear 
laboratories (Smith 1996). Clearly, domestic political factors played a role in this new 
test series:the tests could have been a concession to the technologists in the nuclear 
complex.  
 
                                                 
13 Author’s interview with Camille Grand, 16 July 2004, Paris.      
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However, Chirac’s justification of the tests is worth noting:  
 
This ambitious program of adaptation and modernization of our defense 
shows the will of France to continue to guarantee its ultimate security 
in any circumstances. Based on deterrence, the French nuclear strategy 
remains, ne variatur, a defensive one. Nevertheless any aggressor who 
would want to strike our vital interests must remain convinced of our 
capacity and resolution to preserve them (Grand 1998c, 534).  
 
The government had demonstrated that it would not compromise when survival was at 
stake, thus strengthening the deterrence strategy (Grand 1998a, 43; Tertrais 1998, 32).  
 
It is tempting to view the test series as a throwback to France’s adversarial stance 
towards the nuclear regime. In fact, testing was presented as a requisite for France to 
comply with the regime. The French Ambassador said in Geneva that the tests were 
necessary so France could “embark determinedly on a policy of using simulation in 
order to guarantee the safety and reliability of its weapons” (Johnson 1995). Other 
French strategists claimed that the French tests had triggered progress in the CTBT 
negotiations (Delpech 1995). Most significantly, the unprecedented negative global 
reaction demonstrated the strength of the unwritten norm against testing.  
 
France’s nuclear test sites were finally formally closed down in 1997 (Delpech 2004, 
136). France now strongly backs the FMCT. It closed down the Marcoule reprocessing 
plant  and  the  Pierrelatte  enrichment  facility  in  1998  (Delpech  2004,  135).  In  the 
future, some have suggested, missile testing may substitute for the testing of nuclear 
devices to maintain deterrence (Yost 1995, 73). By signing the NPT, an international 
treaty, the French government could signal to potential adversaries (possibly in the      
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Arab world) that it was serious about combating weapons of mass destruction without 
singling out a group of countries (Jabko and Weber 1998, 142). 
 
Constitutive norms and the French program 
 
France  was  not  particularly  disadvantaged  by  the  definition  and  categorization 
processes of the nonproliferation regime, yet felt alienated from the regime because it 
was dissatisfied with simply being one of five NWS. France’s leaders aspired to an 
identity that can be termed ‘NWS plus’, which would allow more space for maneuver. 
Consequently,  they  had  to  adhere  to  some  of  the  regime’s  strictures.  Regime 
requirements on the issue of nuclear exports were somewhat problematic for France, 
as illustrated in the history of Franco-Indian nuclear relations. There is also the issue 
of  the  influence  of  the  broader  norms  of  modernity  and  European  integration  on 
French policy. I will deal with these at the end of the section.  
 
France: de jure NWS by default 
The other victors of World War II did not view the French bomb with satisfaction. 
France was excluded from the international arms control talks in Washington DC in 
November 1945, mainly as a result of the Communist sympathies of French scientists 
like Frédéric Joliot-Curie, founder of the CEA (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 23). 
Later, France was sidelined in disarmament negotiations as a result of its political 
instability and economic weakness. Interestingly, France’s lack of progress towards a 
bomb helped deny it a place at the negotiating table (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 
209).  
 
According to one American writer, it was the advent of “nuclear upstarts” such as 
France  that  made  the  US  intensify  nonproliferation  efforts  (Williams  1969,  2).      
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Naturally, de Gaulle saw nonproliferation as a strategy of ‘les deux grands’—the two 
superpowers—intended to preserve their nuclear monopoly. De Gaulle’s successors 
found it hard to reverse his policy of staying out of multilateral arms control.
14 Once 
the  inevitability  of  the  French  bomb  had  sunk  in,  however,  the  big  powers  were 
willing to accommodate it in the nuclear club (as they did in the case of China). At the 
1962 Nassau conference President Kennedy indicated he was "willing to draw the line 
after France" (Trachtenberg 1999, 366).  
 
France thus reaped the benefits of NWS status, being defined as such by the NPT, sans 
legally binding responsibilities. Muller therefore terms it a ‘free rider’ with respect to 
the regime (Muller 1990, 3). This is not entirely accurate. France recognized that its 
default NWS identity depended on adherence to the regime. De Gaulle’s refusal to sign 
the NPT was accompanied by the declaration that France would adhere to the NPT’s 
provisions, and for the next two decades, France’s policies were implemented ‘as if’ it 
had signed that treaty (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 175). Similarly, since 1974 
France conducted all its tests underground, thereby adhering to the PTBT (a treaty that 
it  never  signed)  (Yost  1995,  33).  Over  the  years  other  countries  acknowledged 
France’s de facto adherence. Even NATO made its peace with the French deterrent. 
The  1974  NATO  Ottawa  Foreign  Ministers  declaration  formally  recognized  the 
contribution of French (and British) nuclear forces to alliance stability (Ullman 1989, 
8). 
 
                                                 
14 Author’s interview with George Bunn (11 May 2005, Palo Alto, CA), author’s interview with 
Camille Grand (16 July 2004, Paris).       
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France and nonproliferation  
France’s  oppositional  attitude  to  arms  control  agreements  was  a  reflection  of  its 
resolute independence in defense. However, as we have noted, France’s behavior was 
not inconsistent with the constitutive principles of the regime. The rest of this section 
shows  the  evolution  of  France’s  position  on  the  nonproliferation  regime.  France 
refused to sign the PTBT, the NPT, or the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). 
Its ‘empty chair’ at arms control negotiations served as a symbol of its resistance to 
superpower oligopoly. This fitted perfectly with France’s general style in world affairs 
which was described as the “diplomacy of discontent” (Harrison 1987).  
 
France was fond of throwing the goal of disarmament in the face of nonproliferation 
advocates. Although categorized as a NWS, France’s diplomacy therefore had more in 
common with that of the NNWS. French delegates in the 1950s and 1960s put forward 
disarmament proposals that far exceeded in scope those proposed by other nuclear 
states (Grand 1998b, 36). They argued that arms control was a method of maintaining 
superpower duopoly (Grand 1998a, 47). In 1983, speaking at the UNGA, Mitterand 
set forth three preconditions for participation in arms control talks: correction of the 
discrepancy  between  the  two  major  powers'  arsenals  and  those  of  the  others, 
multilateral  conventions  banning  chemical  and  biological  weapons,  and  an  end  to 
escalation  in  missiles,  anti-submarine  weapons,  and  anti-satellite  weapons  (Babu 
1992, 4). France remained pointedly indifferent to US-USSR arms negotiations, and 
often called on the superpowers to reduce their own arsenals before persuading other 
countries to do so (Duval and Mongin 1993, 101).  
 
However, at the 1995 NPT conference there was no trace of disarmament rhetoric in 
the French delegation’s texts. Like other Western countries, France eschewed it in      
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favor of the principles of realism (Grand and Richard 1996, 82). By this point, France, 
interested in consolidating its position within the NWS category, had recognized the 
disjuncture between its NWS status and its oppositional rhetoric.  
 
Until the 1990s France was perceived as considerably more lax than other NWS with 
regard to safeguards on nuclear transfers, although it is unclear that this was the case 
in practice (Yost 1995, 36-37).. The French also claimed that they did not insist on 
IAEA safeguards because they recognized, and were sympathetic to, the problems of 
developing nations. France is suspected of having contributed to programs in Iraq, 
Israel, South Africa, South Korea and Taiwan (Babu 1992, 12; Muller 1990, 9; Reiss 
1995, 190). It was observed that "defiance as a motivation was certainly not absent 
from a few of France's early export dealings" (Muller 1990, 2).  
 
Until the 1980s the issue of proliferation occasioned little concern, and leaders were 
fond of citing Gallois on the stabilizing consequences of proliferation (Heuser 1998, 
101). Raymond Aron also dismisses the dangers of proliferation (Aron 1965, 237). 
France did not even criticize the first Chinese test in 1964 (Schrafstetter and Twigge 
2004, 167). However, French leaders changed their stance, ostensibly as information 
about the diffusion of nuclear technology and differing attitudes to nuclear use became 
available. Apparently, France stopped helping countries like Iraq with their nuclear 
programs when it became clear that they were open to the actual use of weapons and 
did not share France's culture of deterrence (Morel 1995, 109). Chirac expressed the 
fear that new nuclear countries did not share the same rationality as the older ones 
(Chirac 1992, 90).  
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Changing international norms had also changed commercial incentives to abide by the 
nonproliferation regime. By the 1990s it had become important for countries serious 
about  business  in  the  civilian  nuclear  industry  to  follow  international  regulations. 
Trade opportunities outside the NPT regime had narrowed (Babu 1992, 14). Already 
in  1986  William  Walker  was  speculating  that,  in  order  to  enhance  its  global 
competitiveness, the French nuclear industry would put pressure on the government to 
accede to the NPT (Muller 1990, 13). At the 1987 UN Conference on the Peaceful 
Uses  of  Nuclear  Energy,  France  went  along  with  other  Western  countries  in 
demanding nonproliferation assurances in exchange for nuclear supplies—to the great 
disappointment of Argentina, Brazil and India (Muller 1990, 7). The cancellation of a 
reactor sale to Pakistan in 1990 illustrates the change in France’s attitude (Yost 1995, 
53). We must also take into account changes in the economics of the nuclear power 
industry that reduced incentives for staying out of regimes. Nuclear exports in general 
were depressed. Also, France realized that it was more lucrative to sell fuel cycle 
services performed in France than to export them (Jabko and Weber 1998, 143). 
 
In July 1991, the influential Institut Français de Relations Internationales (IFRI) and 
the  Fondation  pour  les  Etudes  de  Défense  Nationale  (FEDN)  jointly  organized  a 
symposium on the perils of proliferation. This was a significant and unprecedented 
step since these institutions had never addressed the issue of proliferation before this 
(Richard  1993,  83).  Another  revolution  in  policy,  a  national  plan  to  curb  sales  of 
conventional and WMD technology, was unveiled in June 1991, a week before France 
announced the decision to sign the NPT (Richard 1993, 84). In the mid-1990s, the 
Directorate of Strategic Affairs and Disarmament in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
created a subdirectorate of nonproliferation (Grand and Richard 1996, 65). 
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The story of Franco-India nuclear cooperation perfectly illustrates changing French 
attitudes and the international transmission of nuclear ideas. In 1951 the CEA and the 
Indian Atomic Energy Commission embarked on a historic joint project (ultimately 
abandoned for technical reasons) to develop a line of beryllium-moderated nuclear 
reactors  (Soubbaramayer  2002,  515).
15  The  CEA  sent  a  congratulatory  note  to  its 
Indian  counterpart  after  the  ‘Peaceful  Nuclear  Explosion’  in  May  1974, 
complimenting it on “the crossing of a new and difficult step towards the mastery of 
nuclear  techniques  (Findlay  1990,  207).
16  In  1976  Jacques  Chirac,  on  a  Prime 
Ministerial visit, made it clear that France would continue nuclear cooperation with 
India notwithstanding the furore over 1974. He reiterated that France would not sign 
the NPT because it was a discriminatory treaty, and called on the Great Powers to 
disarm to the level of other states as a precondition to universal disarmament. He also 
stated that the French bomb was necessary to maintain an independent defense (Anon 
1976).  
 
French nuclear policy was “followed with interest” in India, and French strategists 
even discerned a ‘Gaullist’ insistence on strategic autonomy in  Indian declarations 
(Racine  1998,  159,65).  Analyzing  the  1974  test  and  the  possible  acquisition  of  a 
military  capacity  by  India,  Pierre  Gallois  remained  sanguine  about  proliferation. 
India’s critics are confusing two very different things, he wrote, nuclear weapons for 
deterrence  and  for  coercion  (Gallois  1975,  296).  For  coercive  capability  against  a 
nuclear power a country needs a first-strike capable of destroying all the adversary's 
                                                 
15 France was the unsuccessful competitor of General Electric for the Tarapur project as well. In the 
1960s, Indian scientists visited the French nuclear complex at Saclay, although there was no formal 
transfer of nuclear know-how (Chengappa 2000, 85). 
16 André Giraud, the CEA Chairman in 1974, directed Bertrand Goldschmidt to draft this telegram. In 
Giraud’s view, the first draft was not sufficiently effusive, so a second draft was produced, and sent to 
India without the knowledge of the Quai d’Orsay (Reiss 1995, 327-28, n.65).      
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weapons  (Gallois  1975,  297).  While  the  Americans  and  Russians  had  such 
capabilities,  the  British,  French  and  Chinese  arsenals  were  designed  with  the  sole 
purpose of deterring an adversary. If India were to build weapons, it would also take 
the  passive,  non-bellicose  route  of  deterrence  (Gallois  1975,  300).
17  K. 
Subrahmanyam praised Gallois’ ideas about the size of the nuclear arsenal, as a viable, 
cheaper  alternative  to  US-centric  doctrines  based  on  the  strategic  triad 
(Subrahmanyam 1986a, 276-77). Gallois’ theory was even brought up in the Indian 
Parliament to buttress the argument that India should have its own nuclear capability.
18 
 
France  in  1998  did  react  with  more  sympathy  to  Pokhran-II  than  other  Western 
countries did (Anon 1998g; Anon 1998p; Mulye 1998). The influential scholar Bruno 
Tertrais wrote that it would be counterproductive to lecture India on the NPT and 
advocated  nuclear  cooperation  (Tertrais  2003,  52,  57).  Cabinet  Secretary  Brajesh 
Mishra’s June 1998 Paris visit was a big step in India’s rehabilitation in the post-
Pokhran II period. For all its understanding of India's compulsions, however, France 
was not about to break ranks with the other NWS. It informed India that given its 
commitments to the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) it could not 
export nuclear reactors to India (George 1998a). France’s 1991 decision to require 
full-scope  safeguards  on  nuclear  exports  had  already  forced  the  termination  of  its 
supply of uranium fuel to the Tarapur plant.   
 
Modernity and nuclear power 
The French nuclear program has often been viewed as a substitute for military victory 
and  colonial  possessions.  For  a  country  recovering  from  Nazi  occupation,  facing 
                                                 
17 Gallois’ statements about the need for India to have its own nuclear arms were noted and discussed in 
the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha Debates, 28 June 1971, col. 18)   
18 Lok Sabha Debates, 28 June 1971, col. 18.      
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economic crisis and political instability as well as the inevitable loss of empire, the 
advent  of  the  nuclear  program  provided  a  tangible  reminder  of  past  scientific 
achievement  and  a hope for future development.
19  In that sense,  France,  though  a 
‘colonizer’,  conforms  to  the  post-colonial  framework  laid  out  by  Itty  Abraham. 
Nuclear power became a symbol of the ‘radiance’ of France, as Gabrielle Hecht puts 
it. Hecht’s work shows that ideas of the ‘national interest’ justified particular forms of 
technological development, while technological prowess simultaneously defined the 
French nation. For instance, while national interest justified manufacturing weapons-
grade plutonium before the government had decided to build a bomb, that decision 
strengthened  the  idea  that  national  interest  warranted  extracting  plutonium  from 
reactors (Hecht 1998, 330-31).  
 
Just  as  Indians  re-reading  the  colonial  period  learned  to  value  technological 
superiority,  the  recently  liberated  French  were  re-assessing  their  past.  Mendes-
France’s “passion de la modernité” stemmed from memories of France’s technical 
unpreparedness in the 1930s (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 214). This Presidential 
passion  became  a  great  impetus  for  the  nuclear  program.  Hecht  also  mentions 
anxieties about keeping up with modern states (Hecht 1998, 44). Just as in India, the 
French  technical  intelligentsia  wished  to  distinguish  itself  from  power-hungry 
politicians. Under its guidance, policies were expected to emerge from rational rather 
than ideological choices (Hecht 1998, 35-36).
20 It is also worth noting that the CEA’s 
writ explicitly included “national defense” (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 22). This 
                                                 
19 Raoul Dutry, Minister for Reconstruction and Urbanism in the provisional post-WW II Government, 
was instrumental in touting the virtues of nuclear power and its possible uses in defense (Duval and 
Mongin 1993, 12).  
20 Interestingly, the proponents of large-scale technological systems in both countries placed them in 
direct historical lineage with past national achievements. While Nehru referred to dams as the temples 
of modern India, nuclear reactors were called the heirs of the Eiffel tower (Hecht 1998, 13).      
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was in keeping with the ‘étatisme’ of post-war France, with its ‘indicative’ central 
planning for private and state-owned enterprises. 
 
By  the  1990s,  nuclear  power  shone  less  brightly  as  a  symbol  of  technological 
achievement. Markets for French nuclear exports were depressed. Nuclear arsenals 
now contributed to national prestige in so far as they were pressed into the service of 
international stability; only rogues and proto-rogues followed steadfastly independent 
paths in nuclear affairs. France’s modernity was now best expressed by reinforcing the 
stabilizing role of nuclear weapons. Being a ‘champion of disarmament’ became an 
alternative way of exercising leadership. Critics of French nuclear policies have long 
been calling on the government to take a leading role in arms control initiatives—that 
it should be a leading role was never questioned (Heuser 1998, 103). Today, "the 
empty chair of the de Gaulle era has been replaced by...musical chairs, where the 
music never stops as French negotiators shuttle between different arms control and 
disarmament forums, some organized by the French themselves, to address an ever-
expanding agenda of security problems" (Kolodziej 1994, 189). 
 
Towards a European identity 
The question of Europe has been a crucial factor in nuclear policy. Guy Mollet, who 
succeeded Pierre Mendes-France as PM, was not convinced of the need to develop 
nuclear weapons (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 215). The socialist Mollet and the 
businessman  Jean  Monnet  became  allies  on  the  strength  of  their  distaste  for 
nationalism. This alliance implied that the defeat of the ‘European lobby’ on the issue 
of the European Defense Community facilitated the nuclear military program (Duval 
and Mongin 1993, 31; Hymans 2002, 147).  
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France  was  for  many  years  the  only  European  non-signatory  of  the  NPT.  French 
independence on nuclear policy gradually became a barrier to cementing relationships 
with European countries. This imposed its own security costs. French grand strategy 
aimed to bind traditional rivals Germany and Britain with European ties. European 
integration became the main multiplier of French power both in Europe and on the 
international stage (Bozo 1995, 218). In a Eurobarometer poll in March 1987, 72% of 
the French respondents saw European unity as a way of defending French national 
identity and interests (Feldblum 1999, 108).  
 
France’s  peculiar  nuclear  status,  however,  made  it  difficult  for  it  to  participate  in 
formulating  common  European  policies  on  nuclear  issues.  For  instance,  in  1985 
France would not allow the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) to 
attend  the  NPT  Review  Conference  as  an  observer.  The  European  Political 
Cooperation Group could not be used to form a common Western European position 
for that conference. In 1988 West Germany came up with a plan to get South Africa to 
accede to the NPT. Restrictions on nuclear supply contracts would be lifted, and in 
return, the European Community would block South Africa’s suspension from the 
IAEA. France’s unenthusiastic participation in these negotiations gave its partners the 
feeling that it resisted any kind of involvement with the NPT (Muller 1990, 10). On 
the eve of the 1992 NPT Review Conference the twelve countries of the European 
Union made a joint statement—this had the effect of associating France with a treaty 
that the country had not formally signed.  
 
France’s  refusal  to  formally  join  the  regime  became  not  only  incongruous  and 
inconvenient, but harmful. Its nuclear identity was in contradiction with its European 
identity.  Some  even  claim  that  the  embrace  of  the  NPT  was  not  motivated  by  a      
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recognition of the dangers of proliferation, rather, it was a political victory for the 
supporters of European integration (Morel 1995, 114). French analysts started arguing 
that France was ‘bound’ by its European ties to follow multilateral arms control rules 
(Petit 1994, 245). NPT adherence was also seen as helping France reinforce its identity 
as  a  permanent  member  of  the  UNSC  (Yost  1995,  59).  While  France  obtained 
permanent  membership  much  before  it  had  a  nuclear  capability,  the  intimate 
association between possession of military nuclear power and P-5 membership was 
obviously noted and internalized.  
 
France  is  noted  for  its  insistence  on  maintaining  an  independent  stance  in  world 
politics. Was this merely a vainglorious national vanity project for Charles de Gaulle 
and  his  successors?  Or  an  ingenious  strategy  by  a  beleaguered  nation  to  face  the 
Soviet threat? Or a brave attempt to cover up the country’s inadequacies and assure it 
a  place  at  the  high  table?  In  the  discussion  above  we  see  that  in  fact  the  three 
imperatives of security, domestic politics and norms are irretrivably tangled in France, 
as they were shown to be in the Indian case. An independent stance was necessary to 
convince the Soviets that adventurism would be surely punished. Thus France refused 
to sign any agreements that could bring about the impression that it was restricting 
itself.  Deterrence  was  also  predicated  on  a  domestic  consensus  which  moved  the 
nuclear issue out of the arena of contentious politics and elevated it to a national 
symbol. In the 1990s, new security imperatives ‘appeared’ that made it ‘natural’ for 
France to join the order it had once combated without damaging its national amour-
propre  or  inciting  political  criticism.  Again,  as  in  the  Indian  case,  French  policy 
towards the international nonproliferation regime both made use of its defining and 
categorizing powers, and was constrained by them. 
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Around  the  time  that  France  was  gradually  sloughing  off  its  opposition  to  the 
nonproliferation regime, South Africa made dramatic strides in its acceptance of that 
regime. In this part of the chapter I aim to show that although the case is often cited as 
an  example  of  the  importance  of  domestic  politics,  international  norms  played  a 
significant role in shaping South African nuclear renunciation. As in the case of India, 
South African security strategy in the Cold War period hinged on hovering over the 
nuclear  threshold.  Thus,  its  complex  relationship  with  the  nonproliferation  order 
played into its defense capabilities and into maintaining a certain domestic political 
order.  
 
South Africa was a rogue state before the term. Steve Chan and Richard Betts called it 
a ‘pariah’ in their discussions of nuclear proliferation in the 1970s (Betts 1977; Chan 
1980).  A  repressive  and  undemocratic  state  founded  on  racial  discrimination,  it 
unlawfully occupied contiguous territory (Namibia) and funded guerilla movements in 
other neighbors (Zimbabwe). It also sought out WMD.
21 I first briefly describe the 
progress of the South African military nuclear program, and its swift and puzzling 
dismantling.  
 
In  the  section  “Theories  of  nuclear  acquisition  and  rollback”,  I  present  the  major 
existing answers to this puzzle. In the security model, South Africa’s weapons are 
intended for ‘catalytic deterrence’, and are rendered unnecesary with the end of the 
Cold War. Explanations at the domestic level attribute the program to ideologies and 
bureaucratic interests in a South Africa isolated by apartheid. Here, it is not so much 
the end of the Cold War as the transfer of power to a black-majority government that 
                                                 
21 Project Coast, the CBW program, was initiated in the late 1970s. Within a few years the country had 
come frighteningly close to acquiring offensive capabilities, including genetically-engineered 
bioweapons targeting Africans.       
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brings  about  disarmament.  Can  these  explanations,  privileging  power  and  norms 
respectively, co-exist?  
 
In order to identify ways in which these explanations could complement each other, I 
look  for  questions  to  which  neither  provides  completely  satisfactory  answers—for 
instance, what was the role of nuclear weapons in apartheid South Africa’s defense 
strategy?  Why  did  the  new  South  African  government  give  up  the  nuclear 
infrastructure  without  discussion?  I  find  that  South  African  decision-makers,  both 
during  the  apartheid  era  and  afterwards,  based  their  policies  on  the  anticipated 
reactions of the international community. The very success of deterrence depended 
upon international nuclear norms; similarly, the renunciation of the nuclear option was 





Upon winning independence from the British, South Africa held its first election in 
1948. The National Party, dedicated to serving the interests of the Afrikaners, won that 
election. The cruel and pernicious system of apartheid was put into practice soon after. 
Black South Africans were forcefully relocated to ‘homelands’ (amounting to merely 
13% of the country’s land area, although they made up four-fifths of the population), 
and were removed from common voters’ rolls. The state resorted to increasing levels 
of brutality to keep this system in place. 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, South Africa emerged as a major supplier of  yellowcake 
uranium. As such, it was long suspected of harboring nuclear ambitions. The Atomic      
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Energy  Board  (AEB)  which  began  its  career  in  1948,  began  researching  Peaceful 
Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) in 1969, and by the mid-1970s the infrastructure for an 
explosion was in place.
22 In 1977 preparations for a nuclear test in the Kalahari desert 
were  discovered.  Bowing  to  external  pressure  from  both  superpowers,  the  Vorster 
government stopped short of testing (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 44). The first nuclear 
bomb  was  completed  in  1979,  a  year  after  indigenously  produced  high-enriched 
uranium (HEU) became available (de Villiers, Jardine, and Reiss 1993, 100). There is 
an unconfirmed suspicion that South Africa tested a weapon in 1979.
23 By the 1990s, 
scholars  believed  that  the  country  had  a  fairly  well-developed  military  nuclear 
capability  (although  the  declaration  that  six  actual  gun-type  devices  had  been 
manufactured came as a surprise).
24 The delivery vehicles would have been Canberra 
and  Buccaneer  aircraft  (and  possibly  Jericho  missiles  imported  from  Israel)  (Paul 
2000, 114). South African scientists and engineers were also working on a space-
launch vehicle, which could easily have been transformed into a multi-stage long-




In September 1985 President Botha reconfirmed the political directive to build seven 
nuclear devices (Stumpf 1996, 7). Exactly four years later, at a meeting with senior 
political aides, Botha’s successor F. W. de Klerk put forward his belief that it was 
                                                 
22 By 1977 the US government had reports from several analysts predicting that South Africa could 
conduct a test within four years at the latest (Reiss 1995, 186). 
23 A ‘double flash’ characteristic of a nuclear explosion was noted by a US Vela satellite over the South 
Pacific on September 22, 1977. It is alleged that Israel, and perhaps Taiwan, collaborated with South 
Africa on this test. A commission set up by the Carter administration later concluded that there was not 
enough evidence to confirm a test.   
24 Pauline Baker suggests that the constructive engagement of the 1980s would not have been possible if 
the world had known of the extent to which the nuclear weapons program had developed (Baker 2000, 
114).      
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imperative to end South Africa's isolation from the international community, and that 
this  would  require  the  dismantling  both  of  apartheid,  and  of  the  nuclear  weapons 
program. The first part of the new national strategy was implemented with dispatch. 
Within  a  few  months,  the  government  unbanned  the  African  National  Congress 
(ANC)—which  had  emerged  as  the  standard-bearer  of  the  opposition—and  the 
Communist Party. Nelson Mandela, the world’s most famous political prisoner, was 
freed from his Robbens Island prison in 1990. Four years later, Mandela became South 
Africa’s President at the head of a multi-racial coalition led by the ANC.   
 
The  dismantling  of  the  military  nuclear  infrastructure  also  proceeded  speedily,  if 
secretly, and was essentially complete by June 1991. South Africa formally acceded to 
the  NPT  in  1991.  Already  in  February  1990,  de  Klerk  had  ordered  the  physical 
destruction of the atomic infrastructure. In September 1991, nuclear facilities were 
opened up to international inspections, and two  years later the  IAEA  declared the 
program entirely dismantled. This announcement satisfied those who were unsure that 
NPT accession would defang the program (Pabian 1995, 1). However, it was only in 
March  1993  that  President  de  Klerk  formally  acknowledged  the  existence  of  the 
nuclear  program  in  a  speech  to  Parliament,  and  admitted  that  South  Africa  had 
manufactured six devices. Two months later, he also announced the termination of the 
space-launch vehicle project (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 133). 
 
The  regime  change  in  South  Africa  took  only  two  years  to  complete.  It  was  no 
ordinary event. Immanuel Wallerstein writes of the “...the miracle of South Africa, 
providing a glow of bright light in this dismal world scene. It is time out of joint. It is 
the 1960s triumph of national liberation movements all over again, and it occurred in 
the place everyone had always said had the worst situation and the most intractable”      
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(Wallerstein 1999, 29). Since this change was so radically transformative, it is easy 
(and  not  incorrect)  to  cite  it  as  the  force  behind  denuclearization.  I  will  show, 
however, that policy change was made possible and natural in view of South Africa’s 
relation to the international nonproliferation regime. 
 
 
Theories of nuclear acquisition and rollback 
 
The perceived lack of an ‘objective’ or ‘reasonable’ security threat means that the 
South African program is often cited by proponents of the domestic politics and norms 
models.  Purkitt  and  Burgess  write:  “The  remoteness  of  any  threat  to  its  survival 
demonstrates that the South African case is explained less by neorealism theory than 
any other case involving WMD, and points to other models, especially those that draw 
from  political  psychology  and  organizational  and  domestic  politics”  (Purkitt  and 
Burgess  2005,  209).  Norms’  explanations  point  to  the  effects  of  the  remarkable 
isolation  that  apartheid  South  Africa  faced.
25  They  also  trace  the  program  to  the 
cultural characteristics of the ruling elite. Richard Betts, one of the foremost analysts 




Security model explanations 
The South African nuclear bomb posed a puzzle for this model. It seemed illogical that 
a  country  with  no  peer  competitor  on  the  continent  would  risk  exacerbating  its 
isolation  from  the  international  community  with  a  bomb  program.  Scholars  like 
Benjamin Frankel, Peter Liberman, Mitchell Reiss, and Bradley Thayer characterize 
                                                 
25 By 1981 South Africa had formal diplomatic relations with only 15 states (Reiss 1995, 179). 
26 The term ‘laager’ means a defensive formation of wagons, and comes from the Afrikaners’ treks into 
South Africa. It is used to describe a defensive attitude towards the world.       
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South African security concerns as implausible (Frankel 1993; Liberman 2001; Reiss 
1995; Thayer 1998). In their search for a threat that only nuclear arms could deter, 
certain security model explanations seize on Soviet involvement in proxy wars in the 
neighborhood. In the 1970s, the USSR was giving military support to Angola both 
directly, and indirectly through Cuba. It was also supporting the Matabele in Rhodesia 
(now Zimbabwe) (Fischer 1993, 277). However, the idea that the USSR would be 
deterred by this relatively insignificant nuclear capability being somewhat incredible, 
security  model  accounts  also  claim  that  the  immediate  target  of  South  African 
deterrence was the Western bloc.  
 
South Africa’s nuclear strategy was thus similar to the Israeli ‘Samson Option’.
27 If 
South African leaders judged that their survival was endangered, they would demand 
that their allies in the West—the US and the UK in particular—come to their rescue, 
or else they would detonate a nuclear device. This explosion could be expected to spur 
an exodus of African countries from the NPT. Spurred by fears of a nuclear holocaust 
in  Africa  and  fearful  of  the  breaching  of  the  nuclear  taboo,  Western  governments 
would commit their troops and resources to the beleaguered South Africans. Howlett 
and Simpson characterize this use of nuclear weapons as "catalytic deterrence." The 
small size of the arsenal is thus explained, since the weapons were not meant to be 
employed in conflict, or even to survive a first strike (although admittedly size could 
have been a function of manufacturing constraints (Howlett and Simpson 1993, 158-
59)). Betts thus describes the South African nuclear weapon as a “diplomatic bomb” 
(Betts 1979).
28 
                                                 
27 Some suggest that US intervention in the 1973 Yom Kippur war on Israel’s side encouraged South 
Africans to believe in catalytic deterrence (Liberman 2001, 63). 
28 Interestingly, Pik Botha, the South African PM described the nuclear weapon as a “diplomatic 
weapon to defend South Africa” (Liberman 2001, 60). Other possible uses of the weapon listed by Betts 
were dissuading neighboring African states from harboring insurgents, compelling them to engage in      
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The credibility of this novel twist on deterrence remains doubtful. Firstly, it is hard to 
believe that the West would have allowed the Soviet Union to gain a foothold on the 
continent by invading South Africa (Fischer 1993, 279). South Africa was of immense 
strategic value in the Cold War. In fact, Walters described it as “an unofficial NATO 
proxy  state”  (Walters  1987,  142).  Secondly,  if  the  USSR  was  not  deterred  from 
invading  in  the  first  place  by  South  Africa’s  own  nuclear  capability,  would  it  be 
deterred by Western extended deterrence? That is, would the Soviets believe that the 
US and its allies would risk a nuclear exchange for South Africa’s sake? Further, it is 
not clear that Moscow planned to go further than lending opportunistic support to 
guerillas (Reiss 1995, 199). Finally, if Western countries were uninclined to intervene 
before the country was overrun, a nuclear demonstration violating international norms 
on the part of South Africa would reduce their incentive to face down the USSR.  
 
Security models do an even less satisfactory job of explaining nuclear rollback. Neil 
Joeck  writes  that  the  reversal  was  a  response  to  the  amelioration  of  the  security 
environment, but that the white-majority government’s reluctance to hand the atomic 
crown jewels over to the ANC was a contributing factor (Joeck 1998, 124-5). David 
Albright credits the easing of Cold War tensions, which made possible the American 
brokering of a comprehensive peace settlement in Southern Africa in the late 1980s, 
with putting to rest fears of a Communist onslaught. Yet on the next page, he states 
that the Marxist enemy had provided an “excuse” for the apartheid regime’s nuclear 
program (Albright 1998, 81-82).  
                                                                                                                                              
greater economic and diplomatic interaction with South Africa, thus reducing its isolation (Reiss 1995, 
193). These seem even more implausible.      
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Domestic level explanations 
Domestic  politics  explanations  focus  on  the  growth  of  a  powerful  atomic  enclave 
within this isolated nation. Nuclear reversal in South Africa appears to fit neatly into 
the  domestic  politics  model.  Explanations  for  reversal  cite  democratization  (the 
transfer  of  power  to  a  non-racial  government)  or  re-integration  into  the  global 
economy, or both (Liberman 2001, 45-86; Sagan 1996/97, 71; Solingen 1998, 159-
62).  Arguments  about  democratization  have  to  explain  both  why  the  de  Klerk 
government decided to give up the bomb, and why its successors acquiesced in that 
decision.  
 
Nuclear reversal in South Africa was an entirely top-down, elite-driven and secretive 
process. Since de Klerk in 1990 did not inform the general public or opposition leaders 
that he was dismantling the nuclear program, his intended audience must have been 
Western leaders. De Klerk wished to convey to them that scrapping the arsenal was 
only one in a complete reversal of national and international policies including the 
abolition  of  apartheid,  and  the  replacement  of  regional  destabilization  with 
cooperation (Fischer 1993, 281). It has been suggested that de Klerk was using nuclear 
renunciation  to  buy  insurance  from  Western  governments  against  the  explosive 
consequences of his revolutionary dismantling of apartheid (Cho 2004, 36). Western 
support for nuclear rollback was a power resource that he drew on in the negotiations 
on a new constitutional order (Liberman 2001, 81). Strategic decisions were “fueled 
by the overarching need of the National Party to reposition itself within a changing 
domestic political environment and maintain its dominant position in government” 
(Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 131). At a personal level, de Klerk “assured his role in      
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history” with these decisions (Purkitt, Burgess, and Liberman 2002, 126). In 1993 he 
was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace. 
 
The second important domestic factor is the ANC’s attitude towards nuclear weapons. 
The ANC’s ideological predisposition towards pacifism had two sources. First, anti-
apartheid  activists  familiar  with  the  regime’s  reliance  on  military  force  to  crush 
internal  dissent,  developed  an  alternative  human-centered  concept  of  security.
29 
Second, the global linkages of the anti-apartheid struggle were with peace groups, 
disarmament  campaigns  and  the  non-aligned  movement.  Expatriate  activists,  in 
particular Abdul Minty and Kader Asmal, were outspoken critics of WMD, forcibly 
bringing  the  apartheid  regime’s  nuclear  activities  to  the  attention  of  Western 
governments and publics in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s these activists became 
the  leading  lights  of  the  Military  Research  Group  established  to  formulate  ANC 
foreign and defense policy (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 184). As the party struggled to 
steer the country through turbulent times, these respected individuals played crucial 
roles. By 1994, the few ‘Africanists’ in the party who had put forward the case for the 
‘black bomb’ had been banished to the fringes (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 185).
30  
 
The Liberal strand of the domestic politics model focuses on the economic structure of 
the  ruling  elite.  The  nuclear  enclave  used  the  benefits  of  prestige  and  secrecy  to 
become powerful (Liberman 2001, 63). The South African military and the cabinet 
were not kept informed of developments in the nuclear program (Liberman 2001, 64-
65).  The  ‘securocrats’  as  they  came  to  be  called,  entrenched  themselves  in 
ARMSCOR, a state-owned corporation set up specifically to attain self-sufficiency in 
                                                 
29 In 1961 the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Chief Albert Luthuli, the ANC’s President-General. 
30 Ali Mazrui’s 1980 book The African Political Condition (London: Cambridge University Press) 
advocated a black African bomb.      
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military  equipment.  Positioning  themselves  against  the  international  regime,  they 
promised the politicians that they could deliver security. The date on which the UN 
imposed  mandatory  arms  sanctions  on  South  Africa  (November  4,  1977)  was 
celebrated as the birthday of the country’s military-industrial complex (Purkitt and 
Burgess 2005, 225).  
 
This  enclave  development  was  in  consonance  with  the  National  Party’s  economic 
policy.  The  party  represented  the  interests  of  old-school  Afrikaners  and  supported 
import-substituting  industrialization  (Liberman  2001,  71).  However,  the  party’s 
support base became more liberal and outward-oriented in the 1990s (Liberman 2001, 
82). A significant change in trade policy in 1989 allowed a new elite to come up. In 
the process of democratization, de Klerk was able to combat the dominance of the 
military and 'securocrats' in government (Albright 1998, 83).  
 
However, there is little or no actual evidence that liberalizing economic coalitions, 
democratic institutions, academics or opposition groups challenged the state’s nuclear 
decisions and provided the impetus for denuclearization (Long and Grillot 2000, 28). 
The  rejection  of  nuclear  weapons  in  fact  found  unlikely  support  in  the  staunchly 
nationalist  South  African  Defense  Forces  (who  saw  it  as  an  opportunity  for  cost-
cutting). De Klerk’s replacement of securocrats was not motivated by  the need to 
please a liberal constituency (Purkitt, Burgess, and Liberman 2002). Even Liberman 
admits that policy participants believe that the degree of statism/liberalism did not 
influence nuclear policy (Liberman 2001, 84).  
 
Explanations from the norms model are centred around the political ideologies of the 
Afrikaner nationalists and (by contrast) the pacific African elite. For reasons of space I      
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do not treat them here, except to point out that they make assumptions that need to be 
explained—why did the Afrikaner government in the last years of apartheid, under 
immense  international  pressure,  not  ‘circle  the  wagons’?  Why  was  nuclear 
renunciation  part  of  the  transfer  of  power?  What  accounts  for  the  anti-nuclear 
sentiment  of  the  ANC,  an  organization  which  refused  to  unconditionally  criticize 
violence against apartheid? These are all issues that I will take up below. 
  
Deterrence and security 
 
As detailed above, scholars find the security rationale for the South African bomb 
unconvincing. However, as Walters points out, such analyses do not take into account 
South African decision-makers’ own subjective assessments of the threats they faced 
(Walters 1987, 63). They felt encircled by black African states and faced a majority 
hostile  population  internally.  International  isolation  added  to  the  fear  factor  and 
impressed on South Africans the absolute necessity of self-help. Patrick Garrity points 
out that their security strategy was remarkably sophisticated and complex; of course, if 
leaders had paid this sort of attention to domestic reform, there would have been no 
need to face isolation (Garrity 1980, 29). In this section I take the security justification 
seriously—that  is,  I  assume  that  policy-makers  did  adopt  nuclear  deterrence  in 
response to threat perceptions. I ask how nuclear deterrence operated, and how its 
characteristics shaped nuclear reversal.  
 
South Africa’s unique deterrent 
South  African  defense  was  premised  on  the  existence  of  buffer  states.
31  The 
elimination  of  this  cordon  sanitaire  as  Guinea-Bissau,  Mozambique,  Angola  and 
                                                 
31 Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe have borders with 
South Africa. These ‘frontline states’ were accused of providing shelter to anti-apartheid fighters and to 
Communists.       
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Zimbabwe  became  independent  created  external  insecurity,  as  it  increased  the 
likelihood that South African territory would be encroached on gradually by African 
guerilla  forces  (Walters  1987,  12-14).  Internally,  instability  and  opposition  were 
triggered by the reprehensible practices of apartheid. The ‘total onslaught doctrine’, 
which guided military planning from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, envisaged a 
defense against joint invasion by the USSR, Cuba, and South Africa’s black-majority 
neighbors (Dunn 1991, 12).  
 
An important formulation of the security dilemma that South Africa faced is found in 
an  article  co-written  by  a  former  head  of  the  nuclear  program,  an  ANC  defense 
analyst,  and  an  American  scholar.  It  states  that  the  1978  decision  to  manufacture 
weapons can best be understood in terms of the country’s “international standing” at 
the  time—that  is,  isolation  (de  Villiers,  Jardine,  and  Reiss  1993,  101).  For  South 
Africa, the security problematique was not distinct from the moral opprobrium that it 
faced. Security rested ultimately on ensuring that the country had allies who would 
intervene in the worst-case scenario of invasion; however, internal repression turned 
international opinion against the state and reduced incentives for the West to come to 
its aid.  
 
Historically, South Africa had seen itself as part of the West. During the Cold War, 
elites employed the specter of communism to maintain this identity of interests. The 
country’s most valuable resource was the West’s perception of cultural commonality 
and strategic interest. This perception was somewhat tenuous even when apartheid 
had not yet become a liability, as Western countries came to realize that the Soviet 
Union was unlikely to engage in dangerous adventurism on the tip of the African 
continent. The 1955 Simonstown agreement  giving the  British Navy  access to the      
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Southern African coast featured disappointingly vague security commitments by the 
UK (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 33-34).  
 
South Africa then had to draw on another global norm to ensure its security—the need 
to contain nuclear proliferation. It adopted a three-step deterrent strategy based on a 
plausible nuclear capability, which is sometimes known as ‘catalytic deterrence.’ In 
the first phase—“strategic uncertainty” the government would neither acknowledge 
nor deny the existence of “nuclear capability”. If this ambiguous deterrence failed and 
the country was invaded, in Phase Two, the existence of a bomb would be secretly 
disclosed to certain Western governments. If even this implicit threat to use nuclear 




Operating catalytic deterrence 
How did this form of deterrence operate in practice? In order to be catalytic, it had to 
be ambiguous, as the intended targets were likely to punish South Africa for openly 
crossing  the  nuclear  threshold.  South  Africa  practised  the  same  methods  of 
maintaining ambiguous deterrence as India.  
 
Some practices that we can easily recognize:  
•  speaking with many voices 
•  affirming its determination to defend itself with all means 
•  assuring the world of its interest in maintaining stability  
•  periodically informing the world of its progress in nuclear technology 
                                                 
32 The next two stages, according to another source, were exploding a nuclear device over the Indian 
Ocean at a height of 1000 kms, and using nuclear weapons on the battlefield (Liberman 2001, 57).      
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•  expressing a fervent interest in the peaceful uses of nuclear power 
 
In February 1977 a South African official stated that “no rules [would] apply at all” if 
the country were attacked (Walters 1987, 1). In 1977, Minister for the Interior Mulder 
declared that his country would “use all means” at its disposal to defend itself. He 
added that it was true that South Africa had commissioned a pilot enrichment plant 
employing “very advanced technology” and reminded the world that it had “major 
uranium resources” (Forge and Myhra 1995). 
 
In December 1968 the South African Army Chief of Staff stated that both nuclear 
weapons  and  delivery  vehicles  were  on  the  nation’s  agenda  (Reiss  1995,  187). 
Speaking  to  Parliament  in  July  1970,  Prime  Minister  Vorster  announced  that  the 
country’s research and development program was “directed entirely towards peaceful 
purposes”. Officials then announced that the country had come up with a new, unique 
process of uranium enrichment, and that a pilot plant capable of an annual production 
of 50 kilograms of HEU would be set up to serve as a model for this process (Fischer 
1993, 273-74). Vorster noted that this plant would not be subject to IAEA safeguards, 
and while emphasizing peaceful aims, hinted that the country was not restricted to 
those aims (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 40). Reacting to the 1974 Pokhran explosion, 
A. J. A. Roux, then AEB Chairman, said that although government policy was to use 
enriched uranium for peaceful purposes, the new uranium enrichment process placed 
South Africa “in a position to make its own nuclear weapons” (Reiss 1995, 187). 
 
While the ‘catalytic’ function of the deterrence was never tested, there have been some 
claims as to the international advantages it secured. In 1988 under US auspices, a 
tripartite agreement was signed among South Africa, Cuba, and Angola, ending the      
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Angolan civil war. Did the nuclear deterrent get South Africa a better deal than it 
would  have  otherwise,  thus  strengthening  the  case  for  maintaining  the  arsenal? 
Various accounts answer in the affirmative (Hibbs 1993; Liberman 2001, 61; Purkitt 
and  Burgess  2005,  81).  During  negotiations,  satellite  surveillance  detected  the 
construction of a 100m long hangar at the Kalahari test site. The Foreign Minister at 
this time made a statement to the effect that his country could make a bomb if it 
wanted  to.  This  led  to  widespread  concern  in  the  world’s  capitals.  ARMSCOR 
officials claimed that the activity at the test site was designed to strengthen the South 
African  bargaining  position  (Howlett  and  Simpson  1993,  162).  Similarly,  there  is 
speculation that the August 1977 Kalahari affair (where apparently US and Soviet 
satellites detected preparations for the test of a nuclear device) was engineered by the 
South  African  government.
33  These  ‘preparations’  were  initiated  at  a  time  when  a 
mandatory arms embargo against South Africa was being debated at the UN. 
 
Deterrence and the nonproliferation regime 
‘Catalytic  deterrence’,  ironically,  rests  on  the  international  community’s  desire  to 
prevent  proliferation.  South  African  deterrence  depended  on  the  very  international 
norm it was cautiously violating. South Africa had to maintain a fine balance between 
establishing the credibility of its deterrent and respecting certain nuclear thresholds. 
Robert  Harkavy  predicted  in  1981  that  South  Africa  would  “continue  to  keep  the 
world  guessing  about  its  capabilities  in  order  to  provide  itself  with  the  maximum 
leverage in warding off further pressures about racial liberalization” (Harkavy 1981).  
 
                                                 
33 South African engineers had extensive experience with deep-level mining, so it is unclear why they 
would make the preparations above ground, permitting detection by satellites. It is also suggested that 
the country had not produced enough HEU for a test in 1977.       
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It is interesting to note that the formal argument put forward by South African leaders 
in rejecting the NPT was similar to the Indian and French critiques of the treaty. It 
included  criticism  of  the  lack  of  provisions  for  superpower  nuclear  disarmament, 
discrimination  against  NNWS,  and  the  absence  of  guarantees  on  PNEs  and 
international nuclear cooperation (Masiza and Landsberg 1996, 33; Reiss 1995, 188). 
International  inspections,  it  was  stated,  would  compromise  the  unique  uranium-
enrichment process (Liberman 2001, 51).  
 
Signing the NPT would have meant compromising deterrence. As in the Indian case, 
not signing the treaty was a way of signaling South Africa’s nuclear intentions. In the 
spring of 1981 an African-American lobby obtained a classified memo from to the US 
Secretary of State, which presented the South African case. Its main argument was that 
the South African nuclear deterrent was  aimed  at the USSR and signing the NPT 
would signal that the deterrent was ineffective (Walters 1987, 102-03). In 1976, in an 
interview to Newsweek, the South African PM declared that while his country was 
only interested in the peaceful applications of nuclear power, it had “the capability” to 
make nuclear weapons. He made it a point to remind the world that South Africa had 
not signed the NPT (Betts 1979, 92).  
 
South Africa, being the African country with the most developed nuclear capability, 
was accorded a permanent position on the Board of Governors of the IAEA at its 
inception. In fact South Africa was among the first countries to sign the IAEA treaty 
in 1957. In 1963 Ghana tried unsuccessfully to oust it from this position. In 1976, as a 
result of protracted campaigns by the recently decolonized countries in conjunction 
with the anti-apartheid movement, South Africa had to give up the right to automatic 
inclusion on the board (although it was not expelled from the IAEA). The nuclear      
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policies of the apartheid regime were deemed incompatible with “the objectives of the 
Agency to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health 
and prosperity throughout the world” (Department of Foreign Affairs 2001).  
 
Some scholars have claimed that such sanctions were a response to apartheid rather 
than  to  nuclear  activities  (Scheinman  1987,  211).  But  in  fact,  the  nonproliferation 
regime assessed countries’ nuclear programs based on their national identities, and in 
this case apartheid was integral to South African identity. Some evidence comes from 
the contrast with India. South African officials could not fail to note that while they 
were denied participation in the 1979 IAEA General Conference through a resolution 
that also urged them to sign the NPT, that Conference was held in India, which did not 
face this type of pressure after its PNE (Pabian 1995, 5; Stumpf 1996, 5). In fact, 
South African officials were surprised that the two superpowers went to great lengths 
to avert their 1977 test, considering the tepid reaction to India’s 1974 test, which they 
had observed closely (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 11; Reiss 1995, 9-10).
34 Events such 
as  this  made  South  Africa  painfully  aware  that  simply  signing  the  NPT  without 
making domestic changes would not lead to the lifting of sanctions on the nuclear 
program  (Liberman  2001,  50;  Stumpf  1996,  6).  Nor  would  giving  up  the  nuclear 
program mitigate sanctions if apartheid continued (Liberman 2001, 70).  
 
 
The constitutive role of international norms 
 
That  both  the  apartheid  regime  in  its  dying  days  and  the  new  ANC  government 
renounced the nuclear option indicates that international norms played an important 
                                                 
34 A month after the 1974 Pokhran explosion, the US signed an agreement on nuclear transfer with 
South Africa. It is no wonder the South Africans were not convinced of the strength of American 
commitment to nonproliferation (Cho 2004, 10-11).      
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role in their decisions. de Villiers et al. write that towards the end of the 1980s, “South 
Africa saw clearly that the nuclear deterrent was becoming superfluous” as the USSR 
collapsed and Cuban troops withdrew from Angola (de Villiers, Jardine, and Reiss 
1993, 102). The direct Soviet threat was eliminated and this was a crucial factor in 
giving up nuclear weapons. However, unlike in France, the arsenal did not swivel 
around to face new targets. The reason was that nuclear weapons had always been 
intended to trigger Western help in case of attack--but the attitude of the West changed 
in the late 1980s. In this section I explain how the apartheid government dealt with 
new attitudes, and how the ANC’s attitudes towards nuclear weapons were formed in 
an international context.  
 
Apartheid South Africa and the international community 
While rogue states are generally viewed as being ‘outside’ the scope of norms, no 
country escapes the influence of international social forces. Analysts have pointed out 
that South Africa’s elite drew on global norms such as national self-determination (for 
the White nation) and racist views of Africa for the very legitimacy of the state (Klotz 
1995, 170-71).  
 
The nuclear program itself was very much a product of international collaboration (Fig 
1999; Patnaik 1993; Rajamohan 1980; Reiss 1995, 182). Cooperation with Israel (a 
missiles-uranium swap) is well documented. The country also had links with Germany 
and France—an important market for South African uranium and a supplier of power 
technology (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 36).
35 US-South African nuclear cooperation 
began during World War II when South African uranium supplies were crucial. In 
                                                 
35 In the late 1980s there were also concerns in the US about possible nuclear cooperation between 
South Africa and Iran. See Secret Cable 11288, July 29 1987, “Nuclear News from South Africa”, 
National Security Archive Item SA02378.       
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1957 the US and South Africa signed an agreement on cooperation in the civilian uses 
of atomic power. South Africa was able to purchase a weapons-grade Oak Ridge-type 
experimental power reactor at a heavily subsidized price (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 
36). The US provided the research reactor SAFARI-1 (commissioned in 1965), trained 
scientists, and supplied the HEU fuel (Pabian 1995, 2).  
 
In  the  face  of  growing  pressure  from  other  countries—especially  post-colonial 
states—and  African-American  and  liberal  groups  at  home,  successive  US 
governments continued to support South Africa and tolerate its nuclear ambitions. The 
US  and  its  allies  justified  their  support  citing  the  strategic  imperatives  of  anti-
Communism. Clearly, the hegemon privileged  nonproliferation only in so far as it 
contributed to stability. Nuclear programs that did not cross the proliferation threshold 
with an explosion would be tolerated unless they threatened stability. In the late 1970s, 
partly  as  a  result  of  the  Indian  tests,  the  US  started  withdrawing  from  nuclear 
cooperation. South Africa then turned to Western Europe and to China (Fig 1999, 94). 
 
By maintaining a civilian atomic power program South Africa was able to justify its 
nuclear technology imports (Fig 1999, 89). The civilian program was also useful to 
dilute  international  pressure.  For  instance,  a  November  1977  UNSC  resolution 
declared that “all states shall refrain from any cooperation with South Africa in the 
manufacture and development of nuclear weapons.” However, since no state would 
admit to cooperation in weapons manufacture, this resolution was not very effective. 
A  month  earlier,  a  triple  Western  veto  had  killed  a  potentially  more  effective 
resolution,  introduced  by  African  states,  calling  on  states  to  refrain  from  any 
cooperation in the nuclear field (Minty 1994, 226). US officials continued to claim 
they were trying to convince South Africa to sign the NPT and that their influence had      
  235 
induced South Africa to adhere to NSG guidelines and resume negotiations with the 
IAEA on nuclear safeguards.
36  
 
South African officials modified their behavior in response to changing norms. They 
have stated that American programs like Plowshare inspired them to plan for PNEs. 
However,  by  the  late  1970s,  the  international  tide  of  opinion  was  turning  against 
PNEs. Recognizing this, the South African government ordered that plans for a PNE 
be kept secret (Stumpf 1996, 4). In 1984 South African officials pledged that they 
would  act  in  a  “manner  that  is  in line  with  the  spirit,  principles  and  goals  of  the 
Nuclear  Nonproliferation  Treaty  and  the  Nuclear  Suppliers  Group”  (Albright  and 
Hibbs 1993, 37). In this way they recognize the strengthened norm prohibiting nuclear 
transfers and simultaneously reaffirm South Africa’s pretensions to responsibility. 
 
Reconstructing South Africa’s identity: the apartheid government  
Revisiting his decisions on nuclear reversal, de Klerk wrote: "[…] I expected that the 
reform policies which I intended to introduce would help to end confrontation with our 
neighbors  in  southern  Africa  and  the  international  community.  Under  these 
circumstances, the retention of a nuclear capability made no sense." (de Klerk 1999, 
274). It is clear that the ending of apartheid was part of a larger identity reconstruction 
project that would ultimately ensure the security of the white South African rulers. In 
1977,  an  influential  paper  titled  “The  Deterrent  Strategy  of  Nuclear  Weapons” 
advocated an arsenal on the grounds that since the country was already an outcast, 
nuclear acquisition would not necessarily isolate it any further (Pabian 1995, 3). Yet 
                                                 
36 Memo from Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State, to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
April 17 1985, National Security Archive Item SA01795.       
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by the late 1980s, de Klerk was estimating that if his country was no longer a pariah it 
could depend on allies against future threats (Liberman 2001, 76).  
 
The process by which rehabilitated ‘rogues’ regain good standing makes visible the 
power of international norms.
37 Nuclear renunciation was one of the strategies South 
Africa employed to ‘come back in from the cold.’ South Africa knew it was important 
to escape the fate of being placed in the ‘rogue state’ category. Unlike India, which 
accomplished the task by declaring NWS status, South Africa chose to slide gradually 
out of the category of states that had potential, formally undeclared nuclear programs. 
In 1991 the government did not reveal that it had manufactured six devices (this was 
announced in April 1993 by de Klerk). In 1991, South Africa was afraid that it would 
face the same fate as Iraq (although South Africa had violated no treaties) (Stumpf 
1996, 7).  
 
The government perceived increasing hostility to nuclear weapons in the international 
community (Albright 1998, 83). Starting in the mid-1980s South African diplomacy 
aimed to project an image of a flexible government dismantling apartheid and at peace 
with  its  neighbors  (Makinda  1992,  174).  Sanctions  during  the  apartheid  era  had 
created a sense that South Africa was out of step with the world. Kate Manzo points 
out  the  significance  of  the  term  used  by  Afrikaner  elites  to  describe  de  Klerk’s 
policies—‘normalization’  (Manzo  1992,  23).  The  de  Klerk  regime’s  goal  was  to 
became  more  acceptable  to  the  West,  not  merely  because  of  the  need  for  foreign 
                                                 
37 Although they may retain their legal identities, such states are, in a sense, learning the rules of the 
system. This moment is analogous to a ‘breaching experiment’ in social psychology, which reveals 
deep, commonly held understandings.       
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Waldo Stumpf’s recollection of the fateful 1989 meeting with de Klerk, when the 
Prime  Minister  announced  the  policy  of  nuclear  reversal  is  instructive  for  its 
juxtaposition of choices. According to Stumpf, de Klerk said: “I have one vision in my 
term of office. I want to make this country once again a respected member of the 
international community, and we’ll have to turn around the politics, and we’ll have to 
terminate  this  program,  turn  it  around  and  accede  to  the  Nuclear  Nonproliferation 
Treaty” (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 124). 
 
The ANC’s nuclear policy: fitting in with the international community 
The pacific tradition is an important reason for the victory of the anti-nuclear activists 
in South Africa. However, it is important to note that this tradition was nourished over 
the years in a global context where the apartheid regime was intimately identified with 
militarism and immoral alliances with NWS (the UK and the US), while the ANC 
strove to expose that project.  
 
Material factors undoubtedly bolstered the new South Africa’s nuclear policy. In the 
1990s,  it  initiated  a  neoliberal  economic  strategy—Growth  Employment  and 
Redistribution (GEAR). Key economic actors were the old white business interests, 
the  black  bourgeoisie  and  the  ANC’s  policy-makers  (Taylor  2001,  4).  They  did 
perceive  and  receive  benefits  from  nuclear  renunciation.  One  of  South  Africa's 
conditions for joining the NPT was the lifting of the embargo on its uranium exports 
                                                 
38 Klotz quotes de Klerk as justifying reforms by characterizing apartheid as “evidently unjust, in 
conflict with the Christian values to which we profess to aspire, contrary to internationally acceptable 
norms, and a certain recipe for revolt, revolution and civil war” (Klotz 1995, 157, emphasis Klotz's).      
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(Goldblat and Lomas 1989, 20). Yet these actors are also aware of less tangible, long-
term benefits. One scholar writes that in transitional South Africa, “…the industry and 
the scientific community [saw] that renewing international ties requires eliminating 
proliferation concerns, leading them to dissolve their alliance with nuclear weapons” 
(Flank 1994, 276). Both South African politicians and businesspeople were only too 
aware of the need to consolidate a positive identity and maintain their status at the 
national and global levels (Stanley 2001, 185). 
 
There was hardly any domestic opposition to nuclear renunciation because the arsenal 
had become tainted by its role in protecting repressive Afrikaner rule. The ANC had 
good  reasons  to  demand  that  the  nuclear  program  be  handed  over  to  the  new 
government. Building on the existing infrastructure, South Africa could develop its 
uranium exports and civilian nuclear technology. Already in 1993, officials from the 
old  regime  had  expressed  fears  that  an  ANC  government  would  sell  nuclear 
technology  to  countries  like  Iran  or  Libya,  or  even  to  the  Palestine  Liberation 
Organization in consideration of their past support, but the ANC dismissed this as 
nonsense (Albright and Hibbs 1993, 38; de Villiers, Jardine, and Reiss 1993, 106). In 
fact, in 1992 the ANC (which was at that point putting together a multiparty national 
government) demanded that the former rulers come clean about the nuclear program, a 
demand that was partly responsible for the April 1993 de Klerk confession (Howlett 
and Simpson 1993, 163).  
 
Drawing on the moral capital of the successful anti-apartheid struggle, as personified 
by Nelson Mandela, the new South Africa chose to fit in with the international order. 
Overcoming the earlier externally-imposed identity of rogue state, it began working 
towards securing a new identity. Among these roles are ‘symbol of hope for Africa’      
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and ‘rising middle power in international affairs.’ At the 1998 Durban NAM summit 
South Africa presented, to a surprised audience, the virtues of economic globalization 
(Taylor 2001, 145).  
 
The Draft White Paper on Defense (1995) begins by declaring that the country was no 
longer at war with its own people and with neighbors:  
 
After  two  and  a  half  decades  of  isolation,  South  Africa  has  been 
welcomed back into the international community and has joined a host 
of important regional and international bodies. The country's foreign 
relations have been transformed from an adversarial mode to bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation… A fundamentally different approach is 
required  in  a  democracy  and  the  prevailing  South  African  situation. 
Security policy is no longer a predominantly military problem but has 
been  broadened  to  incorporate  political,  economic,  social  and 
environmental matters… South Africa is committed to the international 
cause of arms control and disarmament. It shall participate in, and seek 
to  strengthen,  international  and  regional  efforts  to  contain  the 
proliferation of small arms, conventional armaments and weapons of 
mass destruction” (Ministry of Defence 1995). 
 
The ANC’s foreign policy was based on strengthening economic ties with Southern 
African countries, and possessing nuclear weapons was seen as incompatible with this 
strategy (Beri 1998, 90; Mandela 1993). Signing the NPT could be a way to offer 
reassurance to potential partners. This signaling function of treaty accession has been 
observed in other cases (Sasikumar and Way 2005). New alliances constrained South 
Africa in multiple ways. Joining the community  of African states and assuming a 
leadership role implied that the new South African government had to work towards 
the goals of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). While this organization was 
focused on economic cooperation in the region, its security agenda gave pride of place 
to peacekeeping and to the creation of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Africa. The      
  240 
OAU’s demand for an African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (ANWFZ) dates back to, 
and was aimed at, the South African nuclear program (Dunn 1991, 12). 
39 
 
Mandela’s  foreign  policy  manifesto  stated  that  his  government  would  implement 
policies “necessary to take South Africa into the new world order as a responsible 
global citizen” (Mandela 1993, 86-87). It declared that South Africa would accede to 
the major arms control regimes (Mandela 1993, 89). The upholding of international 
agreements and conventions, especially in relation to WMD, is fundamental to South 
Africa's achievement of respected international status (Gutteridge 1997, 3). 
 
Like India in the 1950s, South Africa attempted to gain influence by taking up the 
cause of disarmament. South Africa consciously chose the role of “bridge-builder” in 
the nuclear regime (Stumpf 1996, 7). It entered into new alliances with other ‘middle 
powers’, joining Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and Sweden in a New 
Agenda Coalition on the nuclear issue. This group issued some statements linking 
nonproliferation and disarmament (Anon 2004c). On the whole, though, they represent 
moderate NNWS, calling for incremental progress in arms control. 
 
South Africa’s new role as mediator was most dramatically demonstrated at the 1995 
NPT Review Conference. Many non-aligned nations were taken by surprise at the 
sight of South Africa advocating indefinite extension rather than a rolling extension. 
At the Plenary session, Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo declared that his country would 
support an indefinite extension without any conditions. The official justification was 
that since the NPT is the only legal instrument to bind NWS and promote cooperation 
                                                 
39 South Africa had made its signing of the NPT conditional on the accession of Zambia, Tanzania and 
Mozambique, and this demand was satisfied in the late 1980s.      
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in nuclear technology, it was not worth endangering by linking extension to other 
treaties  or  commitments  (Masiza  and  Landsberg  1996,  23).  The  South  African 
delegation  presented  a  paper  of  23  principles  for  nuclear  nonproliferation  and 
disarmament which would serve as  yardsticks to judge whether states-parties were 
keeping to their commitments; it avoided the term ‘conditions’. This document was 
widely considered to be a watered-down version of NNWS demands on NWS (Liebert 
1995). Mandela’s personal appeals to support indefinite extension helped to ensure 
that there was no recorded vote on the issue (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 122).  
 
It  is  widely  believed  that  South  Africa’s  identity  among  developing  countries, 
stemming from its leadership of Africa and the moral standing of its leaders, as well as 
from  its  recent  renunciation  of  nuclear  weapons  facilitated  extension.  However, 
Masiza and Landsberg find no evidence for the claim (or accusation) that the South 
African delegation ‘secured’ the indefinite extension, noting that the non-aligned bloc 
did not have a common position at the start of the conference (Masiza and Landsberg 
1996, 26, 29). 
 
South Africa’s government has committed itself to a policy of nonproliferation and 
arms  control  which  covers  all  WMD  and  extends  to  conventional  weapons 
proliferation. A primary goal of this policy is to reinforce and promote South Africa as 
a responsible producer, possessor and trader of advanced technologies in the nuclear, 
biological,  chemical  and  conventional  arms  fields  (Department  of  Foreign  Affairs 
1996).  In  1993,  an  “Act  on  the  Control  of  Nonproliferation  of  Weapons  of  Mass 
Destruction” was passed. In the same  year a new Nuclear Energy Act was passed 
which incorporates into domestic law the obligations entailed by accession to the NPT 
and the signing of an IAEA safeguards agreement (Stumpf 1996, 7).       
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Comparing France, India and South Africa 
 
As stated in the introduction to the chapter, France and India can be considered as 
‘most different cases’ (in terms of intensity of security threat and national politics) 
with a similar outcome (reaffirmation of nuclear status). South Africa and India are 
similar in many ways, but chose two different nuclear paths in the 1990s. However, 
the great number of differences in domestic politics and international status mean that 
neither of these cases is amenable to controlled comparison with India according to the 
Millian  logic  of  elimination.  These  two  mini-case  studies  have  been  included  for 
purposes of theory-testing and extension, to demonstrate the effect of the independent 
variable—international norms—on two cases besides India. My objective is to identify 
the conditions under which different patterns of nuclear policy occur, that is to arrive 
at conditional generalizations rather than frequency distributions. In this final section I 
draw out explicit comparisons between the cases treated in this chapter and the Indian 
case. 
 
India and France  
Both India and France experienced definitional pressure to clarify their identities in 
the  post-Cold  War  world.  France’s  entry  into  the  NWS  category  was,  however,  a 
much smoother process than India’s attempt since it was already defined as a NWS by 
the NPT irrespective of its accession to the treaty. A set of formal signatures was all 
that was needed. There was no major domestic opposition, nor was the international 
system startled by this development. However, it is worth underlining that both India 
and France desired membership in the same NWS category. 
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We find that in France, as in India, there are no stark lines between development and 
security. Some of the ‘postcolonial’ attributes of Indian nuclear policy are observed in 
France’s stance. This leads me to hypothesize that in the nuclear field the race to 
‘catch up’ is not restricted to former colonies. We also find that although India and 
France are very different in terms of general political culture, they are characterized by 
the  same  sort  of  nuclear-political  culture.  There  is  a  small  enclave  of  technocrats 
formulating policy and a few interested politicians. The coming to power in the 1990s 
of  a  new  generation  of  analysts  who  found  the  old  anti-hegemonic  rhetoric 
anachronistic must have been an important factor in change in nonproliferation policy 
in both France and India. The need to maintain independence in nuclear policy has 
been shown in the previous chapters to be a hallmark of Indian diplomacy. Similarly, 
France eschewed rewards from formal NPT membership for a long time for fear of its 
effect on domestic politics. 
 
India and South Africa 
Regime  change  has  been  shown  to  be  neither  necessary  nor  sufficient  for  nuclear 
renunciation. However, in South Africa, the end of apartheid was the context in which 
nuclear capability was given up. Thus, the key question for this analysis is: why did 
regime change in South Africa lead to a decision to reject nuclear capability?  
 
Taken to its extreme in apartheid-era South Africa, a holistic conception of security 
produced  three  fusions:  of  peace  with  war,  of  threats  to  territorial  integrity  with 
internal threats to the established order; and of the military’s defense and national 
security roles, so that the maintenance of the existing government became part of the 
military’s  mandate  (Johnston  1991,  152).  As  in  India  and  France,  nuclear  power 
became a polyvalent symbol intertwined with the political, diplomatic and economic      
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aspects of security. In the 1990s South Africa also experienced the pressure to define 
its nuclear identity. Unlike  India, which accomplished the task by declaring NWS 
status, South Africa chose to slide gradually out of the category of states that had 
potential, formally undeclared nuclear programs.  
 
Both  India  and  South  Africa  are  leaders  in  their  regions  and  in  the  nonaligned 
movement, have developing economies and turbulent internal politics. How then do 
we account for their differing paths? The answer lies to some extent in the differences 
in security threats and internal politics in these countries. South Africa did not face 
nuclear-armed neighbors, unlike India. In the last days of the apartheid regime, the 
nuclear complex was scaled back and ANC leaders wanted to mark their ideological 
difference  from  their  predecessors  by  jettisoning  nuclear  ambitions.  However, 
acknowledging the role of security and domestic politics does not reduce the relevance 
of  international  norms  to  this  account.  Security  strategy  was  predicated  on  the 
powerful norm that states that gave up their nuclear weapons would not be targeted 
and that the international community had a special responsibility toward them. Again, 
both  sets  of  political  actors  (apartheid  leaders  and  the  ANC)  were  driven  not  by 
internal political ideology or ethical beliefs but by global norms. The former wagered 
on nuclear renunciation to make themselves more acceptable, the latter’s policy was 





Thérèse Delpech writes of the French deterrent that its political role overshadowed its 
military role (Delpech 2004, 131-32). In a sense, this is true of all nuclear arsenals. In 
this chapter I have tried to show that France and South Africa used nuclear weapons to 
assure their security by reinterpreting the concept of deterrence. The manner in which      
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deterrence was practised in these two countries accounts for the change (or lack of it) 
in the 1990s when the structure of the international system changed. I also show that 
international norms about nuclear weapons shaped both countries’ security perceptions 
and the balance of power among different elite factions. Thus, the international and the 
domestic cannot be separated, just as security and norms merge together in states’ 
nuclear decisions. 
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CHAPTER 6  
 
COMPARING NONPROLIFERATION AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 
 
Nuclear proliferation and terrorism are often identified as the most critical threats to 
international security, and states are cooperating extensively in combating them. In 
this chapter I present some preliminary hypotheses about the career of the counter-
terrorism  regime,  extrapolating  from  the  working  of  the  nuclear  nonproliferation 
regime over the last six decades. I suggest that international efforts against terrorism 
will follow a path similar to that of the nuclear nonproliferation regime: initially, there 
will be bitter struggles over definition and categorization; states will adopt parallel 
(and  sometimes  contradictory)  multilateral  and  unilateral  strategies  and  deploy  the 
regime’s  own  normative  resources  to  secure  membership  in  the  right  category; 
constitutive norms will shape the regime’s regulatory processes as well as domestic 
and external state behavior.  
 
In order to fully understand how the regime works we must observe developments 
both at the global and state levels. This chapter lays out the four main operations of the 
regime and presents illustrations from India’s counter-terrorism diplomacy of states’ 
responses to these. Currently, the dominant powers are trying to ‘identify’ terrorism as 
the pre-eminent threat to the sovereign state system and one that can be defeated only 
by inter-governmental cooperation. Opposing this effort is an idea expressed in the 
cliché: one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. Decision-makers in the 
world’s  capitals  are  calculating  the  implications  for  their  own  policies.  The 
conventional wisdom holds that weaker states have no choice but to follow the lead of 
the more powerful; they merely make virtue out of necessity by echoing the normative 
rhetoric.  My  study  of  India’s  evolving  position  on  international  efforts  against      
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terrorism  challenges  this  idea.  Indian  policy-makers  are  both  constrained  by  the 
international power structure, and transforming it by drawing on an under-rated source 
of power—international norms, thus blurring the lines between virtue and necessity.  
 
The chapter begins with a short introductory section where I explain the validity and 
utility of comparing the nonproliferation and counter-terrorism regimes. The second 
section deals with the effects of the regime on states with different domestic political 
systems. Section Three outlines the four basic mechanisms through which regimes 
affect state behavior—definition, categorization, institutionalization and enforcement. 
For each, I present illustrations from the Indian case. In Section Four, I illustrate the 
power of norms—how they are used instrumentally to bolster India’s role in counter-
terrorism, and how they in turn affect  India’s domestic politics. In the  concluding 
section  I  briefly  discuss  the  counter-terrorism  regime  in  the  context  of  other 
international regimes, with special attention to the implications of the close linkage in 
the discourse today between terrorism and nuclear weapons. 
 
Comparing the nonproliferation and counter-terrorism regimes 
 
Krasner’s canonical definition of a regime as: “principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” 
(Krasner  1983,  1).  Of  these,  principles  and  norms  are  more  fundamental  or 
‘constitutive’ than rules and procedures, and these constitutive powers have been the 
focus of my attention in the preceding chapters.  
 
Can we describe current efforts at the global level against terrorism in these terms? To 
put  it  differently,  is  there  an  international  regime  against  terrorism?  One  analyst      
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depicts cooperation among security institutions as weak, unstructured and unlikely to 
grow in the medium term (Tardy 2004, 121). I argue that a regime exists, although it is 
still evolving. We can identify the following principles: one, terrorism is a threat to all 
states,  regardless  of  ideology,  civilizational  identity  or  level  of  development;  two, 
terrorism  should  not  be  employed  as  a  weapon  of  statecraft;  three,  terrorism  is  a 
transnational threat and can be tackled only by cooperation among nations.  
 
  Table 6.1: Nonproliferation and counter-terrorism regimes compared 
 
  Nonproliferation  Counter-terrorism  
Principles  More is not better  Terrorism  threatens  all 
states 
Norms  NNWS  should  not  seek  nuclear 
weapons 
WMD  more  dangerous 
with terrorists 
Rules  International safeguards  Monitoring  of  money 
transfers 
Procedures  Review of NPT  Intelligence sharing 
 
 
Among the norms of this regime are the ideas that terrorists, having less to lose, are 
more likely than states to use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); that states can 
and  should  deter  and  punish  terrorists,  possibly  with  the  help  of  international 
organizations. The most debated norm is the claim that countries have the right and 
responsibility  to  intervene,  if  the  ‘host  country’  is  unable  or  unwilling  to  tackle 
terrorism. The rules of the counter-terrorism regime are slowly evolving. One notable 
success has been in the area of interdiction of terrorist financing. The procedures of      
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counter-terrorism  cooperation  are  in  fact  more  developed  than  the  foundational 
components  of  the  regime.  Quiet,  functional  cooperation  among  intelligence  and 
police bureaucracies has been ongoing. 
 
The nonproliferation regime consists of formal treaties (the NPT and IAEA safeguards 
agreements) and informal elements (declaratory statements regarding doctrine by state 
leaders).  Similarly,  the  counter-terrorism  regime  has  both  formal  and  informal 
components:  treaties  such  as  the  Convention  for  the  Suppression  of  Terrorist 
Financing (1999) and informal information exchanges among governments.  
 
Table 6.2: Nonproliferation and Counter-terrorism Regimes: Components 
 
  Nonproliferation   Counter-terrorism 
Treaties  NPT  Terrorist Financing 
Convention 
International institutions  IAEA  Interpol 
Intergovernmental 
cooperation 
NSG  Joint Working Groups 
Norm leader initiatives  Export controls  US State Dept ‘watch 
list’ 
 
Because of its military and economic strength the US has the role of ‘norm leader’ in 
the regime. Much of the literature addressing international cooperation on terrorism is 
a response to 9/11, and is focused on US policy. It is important not to confuse the 
international  regime  with  the  US-led  ‘war  on  terror.’  It  is  often  argued  that  the 
selective multilateral approach of the US in Iraq and elsewhere hinders the growth of      
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an  effective  international  regime  against  terrorism.  However,  I  have  defined 
international  norms  as  practices  that  are  generally  accepted  by  the  international 
community and justified in terms of principles. Therefore, I will look at American 
actions as part of the regime and study their impact on the regime. After all, even US 
strategy combines military intervention with more multilateral (but less visible) efforts 
such as promoting a comprehensive convention. As the 9/11 Commission Report said: 
“Practically  every  aspect  of  US  counterterrorism  strategy  relies  on  international 
cooperation”  (National  Commission  on  Terrorist  Attacks  Upon  the  United  States 
2004, 371). 
 
If we compare the reasonably robust and well-articulated nonproliferation regime of 
today  to  the  contemporary  counter-terrorism  regime,  the  latter  does  appear  feeble. 
However, there are many similarities between the latter and the early stage of the 
former.  First,  we  witness  similar  debates  over  the  definition  of  the  problem  and 
categorization of members. Second, we note a tug of war between multilateral and 
unilateral initiatives. Third, the role of the US as norm leader is prominent in both. 
Fourth,  in  both  cases  the  nature  of  the  threat  is  international.  Aware  that  nuclear 
research was an international endeavor in the 1930s and 1940s, the victorious powers 
of World War II tried to draw national boundaries tighter. But they soon realized the 
futility of their attempts and initiated multilateral efforts to control nuclear technology.  
 
There are of course important differences between the two regimes. First, the post-
Cold War, post-9/11 world has no obvious sharp ideological divide unlike the post-
World  War  II  world.  Thanks  to  technology  and  globalization  the  international 
community is far more cohesive today (yet more vulnerable to international terrorism). 
Second,  terrorism  is  extremely  difficult  to  detect  and  defuse,  especially  in      
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democracies.  Nuclear  technology,  by  contrast,  is  sophisticated  enough  that  it  can 
easily be brought under state control (although this assumption is being questioned by 
the revelations about the A. Q. Khan network). Third, enforcing a regime of nuclear 
nonproliferation does not have the same far-ranging implications for domestic politics 
as counter-terrorism, which affects the very relation between the nation-state and the 
citizen.  The  counter-terrorism  regime  is  at  a  formative  moment,  propitious  for 
revealing  the  operation  of  contending  forces.  This  is  an  opportunity  to  study  the 
operation  of  the  processes  I  have  identified  in  the  nonproliferation  regime  in  a 
different issue-area and time period.  
 
At the international-domestic intersection  
   
States feel the impact of the counter-terrorism regime in two ways. First, the regime 
obliges and permits them to make changes in their internal policies on civil rights, 
intelligence, financial flows and so on. Second, they are required to cooperate with 
other countries according to the regime’s principles. Thus the regime influences their 
foreign policies, not only on issues relating directly to terrorism (such as extradition) 
but also their alliances, membership of international organizations, and so on.   
 
In  order  to  closely  examine  the  effects  of  the  regime  on  national  policies,  I  have 
chosen the country that I have been studying for the last few years. As it strives to 
create a cohesive nation-state, India faces challenges—varying in intensity—based on 
regional, religious, linguistic, and/or class identities. We observe a three-tiered state 
response to these challenges: first, a political order based on liberal constitutionalism, 
state-backed secular nationalism and state-led social economic development; second, 
power-sharing in terms of group rights and devolution of authority; and as the last      
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resort—coercion and force (Bajpai 1997, 33). Here I restrict myself to the foreign 
policy dimension of India’s response to these challenges. 
 
Indian  diplomacy  has  shifted  from  opposing  even  a  definition  of  terrorism  by  the 
international  community,  to  authoring  the  draft  comprehensive  convention  against 
terrorism  that  the  UN  is  currently  debating.  The  conclusions  from  this  close 
examination of the Indian case should apply to other regimes and countries. India is 
not  alone  in  its  efforts  to  use  counter-terrorism  to  garner  rewards  from  the 
international  system.  The  Chinese  government  demanded  “reciprocity  and  mutual 
benefit” in counter-terrorism cooperation with the US (Suryanarayana 2002a). Putin 
used  counter-terrorism  rhetoric  to  justify  repression  in  Chechnya  (Lapidus  2002). 
President  Musharraf  of  Pakistan  sought  $700  million  in  American  aid  and 
consolidated his political position (Anon 2002e; Rajghatta 2002a). 
 
Faced with a similar threat from terrorism, countries choose different strategies that 
are determined by their distinctive conceptions of legitimate authority, internal power 
structure,  and  their  relations  to  the  international  sphere.  For  instance,  Germany’s 
strategy  is  high-technology  and  state-centered,  whereas  Japan  chose  an  informal 
strategy  centered  on  police-society  networks  (Katzenstein  1993).  Naturally,  states’ 
participation in international cooperation against terrorism will also depend on their 
domestic politics. History, domestic forces and geopolitical considerations make the 
European  response  to  the  terrorist  threat  significantly  different  from  the  North 
American (Delpech 2002).  
 
The  French  political  class  views  terrorism  as  a  permanent  and  inevitable  part  of 
national life. The attempt is to control and minimize it, an approach that differs greatly      
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from the American concept of a ‘war’ on terrorism (Shapiro and Suzan 2003, 89). A 
centralized state  and  greater tolerance  for police monitoring shape  French strategy 
(Shapiro and Suzan 2003, 88). France has one of the world's most comprehensive 
judicial arsenals against terrorism (Bigo 2002, 82). Counter-terrorist work is based on 
human  intelligence  and  a  strong  legal  and  political  framework.  Investigative 
magistracies, a uniquely French institution, are used to good effect. Effective inter-
agency,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  international,  cooperation  is  valued  (Gregory  2003, 
143). Police cooperation is considered the most crucial of all forms of international 
endeavor (Guillaume 1993, 133). Germany’s view, clearly influenced by its domestic 
strategy,  was  that  terrorism  should  be  countered  with  careful  police  work  and 
international legal proceedings (Katzenstein 2003). Terrorism was already a source of 
tension between US and Europe in the 1990s (von Hippel 2004, 106). The 9/11 attacks 
shone a bright light on these fissures. 
 
Yet, as countries try to establish their identities in an international regime, they are 
obliged to make changes in domestic politics. Norms such as democracy and human 
rights become ways to identify oneself as belonging to a particular category of states 
(Risse  and  Sikkink  1999,  9).  Consider  the  case  of  France.  Its  approach  was 
conditioned by its historically high degree of tolerance for political violence, as well 
as  a  Gaullist  determination  to  play  an  independent  role.  Resistance  to  political 
persecution fostered attitudes favorable to liberal political asylum (Chalk 1996, 118-
19). The French Left has traditionally opposed the extradition of political offenders, 
and one of the first acts of the Mitterand government was to stop the extradition of an 
ETA member to Spain (Lodge and Freestone 1982, 83). In January 1978, a suspect in 
the  1972  Munich  Olympics  attack  was  arrested  in  France  on  an  Interpol  warrant. 
Although  France  was  a  signatory  to  the  1977  European  Convention  for  the      
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Suppression  of  Terrorism,  he  was  released  by  a  French  court  instead  of  being 
extradited to Germany. Shortly afterwards, France signed a big Mirage aircraft deal 
with Egypt (Wilkinson 1978, 13). 
 
France’s  policy  of  negotiating  with  terrorists  complicated  its  relations  with  its 
neighbors. As France became enmeshed in the structures of European integration its 
commitment to a European identity necessitated acceptance of institutional rules. The 
requirements of the 1995 Schengen agreement easing border controls among several 
European states brought France closer to the mainstream, as did its membership in 
Europol, the support service for European law enforcement agencies, and Eurojust, 
which coordinates domestic judiciaries on criminal justice issues. In June 2002 the 
European  Arrest  Warrant  was  formalized  superceeding  extradition  procedures. 
Undoubtedly, as France increasingly became a target for Islamic terrorism, security 
considerations also forced a hard line on terrorism. 
 
Countries  that  could  be  accused  of  being  state  sponsors  of  terrorism  face  drastic 
consequences,  including  even  pre-emptive  invasion.  States  today  have  strong 
incentives to dissociate themselves from any associations with terrorist groups. The 
international  regime  is  establishing  the  principle  that  countries  have  obligations  to 
weed out terrorism domestically, and prevent the export of terrorism to other states. 
Such obligations put enormous pressure on multi-ethnic and weak states. In the former 
the delicate balance of power is upset by demands to bring terrorists to justice; the 
latter may not have the wherewithal to root out terrorist organizations. These effects 
are not mutually exclusive; Pakistan, for instance, is a weak multi-ethnic state. 
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The most dramatic illustration of the perversion of counter-terrorism norms to secure 
international support was seen in Macedonia. In March 2002 seven South Asians were 
gunned down by the Macedonian police, who later claimed that they had intended to 
bomb vital installations and Western embassies. Two years later, a new government in 
Skopje admitted that these were in fact illegal immigrants trying to cross into Greece. 
The shootings had been staged to show the world that the government was serious 
about participating in the war on terror: “It was a monstrous fabrication to get the 
attention  of  the  international  community”  (Anon  2004b).  The  Macedonian  Interior 
Minister  Ljube  Boshkovski,  who  was  facing  strong  opposition,  attempted  through 
these murders to establish the reputation of being tough on terrorism among Western 
governments (Alagjozovski 2002). 
 
Theoretical predictions for the counter-terrorism regime 
 
What sort of international activity should we expect to see in this formative moment in 
the regime? Realists point out that the structure of international politics has not been 
transformed  by  the  2001  attacks,  or  even  by  terrorism  as  a  phenomenon. 
Consequently, “although a mile wide, the anti-terrorist coalition is only an inch deep” 
(Waltz 2002, 353). Many believe that there can be no real allies in this ‘uncivil war’ 
(Marwah 1995, 363). Realists predict that counter-terrorism norms would serve as a 
cover for hegemonic US designs, and would be violated whenever convenient.  
 
Realists,  however,  would  expect  to  see  states  taking  advantage  of  the  hegemon’s 
changing  priorities.  In  the  mid-1980s,  Pakistan  took  the  separatist  movement  in 
Kashmir under the wing of its covert agency, Inter Services Intelligence. American 
funding for Islamic militants in Afghanistan was diverted to the cause of Kashmir.      
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Pakistan was among the opportunistic actors who used the overarching discourse of 
Communist  containment  discourse  to  paint  the  Taliban  and  associated  Kashmiri 
groups as freedom fighters and US allies. India, in turn, today uses the larger counter-
terrorism discourse to its advantage.  
 
In  a  Structural  Realist  perspective,  the  counter-terrorism  regime  emerges  from  the 
threat  perceptions  of  powerful  states;  a  country  such  as  India  can  only  attempt  to 
negotiate the best deal possible within the evolving framework. Statist Realists predict 
that foreign policy will strive to bring the force of international cooperation to bear on 
states’ domestic challenges. The mid-1980s saw a quantitative and qualitative change 
in the nature of India’s terrorism threat. Official figures in 2001 stated that in the past 
fifteen  years  61,000  civilians  and  8,500  security  personnel  were  killed  in  terrorist 
activity (Anon 2001c). Pakistan’s involvement in Kashmiri militancy remains India’s 
most  significant  terrorist  threat,  though  recent  events  indicate  foreign-supported 
militancy was responsible for violence all over the country.
1 As foreign actors became 
more active in internal violence, India changed its stance on terrorism.  
 
While both these approaches lead to plausible accounts of Indian policy, they ignore 
the potential for agency, just as they see regimes as constraining or regulative. India, 
relatively powerless, is only an object of international regimes. An examination of 
structure-agency interaction shows that while structure can constrain actors’ choices, 
actors  can  shape  structure.  In  fact  while  India’s  counter-terrorism  diplomacy  is 
                                                 
1 The government of India currently claims that nearly half the  militants in Kashmir  are Pakistani 
nationals.  Author’s  interview  with  Meera  Shankar,  14  May  2003,  New  Delhi.  India  also  accused 
Pakistan of fomenting Sikh militancy in Punjab in the 1980s. Pakistan blames India for supporting 
insurgencies  in  Sindh  and  other  provinces.  India  has  also  blamed  China  in  the  past  for  aiding 
secessionists in the Northeastern states of India, and Maoist groups in other states.       
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structured by regime norms, it simultaneously seizes an influential location at this 
formative moment in the regime’s evolution.  
 
Liberal Institutionalism would predict the use of international agreements to ‘bind’ 
powerful states. Currently, although  counter-terrorism is meagerly institutionalized, 
weaker  states  do  draw  on  normative  resources  to  achieve  similar  effects.  Liberal 
theories do not adequately take this into account. Moreover, they do not consider the 
domestic effects of the deployment of international norms. My account shows that 
while Indian elites use the intangible power of international norms invoked against 
terrorism, they become constrained by the normative forces they deploy. Domestic 
Politics explanations emphasize the importance  of varying domestic structures and 
ideologies. They predict that the same structural imperatives would be experienced 
and  responded  to  differently.  While  these  fine-grained  accounts  add  depth  to  our 
understanding  of  the  regime’s  functioning,  they  tend  to  ignore  the  gradual 
transformation of national identity in the crucible of the regime. This is a ‘blind spot’ 
that domestic politics models share with Systemic Constructivist accounts, which, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, separate and counterpose the state’s social identity (the state in 
relation to other units in the international system) from its “corporate identity” (the 
glue that holds the state together). This analysis studies the effects of regime norms on 
national identity.  
 
It extends Constructivist work in two other ways. First, it focuses on the strategic use 
of  norms.  Constructivists  are  concerned  with  showing  that  norms  are  not  simply 
instruments of the powerful. However, states do use norms in strategic ways. It is 
important to study such behavior which in fact testifies to the power of the norm. Even 
if  hypocrisy  is  the  homage  that  vice  pays  to  virtue,  we  can  only  identify  what      
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standards  of  virtue  by  observing  how  nations—hypocritical  or  not—portray 
themselves. Second, my work discusses how norms matter. While Constructivists seek 
to establish that norms matter as independent variables, their analyses lack empirical 
documentation of how agent properties are changed (Checkel 2001). My account is 
firmly focused on process. This implies also that I remain agnostic about the ‘real’ or 
‘deep’ causes of strategic change—which may well include variables from Realist and 
Liberal paradigms described above. That is, I do not deny the element of necessity but 
seek to study its implications. 
 
 
Regimes at work—four processes 
 
The  counter-terrorism  regime  defines  terrorism  and  categorizes  states  accordingly. 
These two constitutive processes create rights and responsibilities that are enforced by 
states and international institutions. Definition and categorization shape state behavior 
by setting up standards for appropriate, responsible and just behavior. They also shape 
the regulative processes of institutionalization and enforcement. While the account 
below of their evolution illustrates that they are contingent on power, it also shows 
that once certain norms have been established in the global public, they take on a life 
of  their  own  and  structure  the  actions  of  dominant  powers.  India,  a  relatively 
powerless state, strengthens this aspect of constitutive power by citing international 
norms in support of its actions.  
  
Definition 
In Chapter 2 I discussed debates over the definition of proliferation. The definition of 
terrorism is similarly revealing of power politics. A study in the 1980s found 109 
definitions  of  terrorism  (Schmid  1983).  Ajai  Sahni,  of  the  Institute  for  Conflict      
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Management  (India’s  foremost  thinktank  on  terrorism)  admits  that  terrorism  is  an 
inherently contested concept: “Every victim state has an interest in defining terrorism 
more widely, every state supporting terrorism wants a narrower definition.”
2 From a 
lawyer’s  perspective,  “terrorism  is  a  term  without  legal  significance...at  once  a 
shorthand  to  allude  to  a  variety  of  problems  with  some  common  elements,  and  a 
method of indicating community condemnation for the conduct concerned” (Higgins 
1997, 28). 
 
Following UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 3034, triggered by a spate of 
terrorist incidents, an Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism was created in 
1972. However, the Committee’s deliberations were hampered by a sharp division in 
approach  between  Western  countries  and  developing  nations.  The  former  favored 
practical cooperative efforts, while the latter stressed the importance of first defining 
terrorism such that it distinguished terrorists from freedom fighters. This second group 
also  reminded  the  international  community  that  the  root  causes  of  terrorism  (in 
poverty, colonial occupation, racism) had to be addressed (Perera 1997, 49; Reisman 
1999a, 23).
3 I will call these the ‘definitional’ and ‘root causes’ arguments. Only a 
year after the Ad Hoc Committee was set up, one scholar-diplomat described a sense 
of déjà vu as each delegation remained wedded to its position (Hoveyda 1977, 81). 
 
The 1972 Ad Hoc Committee’s mandate itself included not only “measures to prevent 
international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes 
                                                 
2 Author’s interview with Ajai Sahni, New Delhi, 11 April 2003. 
For a description of Pakistan’s attempts to use ‘definitional’ issues to mobilize international support on 
Kashmir see Ahmed Naeem Khan, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Gambit: Let UN Play Judge”, 
http://southasia.oneworld.net/article/view/72516/1 11 November 2003. 
3 The Annex to the Ad Hoc Committee’s Report features the demands of the Nonaligned Group of 14 of 
which India was a leading member. GAOR: 28
th Session, Supplement #28 (A/9028), United Nations, 
NY, 1973.      
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fundamental freedoms” but also a “study of the underlying causes which lie in misery, 
frustration, grievance and despair, and which causes some people to sacrifice human 
lives,  including  their  own,  in  an  attempt  to  affect  radical  changes.”  The  UNGA 
seemed to be at least as interested in understanding and rationalizing terrorism as in 
ending it (Luck 2004a, 98; Schoenberg 2003, 22). The 1979 Hostage Convention, for 
instance, included a clause stating that it did not apply to wars of self-determination 
(Schoenberg 2003, 40).  
 
During  this  period,  several  conventions  were  formulated  to  dealing  with  specific 
threats in what came to be known as the  ‘piecemeal approach.’
4 The ‘comprehensive 
approach’, on the other hand, became identified with endless ideological debate. It was 
favored by nonaligned and post-colonial countries, trying to safeguard the legitimacy 
of  self-determination  movements.  The  cases  of  Palestine  and  Namibia  were  of 
particular concern (Perera 1997, 10). In fact the Arab group pulled off a political feat 
by  linking  the  liberation  struggles  in  Southern  Africa  to  the  question  of  Palestine 
(Schoenberg 2003, 31). The Political Declaration at the Seventh Nonaligned Summit 
in New Delhi (1983) emphasizes that each case of terrorism is different (Misra 1987, 
47). The declaration suggests that it is impossible to define terrorism, and highlights 
the issue of ‘state’ terrorism. 
 
By the 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet alternative, the adoption of terrorist 
tactics by movements everywhere, and the increased vulnerability of societies, the tide 
                                                 
4 Some of these conventions are: the Convention on Offences and Certain Acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft (Tokyo, 1963); the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (The 
Hague, 1970); the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation (Montreal, 1971); the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, 1973; the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 
1979; the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Vienna,1980).       
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of world opinion had turned.
5 UNGA Resolution 44/29 of December 1989 exemplifies 
this conflict of norms. The phrase “not justifiable” and “criminal...whenever and by 
whoever committed” in the Resolution follows a perambulator clause that reiterates the 
right of self-determination. The implication of the order of these phrases was taken to 
mean that the right to self-determination, which continues to be an important part of 
UN policy, cannot justify acts of terror (Obote-Odora 1999).  Peterson’s study of the 
titles and the preambles of UNGA resolutions and declarations also records a shift in 
the early 1990s (Peterson 2004, 175-76). The 1991 UNGA resolution further defined 
freedom fighters as “those who struggle legitimately” against oppression (emphasis 
mine).  The  rate  of  ratification  of  multilateral  conventions  against  terrorism  also 
increased  significantly  (Peterson  2004,  181,  89).  The  1994  UNGA  Declaration  on 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism was the strongest expression of states’ 
determination to tackle terrorism, omitting references to liberation movements, state 
terrorism, or understanding for the offender (Reisman 1999a, 25).  
 
Thus, even before the 2001 attacks on the US, the world community had increasingly 
taken  a  hard  line  on  terrorism.  However,  UNSC  Resolution  1373  (UNSC  1373), 
passed soon after 9/11, completely rejected ideological justifications for terrorism. Its 
objective is to ensure that states cannot be used by terrorists as safe havens. Although 
UNSC 1373 does not explicitly define terrorism, it has definitional effects.
6 Terrorism 
                                                 
5 Resistance to this definition persists, including within the UN. For instance, see the storm over the 
Report on Human Rights and Terrorism by the UN Special Rapporteur (Koufa 1999). 
6 It has been suggested that UNSC 1373’s lack of a definition of terrorism was vital to its promulgation. 
However, in 2004, the UNSC quietly came close to defining terrorism in Resolution 1566 as follows: 
"criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily 
injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a 
group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the 
scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no 
circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, 
religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to      
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is described as non-political, in that it targets all members of the state system—like the 
pirate, the terrorist is the enemy of all mankind (hostis humanis generis). This is a 
direct refutation of ‘one man’s terrorist…’ logic.  
 
Such  a  definition  empty  of  all  references  to  ideology  provides  a  lowest  common 
denominator  for  agreement  among  states.  In  political  terms,  it  has  the  effect  of 
polarizing attitudes towards a host of movements—from secular self-determination 
struggles, to indigenous rights movements, to religious militancy; and delegitimizes all 
of them once they resort to violence against the state. Supporters of this approach 
admit that there will be some ‘hard cases’, but believe that the distinction between 
freedom fighters and terrorists can be made on a case-by-case basis (Brown 2004, 53). 
As  Richard  Price  puts  it,  the  international  community  has  decided  that  it  knows 
terrorism when it sees it (Price 2004, 270). Countries that earlier raised objections to 
definitions of terrorism are now coming up with their own definitions. For instance, 
the  Organization  of  Islamic  Countries  in  1999  produced  the  Burkina  Faso  draft 
(Organisation of Islamic Countries 1999). The April 2002 meeting of this organization 
declared  its  opposition  to  intervention  in  any  Islamic  state.  Delegates  wanted  to 
include state terrorism (in a clear reference to Israel) and distinguish acts of terror 
from legitimate resistance by people in occupied lands. However, they also praised US 
efforts to combat terror and rejected an Iraqi suggestion to use oil as a weapon (Sussex 
2001, 32). The ‘root causes’ argument has been similarly discredited. Critics claim 
that it gives aid and comfort to terrorists, pointing to inconsistent correlations between 
terrorism and a ‘root cause’ such as poverty (Dershowitz 2002, 24-25).  
 
                                                                                                                                             
ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature." 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04.html 
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The  UN  Secretary-General  appealed  to  the  Arab  League  in  2005  to  come  to  a 
consensus  on  a  definition  of  terrorism,  claiming  that  the  lack  of  an  agreed-upon 
definition hindered efforts against terrorism. Scholars also claim that cooperation is 
thinner than it should be because governments do not agree on what is prohibited 
(Bosco  2006).  Is  this  drive  towards  definition  motivated  only  by  functionalism? 
Governments are already  cooperating against terrorism on an informal basis under 
current  laws  and  treaties.  Definition  seems  to  matter  for  defining  and  fixing  state 
identities.  
 
India and definition 
In the 1970s when terrorism appeared on the agenda of the international community, 
India  was  maintaining  its  identity  as  leader  of  the  Third  World;  consequently,  it 
opposed  Western  resolutions  and  supported  the  definitional  and  root  causes 
arguments.
7 However, as it set out to influence the global consensus against terrorism 
traditional positions were diluted. Indian diplomats now oppose definitional and root 
causes  arguments,  suggesting  that  they  are  politically  motivated  and  “weaken  the 
ongoing global fight against terrorism” (Suryanarayana 2002b). The position is that 
international legal mechanisms cannot and should not concern themselves with root 
causes: “Terrorism can only be defined with reference to the act and its consequences, 
not  by  a  description  of  the  perpetrators  of  the  act  and  ascribing  labels  to  them. 
Terrorists  are  criminals  and  therefore,  alibis  or  rationalizations  advanced  by  the 
advocates  of  the  ‘root  causes’  cannot  absolve  terrorists  from  their  culpability” 
(Permanent Mission of India to the UN 2003). PM Vajpayee said in his address to the 
UNGA: “We must firmly rebuff any ideological, political or religious justification for 
                                                 
7 The Annex to the Ad Hoc Committee’s Report features the demands of the Nonaligned Group of 14 of 
which India was a member. GAOR: 28
th Session, Supplement #28 (A/9028), United Nations, NY, 1973.      
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terrorism.  We  should  reject  self-serving  arguments  seeking  to  classify  terrorism 
according to its root causes, and therefore justifying terrorist action somewhere while 
condemning it elsewhere. Those that advance these arguments should explain what the 
root causes of the brutal acts of September 11 were” (2001).  
 
Just as the international community was accepting the need for a broader approach to 
terrorism, India presented it with a draft comprehensive convention in 1996 (Embassy 
of India nd). Indian diplomats do fear the UN as a forum where ‘sponsored’ NGOs 
rake up the country’s human rights record (Ghose 2001). However, they realized that a 
draft  would  give  India  an  enormous  first-mover  advantage.  India  seems  to  have 
learned from its experience in disarmament negotiations where non-participation led 
to its isolation. Moving away  from its preference  for large councils  with majority 
voting,  India  expresses  caution  about  the  utility  of  convening  an  international 
conference  to  arrive  at  a  consensus  definition  of  terrorism  (Asian  African  Legal 
Consultative Committee 2001, 9, 11).  
 
India today  attempts to broaden the definition of terrorism to include  all types of 
internal challenges, and narrow it to exclude states as perpetrators of terrorism. Article 
2 of India’s draft covers “any means” used in a terrorist act, defined as one intended to 
intimidate  a  population  or  to  compel  a  government  or  international  organization. 
Article  5  states  that  the  offenses  can  under  no  circumstances  be  justified  by 
considerations  of  a  political,  philosophical,  ideological,  racial,  ethnic,  religious  or 
similar nature. Thus, while terrorism is separated from common crime by reference to 
political motivations, it cannot be justified by such motivations. India holds that ‘state 
terrorism’ can be dealt with under the rubric of ‘state responsibility’ in international 
law; instead, it emphasizes ‘state sponsorship’. UNSC 1373 became a rallying point      
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for  ‘victim  states’  like  India  (2001a).  Indian  leaders  pointed  out  that  under  this 
resolution,  all  forms  of  support  to  terrorists  were  proscribed.  Therefore,  even 
Pakistan’s  claim  that  it  was  only  giving  moral  or  political  support  to  militants  in 
Kashmir rendered it culpable (Abdullah 2001). 
 
The Indian draft is meant to plug gaps in the existing sectoral conventions; to target 
countries that provide support and safe havens; and to deal with terrorist acts that are 
multi-dimensional. It covers violence by any means or any device; includes damage to 
property, installations and communication facilities, apart from loss of life and injuries 
inflicted  by  terrorist  acts.  Hence  it  is  described  as  ‘comprehensive’  (Ministry  of 
External Affairs 2001). Various international groupings have come out in support of 
such an act.
8 While acts of terrorism are illegal under various piecemeal conventions, 
there  is  no  single  law  under  which  countries  can  be  sanctioned  for  supporting  or 
tolerating terrorism. For instance, because it does not address the state-sponsorship of 
perpetrators, Western countries chose not to use the Montreal Convention on Civil 
Aviation in the trial relating to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103, (Higgins 1997, 23).  
 
The UNGA Sixth Committee formed an Ad Hoc Committee, which in turn created a 
Working  Group  to  conduct  negotiations  on  the  Indian  draft.  The  article  defining 
terrorism  has  been  a  sticking  point,  as  expected.  The  Organization  of  Islamic 
Countries introduced an amendment asking for an exemption for attacks on occupying 
                                                 
8 The 12
th NAM Summit (Durban, 1998) called for the urgent conclusion and the effective 
implementation of a comprehensive international convention for combating terrorism. The G-8 Foreign 
Ministers meeting in July 2000 supported the initiative of negotiating an effective comprehensive 
convention. The India-EU Summit held at Lisbon in June 2000 agreed to strive for it. The 
Commonwealth Heads of Government at Durban in November 1999 welcomed the agreement. The 
Cairo G-15 Summit (2000) called for the urgent conclusion and the effective implementation of a 
comprehensive convention. (Rao 2000).      
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forces (this was intended to legitimize Palestinian actions). Israel and the US opposed 




Regimes  define  the  problem  to  be  confronted,  and  they  also  define  categories  of 
members with corresponding rights and responsibilities. The current definition has the 
effect of conclusively sidelining the issue of state terrorism—colonial or neo-colonial 
exploitation  of  other  countries  or  the  use  of  excessive  force  against  a  state’s  own 
citizens. Instead, states are sought to be held responsible for sponsorship of terrorism. 
Sponsorship  includes  the  supply  of  territorial  sanctuary,  money,  arms,  training  or 
intelligence to terrorists operating in another country, even international diplomatic 
assistance. The actions listed are offenses against the sovereignty of the target state, 
and therefore already illegal under international law (Obote-Odora 1999). However, 
by linking them to the emotive issue of terrorism, state culpability for these offenses 
becomes even more pronounced in the court of public opinion.  Sponsorship is what 
renders states ‘terrorist.’  In this vein, Secretary  of Defense Rumsfeld called North 
Korea a “terrorist state” and a “terrorist regime” (Rumsfeld 2003) and President Bush 
referred to Afghanistan before 2001 as a “terrorist state” (Bush 2004). 
 
If terrorism by definition is directed against the state, states can have two identities: 
victims of terrorism, or state ‘sponsors’ of terrorism. The question of ‘state terrorism’ 
has been removed from the agenda.
10 The regime attempts to define terrorism in a 
manner acceptable to all states, and to cut off access to the term terrorism by non-state 
                                                 
9 For criticism of the draft from a ‘human rights’ perspective see the letter from Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch at  http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/terrorism/2002/0128aihrw.htm 
10 Achin Vanaik discusses the differences between  the sponsorship, organization and execution of 
terrorism by states (Vanaik 2002a).      
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actors.  Violence  directed  by  the  state  against  its  own  citizens  cannot  be  called 
terrorism. In response to charges that this definition is regressive and denies the reality 
that  states  are  often  the  gravest  threats  to  human  security,  it  is  asserted  that  state 
behavior is regulated by other international conventions. 
 
Unlike  the  nonproliferation  regime  where  the  NPT  formally  names  categories  of 
states,  in  the  counter-terrorism  regime  states  can  declare  themselves  victims  of 
terrorism. In the absence of an authority to adjudicate the issue of state sponsorship of 
terrorism the US as norm leader performs this function. The US Export Administration 
Act in 1979 began the practice of requiring the State Department to come up with a 
list of countries supporting terrorism. This has since been established as a reporting 
requirement (Rochefort 2005). Now various countries call upon the US government to 
designate others as state sponsors. Currently there are six state sponsors of terrorism 
on the list: Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Syria and Sudan (Iraq was removed from the list 
in 2004). Being on this list has consequences not only for trade and travel with the US, 
but with the international arena as a whole.
11  
 
The State Department reports, originally called Patterns of Terrorism were recently 
renamed Country Reports and became less statistical in content. The US government 
presents these reports as objective and scientific.
12 These are also cited by foreign 
political actors for their own ends. For instance, “the geographical shift of the locus of 
                                                 
11 Penalties include political sanctions, suspension of military sales and foreign aid, bans on financial 
transactions, granting of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and second-order bans on other countries or 
commercial organizations doing business with those states. In 1989 the US Antiterrorism and Arms 
Export Amendments Act updated this statue by providing for the immediate imposition of sanctions on 
state sponsors of terrorism. In 1996 the US Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) 
made it illegal for defense-related items to be sold to listed countries. 
12 In February 2003, when Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was asked about the escalatory effects of his 
naming of North Korea as a terrorist state, he claimed that he was stating a ‘fact’ since North Korea had 
been on the ‘terrorist state’ list for several years (Rumsfeld 2003).      
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terror from the Middle East to South Asia” highlighted in Patterns of Global Terrorism 
(1999)  played  into  the  hands  of  the  Indian  government.  The  objectivity  of  the 
definitions and measurements employed in these reports has been questioned (Krueger 
and Laitin 2004; Rochefort 2005).
13 The 9/11 Commission’s investigations revealed 
an instance of the politics of the state sponsors list. In 1998, Madeleine Albright, then 
Secretary of State, decided not to include Pakistan on the list. She worried that since 
relations with Pakistan after its nuclear tests in the summer were fragile, such a move 
would  destroy  any  influence  that  the  US  had  in  Pakistani  affairs  (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004, 123). 
 
India and categorization 
India deploys its secular and democratic credentials to assure itself of the benefits of 
membership  in  the  more  desirable  ‘victim  of  terrorism’  category  (Krishnaswami 
2000). In fact, the claim is that there is no other country as affected by terrorism as 
India.
14 India has demanded that the US declare Pakistan a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’. 
However,  I  could  not  find  any  serious  diplomatic  efforts  pursuing  this  goal.
15 
Presenting  itself  as  threatened  specifically  by  Islamic  terrorism  allows  India  to 
position  itself  as  a  victim  beside  Western  states  and  argue  for  the  privileges  they 
exercise  in  dealing  with  that  threat  (Chellaney  2001/02,  98;  Tellis  2001,  55).
16 
However, at times India’s identification of a global Islamic threat collides with its 
attribution of responsibility to the Pakistani government—for instance when the latter 
                                                 
13 In fact, the discovery of significant statistical errors (with political ramifications) in the 2002 Patterns 
of Terrorism  led the State Department to move to the more descriptive Country Reports. 
14 Author’s interview with Surendra Arora, BJP Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, 28 July 2003, New 
Delhi.  
15 In July 1993 Pakistan was taken off the watchlist of state sponsors of terrorism (Raman 2000, 61). It 
has been alleged that in order to escape being categorized as a state sponsor, Pakistan moved terrorist 
training camps from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to Afghanistan in 1994 (Sood and Sawhney 2003, 34). 
16 It has been suggested that India’s Ministry of External Affairs, influenced by the American discourse, 
is more eager to cite ‘global Islamic terrorism’ than the Ministries of Home and Defence, which see 
Pakistan as directly culpable for terrorism in India (Prasannan 1999).      
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claimed  it  had  no  authority  over  the  Kargil  infiltrators.  Positioning  itself  in  this 
category also allows India to cement alliances, for instance, with Russia (Guha 1999b; 
Gupta 2005, 13).  
 
India uses counter-terrorism as the foundation for bilateral collaboration, including 
military-to-military  ties  that  would  otherwise  be  controversial.  India,  which  had 
refused to allow the Soviet Union to use bases on its territory during the Cold War, 
offered  the  US  bases,  airfields  and  intelligence  for  the  Afghanistan  campaign 
(Chellaney 2001/02, 99). India and the US set up a Joint Working Group on Counter-
terrorism  in  2000  (Boucher  2002b).  This  was  the  first  time  that  the  American 
government had joined such a group (Black 2003). In this less formal setting the US 
can discuss issues ranging from strategies against Al Qaeda to border surveillance 
technology to financial laws.
17 The Indian Army, experienced in counter-insurgency, 
now provides training for US soldiers (Mazumdar 2005). 
 
India  did  not  have  diplomatic  relations  with  Israel  until  1992  and  was  a  stalwart 
supporter  of  the  Palestinian  cause.  India’s  large  Muslim  population  constrains  the 
government  from  adopting  a  pro-Israeli  stance,  but  counter-terrorism  is  more 
acceptable as basis for cooperation. Close relationships in procurement, training and 
military exchange have been initiated (Anon 2000b; Harman 2000; Mago 2003; Paz 
2000). The official communiqué at the end of the 2002 meeting of the India-Israel 
Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism stated that the dialogue was undertaken in 
the context of international counter-terrorism, and specifically in light of UNSC 1373 
(Ministry of External Affairs 2002).  
 
                                                 
17 Author’s interview with Ashley Tellis, Washington DC, 25 August 2005.      
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Institutionalization 
International  institutions  represent  a  concentration  of  technical  and  organizational 
resources  devoted  to  an  issue-area.  Their  services  include  standardization,  dispute 
settlement,  and  facilitation  of  discussion.  The  debate  in  the  current  literature, 
responding to the ‘war on terrorism’, revolves around the issue of unilateralism. As in 
nonproliferation,  in  counter-terrorism  the  perception  is  that  the  US  is  imposing 
unilateral dictates, while the rest of the world (including America’s European allies) 
favors multilateralism. I suggest here that the multilateral-unilateral distinction is not 
so stark. Multilateral institutions are influenced by definition and categorization. A 
paradoxical consequence is that they can furnish justifications for unilateralist actions. 
In  this  section  and  the  next,  I  attempt  to  show  how  definition  and  categorization 
determine  the  type  of  institutions  and  the  manner  of  enforcement  in  the  counter-
terrorism regime.   
 
The  first  effect  of  the  constitutive  processes  discussed  above  is  to  delineate  the 
identities that countries can aspire to. Traditional groupings such as ‘nonaligned’ and 
‘Islamic’ are fractured as their members realize the importance of being placed in the 
‘right’ category by the counter-terrorism regime. Countries like Pakistan, Cuba, Libya, 
and Syria still employ the definitional and root causes arguments, but find themselves 
viewed  with  increasing  suspicion  by  the  international  community.  In  this  manner, 
institutional challenges to the hegemonic definition of terrorism are weakened.  
 
Within the UN, which was the arena for the terrorism debate, multilateral entities now 
operate within the parameters set by constitutive processes. The UNSC, which has 
taken a more activist stance on terrorism than the General Assembly, set up a Counter-
Terrorism Committee to monitor implementation of UNSC 1373. The Committee’s      
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goal is to bring about convergence among member-states on financing, policing, and 
other counter-terrorism measures. We note a remarkably quick pace of compliance 
with UNSC 1373 as measured by the reports submitted by countries to the Committee 
(Rosand 2003, 337-38). This testifies to the importance that states are giving to the 
counter-terrorism regime.  
 
The UN has served as the forum for far-reaching international legislation aimed at 
terrorism. The negotiation of the Terrorist Financing Convention in 1999 is an often-
overlooked success. As per the Convention “states must make the provision of such 
funding a criminal offense under their domestic laws and confiscate assets allocated 
for terrorist purposes.” In April 2005 the International Convention for the Suppression 
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was adopted by the UNGA and opened for signature 
(Welsh 2005b).  
 
However, the US and its allies are still wary of multilateral bodies based on their 
experience  in  the  Cold  War  period  described  above.  Mirroring  trends  in  the 
nonproliferation regime, informal intergovernmental networks are being favored over 
formal  bodies  under  UN  auspices.  The  Proliferation  Security  Initiative  (PSI), 
especially the container security component, has become palatable to governments that 
are formally opposed to the nonproliferation regime. The US-led PSI is presented as a 
“broad partnership” of countries which, “using their own laws and resources”, will 
“coordinate their actions” to halt shipments of dangerous technologies among states 
and non-state actors of  proliferation concern (Rajamohan 2003b). Similarly, in the 
counter-terrorism  regime  the  Financial  Action  Task  Force,  established  in  1989, 
functions  as  a  standards-setting  body.  Membership  in  this  body  is  conditional  on      
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implementing  specific  measures  to  restrict  transnational  flows  to  formal  financial 
institutions. Thus it targets networks such as South Asia’s hawala system.  
 
Enforcement 
Enforcement includes both positive incentives (inducements) and negative incentives 
(sanctions). States’ interests are determined by their identity choices, and the processes 
of  definition  and  categorization  have  established  the  range  of  possible  identities. 
However,  enforcement  is  still  important  in  that  it  reinforces  definition  and 
categorization. The counter-terrorism regime, as we have seen, excludes the issue of 
‘demand’—that is, the question of why individuals or groups would resort to terrorist 
tactics. Enforcement seeks international cooperation to restrict supply (of weapons, 
especially those capable of ‘mass destruction’, finance, and other important resources 
such as territory).
18 The focus is on the supply to terrorists, not the supply of terrorists. 
The definitions of terrorism and the support of it, allow powerful actors to violate 
other norms of international society in their enforcement of counter-terrorism. 
 
None of the existing anti-terrorism conventions has specific enforcement measures to 
ensure  that  states  abide  by  treaty  obligations  (International  Bar  Association's  Task 
Force on International Terrorism 2003, 6). The 1994 UNGA Declaration on Measures 
to Eliminate International Terrorism enjoins a ‘soft law’ positive obligation on states 
to secure the non-use of their territory by terrorists. Can a country be attacked for 
supporting  terrorism?  Some  international  lawyers  argue  that  military  intervention 
would violate the principles of necessity and proportionality (Kirgis 1998). Others 
                                                 
18 The issue of the supply of small arms and light weapons, which are by far the most common terrorist 
weapons, is one of the eloquent ‘silences’ of the current counter-terrorism regime.       
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retort that such a restrictive interpretation is inappropriate for a world menaced by 
terrorism (Roberts 1987).  
 
By designating terrorism “a threat to international peace and security” the UNSC in 
fact paved the way for a military approach to terrorism (de Jonge Oudraat 2004, 158). 
In particular, Resolution 1368 of 12 September 2001, in response to the attacks on the 
US, legitimizes unilateral military action. The resolution did not call for collective 
action,  and  instead  declaring  that  the  right  to  national  self-defense  was  applicable 
against terrorists (de Jonge Oudraat 2004, 160).  
 
The UNSC also imposed sanctions against terrorism in 1992 against Libya, in 1996 
against Sudan, and in 1999 against the Taliban (de Jonge Oudraat 2004, 151). In 1993 
the  Clinton  administration  authorized  a  cruise  missile  strike  on  Iraqi  intelligence 
services  headquarters  in  response  to  an  attempted  assassination  of  the  previous 
president. It asserted in the UNSC that this action was undertaken in self-defense as 
per Article 51 (Luck 2004b, 92). Moreover, the UNSC did not condemn the 1998 
‘anti-terrorist’  strikes  by  the  US  on  Afghanistan  and  Sudan.  These  acts  appear  to 
support the American argument that non-compliance with Resolution 1373 amounts to 
a just cause for the use of military force (de Jonge Oudraat 2004, 165).  
 
The US intervention in Iraq is obviously the major event in norm creation since one of 
the justifications given was that Iraq was sponsoring terrorism (the others being failure 
to comply with UN disarmament resolutions and later, internal oppression). Recent 
studies  have  shown  that  the  Bush  administration  took  advantage  of  (rather  than 
created) a linkage in the public mind between the Islamist terrorism of al-Qaeda and 
Saddam Hussein’s government (Althaus and Largio 2004).       
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On the one hand, the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq forcing ‘regime change’ 
struck a massive blow to the legal, diplomatic efforts of the counter-terrorism regime. 
On the other hand, we note that the US was forced in some ways to pay obeisance to 
regime norms. Some scholars have argued that the global debate leading up to the war 
in  Iraq  signals  widespread  support  for  existing  international  norms.  Most  states 
continue to see force as a last resort, properly subject to multilateral control in all but 
the  most  urgent  cases  of  self-defense.  The  nature  of  American  diplomatic 
maneuverings in the United Nations and the public statements of high-level officials 
suggest that even the US recognizes the importance of these norms. 
 
The US did make an initial concerted effort to get UN approval. The President in 
September 2002 assured the General Assembly that his administration would work 
with the UNSC for the necessary resolutions to intervene in Iraq, though he warned 
that it was ready to proceed sans authorization. The next month, the US Congress gave 
the President the authority to use force in Iraq without such approval. In November 
2002, the US managed to get the UNSC to pass Resolution 1441, which finds Iraq in 
material breach of earlier resolutions and warns it of serious consequences if it did not 
cooperate with the UN. Whether this resolution automatically authorizes the use of 
force by member-states (without further authorization by the UNSC) has been a point 
of contention. At least one country in the US-led coalition of the willing has argued 
that it does, thereby justifying its participation in the Iraq campaign. As is now well 
known, in March 2003 France, Russia and China announced they would veto any new 
‘use of force resolution’ and the US commenced its campaign outside the UN.  
 
It may seem that the international norm that intervention should be multilateral has not 
mitigated US behavior. However, the concept of the ‘coalition of the willing’ does      
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acknowledge the multilateralist norm. Moreover, on account of framing the issue as 
one of ‘civilization’ against terrorism, the US is obliged to at least rhetorically support 
each country when it declares itself menaced by terrorism (or resort unconvincingly to 
American  exceptionalism),  whether  or  not  that  is  in  the  American  interest.  I  will 
explore in more detail the consequences of this constraint in the analysis of US policy 
in South Asia.  
 
India: institutions and enforcement 
India has used international forums to reinforce its role in counter-terrorism for some 
years  now,  working  to  influence  their  resolutions  and  agreements  to  reflect  its 
preferred  norms.  For  instance,  in  June  1993  as  states  debated  the  Declaration  and 
Program of Action at the World Conference on Human Rights in Geneva, the Indian 
delegation worked to include language to the effect that terrorism constituted violation 
of human rights. The leader of the delegation claimed that for the first time there was 
no  qualifier  in  the  declaration  distinguishing  terrorism  from  struggles  for  self-
determination  (Kunadi  1995,  91).  While  these  multilateral  efforts  help  India 
consolidate its identity in the global counter-terrorism regime, at the regional level 
India practises the sort of selective multilateralism that is associated with the US. 
 
At the Tenth Non-aligned Movement (NAM) Summit in Jakarta India successfully 
lobbied for the inclusion of a clause in the Final Declaration calling upon member-
states  to  “fulfill  their  obligations  to  international  law  and  refrain  from  organizing, 
instigating and assisting” terrorism in other countries (Misra 1993, 171). A decade 
later, the negotiation of the final declaration at the Twelfth NAM Summit in Kuala 
Lumpur  was  the  arena  for  an  illustrative  encounter  between  these  two  opposing 
approaches.  India  moved  an  amendment  condemning  state-sponsored  terrorism.      
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Pakistan  submitted  an  alternative  text  condemning  attempts  to  portray  self-
determination movements as terrorism (2003g).
19 Pakistani leader Musharraf declared 
that struggles for self-determination in places such as Kashmir and Palestine should 
not be confused with terrorism. Responding to India’s repeated references to UNSC 
1373, he condemned the “selective approach to UN resolutions.” Vajpayee’s speech 
struck  back  citing  the  main  themes  of  Indian  counter-terrorist  diplomacy:  “Does 
[Musharraf] go into the root causes of sectarian terrorism in his country? Or does he 
take stern action against the perpetrators of that terrorism? He talks of the oppressed 
people of Kashmir. These same people very recently cast their ballots in an election 
universally recognized as free and fair” (Pillai 2003, 40-41).
20  
 
As the pre-eminent power in South Asia, India resorts to bilateral diplomacy whenever 
possible at the regional level. At its first summit in 1985, the South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a regional grouping that the Indian government 
has at times been wary of, issued a declaration on terrorism and set up a study group. 
India was uncomfortable with this development (Perera 1997, 113-14). In fact, citing 
its commitment to NAM and national self-determination movements, India argued that 
the  state  should  have  the  discretion  to  determine  the  bona  fide  character  of  an 
extradition request. Remarkably, India even refused to allow the mention of cross-
boundary terrorism claiming it had no relevance to the region (Perera 1997, 122-26).
21 
 
                                                 
19 Ultimately the NAM Final Declaration referred neither to state sponsorship of terrorism, nor to the 
distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters. The former was in Pakistan’s favor, and the latter 
India’s (Ved 2003).  
20 Such encounters between India and Pakistan at international forums are not the exception but the rule. 
See for instance, arguments in the report on the April 2003 meeting of the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7718.doc.htm Downloaded 8 April 2003. 
21 Similarly when an Indian Airlines plane was hijacked to Pakistan by alleged Kashmiri terrorists in 
1971, the India government rejected the Montreal Convention and international mediation in favor of 
bilateral debate (Lok Sabha Debates, March 29, 1971, 23-30).      
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India also uses bilateral treaties to reinforce its reputation as a country that is serious 
about  combating  terrorism.  These  are  of  three  types:  framework  agreements  to 
facilitate the exchange of operational information,
22 extradition treaties,
23 and mutual 
legal  assistance  agreements  in  criminal  matters  (searching  persons  and  property, 
locating fugitives and property, transfer of witnesses)
24 (Fair 2004, 80). A treaty is 
neither necessary nor sufficient since extradition is primarily a political decision. Yet 
India signed 13 extradition treaties in 2000 alone.
25 The Deputy PM declared that 
India was trying to conclude as many extradition treaties as possible (2003b).  
 
Like  the  US,  India  rejects  the  International  Criminal  Court  (ICC),  which  could 
potentially evolve into a prosecutor of international terrorist crimes. The US is in fact 
constructing a network of bilateral ‘non-extradition’ treaties prohibiting parties from 
producing each other’s nationals before the ICC, thus undermining its effectiveness. In 
2002, India signed such a treaty with the US (Baruah 2002b). “As strong, vibrant 
democracies both India and the US share concerns about the possible conflict between 
robust, national judicial processes and international tribunals as also the impact of 







                                                 
22 India has such agreements with Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Egypt, Italy, Oman, Romania, and Russia. 
23 India has concluded extradition treaties with Belgium, Bhutan, Canada, Hong Kong, Nepal, 
Netherlands, Russia, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Treaties have been signed (but not exchanged) with Germany, Mongolia, Tunisia, Turkey, and 
Uzbekistan. India has also entered into extradition agreements with Australia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tanzania, and Thailand. 
24 India has signed such agreements with Canada, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan and has signed (but not exchanged) agreements with 
France, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, and the United States. 
25 Author’s interview with Meera Shankar, MEA, 14 May 2003, New Delhi.      
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Weapons of the weak: Norms as resources in India’s counter-terrorism diplomacy 
 
In the paragraphs above I have described India’s strategy: to influence the formulation 
of international norms, cite them in its foreign policy justifications, and increase its 
space for strategic maneuver. In this section I describe the normative resources that 
India draws upon to implement this strategy: extrapolation from international practice, 
international  good  citizenship,  democracy,  the  nuclear  taboo,  nuclear  restraint  and 
nonproliferation, and balancing of bilateral and multilateral initiatives. I also show that 
this  normative  discourse  reflects  back  on  India  and  constrains  it,  even  in  ‘purely 
internal’ matters. 
 
Extrapolation from international practice  
The very first battle for the Indian state—and one in which it has succeeded—is to get 
the international community to define acts of violence against Indian citizens and/or 
the government as ‘terrorism’—as opposed to terms such as ‘ethnic violence, ‘civil 
strife’ or ‘radical movements’. The December 2002 Report of the National Security 
Advisory Board suggested the government use the term terrorist for various outlawed 
groups operating in Maharashtra, Assam, Andhra Pradesh, and Bihar rather than terms 
such as ultras, militants, or insurgents (Anon 2003a). 
 
For example, in an interview on CNN, the Indian Foreign Minister sharply corrected a 
reference  to  “militant  groups”  in  Kashmir,  insisting  that  these  were  “terrorist 
organizations” supported by the Pakistani regime (Singh 2001).
26 Similarly, criticizing 
Western analysts for making a distinction between global and local terrorism, Varun 
Sahni writes that such a classification was based not on causes but on consequences. 
                                                 
26 Also see his interview with El Mundo, 17 February 2002, where he asserts that Kashmir is not an 
ethnic conflict but an instance of terrorism (Singh 2002).      
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“…[i]f the victims are Americans or other citizens of the ‘democratic core’ that forms 
the  Western  security  community,  the  terrorist  act  is  ‘global’  and  has  systemic 
consequences. All other terrorist acts can then safely be deemed to be ‘local’, the 
bloody  result  of  ‘ancient  hatreds’  that  characterize  politics  outside  the  democratic 
core” (Sahni 2003, 99-100, n.6).
27  
 
The  most  important  theme  in  India’s  counter-terrorism  diplomacy  is  indeed  the 
international nature of terrorism (Anon 2002b; Chellaney 2001/02, 109; Sharma 2001; 
Suryanarayana 2003a). Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal, in a veiled reference to the 
US ‘war on terror’ said:  
 
International  terrorism  is  our  common  challenge  today  and  how  we 
deal  with  it  holds  out  common  prospects  for  us  all.  Political 
expediency,  short  term  gains,  considerations  of  geopolitics,  the 
difficulties in making a choice between one’s own immediate priorities 
and the global good, nurturing of old constituencies, faulty analysis, 
double  standards,  all  these  and  other  reasons  unfortunately  blur  the 
moral clarity and political focus on how this terrorism should be dealt 
with (Nadkarni 2005).  
 
India  campaigns  against  the  “segmented  approach.” 
28  That  is,  it  claims  that  no 
compromises should be made with terrorist groups or with governments sponsoring 
terrorism. A year before 9/11 the Indian Prime Minister warned the US that distance 
would not always insulate Americans from terror (Suryanarayana 2003b). The 2002 
Delhi Declaration by Russia and India, in what was called a “pointed reference to 
                                                 
27The Council of Foreign Relations’ website furnishes a good example of India’s success. In answer to 
the question: “Who commits acts of terrorism in Kashmir?” it provided this answer: “Mostly Islamists 
from outside Kashmir, affiliated with groups such as Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Some 
attacks have been linked to local pro-Pakistan and pro-independence groups”. The answer to the 
question: “Who commits acts of political violence in Kashmir?” was “Indian security forces, Islamist 
militants, and other separatist groups” (Council on Foreign Relations 2002).  
28 Author’s interview with Meera Shankar, 14 May 2003, New Delhi.      
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Western – and particularly American – vacillation” stated: “The fight against terrorism 
must not admit of any double standards…” (Sahni 2002). 
 
India presents terrorism as a global threat, and it also makes a claim about the nature 
of that threat. Though Indian leaders, mindful of domestic imperatives, often do not 
directly name Islamists as the enemy, their statements portray a secular India besieged 
by the forces of anti-modernism and fundamentalism. C. Rajamohan, for instance, 
presents India’s challenge as one of  “…universalizing Enlightenment values amidst 
renewed resistance from obscurantist and orthodox forces” (Rajamohan 2002a, 204). 
Indian diplomatic strategy is sought to be recalibrated to show the roots of the Islamic 
terror network in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Sondhi and Kapur 2002, 12). To this end, 
Indian elites point out links between the individuals and groups involved in attacks on 
Western targets and those in India (Chellaney 2001/02, 98). 
 
American reluctance to come to the aid of India can easily be cited as evidence of 
softness or hypocrisy on the issue of terrorism. The US is careful to clarify that it can 
only assist in India-Pakistan dialogue. Yet, thanks to American portrayal of terrorism 
as  a  threat  to  all  states,  India  can  maintain  that  it  has  a  responsibility  to  tackle 
Pakistan. On this point Robert Jervis wrote: “Politically and rhetorically convenient in 
the short run, Bush's answer to the question of what terrorists we are at war with may 
prove troublesome over the long run. It might have been more straightforward and 
honorable to declare that it was only terrorists who could menace American assets and 
allies  that  were  our  target”  (Jervis  2002).  As  terrorist  violence  and  cross-border 
infiltration in Kashmir continued, the US began to be censured for not exerting enough 
pressure on Pakistan (Dixit 2002b; Sood and Sawhney 2003, 26). The role of US 
Deputy Secretary Armitage in conveying Musharraf’s promise of a “permanent end”      
  281 
to  support  for  militancy  in  Kashmir  had  the  effect  of  making  the  US  a  guarantor 
(Winner and Yoshihara 2002, 75). 
 
India drew upon the symbolic resources that the US deployed in Iraq against those 
urging it to enter into dialogue with Pakistan. In his first address to the nation after the 
Parliament  attack,  as  the  country  prepared  for  troop  mobilization,  PM  Vajpayee 
declared that the battle against terrorism had entered its final phase (Anon 2001g). 
Comparing Pakistan and Iraq, the Foreign Minister said in Parliament: “I genuinely 
believe if the possession of WMD, absence of democracy and export of terrorism are 
the  criteria,  then  no  country  deserves  more  than  Pakistan  to  be  tackled…”
29  He 
proposed that Pakistan be included in the ‘axis of evil’ (Suroor 2002). He declared that 
India had a better case for initiating pre-emptive action against Pakistan, than the US 
had against Iraq. The US was forced to explain, somewhat unconvincingly, that the 
cases could not be equated (Anon 2003d; Haqqani 2003). Opposition politicians and 
the media also took up the equation of Iraq and Pakistan (Anon 1999e).  
 
Participation in international organizations 
Since independence India has played a prominent role in international politics, a role 
quite out of proportion to its military or economic strength. Recognizing that norm-
oriented  diplomacy  could  strengthen  its  position,  India  negotiated  significant 
successes on issues such as decolonization, foreign aid, and international trade. India 
is  signatory  to  nearly  all  the  major  conventions  in  international  law.  It  is  widely 
acknowledged  as  a  leader  of  the  Third  World  and  the  Non-aligned  Movement 
(although  now  it  seeks  to  distance  itself  from  these  roles).  India  has  been  an 
enthusiastic  participant  in  international  organizations  ranging  from  the  UN,  to  the 
                                                 
29 Yashwant Sinha, Rajya Sabha Debates, 9 April 2003.      
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Commonwealth, to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). 
It is the third-largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations. Thus it has built up 
an  image  as  a  full  and  conscientious  member  of  the  international  community.  As 
described in the section above on institutions, the Indian government brings up the 
terrorism issue at international venues whenever possible (Anon 2005a).  
 
Record of democracy 
Just  as  democracy  was  used  to  legitimize  the  nuclear  program,  it  is  deployed  to 
legitimize  India’s  actions  against  terrorism  (a  strategy  also  followed  by  Israel) 
(Rajghatta 2002b).
30 Indian elites make two parallel claims: first, that the availability 
of  legal  recourse  for  discontented  groups  delegitimizes  terrorism  on  Indian  soil; 
second,  that  non-democratic  polities  like  Pakistan  have  no  right  to  criticize  India 
(Chellaney  2001/02,  97;  Gupta  1994,  75).
31  India  also  highlights  its  secular 
credentials, such as constitutional protections for minority rights. Even the religious-
nationalist BJP government did not openly reject secularism. In fact, it engaged in the 
“othering”  of  fundamentalism  and  implicitly  associated  religious  extremism  and 
terrorism with threats to Indian and global security (Biswas 2001, 505). The Kargil 
Review Committee Report makes this clear: “Pakistan for its part has become the fount 
of religious extremism and international terrorism and a patron of the global narcotics 
traffic. Decades of misgovernance and military rule have prevented the democratic 
tradition from taking firm root…Pakistan poses a threat not only to India…[T]errorists 
have carried out murderous assaults in the US and East Africa” (Tellis 2002a, 51). 
                                                 
30 Similarly, US officials said they would not “rush to judgement” on Chechnya since Russia was 
operating in a democratic context (Evangelista 1999, 372). 
31 Author’s interviews with V. S. Mani, New Delhi 17 February 2003; Meera Shankar, 14 May 2003; 
Ajai Sahni, Institute of Conflict Management, 11 April 2003.      
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Such arguments are particularly resonant in the face of ‘blowback’ from America’s 
Cold War alliances. 
 
Indian leaders use democracy as a common denominator in establishing alliances.
32 
The Indian Prime Minister’s November 2001 meeting with President Bush concluded 
with a declaration where “as leaders of the two largest multi-pluralistic democracies 
they emphasized that those who equate terrorism with any religion are wrong, as are 
those  who  invoke  its  name  to  commit,  support  or  justify  terrorist  acts”  (2001f, 
emphasis mine). In June 2005, the US and India announced a joint Global Democracy 
Initiative (Office of the Press Secretary 2005). 
 
Nuclear escalation, international coercion, and the power of restraint 
The nuclearization of the subcontinent, which was formalized in May 1998, renders 
terrorist attacks doubly dangerous since they may lead via various escalatory steps to 
nuclear war. India used its newly acquired overt nuclear status to draw the attention of 
the  world  to  cross-border  terrorism.  Playing  on  the  world’s  fears  of  a  nuclear 
exchange, it tried to bring pressure on Pakistan to cease its support of cross-border 
terrorism. India also highlighted its ‘restrained’ use of its nuclear capability in crises 
with Pakistan. 
 
In May 1999, the Indian army detected intrusions in the Kargil sector on the border 
with Pakistan. India successfully made the case to the international community that 
Pakistan had supported a terrorist incursion to the extent of sending Pakistani military 
regulars  across  the  border.  Over  the  next  two  months,  the  battle  raged  on  the 
                                                 
32 See also the invocation of democracy and pluralism in the Joint Declaration with the EU (Anon 
2001b).      
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Himalayan peaks. India managed to clear the sector of all intruders at the cost of over 
a  thousand  lives.  Pakistan’s  greatest  defeat,  however,  was  the  near-universal 
condemnation of its role. The US, marking a dramatic departure from its traditional tilt 
towards Pakistan, pressured it to rein in the insurgents.   
 
Similarly, the attack on Parliament in New Delhi on 13 December 2001 by militants 
allegedly  supported  by  Pakistan  triggered  a  military  response  on  the  Indian  side, 
followed by Pakistani mobilization. This border standoff is usually referred to as the 
2001-02 crisis. The two armies faced off across the border until June 2002. As in 
1999, India was more successful than Pakistan in gaining world sympathy, especially 
as the assault came a few months after the al-Qaeda attacks on the US. American 
officials extracted promises from Musharraf to crack down on cross-border movement 
and religious mobilization in his country.
33  
 
India’s  calculations  of  external  intervention  in  these  conflicts  are  founded  on 
international nuclear norms. First, the nuclear powers want to prevent nuclear use in 
order to protect the ‘nuclear taboo’. Second, a nuclear war between India and Pakistan 
could involve other NWS, possibly on opposing sides—a situation that the nuclear 
order strives to avoid. Third, the US does not want a Muslim state (Pakistan) to gain 
advantages from nuclear weapons at a time when other Muslim countries like Iran are 
considering acquiring WMD. In addition, in 2002 there were foreign troops on the 
ground in Pakistan that could be trapped in a nuclear confrontation (Bajpai 2002b, 
155-56). 
 
                                                 
33 On January 12, 2003, President Musharraf made a dramatic public promise that no organization 
would be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir; after the May 14, 2003 Kaluchak 
shooting he vowed that he would end infiltration across the Line of Control.       
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The nuclearization of South Asia thus creates a powerful incentive for the US and 
others to intervene.  In the conflicts described above, both parties were hoping the 
other would ‘blink’ first—that is, pull troops back to escape the worst-case scenario of 
nuclear use. Since it could assume that the US shared a strong interest in avoiding an 
actual nuclear exchange, each party also tried to stimulate American intervention in its 
favor. India’s External Affairs Minister stated that the troop mobilization in 2001 was 
a signal both to Pakistan and to the international community (particularly the US) of 
India’s determination “to take any step” to counter terrorism (Anon 2002b; 2003c). 
India used its declared commitment to countering terrorism and its nuclear capability 
to convince the US that nuclear war was a possibility, forcing it to get more involved. 
Paradoxically, the more credible the American resolve to stay involved, the lower the 
risks to both India and Pakistan of adopting dangerous strategies of brinkmanship. 
 
However,  the  need  to  remain  in  good  standing  with  the  international  community 
restricted India’s military options. Surveys showed widespread public support in India 
for attacks on terrorist camps and hot pursuit across the de facto border, the Line of 
Control  (LoC)  (Manchanda  2002,  313).  Yet  India  did  not  cross  the  LoC  in  ‘hot 
pursuit’ of militants, refrained from air strikes and commando raids on training camps 
in  Pakistan-occupied  Kashmir,  and  showed  openness  to  US  intervention.  This 
restraint, in contrast with Pakistan’s inability or unwillingness to control jihadis on its 
territory,  was  repeatedly  parlayed  into  diplomatic  gain.  National  Security  Adviser 
Brajesh  Mishra  said:  “The  recent  operations  in  Kargil  have  demonstrated  that  our 
system and the political leadership believe in great responsibility and restraint, as you 
would expect from the largest democracy in the world” (Sidhu 2000, 145). While 
India’s stance during Kargil marked it as a mature country, Western fears of nuclear 
escalation boomeranged on Pakistan (Guha 1999a; Karnad 2002a, 145). Speaking at a      
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conference,  India’s  Ambassador  called  Pakistan  the  “epicenter  of  international 
terrorism.”  He  held  Pakistan  responsible  for  a  hundred  terrorist  training  camps  in 
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), the growth of “terrorist factories” in the fifteen 
thousand madrassas in Pakistan, and for “nuclear blackmail.” In contrast, India has 
shown restraint with its ‘no first use’ policy (Sardesai 2003).  
 
Nuclear proliferation and terrorism  
India  attempted,  most  dramatically  in  the  crises  described  above,  to  use  the 
international community to coerce Pakistan on the terrorism issue. Yet, the projection 
of nuclear restraint was also integral to its strategy. Indian decision-makers are aware 
that in the post-Cold War world and especially after 9/11, the possession of WMD is 
strongly  linked  in  the  dominant  discourse  to  sponsorship  of  terrorism  and 
undemocratic  government.  Thus,  India’s  self-presentation  as  a  victim  of  terrorism 
depends on the ‘appropriate’ governance of its nuclear arsenal/capability.  
 
First, as I showed in earlier chapters, although not a member of the NPT, India has 
been  relatively  conscientious  about  restricting  the  proliferation  of  sensitive 
technologies.  The  country  highlights  this  restraint,  contrasting  it  to  the  Pakistani 
program which has been held responsible for transfers of nuclear technology to North 
Korea and Libya—countries on the list of ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ (Ministry of 
External Affairs 2004). In 2002, Foreign Secretary Sibal complained:  
 
While  deep  concerns  are  mounting  about  the  nexus  between 
fundamentalism,  terrorism  and  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  the 
spotlight  is  not  on  Pakistan  which  has  all  these  ingredients  of 
concern…there  is  a  remarkable  lack  of  curiosity  about  Pakistan’s 
nuclear  connection  with  North  Korea  in  exchange  for  missile 
technology,  which  poses  grave  challenges  to  our  security  (Nadkarni 
2005).      
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Second,  Pakistan  has  been  through  periods  of  martial  law,  alternating  with  quasi-
civilian rule.  It is thought that militaries were  more likely than civilian leaders to 
consider nuclear weapons in roles other than pure deterrence. Observers also worried 
about the growing religious fundamentalism within the army and the rest of the ruling 
class in Pakistan (Cohen 1998b, 169, 74).
34 Close ties with the Taliban, the victory of 
religious  parties  in  the  2002  elections,  and  evidence  about  the  involvement  of 
Pakistani citizens in Islamist terrorism, reinforced these fears (Hersh 2001; Sagan and 
Waltz 2003). India was quick to capitalize, pointing out repeatedly that its own nuclear 
weapons are under civilian control. While the world worries about the security and 
safety  of  all  South  Asian  nuclear  weapons,  India  raises  concerns  about  Pakistan’s 
arsenal and links it to terrorism (Santhanam and Rajagopalan 2001; Sudarshan 2003). 
In his 2002 address to the UNGA the Indian PM accused Pakistan of adding “nuclear 
blackmail” to its “quiver of state-sponsored terrorism” (Rajghatta 2002b).  
 
Third, India uses its role in counter-terrorism to deflect attention from its position in 
the nonproliferation regime. As associations with terrorism made the possession of 
nuclear  weapons  suspect—as  in  the  cases  of  Libya  and  Iraq—India  made  its 
opposition  to  terrorism  louder  and  reinforced  its  democratic  credentials.  An  ex-
diplomat  advocated  that  while  India  should  keep  working  towards  a  multilateral 
regime, terrorism should be the main focus of attention in multilateral forums like the 
UN to divert attention from Kashmir and the nuclear issue (Dubey 1998a). India’s 
Foreign Minister specifically claimed that the US was paying too much attention to 
nonproliferation and not enough to terrorism (Singh 2002, 46). 
  
                                                 
34 Kampani disparages these concerns about the Pakistani program (Kampani 2001b).      
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Intervention: the balancing act 
In the discussion above we have seen India’s slow and strategic accommodation with 
US  priorities  on  terrorism.  However,  the  government  tries  to  balance  this  with 
recourse to other norms to preserve some space for long-range strategic maneuver. 
Indian elites do worry that the country’s efforts at maintaining the identity of a victim 
of  terrorism  will  not  insulate  it  from  the  fallout  of  the  terrorism-WMD-human 
rights/democracy linkage (Ramachandran 1998).
35  
 
The  Kashmir  issue  illustrates  India’s  evolving  position  on  the  international 
community’s role. In 1948 India referred the matter to the UN, which at that time 
appeared to be a fair and capable arbiter. However, the Indian government swiftly 
became disillusioned with the UN, which, in its perception, favored Pakistan as a 
result of Cold War alignments. Nehru wrote in 1948, “I must confess that the attitude 
of the great powers (on the question of Kashmir) has been astonishing. Our experience 
of international politics and the way things are done in the higher regions of the UN 
has been disappointing to the extreme—no doubt all this will affect our conduct of 
international relations in the future” (Mitra 1998, 34). 
 
During the 1950s and the 1960s India positioned Kashmir as a purely internal issue 
where Pakistan had no locus standi, much less the US. The 1972 Shimla Agreement 
between India and Pakistan was intended to locate Kashmir as a bilateral issue. India 
concentrated on keeping international players out of the dispute. There were several 
reasons  for  this:  external  intervention  was  seen  as  a  strategic  equalizer  for  the 
Pakistani side, third parties were not really perceived as ‘neutral’ in the dispute, and 
                                                 
35 Author’s interviews with Arundhati Ghose, New Delhi, 1 August 2003; Soli Sorabjee, Ithaca, 1 
October 2003.       
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allowing  international  intervention  would  have  brought  into  question  all  states’ 
accessions to India.
36 In the discourse on Kashmir India has historically taken shelter 
behind the sovereignty norm. India has disapproved of intervention, in Kosovo for 
instance, for fear that this logic would encourage the internationalization of Kashmir 
(Kampani 1999).  
 
Currently India enjoys a good relationship with the reigning superpower. Some Indian 
leaders believe that since at this historical moment, intervention can work in India’s 
favor, the country should not be tied to its old principles.
37 One commentator wrote 
that although “the very word ‘internationalization’ sends the Indian political class into 
paroxysms of furtiveness, India has now chosen deliberately to internationalize.” In 
June 2002, the Prime Minister indicated that he would accept ‘facilitation’ of dialogue 
on Kashmir (Rajamohan 2002b).  
 
Writers  on  the  Left  and  the  Right  of  the  political  spectrum  continue  to  express 
apprehensions about the long-term effects of US interest in Kashmir (Chari 2003b, 51; 
Dixit 2002a; Gill 2001). Even a reference to Kashmir as a “central issue” by the US 
Secretary of State caused unease in India (2001d). While calling on the international 
community to sanction Pakistan, India attempts to restrict the scope of intervention. 
For  instance,  India  demanded  a  suspension  of  international  financial  assistance  to 
Pakistan during the 1999 conflict, but rejected the UN Secretary-General’s offer to 
dispatch an envoy to mediate between India and Pakistan (Swami 2002). 
 
                                                 
36 Author’s interview with Kanti Bajpai, 3 February 2003, New Delhi. 
37 Author’s interview with Air Comm. Jasjit Singh, New Delhi, 24 July 2003.      
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India’s response to the US intervention in Iraq is another illustration of the balancing 
act.
38 India is a quasi-member of the ‘coalition of the willing’ although not on the list 
of 45 countries that Secretary Powell produced in March 2003. Yet, even within the 
ruling  coalition  there  were  rumblings  of  disapproval  (Bhaumik  2003).  The  PM 
publicly  opposed  the  philosophy  of  ‘regime  change’  (Anon  2002c;  Baruah  2002a; 
Bhaumik 2003). The Indian Parliament witnessed an intense debate over the wording 
of  its  8  April  2003  Resolution—the  question  was  whether  it  should  ‘deplore’  or 
‘condemn’ the US actions (2003h). Initially, the Indian government had laid down UN 
authorization  for  a  multinational  peacekeeping  force  as  a  condition  for  India’s 
participation in the Iraqi operation (Baruah 2003). But even when authorization had 
been secured, and in spite of other incentives offered by the US, the government felt 
compelled to withdraw its initial offer of 17,000 Indian troops to be deployed to Iraq.
39 
By citing domestic compulsions, a government wishing to express muted disapproval 
was able to save face with the Americans.  
 
 
Effects on national politics 
 
India, though weak in material power, is able to constrain more powerful actors by 
harnessing the rhetorical power of norms. However, the story would not be complete 
without a discussion of how Indian decision-makers themselves are constrained by the 
norms that they deploy. While Realist and Liberal regime theories would allow for the 
possibility that certain norms may influence domestic policy precisely because India 
promotes them at the international level, they would not see national identity itself as 
being affected. However, if we see national identity as constructed, then ‘strategic’ 
                                                 
38 India supported the US airstrikes in Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998, but also pointed out that 
international cooperation was better than unilateral action (Nanda 1998). 
39 US ‘carrots’ were economic as well as political (Anderson, Bennis, and Cavanagh 2003; Deen 2003).      
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changes over time would produce a new conception of identity. This development can 
only be demonstrated through process-tracing over a period of time; but this work 
cannot avail of that explanatory distance. Here I present some initial descriptions of 
domestic  change,  showing  the  political  structure  being  molded  by  the  regime’s 
imperatives.  
 
Counter-terrorism and governance  
The  most  direct  effect  on  domestic  policy  of  international  activism,  as  discussed 
above,  was  the  acknowledgment  of  other  countries’  rights  to  intervene  in  internal 
conflicts such as Kashmir, changing the balance of power among different  groups 
within the government and the secessionists. At the 1994 Geneva session of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights, for instance, the Indian delegation was able to prevent 
Pakistan from introducing a resolution censuring India on Kashmir. In turn, it had to 
allow foreign delegations to visit Kashmir (Gupta 1994). Naturally, Indian leaders also 
fear  that  participation  in  counter-terrorism  operations  would  invite  new  terrorist 
attacks. If India is seen as too closely allied with the US, it might become a target of 
Islamist terrorism. 
 
India  has  also  made  changes  in  its  domestic  institutional  framework  that  mirror 
developments in other countries. In January 2003, the Office of the Counter-terrorism 
Coordinator  was  set  up  in  the  Ministry  of  External  Affairs.
40  In  2002  the  BJP 
government introduced the Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act (POTA), which was 
widely  criticized  for  curbing  press  and  civil  liberties  (Ananthanarayanan  2004; 
Krishnan  and  Tewary  2003).  POTA  treated  terrorist  acts  as  outside  the  normal 
criminal procedure which seeks to balance the rights of criminal defendants with the 
                                                 
40 Author’s interview with Meera Shankar, New Delhi, 14 May 2003.      
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interests of the state.
41 POTA was justified by pointing to the USA-PATRIOT Act and 
a similar law in the UK (Mohapatra 2004). Upholding the constitutionality of POTA, 
India’s Supreme Court cited international obligations: UNSC Resolutions 1368 (2001) 
and 1373 (2001) and GA Resolution 56/1. The Court reminded the government: “It 
has  thus  become  our  international  obligation  also  to  pass  necessary  laws  to  fight 
terrorism”  (Paul  2005).  Government  officials  also  claimed  that  POTA  was  less 
stringent than laws in other countries (Ghosh 2001). Similar comparisons were made 
in favor of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act over a decade ago (Marwah 
1995,  357-79).  The  State  Department  Coordinator  for  Counter-Terrorism,  while 
congratulating India on POTA, claimed that US officials had met with their Indian 
counterparts to discuss US anti-terrorism laws such as the Anti-terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and to exchange ideas and suggestions (Anon 2001e).  
 
Counter-terrorism and party politics  
As we have seen, India’s stance in international negotiations on the terrorism issue 
hewed to the principles of anti-colonialism and global justice. Since it has one of the 
largest Muslim populations in the world, India was careful to avoid branding Islamic 
movements with the terrorist stamp. In the 1990s, however, the BJP came to power at 
the national level. It was less constrained by the need to appeal to a Muslim electorate. 
How did international counter-terrorism fit into the party’s strategy? 
 
The BJP has determinedly portrayed itself as the ‘party of national security’ and its 
participation in the international fight against terrorism is integral to its strategy, as its 
ideologues make clear (Punj 2003). The BJP National Executive in 2001 declared that 
                                                 
41 POTA was repealed in September 2004 by the new Congress government and replaced by the 
Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, but questions remain about effects on civil rights.   
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terrorism would be one of the main issues in its election strategy. Party spokesman V. 
K.  Malhotra declared: “There is no doubt that terrorism and the passage of POTO 
[The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, a precursor to POTA] will be an election 
issue. The BJP will campaign in its favor because terrorism today is a worldwide evil” 
(Sahay  2001).  Invoking  terrorism,  the  party  has  been  somewhat  successful  in 
overcoming  its  initial  image  with  the  international  community  as  a  Hindu 
fundamentalist party; and these gains also play into its legitimacy with Indian voters.    
 
At  the  same  time,  India’s  democratic  and  secular  credentials  had  to  be  constantly 
reinforced. This implies that the government must take unpopular actions, and alters 
the balance of power between moderate and extremist factions. Provocative statements 
by leaders such as Ashok Singhal of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, part of the BJP’s 
‘family’, were deplored by the BJP President on the grounds that they compromised 
India’s  fight  against  terrorism  and  provided  the  international  community  “with  a 
pretext  to  bracket  [the party]  with  the  forces  of  religious  fundamentalism”  (Gupta 
2002; Vyas 2002, 11). Elections in Jammu and Kashmir in 2002 held at a high human 
cost were meant to provide an alternative political path to militancy; they were also 




Counter-terrorism and human rights 
India’s self-presentation as a victim of terrorism also constrains the freedom of action 
of state actors.
43 The Ministry of External Affairs hastened to point out that the 2002 
                                                 
42 State Department spokesman Richard Boucher welcomed the elections (Boucher 2002a). 
43 Similarly, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention’s provisions for the treatment of detainees vary 
considerably from US practice after 2001. This multilateral obligation might force the US to change its 
domestic policies (Welsh 2005a)      
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US State Department report on terrorism acknowledged that India was the country 
most affected by terrorism (Shukla 2003). At the same time, the Ministry did not 
appreciate  criticism  of  India’s  record  on  religious  tolerance  in  another  State 
Department  report,  and  resorted  to  terming  it  interference  in  internal  affairs  (Raj 
1999).  
 
In February 2002, local Muslims were accused of setting a train on fire in Godhra in 
Gujarat.  In the weeks  after this incident, Muslims were systematically  targeted by 
rioters with the complicity of the state government and over 2500 were reportedly 
killed.  In  April  2002,  the  Ministry  of  External  Affairs  upbraided  visiting  foreign 
dignitaries and missions in New Delhi for their statements on Gujarat, terming it a 
purely internal affair (Malhotra 2002a). Indian and foreign commentators were quick 
to point out that the international community’s right to intervene was now accepted 
and had been invoked by India itself (Anon 2002a). The practices of democracy and 
secularism  had  come  under  scrutiny  precisely  because  India  had  trumpeted  their 
importance (Malhotra 2002b). The most dramatic outcome of the spotlight was found 
in  the  State  Department's  International  Religious  Freedom  Report  released  in 
September 2004. Narendra Modi, the Chief Minister of Gujarat and a prominent BJP 
leader, was held responsible for the Gujarat massacre. Consequently, Modi was barred 
from entering the US (Anon 2005g).
44  
 
Counter-terrorism and other regimes 
 
In this section I situate the counter-terrorism regime within the larger framework of 
international norms. How does counter-terrorism impinge on other regimes? Here I 
                                                 
44 Even according to official Government of India figures, 790 Muslims were killed in the post-Godhra 
violence (Anon 2005b), as opposed to a toll of 800 dead in the entire al-Aqsa intifada.      
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discuss briefly the relationship of this evolving regime with international human rights 
and with the nonproliferation regime. 
 
Counter-terrorism and human rights  
The  gradually  consolidating  human  rights  regime  is  most  affected  by  the  counter-
terrorism  regime.  The  latter  constitutes  states  as  victims,  never  perpetrators  of 
terrorism. While states still remain responsible for their domestic actions under other 
aspects  of  international  law  such  as  prohibitions  against  genocide,  the  terrorism 
justification is often invoked for these actions. The US and its allies have depicted 
human  rights  and  democracy  as  the  ultimate  targets  of  terrorism.  These  are  the 
universal values, exemplified by the US, that the terrorists are alleged to hate. Yet 
these very values are being compromised by US practices in the ‘war on terrorism’ 
such  as  illegal  detentions  of  suspected  terrorists,  torture  of  detainees,  extra-legal 
transfers  of  detainees  to  and  from  the  US.  Moreover,  the  US  is  becoming  more 
tolerant  of  illegal  and  unethical  practices  in  other  countries,  thus  creating  more 
breathing space for human rights violators. In preparation for its 2003 Country Reports 
the US government issued instructions to its embassies that human rights violations 
undertaken by states in actions that had the expressed support of the US should not be 
included in the reports (Lawyers' Committee on Human Rights 2003, 74). 
 
These practices foster a strong perception that human rights are to be subordinated to 
an  ill-defined  security  imperative  under  all  circumstances.  Invoking  security 
considerations,  officials  and  politicians  can  ward  off  domestic  and  international 
scrutiny.  Often  these  invocations  specifically  refer  to  the  ‘norm  leader’—the  US. 
Various instances in the Indian case have been provided above, but similar behavior in 
other states is documented (Lawyers' Committee on Human Rights 2003, 74-79).      
  296 
 
The infringement of rights by the counter-terrorism regime’s indirect effects is not 
confined  to  weak  states.  The  redefinition  of  civil  rights  by  domestic  legislation 
referencing  an  international  threat  has  been  documented  in  the  UK  and  Australia 
(Cavanagh  2002;  Hocking  2003;  Michaelsen  2005).  International  norms  are  often 
pressed into service to justify these draconian laws (Pitts III 2003). Since September 
2001, 24 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have introduced specific anti-
terrorism  legislation  in  their  parliaments
45  (Whitaker  2005).  Enacting  stringent 
counter-terrorism legislation is presented to domestic audiences as a necessary step for 
being a civilized and modern state.  
 
Counter-terrorism and nonproliferation  
Two  connections  can  be  established  between  stockpiles  of  nuclear  weapons  and 
terrorism—first, that nuclear weapons are used to terrorize weaker peoples; second, 
that weapons could fall into terrorists’ hands (Dhanapala 2001). The former reflects 
the saying in the anti-colonial struggle that "terrorism is the poor man's atom bomb" 
(Teichman  1989,  515).  However,  this  connection  was  swept  aside  because  the 
counter-terrorism regime today sidelines the issue of ‘supply of terrorism’, and places 
nuclear  terrorism  centre-stage.  The  equation  between  supporting  terrorism  and 
possessing WMD was strengthened by constant juxtaposition of these two ‘crimes’ in 
references  to  North  Korea,  Pakistan  and  Iraq.  As  a  result,  the  international  norms 
against  nuclear  proliferation  and  terrorism  began  to  blur  into  each  other. 
Nonproliferation  and  counter-terrorism  are  increasingly  linked  as  international 
security strategies. 
                                                 
45 This list does not include countries such as Guyana, Malaysia, and Panama that have enacted anti-
terrorism measures as amendments to existing criminal laws, or countries like Egypt, Pakistan, and Peru 
that had similar laws on the books even before the current war on terror.      
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One argument claims that counter-proliferation reduces the severity of the terrorist 
threat  by  keeping  dangerous  weapons  out  of  terrorists’  reach  (Walsh  2002;  Wirtz 
2002). A different but related argument predicts that state sponsors of terrorism make 
nuclear threats to deter action by the US or the international community against them. 
Counter-proliferation, then, creates the strategic space for counter-terrorism. Concerns 
about the terrorist use of nuclear weapons played a role in bringing about the 1979 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Donohue 2001, 21). In 
October  2002,  the  UN  First  Committee  passed  an  Indian  resolution  urging 
governments to thwart terrorists from acquiring WMD or delivery vehicles (Baruah 
2002c).  
 
A significant achievement of the international legal process is the conclusion of the 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005, after seven 
years of negotiations on a Russian draft. The convention outlaws any use or threat of 
use, of a nuclear weapon or other radiological device by nonstate actors, and would 
require all states to cooperate in prosecuting individuals accused of committing these 
crimes (Wurst 2005). Even more significant is the passage of UNSC Resolution 1540 
in 2004. As a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN charter, 1540 imposes on all UN 
members the duty to prevent the diffusion of WMD technology even if they have not 
acceded  to  export  control  arrangements.  Recognizing  its  far-reaching  implications, 
many states raised objections to the resolution. They complained that the UNSC was 
turning into a legislative body. They expressed the apprehension that the reference to 
Chapter  VII  could  serve  as  a  pretext  for  coercion  against  states  accused  of  non-
compliance with the resolution; and also, that the resolution comes at the expense of 
the aspiration toward complete disarmament. However, the resolution was passed as      
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its movers made the argument that the world was running out of time on this issue and 
traditional arms control would not meet the challenge (Mendelsohn 2006). 
 
While  the  danger  of  nuclear  terrorism  cannot  be  denied,  I  want  to  point  out  the 
consequences of the rhetorical association of nonproliferation and counter-terrorism. It 
created  an  atmosphere  where  dissent  was  no  longer  tolerated.  At  the  2002  NPT 
PrepCom,  for  instance,  members  were  afraid  to  challenge  the  US  on  nuclear 
disarmament issues. Observers at the conference wrote: “the ‘we don’t want to be 
tarred with the terrorist brush’ attitude…may be linked to the ‘those who are not with 
us’  rhetoric”  (Ogilvie-White  and  Simpson  2003,  46).  The  association  between 
terrorism  and  WMD  is  used  to  delegitimize  new  nuclear  powers.  Playing  on  this 
association, Indian diplomats chose a strategy of highlighting Pakistan’s “incitement 
of  terrorism”  at  the  47
th  UNGA  session  to  weaken  Pakistan’s  credentials  in 
championing  nonproliferation  (Murthy  1993,  119).  Even  the  proposed  US  missile 
defense system, recognized as dangerous to nonproliferation efforts, is being sold as a 
shield against “terrorists and rogue states” (Carter 2004). 
 
Counter-terrorism and deterrence  
One  could  read  the  terrorist  attacks  of  9/11  as  showing  that  WMD  could  be 
‘existential. Any object—like an airplane—could be turned into a weapon of mass 
destruction. On the other hand, the attacks refuted the assumption that terrorists would 
not  aim  for  mass  casualties.  The  world’s  attention  turned  to  the  possibility  that  a 
terrorist group could acquire nuclear weapons and use them too. Is nuclear deterrence 
still valid against this new threat? Terrorist groups were considered to be undeterrable 
since they had no stake in a stable society, and also because they had apocalyptic goals 
that  were  not  amenable  to  negotiation.  The  sponsorship  of  terrorism  is  intimately      
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linked in the dominant discourse with desire to acquire WMD and ultimately to upset 
the international status quo; it functions as one of the marks of ‘rogueness.’ This in 
turn allows for certain predictions about the country’s behavior. According to the 2002 
US National Security Strategy (NSS), since rogue states are characterized by WMD 
ambitions and sponsorship of terrorism, it is obvious that they are risk-acceptant and 
uncaring about their populations. They will use these weapons to wage aggression 
against their neighbors. In short, they are “enemies of civilization” (National Security 
Council 2002, 15).  
 
It is precisely the posited character of potentially nuclear-armed terrorists that allows 
the NWS to retain their nuclear arsenals as insurance. The 2002 NSS states: “We are 
menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of 
the  embittered  few”  (National  Security  Council  2002,  1).  The  deployment  of  new 
threats to justify nuclear arsenals has been discussed in detail in earlier chapters. Here 
I point out that the constitutive processes of the counter-terrorism regime strengthen 
the tendency to preserve the current nuclear status quo, however discriminatory. Even 
the loudest voice warning of the dangers of nuclear terrorism, Graham Allison, writes 
that  the  international  community  should  “draw  a  bright  line”  under  today’s  eight 
nuclear-armed states—which would include non-signatories to the NPT: India, Israel, 




The  definition  of  proliferation  that  has  become  hegemonic  has  succeeded  in 
preventing the precipitous expansion of the club of nuclear-armed states. Yet it has 
also  halted  progress  towards  disarmament.  Even  the  end  of  the  four-decade-long      
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bipolar conflict did not lead to the renunciation of nuclear weapons. Rogue states, 
terrorists  and  inchoate  threats  now  justify  their  continued  possession.  Although 
haunted by the possibility that nuclear arsenals would fall into the hands of terrorists, 
states want to retain them. The treaty language of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention 
makes it clear that the treaty “does not address, nor can it be interpreted as addressing, 
in any way the issue of the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by 
states” (Wurst 2005). 
 
The counter-terrorism regime too can succeed only by making it unthinkable, or at 
least inappropriate, for countries to support terrorism. By delegitimizing ‘root causes’ 
and ‘definitional’ arguments, it is already taking a big step in this direction. The goal 
is to make terrorism a crime like genocide or piracy, undertaking which would be a 
fatal blow to the sovereignty of a country. The initial definitions of terrorism that are 
being conceptualized today will also have a structural effect. For instance, we can 
predict  that  the  entry-into-force  of  the  Draft  Comprehensive  Convention  against 
Terrorism will put pressure on all countries to accept that states cannot be said to 
commit terrorism. Only crimes against states can be named as terrorism. We already 
observe  a  gradual  but  inexorable  marginalization  of  dissent  and  acceptance  of  the 
dominant definition as common sense. Edward Said writes that this refusal to study 
root  causes  amounts  to  ‘terrorist  exceptionalism’—since  terrorism  is  a  human 
phenomenon like any other, we should probe its causes (Troyer 2001). 
 
However,  as  we  have  seen  in  examining  the  case  of  India,  states  are  not  passive 
objects of the regime. Even states lacking in material power can deploy the regime’s 
own symbolic resources to reinterpret and subvert it. India, struggling to reinvent itself 
as an international actor in the post-Cold War world, has adopted counter-terrorism as      
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a device in its foreign policy arsenal. India takes international norms seriously, citing 
them to bolster its position in the short-term, and seeking to influence, in the long 
term, the content of these norms. While collaborating with the hegemon is a strategic 
necessity, Indian policy-makers have succeeded in curbing the latitude with which 
hegemony is exercised. This is a strategy that has paid dividends so far, although it has 
also involved significant compromises in both its domestic and foreign policies.  
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CHAPTER 7 
   
CONCLUSION 
 
On 18 July 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was welcomed to the White 
House in Washington DC, and later that day Singh and President George W. Bush 
issued a Joint Statement. Inter alia, the statement declared that “as a responsible state 
with  advanced  nuclear  technology,  India  should  acquire  the  same  benefits  and 
advantages as other such states” (Office of the Press Secretary 2005). This declaration 
has been widely taken to mean that the US has accepted India’s self-declared status as 
a Nuclear Weapon State.  
 
Just over seven years earlier, Bush’s predecessor had reacted to the Indian nuclear 
tests  with  dismay,  saying  that  India  had  put  itself  “at  odds  with  the  international 
community” and “on the wrong side of history” (Clinton 1998).
1 In 2005, however, it 
seemed that India had emerged on the right side of the nonproliferation regime with a 
validated nuclear identity, leaving an undefined and worrisome past behind it. The 
2005 declaration represented a shining moment for Indian elites who had been pushing 
for the country to openly declare its nuclear status. However, the groundwork for this 
moment was laid over several decades. In fact, the nonproliferation regime has been 
willing to treat India as exceptional since 1967 (Tellis 2002b, 22). Writing at the end 
of the Cold War, the influential statesman Joseph Nye referred to India and Israel as 
“de  facto  nuclear  states”  while  describing  South  Africa  and  Pakistan  as  “covert 
nuclear states” (Nye 1989-90, 55). 
                                                 
1 Similarly, speaking at the P-5 meeting in June 1998, British Foreign Minister Robin Cook said: "We 
fully understand India's aspirations in the international community…If India wishes to be respected in 
the international community…then the best way to do it is to sign up to the international nuclear arms 
control regimes. The world community is unlikely to reward a country that breaks all those rules." 
(Anon 1998l).      
  303 
 
The bulk of my thesis is an attempt to explain the process of India’s nuclear identity 
construction  through  a  focus  on  the  constitutive  effects  of  international 
nonproliferation norms. In this concluding chapter, I make some predictions as to the 
effects  on  global  security  of  the  world’s  gradual  recognition  of  India’s  nuclear 
identity.  These  are  presented  in  the  first  section.  In  Section  Two  I  show  how  my 
approach  is  able  to  explain  more  than  the  three  conventional  accounts  of  nuclear 
acquisition. In Section Three I put forward some implications for IR theory, and in 
Section Four draw out some lessons for policy-makers interested in strengthening the 
nonproliferation regime. Section Five is devoted to three cases of global concern—
Iran, Israel and North Korea. I hazard some predictions about these countries based on 
the India case. In Section Six, I draw out implications from the study of France and 
South Africa, and  from the counter-terrorism regime.  In the last section,  I discuss 
prospects for further research. 
 
Section One: Recognizing India’s identity 
 
From  all  over  the  political  spectrum  (see  the  reports  of  the  left-wing  Carnegie 
Endowment and the right-wing Cato Institute), analysts have been calling on the norm 
leader to accept India’s post-1998 nuclear status (Alagappa 1998, 12; Gobarev 2000; 
Tellis 2005). They point out that India is not a rogue that could easily be exiled (Karp 
1998). Some suggest offering it Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership (Gahlaut 
2005; Gilani 2004). Others propose that India be invited to sign regional arms control 
treaties as a nuclear power (Taksal 1999). What predictions can we make about the 
effects of the recognition of India as a de facto nuclear weapons state (NWS)? I first 
discuss the effects on India, then on regional and global security.       
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Dealing with a nuclear India  
After  the  September  2001  attacks,  the  international  community’s  concerns  about 
WMD outside the arsenals of the NWS were heightened by fears of terrorism. India 
finds it even more important to reinforce its identity as a stable and mature nuclear 
power.  As  we  have  noted,  it  has  been  striving  to  portray  itself  as  a  victim  of 
transnational terrorism and a leader in the fight against it. These new identities give 
the world more say in Indian policy, but they may also loosen restraints on it. India’s 
self-presentation as  a secular democracy combating terrorism and a nuclear power 
exercising  restraint enables it to lay  claim to  certain options. The most dangerous 
manifestations  of  this  new  freedom  of  action  were  seen  in  the  1999  and  2001-02 
conflicts  with  Pakistan,  when  India  deployed  international  norms  in  nuclear 
brinkmanship. On the domestic front, if the international community acquiesces in 
India’s  definition  of  all  anti-state  violence  as  terrorism,  it  would  heighten  internal 
intolerance. In 2003, Pakistan’s President Musharraf termed the violence in Gujarat 
“ethnic cleansing” (Malhotra 2003). However, the world ignored this instance of state-
sponsored violence against a vulnerable religious minority, since India had established 
itself as a victim of terrorism.  
 
Regional relationships 
How does the formal acknowledgement of nuclear capabilities affect deterrence? The 
full-fledged war over Kargil with Pakistan, followed by the border standoff three years 
later, proved that nuclear-armed states could enter into conflicts, albeit limited ones. 
Clearly, bringing nuclear arms out of their closets did not contribute to India-Pakistan 
stability. On his visit to South Asia in March 2000, President Clinton called it the most 
dangerous place in the world (Cohen 2000b, 1).  India  and Pakistan have the only      
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nuclear ‘hot border’ in the world (although some would count the Korean DMZ as 
one).  Somewhat  dangerously,  Lieberman  suggests  that  short-term  failures  of 
deterrence will force long-term learning (Lieberman 1994, 414-15). 
 
Pakistan cannot access the same normative resources as India for presenting itself as a 
responsible state. Although it is unlikely that Pakistan would get the same treatment as 
India, given its fraught relationship with the US, its protests of discrimination will 
gain in credence after the 2005 nuclear deal, and will have to be quieted with some 
concessions. India has offered to sign a No First Use (NFU) pact with Pakistan, but the 
latter, being the conventionally weaker party, has refused to give up the right to use 
nuclear weapons at a time of its choosing. Pakistani military and political leaders have 
repeatedly declared that they would resort to the early use of nuclear weapons in a war 
with India if conventional defenses fail (Kanwal 2001, 1955).  
 
Yet,  there  are  some  grounds  for  optimism.  India  and  Pakistan  have  adhered  to  a 
ceasefire on their border since December 2003, democratic elections have been held in 
Kashmir  and  militancy  is  on  the  wane.  The  two  countries  have  entered  into  an 
agreement on mutual notification of missile tests (Kohlmeier 2004). Domestic political 
imperatives, encouragement from the  US, and a desire to win the approval of the 
world  are  driving  the  reconciliation.  Another  cause  for  optimism,  the  growing 
rapprochement between India and China, may have been facilitated by India’s new 
nuclear status. Susan Shirk reports that China did not change its military posture vis-à-
vis India after 1998, and even canceled the development of the DF-25, the 1700 km 
range missile that could target Indian strategic forces (although she admits that other 
missiles in southwestern China could easily be retargeted) (Shirk 2004, 90-91). The 
long-term menace to this delicate balance from the two Asian giants comes mainly      
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from US attempts to use India as a counter to a rising China. The 2005 deal, by freeing 
up India’s fissile material reserves  
 
Global nonproliferation  
India has successfully projected its nuclear program as more legitimate than those of 
other  nuclear  aspirants,  say,  Pakistan  or  North  Korea.  The  former  head  of  Policy 
Planning in the US State Department, Richard Haass, wrote: “We […] long viewed 
India, as well as Pakistan and Israel, as in a different category than Iran, Iraq, Libya 
and  North  Korea.  Double  standards—and  triple  standards  if  need  be—are  what  a 
realistic  and  successful  foreign  policy  is  all  about”  (Haass  1998).  Discussing  the 
nuclear  deal,  the  US  Ambassador  called  India  “a  unique  case”  (Menon  and 
Subramaniam 2005). Yet questions of fairness are important as they do influence the 
ease with which norms can be defied. ‘Managed proliferation’ erodes the moral basis 
of the NPT (Dhanapala 2004, 3).  
 
The July 2005 deal and other arrangements that accommodate India will inevitably be 
seen as rewarding India’s nuclear exploits. The question for the regime’s health is: 
will states perceive India as being rewarded for its restraint, or for its violation of 
norms? Countries could take away the message that responsible behavior is rewarded 
by international acceptance—and refrain from selling their fissile materials or hiring 
out  their  nuclear  experts.  Or,  they  could  learn  that  the  US  and  by  extension,  the 
international  community,  will  accept  a  fait  accompli—and  be  encouraged  in  their 
nuclear ambitions. 
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Section Two: Alternative explanations 
 
Scott  Sagan’s  article,  “Why  do  States  Build  Nuclear  Weapons?  Three  Models  in 
Search of a Bomb” is often cited in the literature because it is a handy heuristic for 
understanding  proliferation.  I  use  it  here  to  organize  my  survey  of  the  existing 
literature on India and its relation with the nonproliferation regime.
2 I point out that 
Sagan’s security and domestic politics models both suffer from a ‘level of analysis’ 
problem:  while  the  security  model  takes  national  identity  (and  therefore  national 
security interests) as given, the domestic politics model, while opening up the black 
box of the state, neglects to consider international influences on national identity. 
 
This level of analysis issue also contributed to the disciplinary separation between IR, 
especially security studies, and area studies, which rendered it almost impossible for 
specialists of South Asia to work on nuclear weapons. Security studies scholars who 
were  interested  in  the  nuclear  question,  on  the  other  hand,  remained  more  or  less 
uninformed by an understanding of the Indian political context. They fell back into a 
reflexive  dependence  on  a  Realist  argument  turning  on  national  interest,  and  their 
work focused on problem solving. While a few scholars acknowledge the specificities 
of the Indian situation their analysis of domestic politics is often simplistic.
3 
 
Regimes, security, and securing compliance 
The  conventional  tripartite  division  of  theories  of  proliferation  obscures  the 
fundamental role that states’ identities play in security politics, a role that blurs the 
                                                 
 
2 In Chapter One, I presented a detailed analysis of Sagan’s third model, the norms model, since it was 
so closely related to my own approach. Here I discuss the security and domestic politics models.  
3 I am grateful to Peter Katzenstein for pointing out that a pluralist bargaining model of domestic 
politics may not apply outside Europe and North America. Accounts of nuclear policy employing such 
models would naturally be unsatisfactory.       
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distinctions between the security and norms models. Using the cases of China and 
Pakistan, I show that identity considerations are essential to security and deterrence.  
 
The ‘security model’ provides the conventional, Realist answer to the question: ‘Why 
do states build nuclear weapons?’: ‘to counter external threats.’ States are rational 
security-maximizing  actors  in  an  anarchic  international  system.  To  Realists,  the 
mechanism  through  which  regimes  affected  state  choices  was  a  form  of  coercion. 
Though  not  direct  or  physical  coercion  in  the  first  instance,  it  was  coercion 
nonetheless  that  restrained  states  from  pursuing  their  goals  in  destabilizing  ways. 
Regimes cannot have power independent of the states that back them. Thus it was said 
of the League of Nations that it was not the League that failed the nations, but the 
nations  that  failed  the  League.  Regimes  functioned  as  mechanical  clearinghouses 
where issues were passed through the filters of power and interest, and the ‘right’ 
outcomes for each constellation of power were calculated and published. Robert Jervis 
expressed  pessimism  about  security  regimes  in  the  path-breaking  Krasner  volume, 
arguing that these were difficult to institute because the general Prisoners’ Dilemma is 
compounded  in  this  field  by  the  primacy  of  defense,  its  competitive  nature,  the 
unforgiving  nature  of  the  international  arena,  and  the  uncertainty  of  how  much 
security the state needs and has (Jervis 1983, 175).  
 
The security model features two stories about India’s nuclear path—why it embarked 
on the path, and why the path was so long and winding. In the structural version of the 
security model, the shifts in the international power constellation impinge on India. 
India’s nuclear decisions are responses to the varying intensity of security threats. 
During the Cold War as bipolarity insulated India from the most extreme threats it 
chose  the  low-risk  path  of  acquiring  nuclear  capability  without  manufacturing      
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weapons. Structural Realists see the long-drawn deferral of formal nuclear status as 
facilitated by India’s international situation. In 1998, Indian leaders realized that they 
could no longer defer the nuclear decision—the post-Cold War environment featured 
threats so acute that nonproliferation had to be abandoned (Paul 1998). The security 
environment began to deterioriate only in the 1990s (Jha 1998). The benefits of going 
nuclear began to outweigh the costs (Paul 2000). In this view, the regime’s quest to 
stop India’s progress was thus misguided and destined to fail (Hagerty 2001, 107). 
 
Statist  Realism  has  also  been  called  “neoclassical  realism”  (Rose  1998).  Statist 
Realists  do  not  abstract  society  out  of  their  theory,  but  examine  the  effect  of  a 
country’s  values,  leadership  structures  and  economy  on  security  perceptions  and 
policies.  Within  the  Realist  paradigm,  they  study  how  state  interests  are 
conceptualized.  In  India,  for  instance,  the  classical  objects  of  security  –  territorial 
integrity and national sovereignty – co-exist with, and are sometimes subordinated to, 
internal peace, economic development, and the maintenance of a chosen way of life 
(Bajpai 1998b). This version of Realism is particularly appropriate for new and weak 
states.  
 
Statist  Realists  believe  that  the  threat  to  security,  at  least  after  the  1964  Chinese 
nuclear tests, was intense enough to justify India going nuclear. Those Realist scholars 
who study internal political determinants of security policy believe that the regime is 
unimportant  compared  to  the  perception  of  national  interest.  Here  we  find  a 
disjuncture  between  the  primacy  of  security—a  Realist  tenet,  and  the  obvious 
deviance of India from the logical path of nuclear acquisition. To explain why it is that 
India did not go nuclear at crucial junctures such as the Chinese test in 1964 or the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, why it chose to declare the 1974 test a Peaceful      
  310 
Nuclear Explosion, and why it drew back from testing on several occasions, Statist 
Realists  point  to  internal  factors.  According  to  Ashok  Kapur,  successive  Indian 
governments were “befuddled by a Gandhian and Nehruvian morality” (Nayar and 
Paul  2003,  159).  Ganguly  believes  that  the  chaotic  features  of  domestic  politics 
explain  India’s  failure  to  adhere  to  Realist  prescriptions  and  shape  its  policy  in 
response to external threats (Ganguly 1999a, 439).
4 
 
Supporters of the BJP government claim that successive governments did not have the 
courage to stand up to the world by going overtly nuclear –that is, a lack of political 
will  (Gupta  1998b).  As  Jagmohan,  a  BJP  Member  of  Parliament  said  about  the 
absence  of  testing  before  1998:  “Why  did  they  not  do  it?  Because  that  level  of 
commitment  and  level  of  courage  was  not  forthcoming.”
5  Others  claim  that  the 
influence of idealism or the turbulence of democracy restrained leaders.
6 Yet others 
attribute the ‘lack’ of a decision to material factors, such as deficiencies in fissile 
material/technology/economic  strength.  Nayar  and  Paul  claim  that  India’s  major-
power aspirations “had gone into eclipse” as it struggled with strategic and economic 
crises in the 1960s and 1970s (Nayar and Paul 2003, 231). 
 
In both types of Realist accounts the regime is but a constraint, which India is forced 
to throw off in the 1990s. Ganguly, for instance, notes three shifts in this period in 
India’s stance vis-à-vis the regime: “a reduced sense of urgency about the need for 
                                                 
4 Most Realist accounts use both structural and domestic factors in explaining policy. They do 
sometimes acknowledge the importance of prestige, status and reputation factors. However, these are 
usually mentioned without much analysis and with the goal of exposing the hypocrisy of the regime. 
Realist/security accounts often perform the ideological function of justifying the Indian program; 
consequently, critics of such accounts are easily portrayed as serving the interest of India’s enemies. 
While the majority of analysts based in India support the security justification, some scholars based in 
North America join them. In this category are Sumit Ganguly, Devin Hagerty, Neil Joeck, T. V. Paul, 
Raju G. C. Thomas and Kenneth Waltz.   
5 Lok Sabha Debates, 27 May 1998 
6 Author’s interview with Brahma Chellaney, New Delhi, 30 July 2003.       
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international agreements in disarmament matters, a withdrawal from an active role…, 
and the pursuit of more traditional goals of statecraft such as national security based 
upon  military  power,  as  opposed  to  reliance  on  the  force  of  moral  arguments” 
(Ganguly  1999b,  157).  The  change  is  symbolized  by  India’s  citing  of  security 
concerns  in  its  rejection  of  the  CTBT  (Ghose  1996).  However,  in  the  absence  of 
objective standards for ‘costs’ or ‘threats’, explanations in the security model run the 
risk  of  serving  as  ex  post  facto  justifications  for  decisions  (Sagan  2000,  26).  The 
security model is, in a sense, non-falsifiable. If we accept that it is the perception of 
threat that matters, then it can only be disproved if policy-makers ‘confess’ they were 
motivated by symbolic or personal goals. 
 
Explanations in the domestic politics model assume that foreign policy change results 
from factors operating within the nation-state. They are diametrically opposed to the 
traditional Realist approach in which events within the ‘black box’ of the state are 
essentially irrelevant. They provide a corrective to perspectives that concentrate on 
external stimulus and assume an automatic response. Since they view the regime as a 
constant and constraining presence, they end up ‘black-boxing’ the international. At 




The domestic politics model regards the state not as a unitary actor but as a complex 
of intersecting interests. Nuclear weapons programs serve the parochial interests of 
domestic  political  actors—officials  in  the  nuclear  technology  establishment,  units 
within the military, and/or politicians (Sagan 2000, 27). This approach fits with the 
                                                 
7 Statist Realism differs from the domestic politics model in that it holds that the external power 
structure should have been decisive.  
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pluralist strand of the Liberal school. Pluralists disaggregate the state and consider the 
resources and interests of domestic actors. They assume the primacy of societal actors. 
Regimes  affect  international  outcomes  through  their  influence  on  the  rational 
calculations  of  decision-makers  at  the  national  level.  The  institutionalist  strand  of 
Liberalism emphasizes established (formal and informal) arrangements among actors 
with  different,  yet  linked,  interests.  State  preferences—which  are  official 
representations of domestic economic and political coalitions—are not necessarily in 
conflict,  and  international  institutions  exist  to  facilitate  their  coordination  or 
convergence (Moravcsik 1997). Institutions provide benefits that offset the costs of 
restraint even for powerful states (Ikenberry 2003). Institutions arise out of a ‘demand’ 
by states with pre-formed interests and identities. The term institution encompasses 
cooperative  arrangements  ranging  from  informal  understandings  among  states  to 
formal  bodies  like  the  UN.  Institutionalists  would  treat  the  international 
nonproliferation regime as an imperfect institution. The inadequacy of the incentives it 
provides  to  the  above-mentioned  actors  impels  states  to  go  nuclear  (Betts  1993; 
Frankel 1993).  
 
Table 7.1 Causes of change in Indian nuclear policy 
 
  Systemic  Domestic  





Institutionalism  Pluralism  Liberalism 
Faulty design of 
regime 
Inadequate payoffs 
to national actors      
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The most important strand in the domestic politics model argues that a pro-nuclear 
“strategic enclave” sustained India’s nuclear program and sought to conduct nuclear 
tests. The term ‘strategic enclave’ was first used by Itty Abraham to denote the nuclear 
and  missile  programs,  which  he  saw  as  a  subset  of  the  military-security  complex 
(Abraham 1992, 233). It has been used by other scholars studying the Indian program. 
I  define  the  strategic  enclave  as  ‘technocrats  and  bureaucrats  working  for  nuclear 
agencies in India.’  
 
This enclave has, it is alleged, instituted self-reinforcing mechanisms that shield its 
organizations  from  public  and  legislative  scrutiny.  Nuclear  programs,  like  other 
government  endeavors,  end  up  creating  bureaucratic  and  economic  interests  well-
situated to perpetuate themselves.
8 The Indian nuclear program was sustained by a 
clique  of  technocrats,  bureaucrats  and  strategists  who  made  full  use  of  the 
concealment and resources the state allowed them. Dhirendra Sharma describes this 
enclave as a “virtual nuclear sub-government” (Sharma 1983, 84). Scientists exhorted 
the political leadership to take the costly step of testing the devices (Joeck 1997, 31). 
For  instance,  the  former  head  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  (AEC),  Raja 




Note  that  such  explanations  do  not  necessarily  attribute  ‘bad  faith’  to  decision-
makers—who may genuinely believe they are advancing national interest. They do, 
however, beg the question of how it was that, in a normally contentious democracy 
                                                 
8 “Parochial politics” arguments have much in common with technological determinism, but they are 
more focused on actual benefits accruing to real actors. 
9 Rajya Sabha Debates, 28 May 1998.      
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with  scarce  resources,  these  groups  were  able  to  advance  their  preferred  policies. 
Further, the widespread enthusiasm that greeted the 1974 and 1998 tests suggests that 
the Indian nuclear program was not simply ‘hijacked’ for parochial ends. Since the 
diplomatic  and  financial  costs  of  the  nuclear  program  are  rather  high,  we  would 
assume that the strategic enclave is quite powerful. How did the strategic  enclave 
come to acquire such clout? Scientific and technological elites credibly claimed to 
provide important resources. This work has analyzed the use of international norms by 
the strategic enclave to acquire a certain level of state resources in the first place and 
then to strengthen its position. I also show the contribution of developmentalism as an 
economic  strategy  to  this  endeavor.  Thus,  my  explanation  allows  for  the  role  of 
domestic actors in furthering the nuclear program, but also accounts for their power.  
 
Other  variants  of  the  domestic  politics  model  claim  that  the  symbolic  aspects  of 
nuclear capability were be used by politicians to create a ‘rally-around-the-flag’ effect. 
Explanations  for  India’s  1998  tests  often  focus  on  the  nationalist  ideology  of  the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), accusing the party of violating the national consensus on 
nuclear policy which was that the option should be kept ‘open’. While some charge 
the  BJP  with  using  the  tests  for  electoral  gains,  others  claim  that  the  party’s 
foundational religious-nationalist ideology impelled it to test.  
 
In fact, nuclear policy has never been a major issue in Indian politics. The fortunes of 
the two governments that conducted nuclear tests soon declined. In 1975, the Prime 
Minister felt threatened enough to declare an internal Emergency (for the first and last 
time in India’s history). Shortly after the 1998 tests, the BJP lost state elections in 
three Northern strongholds. In early 1999, the BJP-led government was forced out of      
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office  at  the  national  level.
10  What  of  the  claim  that  the  BJP  was  ideologically 
committed to building a ‘Hindu’ bomb? Authors have pointed out that the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the ideological parent of the BJP has been clamoring for 
a bomb since the 1960s. However, although BJP policy is influenced by the RSS, as a 
political party it is not irrational. RSS directives on issues such as the economy and 
Ayodhya  temple  did  not  prevail.  In  May  1998  the  party  needed  to  reinforce  the 
coalition that had brought it into power. It is precisely because there was consensus on 
the nuclear issue that it allowed for bold steps that would establish the BJP as the 
‘party of national security’ in India. 
 
The impact of economic change on India’s nuclear aspirations occasions much debate. 
Etel Solingen writes that India’s earlier nationalist, inward-looking economic strategy 
encouraged the growth of a technological-military-industrial complex. A brief period 
of liberalization and nuclear rollback in the early 1990s was torpedoed by the advent 
of the “radical-confessional Hindu BJP” which represented import-competing groups 
and was therefore hostile to “Western” regimes (Solingen 1994, 147-48). Solingen’s 
pluralist argument is based on the differential empowerment of economic groups as a 
result  of  liberalization.  In  fact,  in  the  context  of  a  comprehensive  conception  of 
security,  a  state-led  economic  strategy,  a  global  market  that  was  both  free  and 
institutionalized,  and  a  fractured  and  inconsistent  economic  sanctions  regime, 
economic integration actually eased the government’s decision to undertake the tests. 
Economic  integration  also  chipped  away  at  notions  of  Indian  exclusionism  and 
pacifism. 
 
                                                 
10 On 14 March 1999, the AIADMK withdrew support to the government; as a result the Lok Sabha was 
dissolved and elections took place. The AIADMK was upset at the pursuit of legal proceedings at the 
state level against its leader Jayalalithaa.        
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Section Three: Theoretical implications 
 
In this section I lay out the implications of the conclusions in the preceding chapters 
for IR theories, especially those of nuclear acqusition.  
 
Causal and constitutive mechanisms 
If Constructivists want to claim that rules or norms do not operate causally in the sense 
of determining how actors behave, they must identify the mechanisms operating to 
engender motivation and sustain compliance (Sharrock and Button 1999, 197, 206). 
This leads us to a search for constitutive mechanisms. The complex and subtle means 
by which they affect state decisions is remarkably hard to capture with the methods 
used  to  study  causation.  Intersubjective  meanings,  or  norms,  quasi-causally  affect 
certain actions not by directly or inevitably determining them but rather by rendering 
those  actions  plausible  or  implausible,  respectable  or  disreputable  (Yee  1996,  97, 
emphasis mine).  
 
Both Realists and Liberals see regimes as influencing the cost-benefit calculations of 
state elites—the latter are more sensitive to the possibility that costs and benefits could 
be non-material and could be affected by domestic considerations. Liberal theorists 
remain convinced of the centrality of the state, the primacy of national interest/security 
and  actor  rationality.  While  affirming  that  “pressures  from  domestic  interests  and 
those generated by the competitiveness of the state system exert much stronger effects 
on  state  policy  than  do  international  institutions,  even  broadly  defined”  (Keohane 
1989, 6), some institutionalists began to accept that the very process of participation in 
institutions  could  redefine  interests  (Goldstein  and  Keohane  1993).  States  could 
develop an interest in preserving institutions even when the forces that brought them      
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into being are no longer operative (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997, 4). Yet, 
as I have shown at length, identity is fundamental to all cost-benefit calculations.  
 
I have shown that decision-makers in India, France and South Africa were well aware 
of the need to maintain certain specific nuclear identities, although they may not have 
explicitly used these terms. India, after the five tests in 1998, repeatedly put forward 
its claim to be treated as a NWS (Anon 1998r). Why is naming so important? India is 
well aware that the legal status of NWS remains out of reach, yet it ‘performs’ that 
identity to the best of its ability. This strategy has been remarkably successful. Asked 
if France recognised India as a nuclear weapon power, Laurent Fabius, then President 
of the National Assembly, replied: “We recognize facts. India is well advanced in the 
nuclear field” (Anon 1998f). 
 
Evaluating regime performance 
Realists originally shied away from considering the normative role of regimes, which 
were to them as morally neutral as the international system itself. In the post-World 
War  I  period  claims  about  the  influence  of  institutions  became  discredited  as 
‘idealism’, or worse. E. H. Carr, discussing interwar disarmament efforts, decried the 
strategy of “regarding one’s own vital armaments as defensive and beneficient and 
those of other nations as offensive and wicked.” He used “the weapon of the relativity 
of  thought”  against  the  assumption  of  a  harmony  of  interests  (Carr  1949,  74-75). 
Institutionalists exalted the benefits of regimes and highlighted their efficiency but in 
the process they concealed the workings of power. Susan Strange objected to the very 
term ‘regime’ because its connotations of authority and legitimacy were inappropriate 
to the international system (Strange 1983). At the other extreme, some scholars claim 
that the only way states today can realize and express their sovereignty is through      
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participation in international regimes (Chayes and Chayes 1995, 27). In this work I 
have shown that regimes are not merely functional, but also perform the function of 
allowing states to realize different identities. Scholarly work on regimes must take this 
aspect of regimes into consideration.  
 
Viewing the regime solely as a constraint on going nuclear leads us to underestimate 
its power. The nonproliferation regime has made it dangerous and inappropriate for 
countries to go nuclear. Signing the NPT has become a matter of international good 
citizenship (Talbott 1999, 113). This work has taken a fresh look at the operation of 
the regime, to achieve a deeper understanding of its effect on countries’ policies. First, 
it  recognizes  that  the  regime’s  main  source  of  power  is  its  ability  to  ‘identify’ 
proliferation and define the identities of its members. Second, it examines how states, 
the objects of the regime, attempt to resist and change it. I use the case of India to 
illustrate  how  a  country  negotiated  and  redefined  its  identity  vis-à-vis  the 
nonproliferation  regime,  leading  to  an  outcome  (testing)  that  represented  both  the 
regime’s success and its failure.  
 
While the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT was welcomed by the international 
community,  the  regime’s  ability  to  prevent  proliferation  is  now  in  question. 
Nonproliferation  arrangements  deserve  credit  in  the  first  place  for  averting  the 
nightmare scenarios of the 1960s—aside from the five NWS, there are only  three 
(India, Israel, Pakistan) and possibly four (North Korea) states in possession of nuclear 
weapons. The very existence of threshold states shows that there is some cost imposed 
by  regimes  (Spector  1998,  62-3).  The  vast  amount  of  time  and  energy  that  states 
devote to strengthening the regime also indirectly indicates its importance.  
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Integrating the three models 
One of the goals of this project has been to challenge the distinction between the three 
models of security, which prove unhelpful in explaining specific policies although 
such heuristic distinctions are important for systematizing and categorizing various 
accounts. However, in describing decisions to ‘proliferate’, the models are juxtaposed 
in a winner-takes-all game. Ascribing a nation’s decision to one model over another is 
also a highly political decision. Security justifications for weapons programs enjoy 
legitimacy  in  the  global  discourse.  Not  surprisingly,  Indian  elites  are  hostile  to 
analyses of the nuclear program that incorporate cultural variables, insisting that the 
program  is  driven  by  India’s  ‘legitimate’  security  needs.  American  scholars  are 
rebuked for the claim that domestic politics determined nuclear policy (Jha 1998). 
 
I  find  that  since  India’s  security  environment  was  itself  fashioned  by  the 
nonproliferation order, its search for security cannot be separated from its stance on 
nuclear  arms  control—that  is,  the  norms  and  security  models  are  linked.  Nuclear 
weapons, like the long-range missile and the spy satellite, are tools with which states 
move up the power index and exude a sense of nationhood and strategic autonomy 
(Bhaskar 1997). China, for instance, uses its space program to establish itself as a 
great  power  in  a  way  that  does  not  demand  a  defense  response  from  the  US.
11 
Attempts to establish certain identities are not only quests for prestige or endeavors to 
satisfy domestic constituencies, but also satisfy security imperatives. 
 
Similarly,  India’s  nuclear  ambitions  were  stronger  for  combining  security  with 
domestic  political  and  economic  motives.  Nuclear  science,  both  in  its  civil  and 
military aspects, was considered a liberating technology, enabling India to challenge 
                                                 
11 Christopher Chyba, personal communication, 21 August 2005.      
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the international hierarchy. Attempts to stymie India’s nuclear enterprise strengthened 
the conviction that this technology was critical. Nuclear advocates in India could thus 
tell  their  opponents  that  rejecting  nuclear  weapons  was  equivalent  to  accepting 
subordinate status in the international sphere or widespread poverty in the domestic 
(Subrahmanyam 1982, xiii).  
 
The term ‘peaceful uses of nuclear energy’ took on multiple meanings. Apart from the 
original significance of ‘using energy in the civilian sector’, it conveyed the prospect 
of  using  nuclear  capability  to  bring  about  peace,  through  deterrence,  through 
disarmament and through development. During the 1974-1998 period, these peaceful 
uses  were  predicated  on  the  basis  of  three  distinctions:  between  capability  and 
intentions,  between  nuclear  technology  and  weapons  technology,  and  between 
disarmament and nonproliferation. In 1998, India switched its position and insisted on 
placing its nuclear capability in the security field. It gave up the idea of disarmament 
for  nonproliferation.  However,  India  still  insists  on  distinguishing  its  military 
capabilities from its peaceful and deterrent intentions. 
 
Studying the discourse around the tests in 1974 and 1998 is instructive in showing 
change  and  continuity  in  Indian  policy.  The  five  most  salient  words  in  1974  are 
nuclear,  India,  Indian,  test  and  Pakistan.  On  comparing  this  to  1998,  we  find 
essentially  the  same  list:  nuclear,  India,  Pakistan,  USA  and  tests,  followed  by 
government and Indian. Since India, Indian and India’s together account for 21.6% of 
the words in 1974 (and 18.6% in 1998), we can gain more insights from moving down 
the list. The next most salient words in 1974 are USA, government and energy; in 1998      
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they  are government, two, and security.
12 We see that energy  and security occupy 
roughly the same place at 3.3% each in 1974 and 1998 respectively. Again, while the 
1974 list features peaceful (2.8%) in 13
th place and weapons in 21
st place, the 1998 list 
features weapons in 10
th place (3.0%, while peaceful did not cross the threshold for 
significance).  
 
Horizontal and vertical proliferation 
Does the nonproliferation regime acknowledge a link between horizontal and vertical 
proliferation? Why is this an important question? Some claim that the delinking of 
vertical and horizontal proliferation is key to the discourse on proliferation (Gusterson 
1999, 114). Others argue that the NPT symbolizes the acknowledgement of this link 
(Scheinman 1987, 15).  During the Cold War, the two superpowers shot down the 
claim that the US-Soviet competition fueled horizontal proliferation on the grounds 
that  their  bombs  threatened  each  other  rather  than  non-nuclear  states.  Poulose  has 
contested  this  argument  citing  the  “psycho-logic”  of  power:  for  example,  ideas  of 
nuclear polycentrism and multiple deterrence originating in France were borrowed by 
the  Chinese  (Poulose  1996,  110-11).  Barrie  Paskins  coined  the  “partial  linkage 
thesis”—countries acquire nuclear weapons partly with an eye to their unique security 
problems,  and  partly  with  an  eye  to  the  apparent  success  story  of  the  East-West 
deterrent  system  (Paskins  1983,  128).  Responding  to  the  1974  test,  Hedley  Bull 
pointed  out  that  the  will  to  proliferate  derives  from  the  idea,  affirmed  by  NWS 
policies, that nuclear weapons are vital strategic instruments and a source of great 
power status (Bull 1975, 176).  
 
                                                 
12 The word ‘two’ is most often used in phrases like, “the two countries/states/heads of government”, 
and indicate bilateral diplomacy. In 1998 this would have been mainly confrontational!      
  322 
My discussion of the Indian case demonstrates not only that the values and attitudes 
expressed by the dominant powers about nuclear weapons and technology serve as a 
basis for the formation of expectations among decision-makers elsewhere, but that the 
principles  enshrined  in  regimes,  often  at  their  behest,  structure  the  security 
environment  for  all  states,  and  set  up  norms  of  appropriacy  and  possibility.  For 
instance, the December 2002 report of India’s National Security Advisory Board cited 
the US Nuclear Posture Review earlier that year to press for a dilution of India’s No 
First Use commitment to Pakistan. The US  government was threatening  a nuclear 
response to chemical and biological weapons and the Board wanted India to follow 
suit.
13 The report also advised the government to use the term ‘terrorist’ for all internal 
militant groups (Anon 2003a). The content analysis of the 50-year period from 1950-
1999 shows that the most salient term (after ‘nuclear’) in the entire sample was ‘USA.’ 
This term is even more salient than ‘India’. It is also important to note that after 1980, 
the term is to be found most frequently clustering with ‘India.’ This indicates that the 
US was seen as a factor in India’s own security problematique, whereas in the 1950s 
the term ‘USA’ is most often found to be associated with other terms like ‘bomb’, 
‘president’ or ‘atomic’.  
 
While the US stopped nuclear testing in 1992 and has declared nonproliferation to be 
one of its foremost foreign policy goals, it has moved away from multilateral arms 
control.
14 The present government has initiated research that signals interest in the use 
of nuclear weapons. For instance, the Department of Energy’s Advanced Concepts 
                                                 
13 Of course, this idea was not totally new to the Indians. We should note that soon after the 1998 tests, 
the Defence Minister described them as erecting an effective deterrent against WMD, not specifically 
nuclear weapons. Lok Sabha Debates, 29 July 1998, starred question 523. 
14The US is unlikely to sign the CTBT. Other moves include withdrawal from the Anti Ballistic Missile 
Treaty, disinterest in the Fissile Materials Control Treaty, and the weakening of the Biological Weapons 
Convention.       
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Initiative is researching low-yield nuclear weapons designs, while its Enhanced Test 
Readiness program aims to reduce the time needed to prepare for future tests (Grotto 
2004). American research into the testing of small nuclear weapons is particularly 
worrying for other states (Varadarajan 2004b). Powerful bureaucratic interests are at 
work to preserve these programs, but the main motivation behind them is to maintain 
the credibility of the American deterrent. While 1980s strategies of warfighting were 
aimed at making deterrence more credible, today the strategic goal is no longer to 
deter peer competitors (Huntley 2006). Tactical military nuclear weapons are intended 
to be used for compellance on a regional scale.  
 
The US claims that this nuclear consolidation is irrelevant to the calculations of other 
countries. High-level officials recently testified that the repeal of the prohibition on 
low-yield warhead development by the US government would not trigger proliferation 
(Secretaries of Defense 2004). However, even a country like India which does not face 
a  direct  threat  from  the  US  (and  is  building  a  closer  partnership  with it)  sees  the 
nuclear weapon as essential to independence. US counterproliferation policy, which 
could  translate  into  direct  strikes  on  nuclear  establishments,  and  US  geostrategy, 
hostile to rising powers in general, are presently portrayed as subsidiary and remote 
threats, but are increasingly referenced by  Indian scholars (Bajpai 1998a, 151-52). 
Nuclear  weapons  become  valued  as  they  provide  relatively  inexpensive  deterrence 
against “advanced and predatory countries” (Karnad 1998). The Indian case thus prods 
us to recognize the American arsenal as a factor in the defense strategies of states of 
proliferation concern, like Iran and North Korea.  
 
At the same time, India’s own actions have only heightened incentives for other states 
to  acquire  nuclear  weapons.  In  1966,  an  Indian  representative  to  disarmament      
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negotiations argued: “First of all we must ensure that no prestige accrues to those 
misguided  nations  which  have  embarked,  or  are  embarking  on,  nuclear  weapon 
programmes. There must be an end to all this talk about the high table or top table, a 
select club, centres of nuclear power, and a superior coterie, or a group of four or five 
who could meet among themselves and work out the salvation of the world” (Trivedi 
1966, 621). India’s quest for inclusion in the nuclear club in fact ended up reinforcing 
the prestige of nuclear weapons. North Korean leaders, for instance, became more 
likely to perceive nuclear weapons as attractive (Huntley 1999, 509). 
 
The importance of context and discourse 
The Indian case does not fit within a pluralist understanding of politics where power is 
dispersed among powerful competing actors with prior interests and identities, and this 
is likely to be true of other new nuclear states as well. Even in the accounts of those 
working within the domestic politics model we often see simplistic cultural relativist 
arguments pitted against the straightforward security model. The main lesson of the 
India case for this model is to be more attentive to context.  
 
For instance, the lack of attention to military doctrine has been seen as evidence that 
security was not the motivation for the Indian bomb program (Liberman 2001, 62; 
Perkovich 1999). In fact, the marginalization of military options was a result of a 
particular  conception  of  deterrence  as  automatic  and  existential,  in  both  India  and 
South Africa. South African scientists, engineers and policy makers speaking both on 
and off the record, say that the weapons were never intended for actual military use, 
and  remained  un-integrated  into  military  doctrine.  Their  use  was  solely  political 
(Muller, 34). Indian decision-makers hold a mechanistic conception of deterrence, in 
which nuclear weapons are stripped of military implications and viewed  purely as      
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political instruments (Tellis 2001, 280-81). This does not mean that the weapons are 
not the product of security imperatives.  
 
Section Four: India and the regime-- lessons for policy 
 
What insights could policy-makers draw from the preceding analysis as they re-assess 
the performance of the nuclear nonproliferation regime? This section answers that 
question, while the next deals specifically with lessons from India for dealing with 
states of proliferation concern.  
 
Rebuilding the regime 
At least 44 countries currently possess the industrial and scientific infrastructure to 
build  nuclear  weapons  (these  are  listed  in  Annex  II  of  the  CTBT).  The  regime’s 
current focus on technological capability has led to concern about the destabilizing 
potential of fuel cycle capabilities. The US government has proposed a modification in 
the provision of technological assistance for civilian nuclear programs promised under 
Article IV of the NPT—countries deemed to be in violation of Articles I and II (on the 
diffusion of nuclear technology) would be excluded (Rademaker 2005). The IAEA 
chief  also  suggested  in  a  2003  article  that  the  enrichment  of  uranium  and  the 
reprocessing of plutonium should be restricted to facilities under multinational control 
(El Baradei 2003). This means that the ‘nuclear hedging’ discussed by Ariel Levite 
would no longer be possible. The Indian case suggests that such a move may force 
countries to formally go nuclear, as they can no longer use nuclear development in 
deterrence signaling. The tightening of the regime may lead to unexpected defections 
in the short and medium term.  
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The  economic  bargain  is  supposedly  at  the  heart  of  the  nonproliferation  regime: 
countries receive aid in the civilian uses of nuclear technology in return for giving up 
military  uses.  When  the  US  government  in  January  2004  announced  formal 
cooperation in technology transfer in nuclear, space and other high-technology areas, 
it asserted that economic ties would temper the evolution of the Indian arsenal. We 
have seen, however, that in India the line between civilian and military uses of nuclear 
power was blurred, suggesting that technology that helps one sector would benefit the 
other. Similarly, the US is pushing for the clear separation of civil and military nuclear 
sectors. In the French case this was found to be uneconomical. Nuclear civil-military 
synergy was supporting national autonomy (Jabko and Weber 1998, 125). 
 
Supply of conventional arms and security guarantees 
The US approved arms supplies to Pakistan in the hopes that by boosting its security 
against  India,  they  would  help  to  quell  Pakistan’s  nuclear  ambitions  (Anon  1992; 
Galbraith 1990, 68). The US offered light water reactors to North Korea in 1994 for 
the  same  reason.  However,  we  see  from  the  India  case  that  nuclear  weapons  are 
desired not just to combat immediate security concerns, but also to place the country 
in a specific identity category. Arms transfers do not address these issues. In fact, in 
the South Asian context, transfers may have strengthened the position of the military 
in Pakistan and spurred nuclear development. Obviously, they also encouraged India 
to ratchet up its own arms spending in response. We have seen also that security 
guarantees are also credible only when they are backed by a solid commonality of 
interests between two nations. Nations may demand security guarantees as signals to 
the world that they have legitimate security concerns. 
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Economics and nuclear restraint 
‘Integration optimists,’ often working within the Liberal paradigm, predict that as a 
country becomes more integrated with the world economy, the opportunity costs of 
defiance  of  the  nonproliferation  order  rise.  Sanctions,  for  instance,  can  do  more 
damage. The internationalization of markets, finance and technology is credited with 
securing near-universal adherence to the nonproliferation order (Solingen 1995, 208). 
The Indian case leads us to doubt that this mechanism will always come into play.  
 
First, the distinction between defense and economic imperatives was blurred in the 
comprehensive  conception  of  security  in  India.  According  to  Andrew  Wyatt,  “the 
strategic  imperatives  of  economic  nationalism  continue  to  inform  policy-makers’ 
decisions even in the context of liberalizing reform.”
15 Supporters of liberalization 
believed that India as a declared NWS would have a higher profile in the international 
economy. Thus, we need to be more cautious about the so-called ‘European approach’ 
to  nuclear  proliferation,  based  on  institutions  and  economic  incentives.  Policies  of 
economic engagement would lead to restraint only if they empowered independent 
actors,  primarily  concerned  with  economics,  who  are  able  to  put  pressure  on  the 
government. This process did not play out in India, consequently we must be skeptical 
about its power in more authoritarian states. Against this we must acknowledge that in 
the Chinese case, as economic integration increased the country moved closer to the 
nonproliferation regime.  
 
This study also has implications for the debate as to the effectiveness of economic 
sanctions.
 
Sanctions seem to have been ineffective in the Indian case. In 1967, top 
policy-makers  perceived  a  veiled  threat  of  withdrawal  of  economic  aid  if  India 
                                                 
15 Andrew K. J. Wyatt, personal communication, 29 June 2005.      
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rejected the NPT (Jha 1983, 301). Yet they did not hesitate to oppose the treaty. After 
the 1974 PNE India faced mild sanctions which only had the effect of spurring the 
indigenization of nuclear infrastructure. In 1996 the Finance Ministry estimated the 
potential costs of sanctions as $3 billion (Perkovich 1999, 412). Yet this economic 
punishment was predicted to be bearable and India tested two years later. Theories 
postulating the restraining effects of economic integration tend not to consider the 
possibility that domestic interests both in sanctioning countries and targeted ones can 
cushion the effects of sanctions. Moreover, sanctions’ direct effects are increasingly 
outweighed by their signaling effects. By creating the perception that an economy is 
unstable,  they  dissuade  private  investors.  India  was  able  to  signal  its  economic 
stability in other ways. Policy-makers would do well to factor this indirect effect into 
their  cost-benefit  analyses.  Finally,  although  the  international  norms  enveloping 
economic integration contributed to reducing the economic costs for India (such as the 
prohibition  on  holding  trade  hostage  to  security),  such  norms  are  not  taken  into 
account in the literature.  
 
The rising influence of international actors 
Obtaining recognition of its nuclear identity from the norm leader was a major policy 
goal for India. Strobe Talbott, who represented the US at talks with India’s Jaswant 
Singh in the months after the 1998 tests, said that his interlocutors saw the dialogue, in 
and of itself, as a justification for the tests (Talbott 2004, 95). When Indian opposition 
parties assailed the secrecy of the Singh-Talbott talks, Vajpayee countered that such 
talks were an inevitable part of diplomacy as a NWS (Anon 1998h).  
 
In the last seven years, there has been a steady stream of strategic analysts advising 
India on nuclear issues. India’s acceptance of arms control creates a less ideological,      
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more practical, approach—a new openness to learning about safety and best practices 
in command and control, for instance. However, the mounting influence of Western 
ideas and the hegemony of deterrence in particular, are warping India’s distinctive 
approach  to  doctrine.  Indian  security  thinking  is  increasingly  being  influenced  by 
foreign  actors,  and  internally,  by  non-governmental  experts  who  are  sensitized  to 
developments in the international sphere. India’s rapprochement with the US gives it a 
stake in the current world order. The economic and technical cooperation envisaged in 
the July 2005 deal in particular, will aid the cultivation of such constituencies in both 
countries. However, India’s closeness to the US also means that it is less restrained by 
the views of nonaligned nations and other normative considerations. With the end of 
the  Cold  War  challenges  to  Realist  doctrine  already  became  weaker  (Bidwai  and 
Vanaik  2001,  197,  n.1).  India’s  official  discourse  now  self-consciously  seeks  out 
Realist arguments. The principle that all nations have equal and legitimate security 
interests is at times cited to justify India’s acquisition of weapons (Singh 1999, 310).  
 
Indian disarmament diplomacy has often involved grand symbolic gestures, empty of 
content,  and  aimed  at  domestic  acclaim  (Anon  1996).
16  Liberalizers  and  nuclear 
pragmatists are the new constituency for arms control (although interlocutors should 
note  that  they  are  motivated  by  entrenched  beliefs  about  technology  and  national 
strength,  not  by  economic  calculations).  Proponents  of  the  international  regime’s 
institutions will increasingly find conditional allies among these younger actors, while 




                                                 
16 In the 1950s, Bedi and Berkes wrote that Indian diplomats strove to portray Indian foreign policy as 
“embodying the conscience of mankind and India as a Power haughtily superior to the corrupting 
influences of politics and sterile considerations of power” (Berkes and Bedi 1958, 38).      
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Section Five: States of concern for the regime-- implications and predictions 
 
India is an exceptional case in some ways—a large country with a robust domestic 
market  and,  lately,  a  thriving  economy.  It  has  sustained  a  democratic  form  of 
government in conditions which elsewhere have led to authoritarian and military rule. 
It has had a remarkably high profile in diplomacy. In other ways, India is typical of the 
countries  of  concern  to  the  nonproliferation  regime.  Its  economy  remains  under-
developed  and  autarkic,  although  incremental  liberalization  was  initiated  in  a  top-
down fashion. While it lacks a classic military-industrial complex, elite beliefs are 
crucial in determining foreign policy. The forces of religious fundamentalism are on 
the rise. In this section I draw out some implications for other countries from the 
Indian experience, focusing on Iran, Israel and North Korea.  
 
The utility of a deterrence framework 
In the Indian case, I reinterpreted restraint (‘keeping the option open’) as a security 
strategy  aimed  at  establishing  deterrence.
17  Framing  the  nuclear  behavior  of  these 
three countries in a deterrence framework helps us recognize that pressure from the 
regime can heighten their threat perceptions.  It  should be noted that supporters of 
nonproliferation tend to resist this move, and concentrate on demonstrating that Iran, 
Israel and South Korea do not face security threats that merit a nuclear response.  
 
Governments can fight to keep the option open even under extreme duress. Although 
Iraq  was  forced  to  abandon  its  nuclear  ambitions  after  1991,  Saddam  Hussein 
                                                 
17 This should also sensitize us to the deterrent function of capability development elsewhere. South 
Korea was persuaded to sign the NPT in the 1970s. Recently there were revelations that the country had 
enriched a small quantity of uranium, proving that it was capable of building nuclear weapons. Blaming 
‘rogue scientists’ for this violation of its agreement with the IAEA (South Korea is allowed to conduct 
experiments only if they are reported to the agency), the country escaped repercussions (Tirone 2004).      
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endeavored  to  retain  its  intellectual  capital  by  keeping  the  Iraqi  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  alive  (Director  of  Central  Intelligence  2004).  He  persisted  with  this 
policy even when it became obvious that the US would invade to ‘verify’ that Iraq had 
no atomic weapons.  
 
Israel’s trajectory to nuclear capability is similar to India’s in that it developed an 
ostensibly peaceful nuclear complex. It was the second nation to join the Atoms for 
Peace  program  (Bahgat  2005).  The  Israeli  Atomic  Energy  Commission  was 
established  in  1952.  Over  the  years  this  body  developed  close  links  with  defense 
research  organizations,  and  with  France,  establishing  a  secretive  and  resource-rich 
nuclear complex. In the 1970s, Israel was capable of producing a few dozen nuclear 
warheads, and might have acquired 100 to 200 warheads by the mid-1990s.
18  
 
Like India and France, Israel abandoned the idea of relying on security guarantees. It 
has followed a carefully crafted strategy of ambiguous or opaque deterrence. As it 
embarked on the construction of nuclear infrastructure, its leaders insisted they were 
interested solely in the civilian uses of nuclear power. David Ben-Gurion stated in 
December 1960 that the Dimona nuclear research center was dedicated to “peaceful 
purposes” (Anon 2000c). Prime Minister Levi Eshkol pledged in the mid-1960s that 
Israel would not be the first nation to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East. 
The US, apprehensive about the destabilizing effect of Israeli weapons, put pressure 
on the country to sign the NPT as a NNWS.  
 
                                                 
18 The Jericho series of ballistic missiles can reach any point in the Middle East, and Israel is also 
capable of launching satellites, giving it a putative ICBM capability.       
  332 
However, by late May 1967, Israel had already assembled a couple of crude nuclear 
devices and no longer had any intention of joining the NPT (Cohen 1998a, 16). The 
Western  powers,  for  their  part,  did  not  want  to  trigger  an  international  crisis  by 
revealing the extent of Israeli nuclear development. The question of accession to the 
treaty was shelved. In September 1969, Israel reached a secret agreement with US 
President Nixon. Israeli PM Golda Meir explained that Israel had been compelled to 
develop a nuclear capability, and that it could not sign the NPT without compromising 
its  opaque  deterrent.  She  also  promised  that  Israel  would  not  become  a  declared 
nuclear power—it would not test nuclear devices, nor declare itself a NWS. Thus, 
while staying out of the NPT, Israel would not defy it (Bahgat 2005).
19  
 
Originally, opacity was a tactic that enabled Israel to continue its nuclear development 
while minimizing international friction, especially with the US. By the 1970s it had 
become the foundation of Israel's security policy (Cohen 2000a, 22). Israel made use 
of  its  nuclear  capability  in  international  relations  with  calibrated  statements  and 
deployments. The ultimate threat was to exercise the ‘Samson option’ and detonate a 
nuclear weapon when its survival was already doomed. During the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War the US responded to a veiled threat from the Soviet Union (which was backing 
Egypt) by increasing the level of nuclear alert. There is also a lesser-known nuclear 
dimension  to  this  crisis.  During  the  early  stages  of  the  war  when  Israel  suffered 
military setbacks, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan proposed to place nuclear warheads 
on  missiles.  US  intelligence  spotted  ill-concealed  signs  that  the  nuclear-capable 
Jericho  missiles  were  on  high  alert.  It  has  been  hinted  that  Meir  extracted  arms 
supplies from the US using this subtle threat of nuclear use (Hersh 1991, 225-30). By 
                                                 
19 Observers have speculated that a suspected nuclear explosion in the southern Indian Ocean in 1979 
was a joint South African-Israeli nuclear test (Anon 2000c).      
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backing down on the nuclear deployment issue in 1973, Israel burnished its image as a 
responsible  nuclear  power.  Again,  during  the  first  Gulf  War,  facing  threats  from 
Saddam Hussein, Israeli leaders played up their restraint.  
 
North Korea declared in February 2005 that it had manufactured nuclear weapons for 
self-defense. It attempted, rather unsuccessfully, to position itself within the deterrence 
paradigm by linking its nuclear activities to the American threat. In mainstream policy 
analysis, North Korea’s security justifications are denied legitimacy. We must note, 
however,  that  the  second  Bush  administration  has  indicated  that  it  seeks  regime 
change in North Korea, which would inevitably involve intervention. North Korea was 
also specifically named as a threat to the US in the 2002 State of the Union speech. 
Declarations  of  capability  on  North  Korea’s  part  have  included  the  testing  of  the 
Taepodong  missile  in  1998,  the  announcement  that  it  had  started  reprocessing 
plutonium in April 2003, and its second withdrawal from the NPT in January 2004.  
 
While  North  Korea  has  overtly  defied  the  regime,  Iran  is  pursuing  a  more  subtle 
strategy  of  deterrence.  George  Perkovich  hypothesizes  that  Iran  is  developing  a 
capability that does not involve actually making weapons or explicitly violating the 
NPT (Ruppe 2005). Iran’s nuclear infrastructure dates from the pre-Islamic Revolution 
days. Iran has admitted to constructing uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz, and a 
facility at Arak to produce heavy water (used in plutonium production) (Takeyh 2003). 
The IAEA chief recently declared that if Iran decided to make nuclear weapons it 
could do so in two to three years (El Baradei 2005).
20 More significant is the fact that 
                                                 
20 In 2005 America’s own National Intelligence Estimates team calculated that Iran required ten years to 
develop a weapon.      
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Iran can come within weeks of acquiring a large arsenal of weapons without breaking 
the rules of the NPT or IAEA (Anon nd).  
 
Diplomatic attempts to negotiate with Iran and secure the country’s renunciation of 
enrichment and processing have had limited success. The Iranian President declared: 
“This nation will never give up its right to use peaceful nuclear energy. Our enemies 
have to know that the  Iranian people will develop their nuclear technology to the 
limit”  (Anon  2005c).  On  the  diplomatic  front,  Iran  justifies  its  program  using  the 
regime’s norms—specifically, the right to develop a nuclear fuel cycle for civilian 
purposes. Although it exports oil, Iran claims that it intends to reduce its domestic 
dependence on fossil fuels by turning to nuclear power, and that the US is backing 
away  from  the  obligations  inherent  in  the  NPT’s  Article  IV,  which  guarantees 
countries  this  right  (Ruppe  2005).  Like  India,  Iran  also  attacks  the  NWS  for 
disregarding their responsibilities under Article VI, which promotes disarmament. 
 
Iranian attempts to acquire a deterrent are being evaluated on the basis of the objective 
threat it faces. However, this evaluation should not be separated from the issue of 
Iran’s identity in the international sphere. The US has named Iran a member of the 
‘axis of evil’ and accuses the state of sponsoring terrorism against the West. President 
Bush also refused to rule out the possibility of military action against Iran, stating 
specifically  that  he  would  not  “take  any  option  off  the  table”  (Rajghatta  2005). 
Viewing Iran’s actions through a deterrence paradigm also highlights the inevitability 
of considering the nuclear status of Israel.  
 
I recognize that Israel in the 1990s diverges from the path taken by the other cases I 
study. The regime seems to have a different effect on Israel than on my other cases.      
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Israel has not tested or acknowledged its nuclear status. Yet, unlike France and South 
Africa, it has turned a deaf ear to calls to sign the NPT. As opposed to France, Israel 
had something to lose by signing the NPT. In the South African case, the probability 
of securing protection from the US fell once the Cold War ended, therefore, nuclear 
capability lost its rationale. However, the US-Israel alliance actually became stronger; 
Israelis could still use a nuclear threat to force the US to intervene on their side in a 
conflict.  Unlike  India,  Israel  is  protected  by  the  norm  leader  from  attempts  to 
categorize it as a NNWS.
21  
 
At the same time, we have been witnessing some Israeli moves towards a more open 
nuclear posture. In 1998 former PM Shimon Peres admitted that Israel had a bomb 
(Anon 1998m). In December 2003 Mohammad El-Baradei, the Director-General of 
the IAEA, called on Israel to relinquish its nuclear weapons, saying that the agency 
operated under the assumption that Israel has nuclear arms (Anon 2003e). Israel did 
not  protest  this  statement.  We  can  predict  that  Israel  will  face  greater  pressure  to 
clarify its nuclear status, if and when a peace deal in the region becomes likely, and in 
this set of circumstances it will probably test and try to get NWS status.  
 
What predictions can be made about the stability of NWD in the Middle East and the 
Korean peninsula? This question cannot be answered without a careful study of the 
regional dynamics. However, the Indian case did reveal that the decision to cross the 
nuclear threshold in 1998 was not motivated primarily by an increase in the indicators 
of threat from China or Pakistan, but from an apprehension that India’s undefined 
status in the regime rendered it vulnerable to international pressure. Putting pressure 
                                                 
21 The US does not want this issue to further hobble the possibilities for conflict resolution in West 
Asia.       
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on  Iran  to  disarm  might  be  counter-productive  outside  the  context  of 
acknowledgement and alleviation of its security problematique, say, through regional 
peace  talks.  Like  North  Korea,  Iran  has  been  accused  of  sponsoring  cross-border 
terrorism and there are worries that such support will increase under a nuclear shield. 
The  counter-terrorism  regime  contributes  to  marginalizing  and  stigmatizing  these 
countries. Here it might be working at cross-purposes with nonproliferation if such 
naming spurs ‘rogue’ behavior. 
 
Dealing with violators 
The DPRK has broken not one but two of the regime’s norms—it has acquired nuclear 
weapons, while a signatory to the NPT, and it has helped other countries acquire them 
(though some question whether it is a worse offender in this respect than Pakistan). It 
is a proliferator in both senses of the term. Among the three countries, it is the closest 
to  having  a  nuclear  capability,  and  is  accordingly  treated  more  cautiously.  North 
Korea  clearly  perceives  an  existential  security  threat  from  the  West.  Progress  on 
disarmament  cannot  be  made  without  tackling  this  issue,  a  process  which  would 
involve acknowledging that it has some grounds for fearing this threat. The next step 
would  involve  multilaterally  verifiable  disarmament,  without  which  countries  like 
Japan and South Korea would reconsider their renunciation of the nuclear option. 
 
Unlike North Korea, Iran is still marginally ‘within’ the regime. Attempts to deal with 
Iran can be roughly classified into the ‘bargaining’ approach (offering economic and 
diplomatic  benefits  in  return  for  cooperation)  and  the  ‘deterrence’  approach 
(threatening it with the consequences of continuing on the nuclear path). The former is 
mostly favored by the European Union, and the latter by the American government. 
Iran experts Ray Takeyh and Kenneth Pollack recently proposed that the West use its      
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economic clout to strengthen the hands of Iranian pragmatists, who could then argue 
for  slowing,  limiting,  or  shelving  Teheran's  nuclear  program  (Takeyh  and  Pollack 
2005).  It is true that in the early 1990s Rafsanjani was substantially successful in 
introducing  market  reforms  and  a  less  confrontational  foreign  policy  in  order  to 
facilitate economic recovery (Keddie 2003, 264). Yet, it is important to note that the 
Iranian discourse, like the Indian, features a link between nuclear capability and self-
sufficiency, particularly in the field of energy (McFarquhar 2005; Sayimi 2003). The 
Speaker  of  Iran’s  Parliament  recently  declared  that  “benefiting  from  science  and 
different  technologies  is  a  symbol  of  defending  a  country's  independence”  (Anon 
2005f). This suggests that an Iran that is more democratic and more integrated into the 
global economy may well cling to its nuclear option, just as India’s formal declaration 
of nuclear status was facilitated by the liberalization of the 1990s.  
 
The Israeli case has exercised a powerful demonstration effect. That the US turned a 
blind eye to the Israeli bomb did not go unremarked in India (Chellaney 1994; Segal 
1998). In fact, the refusal of the dominant powers to name Israel as a ‘proliferator’—
the 1996 Proliferation: Threat and Response report prepared by the Pentagon does not 
mention it—weakens the norm (Spector 1998, 64). Any Middle East peace process 
will  necessarily  bring  into  question  of  the  Israeli  nuclear  arsenal,  and  so  will  any 
resolution of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Furthermore, Israel is now also a second-tier 
supplier of fissile material (Rauf 1995). It will increasingly face greater scrutiny of its 
nuclear exports and pressure to join supplier groups. 
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Section Six: Lessons from other cases and possibilities for further research 
 
I have also attempted to discern the processes through which the international regime 
influenced policies in France and South Africa. In France, I noted an embrace of the 
NWS identity that it had resisted in the name of independence. Like India, France has 
since been steadily moving closer to the mainstream of NWS behavior. In the process, 
its  distinctive  minimalist  stance  has  been  encroached  upon.  The  conception  of 
deterrence in the 1995  French White Paper that  I discussed at length,  was one of 
“insurance” against rogue behavior (Carle 1994, 176). Although this appeared to be a 
minimalist approach, it left the door open to expand the concept to encompass all 
kinds of threats. In June 2001, President Chirac declared that if European territory was 
threatened  with  WMD,  the  choice  before  him  would  not  be  “between  the  total 
annihilation of a country and doing nothing.” This has been interpreted as a move 
away from an anti-cities strategy to one with a wider array of nuclear strike options 
(Yost 2005, 89). The authors of the new deterrent strategy confirmed in June 2003 that 
the possibility of nuclear retaliation also applied to any attack on a French city with 
chemical or biological weapons (Yost 2005, 90). 
 
South Africa was the “archetype of the pariah state” (Black 1999, 94). Yet in around 
five years it went “from pariah to participant”, as the title of one volume puts it (Mills 
1994). Renouncing its nuclear capability was a vital step in the country’s rehabilitation 
in the global sphere. While this nuclear renunciation was undoubtedly motivated by 
domestic factors and security imperatives, South Africa was responding to changes in 
international  norms  just  as  India  was—although  in  the  opposite  direction.  South 
African policies will be crucial in the near future, as the country constructs its identity 
as the ‘alternative’ norm leader. For instance, its support to the Landmines Convention      
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played a significant role in that agreement’s success, while assisting in the country’s 
identity reconstruction (Price 1998, 634). 
 
As the counter-terrorism regime grows in strength, it is valuable to study the ways in 
which  it  affects  the  nonproliferation  regime.  Counter-terrorism  can  be  a  means 
through which states that have acquired a certain nuclear capability can be socialized 
into compliance with international norms promoting restraint. Countries like India that 
are suspicious of nonproliferation safeguards have been open to cooperation within the 
Marine  and  Container  Security  components  of  the  Proliferation  Security  Initiative 
(Anon  2004a).  Yet,  nuclear  nonproliferation  and  counter-terrorism  could  also  be 
acting  at  cross-purposes.  First,  in  order  to  secure  cooperation  against  terrorists 
dominant powers may have to tolerate proliferation, as in the case of Pakistan and 
India,  thereby  weakening  regime  principles.  A  general  disregard  for  international 
norms  in  the  name  of  fighting  terrorism  would  ease  decisions  to  acquire  nuclear 
weapons (and vice versa).
22 Second, maintaining a suitable deterrent stance against 
terrorists may involve retaining a nuclear arsenal. Third, operations in the ‘war on 
terror’ would lead to more intervention by the US, isolating ‘rogue’ states, creating 
incentives  for  them  to  acquire  nuclear  weapons.  Fourth,  resources  are  limited  and 
diversion of resources at the national and global levels to fighting war on terror in its 
myriad aspects reduces time and money for nuclear safety mechanisms (Clarke 2005). 
 
There are several possibilities for future research. First, the argument can be extended 
to other cases of proliferation, moving beyond the three countries surveyed in this 
work. It would also be interesting to study the effects of constitution on states that 
                                                 
22 The official Indian reaction to the American attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan, which came soon 
after the 1998 tests, avoided expressing explicit disapproval (Katyal 1998). Some commentators 
applauded the US actions (Nalapat 1998).      
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have not had conflictual relationships with the regime, and note the differences in the 
regime’s influence in those cases. Second, within  India, it would be interesting to 
study the opposition to nuclear weapons and the civilian nuclear program in India. As 
we have seen, oppositional voices were muted and co-opted by nuclear advocates. By 
specifically examining how the discourse of anti-nuclear movements differed from the 
dominant one, we can understand the causes for the marginalization of dissent. This 
analysis would be relevant for predictions about the fate of anti-nuclear movements in 
other parts of the world. Third, one could also study the reaction of the international 
system to India’s moves, focusing the spotlight on the feedback loop between India 
and  the  regime.  This  project  would  involve  conducting  interviews  with  those 
responsible for dealing with India in the foreign policy bureaucracies of the major 
powers  and  of  international  organizations,  supplemented  by  content  analysis  of 





This  project  stemmed  from  dissatisfaction  with the  accounts  of  the  Indian  nuclear 
program, derived from various theoretical perspectives that are found in the literature. 
My research showed that the underlying flaw in all these accounts was the inability to 
consider the interaction between the state and the international system as fundamental 
and constitutive. Thus, the insights derived from this set of case studies are applicable 
to the study of general international interactions.  
 
The main task of this work was therefore, to make the process of constitution of Indian 
national identity by the nuclear nonproliferation regime ‘visible.’ I have used both 
quantitative (content analysis) and qualitative (textual analysis, interviews) methods to      
  341 
carry out this task. In each chapter, I have tried to show that taking constitution into 
account is essential to a comprehensive understanding of decisions on nuclear and 
counter-terrorism policy.  It is my hope  and belief that such  an understanding will 
contribute to policy-makers’ efforts to reduce the nuclear danger. While this work has 
shown many of the unexpected and undesirable consequences of the operation of the 
nonproliferation regime, I consider the regime to be the most important international 
arrangement today and worthy of being strengthened through academic study as well 
as political strategies.      




TECHNICAL APPENDIX: PROCEDURE FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS 
 
While the last section of Chapter 1 discusses the utility of the methodology of content 
analysis, this appendix sets out in details the procedures followed and the tools used in 
the analysis presented in Chapters 3 and 4.  
 
CATPAC: basic operations 
 
My theoretical approach (Constructivism) drives my choice of research strategy (case 
study, analysis of discourse) and thus the method (quantitative textual analysis). The 
software  package  chosen  for  the  analysis,  CATPAC,  eliminates  the  need  for 
preconceived categories and tests of intercoder reliability. It enables the organization 
of large bodies of text into meaningful conceptual groupings (Doerfel and Barnett 
1999, 592). Many commonly-used content analysis programs search the text for words 
that the analyst is looking for, but CATPAC is inductive in that it generates lists of 
salient words.  
 
CATPAC does not encode the types of relations between the salient concepts that it 
identifies, as my substantive question does not require semantic analysis. There are 
other  software  packages  that  read  blocks  of  text  and  match  them  with pre-written 
dictionaries of words associated with a particular emotion or attitude. DICTION, for 
instance,  looks  for  words  dealing  with  certainty,  activity,  optimism,  realism  and 
certainty.      
  343 
 
CATPAC is one of the few programs that performs network analysis. The basic idea is 
that meaning stems not from particular words but from the embedding of words in 
context. CATPAC’s software can be compared to the neurons in a human brain. If 
words are connected repeatedly, the software ‘learns’ that pattern. An exclude file is 
created to eliminate prepositions, conjunctions and so on. The biggest advantage for 
political scientists of this software is that it allows for objective and inductive analysis. 
It is also less time-consuming and less expensive than dictionary-based programs.  
 
CATPAC is a self-organizing Artificial Neural Network that reads any text (entered in 
ASCII  format),  discards  minor  words  entered  into  a  prewritten  ‘exclude  file,’  and 
discards also other words that fall below a user-set frequency of occurrence. For every 
remaining  word,  an  artificial  neuron  is  constructed  that  represents  it.  A  scanning 
window of user-set size is then passed through the text. Whenever a given word is in 
the scanning window, the neuron that represents it is activated. Active nodes that are 
connected to each other can be identified. This means that words that are close to each 
other in the text will be tightly connected; it also means that a word similar to another 
word which is similar to a third word will be tightly connected to the third word, and 
so on (Woelfel 1993, 72). 
 
What are the disadvantages of CATPAC? In this project the foremost difficulty was 
the time, effort and cost involved in procuring the newspaper articles and turning them 
into machine-readable form. Another disadvantage is that the program, unlike human 
coders, is not attuned to spelling errors or variations. Thus spelling had to be checked 
carefully  (for  instance,  ‘china’  and  ‘chian’  are  not  counted  as  the  same;  ‘non-
proliferation’  had  to  be  standardized  to  ‘nonproliferation’).  The  exclude  file  was      
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changed in order to leave out of the analysis certain words that appeared often but did 
not convey meaning, such as ‘Mr.,’ the names of months, and so on.  
 
Words  that  are  used  in  phrases  often  appear  as  clusters.  For  instance,  United  and 
States; therefore these phrases were changed to one word in the input text (‘United 
States’  is  represented  as  ‘USA,’  ‘nonproliferation  treaty’  was  changed  to  ‘NPT’).  
However, words were not lemmatized—different forms of a word appear separately as 
they did carry different semantic values.
1 For instance, ‘China’ and ‘Chinese’ appear 
separately. CATPAC, therefore ‘undercounts’ occurrences of some words. Moreover, 
unlike human coders, it does not recognize metonyms or synecdoches or appellations 
(such  as  ‘White  House’  for  the  US.).  A  more  serious  problem  is  that quantitative 
analysis can miss large structures of thought. For instance, one may not find the word 
‘domino’ in foreign policy documents, but decisions may have been structured by that 
metaphor (Shimko 2004, 207-08). 
 
Steps in content analysis using CATPAC 
1.  constructing a sample 
a.  choosing a time period: In this case, each year between 1950-1999 was 
sampled. 
b.  constructing a sample: A ‘representative week’ was constructed. This is 
a stratified random sample with each year as the unit of analysis. Using 
a random number table, I selected three dates to represent each day of 
the week. To put it differently, I created a week with three Mondays, 
three Tuesdays, and so on, thus identifying 21 days in every year. This 
                                                 
1 Automatic lemmatization programs are available as freeware.  
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avoids  the  possibility  that  a  simple  random  sample  would  have  a 
disproportionate  number  of  certain  weekdays,  thus  skewing  the 
coverage of the nuclear issue (for instance, the Sunday supplements 
might pay more attention to it). I scanned the newspaper archive for 
references to the nuclear issue (very broadly defined—all references to 
nuclear/atomic  energy  were  noted).  Since  1974  and  1998  saw  an 
explosion  on  the  production  of  nuclear  texts,  following  the  nuclear 
explosions in May of each year, I sampled 14 days in every month for 
those two years. 1974 and 1998 were also represented in the overall 
sample by 21 days a year. 
c.  choosing publications: This is essentially a subjective decision. Many 
scholars of India agree that The Hindu is the ‘newspaper of record.’ In 
this  case  it  was  chosen  precisely  because  it  was  considered  to  be 
‘middle  of  the  road’  in  its  political  views.  I  believe  that  the  results 
would be congruent with analysis carried out with other publications. In 
my  further  research  I  plan  to  test  this  claim  by  including  other 
publications  in  the  sample.  CATPAC,  like  many  other  software 
programs,  only  analyzes  text in  roman  characters.  While  I  began  to 
collect data from Hindi newspapers, I decided not include them in the 
sample at this time, because of the high costs in time and money of 
translation (and verification of translation). I plan to include Hindi and 
possibly  other  regional  language  publications  in  my  sample  in  the 
future.  
d.  identifying  sources  for  data:  This  was  the  most  difficult  part  of  the 
procedure. Many Western newspapers are available in electronic form. 
The  New  York  Times,  for  instance,  is  available  on  an  electronic      
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database (Lexis-Nexis) from 1 January 1980 onwards. Lexis begins its 
indexing of several English-language Indian newspapers only in 1997. 
As  a  result  I  changed  my  initial  plan  of  sampling  from  three 
newspapers.  However,  in  the  future  this  should  become  less  of  a 
problem.  
e.  identifying articles and inputing into a database. Since articles were not 
available  in  electronic  format  they  were  selected  for  the  sample 
manually. That is, with the help of a research assistant, I read through 
each issue of the 21 days in the sample for each of the fifty years in 
order to identify articles that included the term ‘nuclear’ or synonyms. 
However,  for  the  period  1992-1996  I  made  use  of  the  index  (its 
publication  has  since  been  discontinued)  produced  by  the  Hindu 
newspaper. 
2.  choosing  a  method  of  analysis  and  software:  The  advantages  and 
disadvantages of quantitative analysis in general and CATPAC in particular 
were discussed above. Another issue in choosing a software is that of cost. The 
software CATPAC used here was purchased from Galileo Corporation at the 
student rate of $49.  
3.  obtaining data in hard copy: The majority of the articles of the Hindu in my 
sample  were  obtained  from  the  microfilm  section  of  the  Nehru  Memorial 
Museum and Library (commonly known as Teen Murti) in New Delhi, and 
some  were  obtained  from  the  South  Asia  Library  at  the  University  of 
California at Berkeley. 
4.  transforming data into electronic format:  
a.  It is possible to scan printed materials into electronic format by using 
optical character recognition (OCR) software. However, this was not      
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possible since the articles in question  were quite old, and the scans 
were unclear. The typing of the majority of the articles was done in 
India by a professional typist. 
b.  Quality control through spell-checking, manual proofing, standardizing 
terms and collating is important for quantitative analysis. This includes 
removing extraneous material such as the names of reporters, reporting 
agencies, dates, mentions of the newspaper itself which could interfere 
with the counting of terms.  
5.  transforming data into machine-readable format: The files were saved as .txt 
files. CATPAC requires ASCII files as input.  
6.  running the analysis using content analysis software 
a.  in the first step, the text file is read by CATPAC and a ‘dendogram’ is 
generated. This contains the top 25 salient words (the length of this list 
can be changed) in order of frequency and also in alphabetical order 
along with their frequencies as a percentage of total words in the unit.  
b.  In the second step, the clusters are viewed with a freeware tool called 
THOUGHTVIEW. This program allows us to view the clusters in 2-d 
and 3-d.  
7.  modifying the analysis based on results  
8.  Interpreting the results. The results can be interpreted only if the analyst has a 
fairly close knowledge of the issue. Two questions are usually asked of such 
analyses—generalizability  of  the  results  from  the  sample,  that  is,  how 
applicable are these results to the larger population of texts? This can be found 
by statistical methods if we know the size of the larger population, which we 
do  not  know  in  this  case.  The  question  of  replicability,  i.e.  whether  these 
results would be supported or contradicted if we chose another publication or      
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another software, is, as I indicated above, something that my future research 
will answer.      
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